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Abstract 
The health sector in the Punjab (Pakistan) suffers from many shortcomings and to 
combat these, successive governments undertook different reform interventions. The 
most critical of these took place during the period 1993-2000, when the Punjab 
government introduced seven reforms in rapid succession, with decentralisation as a 
strategy common to all. Substantial inputs were made, but some of these were 
abandoned, others forgotten and yet others remained. Nonetheless, like many 
countries, where few governments have initiated any planned evaluation of reform 
efforts, there is also no evidence of any study having been undertaken in the Punjab. 
This study aims to explore factors that influenced the policy process for the health 
sector reforms undertaken by the government and to draw lessons for contributing to 
ongoing and future initiatives. In preparing to achieve this aim, frameworks were 
developed for the health system and the policy process for health sector reform. 
This is a qualitative research study, which employs a case study approach. Four 
cases were selected for study and, based on a framework for analysing the policy 
process, data was collected using interviews, focus group discussions and document 
reviews. With the help of a tailor-made computer-assisted data processing system, 
the qualitative data was analysed and findings are presented as four single-case 
studies. The cross-case analysis led to generating discussion and developing a 
multiple-case study and identifying factors influencing the policy process for the 
Punjab health sector reforms. 
The study revealed that six factors principally influenced the policy process in terms 
of their origin, design and implementation. These are: (1) the absence of clearly 
defined principles and purposes; (2) the insufficient involvement of the stakeholders; 
(3) the lack of a holistic view of context, focusing on the health sector; (4) the 
shortcomings of the policy machine-, (5) the need for a proper implementation 
structure; and (6) the administrative fatigue of donors. Given these findings, there 
are certain implications for the Punjab health sector, particularly overhauling the 
policy machine, developing the capacity of policyrnakers for policy analysis, and 
broadening the stakeholders' base. 
Key words: Pakistan, Punjab health sector reforms, decentralisation, health sector 
reforms, policy process, factors influencing reforms, qualitative case study research 
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Introduction 
"It was a very exciting time, I must say". 
(A senior bureaucrat in the Health Department) 
The health sector in Punjab (Pakistan) faces many problems inter-alia, the 
centralised approach to health management and organisation; inadequate financing 
and inequitable distribution of resources; insignificant community involvement 
exhibited in the under-utilised services; poor quality of care; and the traditional 
expectation of a free health service held by society. To combat these successive 
governments made interventions, most critical during 1993-2000. However, some of 
these were abandoned, while others were forgotten, and yet others are still struggling 
to survive. Why did this happen? This is the core issue for this study. 
Notwithstanding a great deal of interest in health sector reforms all over the world, 
few systematically planned studies have been undertaken (Gross et al, 1998). This is 
also true for the Punjab. The current study, therefore, is an original work and like 
many qualitative researches breaks new ground (Health Services Research, 1999), 
adding to the body of knowledge. The results can, therefore, be used to determine 
the course of planning and implementing policies for reforms, both ongoing and in 
the future. This is applicable particularly to the Punjab health sector, but is also 
generalizable to countries of similar socio-economic status. 
This study aims to explore factors that influenced the policy process for the 
government initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health sector during the period 
1993-2000. Drawn from this aim, the major objectives of the study are: 
1. to develop a framework for describing the structure and functions of the health 
sector; 
2. to describe the changing structure and functions of the Punjab health sector; 
3. to establish a framework for analysing the policy process for health sector 
reforms; 
4. to analyse the policy process for the reforms undertaken in the Punjab health 
sector during the period from 1993 to 2000; 
5. to explore factors that influenced the policy process for reforms; and 
6. to draw lessons for the ongoing and future reforms. 
xix 
Thesis presentation 
This study picks up from an ailing health system in government care (health sector), 
which was repeatedly given therapy in terms of reforms. The objective is to review 
the prescription process, but not to determine its impact on the patient; although it is 
noted, what happened to the prescription, per se. In other words, it moves from 
general to the specific, presented in seven chapters. The study of contextual grounds 
(chapter 1) and conceptual developments (chapter 2) led to designing an analytical 
framework (chapter 3). The application of this framework following the case study 
approach is narrated as the research process (chapter 4). The outputs are the contents 
or findings presented as case studies (chapter 5), which are discussed and interpreted 
as factors influencing the policy process (chapter 6). The thesis concludes (chapter 
7) by identifying the contribution of this study to the knowledge, relating findings to 
the existing material and highlighting the implications for the Punjab health sector. 
Different chapters are, nevertheless, briefly introduced below: 
Chapter introduction 
This study aims at exploring the policy process for reforms. In this perspective, 
Chapter I examines the Punjab health sector for establishing the context. For this 
purpose, drawing from literature, a framework is theorised for describing the 
structure and functions of the health sector and a brief account of the current status 
and a resumd of government reforms undertaken in the Punjab are given. 
Chapter 2 is about the concepts which underpin this research. After conceptualising 
the reform phenomenon, decentralisation is explained essentially because this 
panacea served as a common strategy for different reforms. Concepts surrounding 
policy are explored including different frameworks developed for studying the 
policy process. %ile discussing these concepts, however, a conscious effort is 
made to contextualise the situation in the Punjab health sector. 
Chapter 3 develops a framework for analysing the policy process. Notwithstanding a 
theoretical base and examination tool available; how is this applied in a research 
setting? Chapter 4 documents the process for studying the selected reforms. This is 
qualitative research which employs a case study approach. Four cases were selected 
for study and based on the framework for health sector reform data was collected 
using mainly individual interviews, focus group discussions and document reviews. 
What was the policy process for the government initiatives undertaken in the Punjab 
health sector during the period from 1993 to 2000? Chapter 5 responds to this 
question. The data was processed and analysed using the framework approach. The 
xx 
findings are presented as four single-case studies, each derived from their respective 
case data. Tailor-made computer software, the Qualitative Data Processing System 
explained in chapter 4, facilitated this analysis. 
Chapter 6 is the cross-case analysis, made to develop a multiple-case study of the 
policy process for the reforms in the Punjab health sector. Discussions held in this 
chapter identify wide ranging factors contributing to the fate of reform initiatives. 
These are: (1) the absence of clearly defined principles and purposes; (2) a lack of a 
holistic view of the context, focusing on the health sector; (3) the shortcomings of 
the policy machine; (4) a need for a proper implementation structure; (5) insufficient 
involvement of the stakeholders; and (6) the administrative fatigue of donors. 
The thesis concludes with chapter 7 by retrospectively looking at the research 
question and variables for addressing them, identifying contributions to the 
knowledge, limitations and the need for ftirther research. Notwithstanding a 
deviation from the originally laid down objectives, the implications of this study are 
highlighted to logically conclude the arguments. It is emphasised for the system 
physician (reformer) to 'heal thyself by overhauling the policy machine, 
institutionalising the policy analysis and broadening the stakeholders' base. Further, 
given that the country has undergone a devolution process, the study highlights the 
need for research into how far the shortcomings of the policy process for the reforms 
of 1993-2000 have been avoided. 
-I- 
1. The context 
1.1. Introduction 
This study aims to explore the reforms undertaken in the Punjab health sector. In 
order to establish the premise and context of the study, this chapter examines the 
Punjab health sector by: 
1. drawing from literature, a fi-amework is developed to analyse the health system; 
2. examining the Punjab health sector using the fi-amework to understand its structure 
and fimctions. The discussion extends to identifying the issues and problems 
surnmarised in section 3; and 
3. giving a brief resurn6 of different reforrn initiatives undertaken in the Punjab in 
order to set the stage for the next chapter. 
This study of the Punjab health sector is assisted by pre-fieldwork (chapter 4) and 
the researcher's experience of working in the Punjab Health Department. 
Health system 
What is a health system? Much confusion surrounds this question and according to 
the World Health Report, 2000, given the complexities of today's world, it may be 
difficult to define a health system (WHO, 2000). The health system is a complex 
entity and has increasingly become so, because of the extensions, both in physical 
terms as well as in the understanding of its dynamics, which have occurred in recent 
years. Notwithstanding this, an attempt is made in the following to survey different 
definitions for a broader understanding of a health system and to develop a 
framework for examining the one operated by the Punjab Health Department. 
1.2.1. Definition 
Health has the same meaning as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO). 
That is, it is a state of complete physical, mental and social well being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity (WHO, 1978). The system, whether 
biological, social or mechanical, as defined by Koontz and Donnel (1984), is a set or 
assemblage of things connected, or interdependent and interacting so as to form a 
complex unity. However, given that this definition sounds like a static notion of a 
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system, a further search is needed. Roemer (1991) considers system as a functional 
unit and defines it as a set of inter-related and inter-dependent parts, designed to 
achieve a set of goals. These constituent parts or things (objects, organs or 
organisms) are, however, unable to achieve results by acting individually or 
operating alone; instead these have to work together (Dorland, 1985). Since these 
concepts are applicable to systems in general, this thesis is about a health system, 
and its definition needs contextualising in a social systems' perspective. 
Miller (1965 cited in Ellencweig, 1992: 2) describes three elements of a social 
system. Firstly, their boundaries are flexible, which is a reflection of their dynamic 
nature. Secondly, they are multi-dimensional and are made up of several variables, 
which interact to form a complex entity. Thirdly, the system's output affects the 
processes in the environment and inputs from the environment affect the system's 
internal processes. Further, in this context two approaches, inventory and relational, 
appear to dominate the literature regarding the health system. 
Roemer (1991), using the inventory approach, defines the health system as a 
combination of resources, organisations, financing and management that culminates 
in the delivery of health services to the people. In a similar vein, Kielmann and 
Siddique (n. d) hold that the health system comprises three elements, as concentric 
circles: the communities, the health services delivery system and the environment. 
According to them, service inputs, support systems, input distribution and service 
outputs together with health service management and organisation make up the 
health services delivery system. In this model, allied sectors fall within the remit of 
the environmental ecology, which include political, social, economic, ecological and 
other environmental systems. 
The World Health Report for 2000 defined health system to, "include all activities 
whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or maintain health" (WHO, 2000: 5). 
This definition, while giving a sense of being nearer to the inventory models, is used 
to measure functions against objectives to determine the performance of the health 
system over time and among countries. In this way, the health system appears to 
have been reduced to an input /output device. How the activities match and relate 
with each other is not taken into account. 
Frenk (1994) defines the health system using both inventory and relational 
approaches. He identifies the health care providers, collective mediator or state and 
the population or communities as the main actors, while other minor components 
that contribute to the formation of a health system include the 'resource generators' 
and 'allied sectors'. Applying the relational approach, he argues that the 
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aforementioned actors are engaged in a complex interaction primarily in terms of the 
transfer of resources and inputs, the delivery of services, and the processes of 
regulation and control. Thus, although a compromise between the two approaches is 
maintained, this model fails to adequately emphasise the role of environment as a 
constituent of the health system. 
Tareen and Omar (1998) envisage the health system comprising three sub-systems: 
f government; 'services providers' and 'communities' or recipients. They argue that 
the latter two elements interact with each other -a relationship that is controlled and 
mediated by the first element i. e. government, and that this phenomenon takes place 
in an environment where many more such systems exist. This model considers the 
4resource generators' of Frenk's (1994) model, as embodied in the 'government' and 
is simpler and emphasises taking into account the community as part of the health 
system. Similarly, they consider the environment as part of the health system; 
however remain short of highlighting the resource generators distinct from the 
government. Further, the trends of sourcing /contracting out of different services 
necessitate considering 'support services' as a component of the health system 
separate from service providers. But, this model does not recognise this distinction. 
Barker (1995) takes a different position. She emphasises that systems should not be 
defted in terms of the component organisations or agencies, but as the set of 
processes and activities that are carried out towards the delivery of health care. In 
her opinion, the health system is "a real life system of complex social institutions 
and relationships within which individuals and groups have complex agendas and 
goals, which change over time". Whereas this model broadens the view in terms of 
the relations' approach, it is of little help in the analysis of a health system. That is, 
whose activities and processes? 
It is, therefore, clear that literature abounds with varying concepts of the health 
system, and that different authors lean towards either inventory or relational 
approaches, while defining it in a social context. Similarly, others fail to take into 
account certain components of the health system. Thus, there is a need for a fresher 
look at defining the health system; and responding to that, this researcher developed 
a working definition. Accordingly it is defined below: 
The health system comprises five sub systems: governance; health 
care/services; communities; resource generators; and support services. 
These constituents of the health system are in an active relationship with 
each other -a phenomenon that takes place in an environment where other 
such systems are also operative. 
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Theoretical framework 
The above definition of health system forms the basis of a framework which is 
depicted figuratively (Figure 1.1) constructed to explain the relationships in the 
Punjab health sector. 
Figure 1.1: - Theoretical framework for the Punjab health sector 
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The in-depth study of this framework points to the health system having a number of 
attributes which are given below: 
1. The health system comprises a number of subsystems, while itself it is located in 
a universe where many more systems - both national and international - are also 
operative. These subsystems will be explored further in the next section, where 
the framework is applied to examine the Punjab health sector. 
2. Health is an open system with porous boundaries, permitting interaction with 
other systems and their constituent subsystems; thus providing avenues for inter- 
sectoral collaboration, which may be both bilateral and multilateral. 
3. Boundaries of different subsystems are flexible and there is a bilateral and 
multilateral interaction between them. By virtue of this, however, there is a risk 
of one subsystem overlapping and or usurping the boundaries of the others. 
4. The aforementioned characteristic provides opportunities for decentralising the 
decision-making powers from one level to the other, both vertically and 
horizontally, from a central subsystem to the periphery in an organisation. 
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5. Since communities are an element of the health system, this framework 
underpins the importance of taking them into account in terms of their 
involvement in decision making and addressing their needs. 
6. Governance being one ftmction of the state, the health system communicates 
with the government at higher echelons in the hierarchy; thus facilitating 
channelling resources and policy guidelines to the subsystems. 
7. In addition to the aforementioned vertical communication, there is also lateral 
dialogue by governance with other systems, especially ensuring the right size 
and skill mix of human resources required for the health system. 
This framework is universal in nature, for this can be applied to any level in the 
hierarchy and even to the individual subsystems. This assumption, as noted earlier, 
facilitates establishing decentralised units within the health system. Further, the 
application of the above framework is not limited to the health system, but can be 
applied to any social system at any hierarchical level. 
Punjab health sector 
In the preceding section, a framework was established to examine the health system. 
Before its application, it is considered useful that a distinction is made between 
health system and health sector. Accordingly, drawing from the definition of the 
health system, if the focus is on the public sector, excluding nongovernmental and 
allied national systems, it is called the health sector. This distinction is necessary in 
order to be sure of dealing with the government reforms undertaken in the Punjab 
Health Department -a specific part of the broader health system (Berman, 1995), 
which is the case in the current study. Further, although, there is a large and growing 
private sector, this will not be discussed, as it is not in the scope of this study. 
In the following, the above framework is applied to the Punjab health sector for 
describing its subsystems. However, this begins with a brief introduction of various 
developments, particularly focussing on the post-colonial era. 
1.3.1. Developments 
Punjab is a province of Pakistan, which shares boundaries with all other provinces: 
Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan in the west, Kashmir in the north, 
Sindh in the south and Indian Punjab in the east (Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2: - Map of Pakistan 
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Since Punjab remained under colonial administration, the health sector bears many 
imprints of pre-independence recommendations of the Bhore Commission, 1945 
(Gol, 1946). However, since they are not in the scope of this study, in the following 
certain salient developments in the post-independence era are given. 
Health is on the 'Concurrent List' of the National Constitution of Pakistan. This 
constitutional provision empowers both the federal and provincial governments to 
undertake interventions in the health sector. However, it is primarily the provinces 
that manage the health sector in accordance with the policy guidelines laid down by 
the federal government. 
Pakistan, upon independence from Great Britain in 1947, inherited a relatively less 
developed health system. For instance: there was one bed for 2,225 persons; one 
doctor for 100,000 people; and two medical colleges which were inadequate to meet 
the growing needs of health in terms of human resource. However, in the period 
from 1947 to 1970, very little health planning took place and emphasis remained on 
establishing urban based hospitals. Nevertheless, a major intervention - the vertical 
international assisted Malaria Eradication Programme - was launched in 1961. This 
programme was later redesigned to create a Communicable Disease Control (CDC) 
programme as it failed to achieve its purpose. 
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The 1970s saw a shift in the approach to health care delivery. For example, the 
government decided to double the health budget after every three years. Further, a 
people's health policy was promulgated, which envisaged the introduction of a 
generic drugs scheme. However, upon resistance from drug companies, this scheme 
was later withdrawn. Also the hospital and urban bias of health services continued as 
several new medical colleges were opened. These medical colleges produced a large 
number of physicians. However, given the low salaries, poor infrastructure and a 
host of other factors, the newly trained doctors did not join the public sector; instead 
they left the country or preferred to remain self-employed. Thus, the public sector 
health services remained poor (Peabody et al, 1999: 319). In 1978, Pakistan signed 
the Alma- Ata Declaration, acknowledging the central role of primary health care 
and emphasising equity in health care. In the same year, smallpox was eradicated 
and instead of a Small Pox Eradication Programme an Expanded Programme on 
Immunisation (EPI) was started in a selected tehsil of all districts. 
During the 1980s' the health infrastructure was expanded, so that each union council 
with a population of about 25,000 had a Basic Health Unit (BHU) and at each 
markaz with a population of about 100,000 a Rural Health Centre (RHC) was 
established. Similarly a Tehsil (THQ) and District Headquarter (DHQ) hospital was 
established in each tehsil and district respectively. In 1982, to enhance the coverage 
of outreach primary care, an Accelerated Health Programme comprising EPI, 
Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases (CDD), and Training of Traditional Birth Attendants 
(TBAs) was started. 
A major development during the 1990s was the launching of a Social Action 
Programme (SAP) aimed at consolidating existing services and redirecting public 
expenditure in favour of the social sector. Under the umbrella of SAP, a donor 
funded Second Family Health Project (SFHP) was launched to bridge the increasing 
gap between the availability of resources and health sector coverage for improving 
the performance of different health programmes. To complement this, a Health Care 
Development Project was implemented to improve the availability of trained human 
resource, especially nurses and paramedics. In 1994 a National (erstwhile, Prime 
Minister's) Programme for Family Planning and Primary Health Care was launched, 
extending the basic health services to households. 
Under the SFHP, a number of major structural changes were introduced in the 
Punjab health sector. In addition to a pilot project in district Sheikhupura, District 
Health Authorities were tested in districts Multan and Jhelum. Autonomy was 
granted to all tertiary hospitals and a beginning was made to extend decentralisation 
to the districts by establishing District Health Goverrunents in ten districts (Collins 
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et al, 2002). To provide legislative cover to these reforms, the Punjab Medical and 
Health Institutions Act, 1998 was promulgated. But, then the progress took a 
different direction. The new government, which came to power in October 1999, 
implemented a Local Government Plan, 2000 hereafter called LGP-2000. The 
developments beyond 2000 are not in the scope of this study; however, to complete 
the argument, these are described below. 
Devolution of the districts (post-study developments) 
The new government visualised devolution of powers and responsibilities at three 
levels of revenue division: province, district and union council. In the new set up, 
according to the LGP-2000, a department of the elected district government is 
responsible for health and population welfare in the district. Contrary to the previous 
efforts, this intervention uses a cross-sectoral approach, and with few exceptions, 
involves decentralising all government departments. The salient implications of 
LGP-2000, relevant to the health sectors are as follows (NRB, 2000): 
1. The structure and functions of the erstwhile divisional tier ceased to exist on 14th 
August, 2001. However, the goverment has been considering raising the status 
of divisions to the provinces (Dawn, 2002). 
2. The district is a basic unit of governance and administration, each following the 
revenue division has three tiers: Union Council, Tehsil, and District. 
3. For the bigger cities, the terin 'City Districts' has been introduced. For example, 
Lahore (capital of Punjab) is a city district, where a 'city government' replaced 
the hitherto local government system. 
4. The district health officer, now called executive district health officer is 
responsible for Public Health, Child & Women Health, and Population Welfare. 
Also, the Medical Superintendents of the district and tehsil hospitals are under 
the control of this office. 
5. Citizens' Community Boards are proposed for different levels of health care to 
enable the proactive elements of society to participate in community work and 
activities related to development. 
1.3.3. Elements of the health sector 
Earlier in this chapter (1.2.2) reference was made to the different elements of health 
sector. These are: governance, communities, service providers, resource generators, 
support services and environment. In this section these elements are introduced in 
the Punjab perspective, however, starting with communities which are the focus of 
the health sector: 
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1.3-3.1. Communities 
The community consists of people living together in some form of cohesion; and 
varies widely in their socio-economic profile and size, ranging from a cluster of 
homesteads to hamlets, villages, towns and cities, where they are organised formally 
or informally. These organisations, whether social, political or those based on some 
interest, may take different forms like firms, trade unions, political parties, interest 
groups etc (Rifkin et al, 1988). The importance of such bodies lies in that they 
provide an avenue for community entry; people by this means come into an active 
relationship with the healthcare providers and health governance (Tareen and Omar, 
1997, Tarin and Thunhurst, 1998). Further, the communities are in active contact 
with the resource generators to whom they contribute resources for feeding into the 
system (see figure 1.1). 
72.5 million or 55.6% of the population of Pakistan live in the Punjab province and 
this is expanding at the rate of 2.55% annually. The influx of Afghan refugees, 
which started in 1978, contributed to a population growth and the continuing 
disturbance in Afghanistan was a source of fresh arrivals. Pakistan, in 1999 hosted 
over 1.6 million Afghan refugees, a significant number of which was located in the 
Punjab. The rural/urban distribution is 68.7% and 31.3% respectively. Males 
outnumber females; for every 100 females there are 106.9 males. The average 
household size is 6.4 persons, which has marginally declined from 6.8 persons in 
1981. Age distribution reveals that approximately 43% of the population are less 
than 15 years of age. The population-density is 353 persons per square kilometre, 
85% of which has access to some kind of healthcare (GoP, 1999). 
133.2. Governance 
According to the World Bank, this is "the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources" (The Mahbub-ul-Haq, 
Human Development Centre, 1999: 29). In a similarly narrow manner, the United 
Nation Development Programme defines governance as the "exercise of economic, 
political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels" 
(ibid). However, the Commission on Global Governance offers a broader view of 
governance, as "the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their common affairs" (ibid). In that sense, governance is different 
from routine management or administration, but it is nearer to the concept of 
stewardship insofar as its purpose is concerned. Saltman and Davis (2000) view 
stewardship as a "particular type of governance linked with agency theory and the 
concomitant role of the state as an agent for its citizens". In other words, governance 
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is a ftinction of state, embodying the 'sum of many ways' to ensure various sub 
systems of the health system perform for achieving its overall goals and protecting 
the interests of the communities. That is, in this way, the state not only mediates, but 
also facilitates the health providers in providing services, which are responsive to 
the needs of the communities. 
The major role and functions performed in terms of governance are financing, 
regulation, and control and administration (Frenk, 1995). These functions vary in an 
organisation, depending on the extent of decentralisation, and may also overlap. 
That is, in a most centralised system, governance includes all three functions, while 
in a decentralised system it may only be confined to regulation. The governance 
function percolates both vertically in the hierarchy and may have federal, provincial, 
district and local levels, as well as horizontally across various component 
organisations at each level in the health sector. 
In the following paragraphs, governance functions are described, including a brief 
commentary on the related issues and problems. Moreover, since social issues and 
policy have a bearing on the government's preferences for health sector, these are 
also studied. However, it commences with an introduction of the revenue division, 
as this forms the basis for the control and administration of the Punjab health sector. 
Revenue division of the Puniab 
Figure 1.3: - Map of the Punjab 
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a metropolitan or municipal corporation, town committee and cantonment board that 
are fin-ther divided into the urban/rural wards or union councils (DGHS, 1996). 
Social issues and policv 
Pakistan is a low income country where 40% of the population live below the 
poverty line and out of this number 11.6% live on less than US$l/day. Poverty is 
important, because it affects negatively health status, constraining the population's 
ability to access health-related services. Similarly, education has a bearing on health 
status, especially when mothers have basic schooling. However, given that the 
overall literacy rate is 42% - 55% for males and 28% for females, this situation adds 
to the worsening of the health status. Sanitation and safe water is a key to the 
prevention of infectious diseases. However, only 55% of rural households have 
access to such an amenity (CIA, 2002; WHO, 2000). No wonder then, as noted 
(1.4.2), infectious diseases form the major bulk of morbidity and mortality. To 
address such issues, a Social Action Programme launched in 1993 focused on basic 
health, rural water supply and sanitation, primary education, and population welfare. 
Decentralisation was also its agenda and figured in the National Health Policy (GoP, 
1996). To that end, the government during the 1990s undertook several reforms, 
which are the subject of this study. This agenda has also been reiterated in the 
government's programme for reconstruction as outlined in LGP-2000 (NRB, 2000). 
Control and administration of the health sector 
The health sector organisation, which originally had a fimctional structure, by the 
addition of internationally funded projects and programmes, evolved into a matrix 
structure. The Punjab health sector organisation as a result expanded: comprising 96 
major organisations, about 5000 health care outlets and employing over 100,000 
staff. Together with these developments, there has been compartmentalisation in the 
health sector. That is, different programmes like health education, EPI and CDC 
were developed as vertical hierarchies within the health sector organisation. And 
alongside these new structures, the old were allowed to remain, often leading to 
duality and overlapping of functions (Appendix- 1.1). 
The top management drawn, both from civil servants and medical profession, has 
further complicated the organisational structure of health sector (Figure 1.4). The 
health secretariat staffed mostly by the civil servants constitutes the government and 
administrative department. A senior civil servant, secretary to the Government of the 
Punjab heads the health secretariat. On the other hand, the Directorate General 
Health Service staffed by medical professionals is at the apex of the line Health 
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Department to supervise health services in the periphery. A director general health 
services (DGHS), usually a most senior professional, heads this organisation. 
Figure 1.4: - Organisational structure - health secretariat 
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Similarly, there is a parallel Directorate of Projects and Nursing, headed by a civil 
servant and a most senior nurse respectively reporting directly to the secretary 
health. Likewise, medical colleges, teaching hospitals, autonomous bodies and 
certain special institutions report directly to the secretary health in health secretariat. 
Re-quiation of the health sector 
Two types of regulatory mechanisms are employed in the health sector. Firstly, there 
are certain autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies created under some legislative 
cover. These bodies act as watchdogs and maintain discipline amongst members of 
the profession in the performance of their obligations through measures like 
licensing, certification and accreditation. Secondly, the National/Provincial 
Assemblies have enacted a number of laws including the adoption of laws 
promulgated during the pre-independence British Rule. Under the powers conferred 
by these laws, the governments in the centre or province formulate rules for use in 
the health sector organisations. This researcher identifies twenty-nine such Acts of 
the National and Provincial Assemblies relevant to the health sector. 
Financinq of the health sector 
The health sector in Punjab is financed through a variety of sources: state, donors 
and clients' out-of-pocket contributions. There is no mechanism of pre-paid 
financing like a health insurance scheme in the Punjab (WHO, 2000). Although the 
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government of the Pakistan Muslim League (1997-99) visualised a National Health 
Card Scheme in its manifesto, this was not implemented. The 'health account' is not 
maintained, but the financing of health from various sources is described below: 
1. The outlay of state funding of health sector during the 1999-2000 year was Rs. 
14.6 billions (Rs. 9.1 billion for the current and Rs. 5.5 billion for development 
expenditure). This expenditure is equivalent to 0.5% of the GNP or US$ 3/ per 
capita. This situation of poor health financing is exacerbated by the budgeting 
routines, especially for recurrent expenditure. That is, whereas the development 
budget identifies capital resources on the principle of zero-based budgeting, the 
recurrent expenditure is budgeted based on historical expenditure. Further, 
stringent purchase and audit procedures make the incurring of allocations 
difficult, with the brunt falling on recurrent allocations. 
2. Donors include mainly the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Department 
for International Development (UK), Kreditanstalt fur Wielderaufbau (KfW, 
Germany), Islamic Development Bank, WHO, and UNICEF. With their 
assistance, several developmental projects have been undertaken, mostly under 
the umbrella of SAP. However, this programme, after initial successes, dwindled 
and finally closed (Dawn, 2002a). According to an official of a donor agency, 
the provinces lost interest and the districts, which should have been the focus of 
programme implementation, were neglected. 
3. The clients contribute from out-of-pocket expenses to the financing of 
healthcare. For example, hospitals mainly provide emergency cover, while 
clients procure medicine and other supplies needed for treatment. Similarly, food 
is also arranged by patients themselves (Medical Superintendent, 1991). This 
situation extends to secondary and primary care facilities and outreach services, 
e. g. people contribute to the purchase of needles and syringes for immunisation. 
1.3.3.3. Healthcare providers 
The healthcare providers range from a unit service focused on individuals to the 
comprehensive care provided to communities, localities and regions. In a household, 
this may be personal care as a result of a health promotion message delivered on 
radio or a mother treating the childhood diarrhoea using home-made Oral Rehydrate 
Salt (Kleczkowski et al, 1984). The TBAs, traditional healers, or community health 
workers offer such services in communities. In the public sector, these services are 
provided by out-reach workers in rural areas, and at population centres static 
curative services are added to the package. That is, health services in the Punjab are 
inclusive, i. e. higher-level care facilities provide lower level care with or without 
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referral and comprise a network of health programmes and about 5,000 health 
facilities (DGHS, 1997). Briefly, these are (World Bank, 1992, GoPb, 1993): 
1) The tertiary care facilities, often attached to a teaching institution, are situated in 
the big cities. These facilities have specialist referral services and also serve as a 
place for the training of medics, nurses, and paramedics. 
2) The DHQ and THQ hospitals are secondary care referral facilities, where 
specialists like physicians, surgeons, radiologists, oto-rhino-laryngologist, 
ophthalmologists, paediatricians, gynaecologists and obstetricians are available. 
The bed strength for a DHQ hospital varies from 125 to 350, while a THQ 
hospital has 40 to 60 beds. 
3) The RHCs, BHUs, Maternal and Child Health (MCH) centres both urban and 
rural, sub health centres, and dispensaries are the first level primary care health 
facilities. Whereas the former two were added to the health care infrastructure 
during the 1980s, the other three are the legacy of the old continuing system. 
The RHCs are 8-20 bedded small rural hospitals where diagnostic and operating 
theatre facilities are available. These act as a first level care referral facility. The 
BHUs are out patient facilities with 2 beds available for emergency and obstetric 
care. The MCH centres, although built-in to the structure of rural health centres 
and basic health unit, are also independent units in the rural and urban localities. 
Sub health centres and dispensaries are the satellite outpatient services in rural 
areas staffed by a dispenser appointed from an RHC. 
4) The primary health care (PHC) is also offered through outreach services: i) 
health education services; and ii) outreach teams for rural areas. For the former 
there is no formal set up in the districts, but at the provincial level, there is a 
special section. The outreach teams, one for each union council, usually 
comprise a vaccinator, a CDC supervisor, and a sanitary inspector. They visit the 
households to provide preventive and promotive health care to the people on 
their doorsteps. Similarly, the federal government launched a National (formerly 
Prime Minister's) Programme for expanding the availability of family planning 
and primary health care services to the rural areas and urban slums. Although, 
not provided globally, one lady health worker is appointed to serve about 200 
households through a health house established in her own home. 
5) Through the outreach services and parallel to the mainstream healthcare delivery 
network, different health jproýzrammes have also been organised for combating 
specific diseases. These are listed below: 
a) Reproductive Health Services 
Health Education 
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C) School Health Services 
d) Expanded Programme of Immunisation 
e) Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses 
f) Communicable Disease Control 
i) Sanitation and Environment 
ii) Malaria Control 
iii) Tuberculosis Control Programme 
iv) Leprosy Control Programme 
V) ARI Control Programme 
vi) HIV/AlDS Control Programme 
vii) ORS and Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases 
g) Food & Nutrition 
6) In addition to Allopathic medicine, Tibb and Homeopathic medicine is also 
provided in the public sector through a network of 128 Tibbi dispensaries and 
128 Homeo dispensaries. The government established a Tibbia Medical College, 
which grants degrees in Tibb after four years of study. A national council for 
Tibb and Homeopathy has been established as a watchdog for alternative 
medicine practice, and a section in the Directorate General of Health Services is 
responsible for the control and administration of these services (DGHS, 1997). 
1.3.3.4. Resource generators 
The resource generators may be: (a) human resource institutions such as the schools 
and universities; (b) technology producing research organisations, firms and 
companies; and (c) financial institutions (Frenk, 1994). The resource generators 
relate to the communities from where they receive resources like pupils and funds 
for feeding into the governance. The latter operates as a mediator determining the 
nature of the relationship between the former two, i. e. resource generators and 
communities. Since financing of health services has already been considered 
(1.3.3.2), it will not be discussed here. However, a brief introduction to human and 
technological resources is given below: 
1) Human resource establishments like schools and universities are the hub of the 
health sector to produce human capital. There are over 157 health human 
resource institutions in the Punjab, including a whole range of undergraduate and 
postgraduate pre-service and in-service institutions (DGHS, 1997). 
2) Technological resources include research and developmental organisations 
responsible for developing techniques for the diagnosis, management of illnesses 
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and maintenance of healthcare standards. In the Punjab health sector, there are a 
few organisations that work towards this objective and include the following: 
a) Pakistan Medical Research Council - Punjab branch; 
b) Standardisation of Medical Equipment - established in secretariat; and 
C) Other research organisations e. g. Institute of Public Health. 
1.3.3.5. Support services 
The support services constitute instruments, largely determining the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the health system (Barker, 1996: 24-26). Primarily performing staff 
functions, these services include: management information systems, supplies and 
inventories, estate and equipment maintenance and quality assurance. Often support 
services are taken jointly with the service providers, and overlap those functionally 
in certain areas. For example, they facilitate the healthcare providers in delivering 
services and may also support the management in discharging its governance role. 
However, the framework for this study considers them as being separate because in 
that case it is easier to conceive of the outsourcing of services. In the Punjab health 
sector, a number of support services are organised which are listed below: 
1) Health Management Information System 
2) Transport Maintenance Organisation 
3) Health Equipment Maintenance Organisation 
4) Estate Management - through Buildings Department 
5) Drugs Administration and Quality Control 
a) Procurement and Supplies (Government Medical Stores Depot) 
b) Provincial Quality Control Board (Drugs) 
C) Drugs Testing Laboratory 
6) Surgeon Medico-Legal 
7) Chief Chemical Examiner 
8) Blood Transfusion Services and Serologist to the Government of Punjab 
9) Government Public Analyst 
10) Bacteriologist to the Government of Punjab 
1.3.3.6. ]Environment 
Study of the health system environment is essential, notably because many answers 
to ill health are found outside its domains (WHO, 1978). It is argued that the health 
system exists in an environment, which may be internal or external. The former 
hosts different sub systems of the health system. The latter is external to the 
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boundaries of the health systems and has two layers harbouring the national and 
international hegemonic systems respectively. The former refers to the nation state 
and people in terms of their history, culture, health problems, economy, welfare and 
political systems. These national systems could be either allied or others. In the 
Punjab, the former include the Local Government and Rural Development, 
Education, Population Welfare, Social Welfare and Punjab Social Security 
Institutions. The latter, which include politics, economy, agriculture, food and 
industry, do not directly concern the health sector, but affect health. International 
systems include bilateral and multilateral aid organisations, international economic 
agreements and non-governmental organisations. These institutions, because often 
control the developing countries by setting boundaries in terms of agreements and 
conditionalities, are also called hegemonic (Twaddle, 1996). 
In the case of Punjab, the hegemonic systems include the World Bank, International 
Monitory Fund, Asian Development Bank, the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development, German KfW, Islamic Development Bank, WHO, 
UNICEF, and other UN agencies. For binding recipient countries these institutions 
employ different instruments e. g. structural adjustment programme. While aimed at 
rectifying macro-economic imbalances, Bennett (2001) argues, these programmes 
have an adverse impact on the developing economies including Pakistan. 
Health status and issues 
In the preceding section the structure and functions of the Punjab health sector were 
discussed. This section will examine the status and issues impacting on it. In this 
regard a considerable quantity of literature both published and non-published is 
available (GoPb, 1993; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1998). However, this study 
relies on a survey report (GoPb and DFID, 1999). This report is comprehensive and 
its structure is compatible with the framework used for this study. Regarding the 
timing of the survey, this relates to the later part of the study period, but this 
researcher is confident that the situation would have been same in the initial years. 
Therefore, its findings are considered valid for the purpose of this study. 
This survey was conducted in ten districts, selected for geo-political reasons to 
introduce the District Health Governments - one of the reforms, on which this 
research is focussing - with the intention of establishing a baseline situation of the 
district health system in the public sector. It may be noted that the main focus of 
report is on primary and secondary care in the rural areas; nevertheless the issues 
and problems identified are crosscutting and extend to tertiary care as well. A 
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snapshot of the same will be presented here. However, the scene is set by presenting 
some key indicators of health and the burden of disease. 
1.4.1. Key indicators of health 
Life expectancy at birth for males is 60.6 and for females it is 62.3 years. The crude 
birth rate has declined from 41.7/1000 in 1984 to 33.8/1000 in 1997. Similarly, the 
crude death rate has witnessed a decline from 10.9/1000 in 1984 to 8.9/1000 in 
1997. However, the total fertility rate remains at 4.4 in 1999. The infant mortality 
rate, which was 112/1000 in 1984 declined to 84/1000 in 1997, and the maternal 
mortality rate was 340 per 100,000 live births (GoP, 1999). Four million cases came 
to public sector health facilities in one year, the majority suffering from 
communicable diseases: acute respiratory infections (31%), diarrhoeal. diseases 
(23%), malaria (6%) and scabies (3%). Similarly, 40% of children below 5 years 
suffered from some degree of malnutrition (DGHS, 1997). 
A review of the key indicators reveals that the health of the population in Punjab 
(Pakistan) has improved over the years. However, the country is still some way 
behind the average for low-income countries including those with a comparatively 
lower GNP per capita. The burden of disease indicates that communicable infectious 
diseases account for the bulk of morbidity and mortality. Other important causes are 
reproductive health problems and nutritional deficiency disorders. Thus, according 
to a study, Pakistan "is still in the epidemiological transition, with basically 
preventable or readily treatable diseases affecting primarily young children and 
women of reproductive age accounting for a dominant share of mortality and 
morbidity" (World Bank, 1998: iii). 
1.4.2. Issues and problems 
Findings of the above mentioned survey report (GoPb and DFID, 1999) reiterated 
the often-raised concerns and the need to undertake reforms (GoPb, 1993; World 
Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1998). Briefly, the following gaps have been identified: 
1. The district health officer lacks capacity in terms of human as well as financial 
resources and the authority to effectively deliver and supervise health services in 
a district. Performance indicators are not used. 
2. The PHC facilities are generally ill equipped, under-staffed or under utilized; 
many of these are ill planned and badly located. A large number of posts of 
doctors, especially lady doctors, remain vacant. Trained manpower, especially 
nurses, lady health visitors and laboratory technicians, is in short supply. 
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3. The non-salary components of PHC programme are not adequately provided for 
in the provincial budgets. These include expenses on drugs, diagnostics, repair 
and maintenance, utilities, monitoring and supervision, transportation, in-service 
training and health education materials. 
4. There exists a gender imbalance as the health staff and managers are 
predominantly male. This results in poor rapport between the facility staff and 
the female population who are the critical link to reach young children. 
5. At the DHQ/THQ level hospitals, there are shortcomings in emergency care, 
surgical services, anaesthesia and laboratory facilities, and maintenance/ repair 
of medical equipment. 
6. Political interference in decisions, such as recruitment, transfers and disciplinary 
actions, has resulted in lowering the efficiency and was a major demoralizing 
factor for the managers and staff. One outcome of this phenomenon is that the 
staff are often absent from their work places and their attitude towards the 
general public is unfriendly. 
7. Lack of a functioning referral system is the major reason on the one hand for 
poor handling of obstetric and other emergencies in rural areas, and on the other 
puts undue pressure on tertiary hospitals. 
8. Private practice engaged in by the public sector physicians and specialists is a 
universal malaise. It is at the expenses of time and energy which government 
doctors should be spending within hospitals. 
9. Family planning services are provided as a vertical program, indicating an 
absence of health/population linkage essential for a successful population 
programme. These services are generally not available in all health outlets, and 
the non-availability of female staff in rural areas compounds this problems. 
10. There is centralisation of management with little powers delegated to the lower 
levels leading to the inefficient use of resources and control. The stringent 
purchase and audit procedures further deter the incumbents from incurring 
expenditure in the public sector. 
11. The inefficient use of resources added to the economy drive is exhibited as 
shortages of medicines and consumables, giving rise to the poor service quality 
and lack of community confidence. As a result, people are alienated from the 
public sector and often ignore its existence, not to mention its utilisation. 
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Reforms in the Punjab health sector 
In the preceding section, the status of the Punjab health sector was described. To 
remedy the problems, the government of the Punjab (GoPb) made repeated but 
diverse attempts for reforms, and table 1.1 identifies seven different major initiatives 
undertaken in the health sector during 1993-2000. 
Table 1.1: - Health sector reforms 1993-2000 
Implementation 
period 
Name of initiative implemented 
- 1993-98 Sheikhupura PHC Pilot Project 
1996/97 District Health Management Teams 
1997-00 Delegation of Financial Powers to Senior Medical Officers at RHCs 
1997-01 Contract Appointment of Medical Officers and Lady Health Visitors 
1997/98 District Health Authorities 
1998- Granting Autonomy to the Medical and Health Institutions 
1998/99 District Health Government 
These reforms, as indicated earlier (1.3.1), were introduced under the overall ambit 
of SFHP and SAP. Four of these reforms: (i) Sheikhupura Pilot Project (SPP); (ii) 
District Health Authorities (DHA); (iii) the Granting Autonomy to the Medical and 
Health Institutions (IA); and (iv) District Health Governments (DHG) are selected 
for in-depth study, and will be reported as case studies in chapter 5. However, a brief 
resumd of the remaining three, constructed from the intelligence gathered during the 
pre-fieldwork stage of this study, is presented in this section. Nonetheless, it will be 
noted that decentralisation was the strategy common to all these initiatives. 
1.5.1. District health management teams 
District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) were established in 1996-97 with the 
aim of consolidating healthcare in a district by bringing both the primary and 
secondary care under the authority of DHO (PHDC, 1996). The rationale was that 
managing a district health system in this way was likely to improve the efficiency, 
performance and competency through the improved operational management and 
on-the-job training and supervision by the DHMTs (Omar, 1996). 
The concerned divisional director health services (DHS) issued a notification laying 
down the membership, responsibilities and roles, procedures and resources for the 
DHMTs. All components of the district health system, except communities, were 
represented. A planning sub-committee was formed to develop a district profile and 
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district annual plan. While no additional resources were allocated for this new body, 
it was entrusted with a wide range of responsibilities for managing the health system 
through regular inspection, monitoring and meeting. 
DHMTs were established in 17 districts, where district health development centres 
existed and the DHS and or DHO were receptive. A workshop format was used as a 
tool to launch the DHMTs. The issues addressed in the workshop included: 
agreement on its membership and the constitution of the planning sub-committee, 
roles and responsibilities, salient features of district profiles and a district annual 
plan, and the mechanism for the working of DHMTs. A profile for eight districts and 
a manual for district planning were prepared'. However, there was no structured 
follow up and there is no evidence that the DHMTs ever met subsequent to their 
notification (Griffith, 1997). 
1.5.2. Delegation of financial powers to the senior medical 
officers at Rural Health Centres 
This intervention was made in 1997 in a bid to decentralise financial powers and 
bypass the bureaucratic channel to ensure on-time availability of resources to the 
RHC. This arrangement also gave the senior medical officers (SMO) a voice in 
management. That is, hitherto as part of the healthcare provider subsystem, in the 
new set up the SMO had an enhanced governance role. 
The RHC was declared the accounting unit and its in-charge SMO was delegated the 
powers of drawing and disbursing officer (DDO). This led to the RHCs appearing in 
the provincial budget book. S/he was declared a DDO in category-IV; empowered to 
incur expenditure according to the financial rules, bill the district accounts office, 
and receive cheques and payments from the State Bank of Pakistan. S/he was 
responsible for undertaking such activities as prescribed and made answerable to a 
regular annual audit. The concurrence of the DHO was sought only if the amount 
likely to be incurred was beyond the SMO's financial powers. 
Seven workshops, each of two days' duration, were arranged at the Provincial 
Health Development Centre (PHDC) for the training of SMOs. The topics covered 
included, dccentralisation and the challenges it poses for human resource and 
financial management and the DDO procedures. Out of the total of 289 SMOs, 196 
(68%) participated in training. However, the intervention had some problems and 
concerns were raised. The SMO of the RHC had been delegated financial powers in 
respect of the facility of which s/he was in-charge. However, for BHUs and other 
I Personal communication with a Programme Director in the Provincial Health Development Centre 
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facilities in the catchment area of the RHC, the DHO continued to function as DDO. 
Furthermore, the administrative authority for the RHC staff also remained with the 
DHO. Moreover, this initiative added to the functions - accounting and audit - for 
the SMOs, while no additional resources- were provided2. 
1.5.3. Contract appointment of medical officers and lady 
health visitors 
This intervention initiated in 1997 was aimed at filling the vacant positions, curbing 
absenteeism and bringing discipline and efficiency into the health sector. This 
reform envisaged also replacing the existing centralised human resource 
management and in a way evading the protection enjoyed by the civil servants under 
the Civil Servants Act, 1974. Since contract employees are not covered under this 
Act they are subject to summary proceedings for any misconduct. 
A Divisional Recruitment Committee (DRC) headed by the DHS was constituted to 
recruit and select the medical officers (MO), Women Medical Officers (WMO) and 
lady health visitors (LHV) for contract appointments against specific positions. The 
list of the successful candidates was then forwarded to the secretary health, who 
formally made orders for their appointment. To these non-transferable incumbents, a 
better pay package was offered. Similarly, in the case of absence from duty or any 
other misconduct, the incumbents would be dismissed from service at the 
recommendation of the DHS. 
A manual 'Training 20003' outlining a curriculum for the orientation and training of 
doctors appointed on contract was published. The master trainers were trained at the 
PHDC and a two days induction training of contract doctors was undertaken in the 
District Health Development Centres (DHDC). However, this activity did not 
continue for long, mainly because the trainees would be too few in number to run 
such a course. Later, a ban was imposed on contract appointments. This ban was 
relaxed, but an officer from the Army Monitoring Team of the area was inducted 
onto the Divisional Recruitment Committee. 
However, contrary to the expected improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the health system, this type of employment arrangement increased the frustration 
of doctors and other incumbents. That is, this intervention eroded the health services 
organisation, as it became difficult to decide, who the government would promote to 
2 Discussion of this researcher with a number of senior medical officers in charge of a Rural Health 
Centres 
3 This title takes its origin from that it was expected to select and train 2000 contract doctors. 
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grade 18, when the pool of the regular incumbents in grade 17 was exhausted. Also 
the government did not devise a system for absorbing contractual doctors into the 
regular health serviceS4. 
Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter a framework was developed to describe the structure and functions of 
the Punjab health sector. The intelligence gathered during pre-fieldwork, coupled 
with the knowledge and experience of this researcher helped in achieving this 
objective. Further, drawing from secondary source, issues confronting the health 
sector were explored. To address these problems the government undertook different 
remedial measures, using decentralisation as a common strategy. 
Despite substantial inputs, a number of these were abandoned, others forgotten 
while some remained. Given this study aims to examine why these trajectories 
occurred; chapter 1 has established the context, providing a base for discussing the 
concepts surrounding different initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health sector. 
This will be done in the next chapter. 
4 Personal communication of this researcher with a Deputy Secretary of the Health Department 
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2. The Concepts 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter a framework was developed to examine the structure and 
functions of the health system. It revealed that because of the many issues 
confronting the Punjab health sector, the government made repeated and diverse 
attempts to reform and that decentralisation was a common strategy for these 
initiatives. This chapter, in this background, sets out to: 
1. conceptualise the health sector reform in section 1; 
2. explain the strategy of decentralisation in section 2; and 
3. explore the concepts surrounding the policy arena in section 3. 
In the discussion that follows, a conscious effort is made to contextualise the 
concepts to the Punjab health sector. The reader may, therefore, expect the 
discussion to be informed with examples from the Punjab health sector. 
2.2. Health sector reform 
There is a diversity of opinion about what constitutes health sector reform. The 
confusion, as Flood (2000) argues, is intensified by the ever-emerging phrases and 
acronyms for denoting the arrangements between government, private insurers, 
purchasers, providers and patients. Therefore, it is considered necessary that some 
agreed understanding of the phenomenon is evolved. This section attempts to 
achieve this objective in three sub-sections. Firstly, the terms are defined followed in 
sub-section 2 by a resum6 of developments that occurred in the concept over time. 
Finally, a debate is presented about why there was a vicious cycle of reforms, 
identifying a conceptual gap; and what should be done to avoid such occurrences? 
2.2.1. Definition 
The term reform refers to "a change made to a system or organisation, in order to 
improve it, remove unfairness etc" (Longman, 1995: 1188), and is distinct from 
revolution or evolution. The former denotes a "great, usually sudden social and 
political change, especially the changing of a ruler or political system by force" 
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(ibid: 1217). The latter, on the other hand, is a "gradual change and development of 
an idea, situation or object" (ibid: 470). These terms are introduced because similar 
situations were encountered in the Punjab health sector. In October 1999, there was 
a sudden change of the ruler and political system - from a democratically elected 
government to an autocratic military rule. Further, the reforms that were initially 
confined to the health sector and remained in the range of deconcentration and 
autonomy were expanded to invoke devolution and establishing district governments 
with elected assemblies. Similarly various observers saw the reforms undertaken 
during the study period as passing through the evolutionary phases5. 
Reform implies building upon and improving what exists in order to convert it into 
another or a better form or an amendment or altering for the better some faulty state 
of things (Oxford English Dictionary, 1971). In this regard, it has been argued that 
any reform, by default, must aim to reconstruct an existing structure or system in 
order to enable it to achieve its original end(s) in an improved way (Seedhouse, 
1995). However, the question arises as to what should warrant 'reconstruction' and 
what is meant by 'improved way'? Gonzalez-Block (1997: 191) regards the reform 
phenomenon as "the removal of evils or corrupt elements out of the body politics or 
to the willed evolution of the social system towards a better stage of being". But, 
this is a narrow definition, focusing on governance issues in society. 
Berman (1995: 15) notes that reform "signals something substantial and 
fundamental, complex and extensive implying, at least, a change in what is done, 
how it is done and who does it". In this background, he defines the health sector 
reform as a positive change that implies "a process of sustainable, purposeful change 
to improve the efficiency, equity and effectiveness of the health sector". This 
definition is comprehensive encompassing the nature and purpose of change as well 
as the outcome; and can also explain certain associated terms using the health 
system framework. Accordingly, health care reform or health services reform means 
change in the health care or health services component of the health system. 
Similarly, health system reform envisages the broader change involving the relevant 
sectors in the environment where the health sector operates. 
Notwithstanding the above definition, in order to enquire into a reform initiative and 
to draw questions for that, a further question is posed: what are the dimensions of 
change that merit a reform? Although this is a critical caveat, it is not to narrow the 
concept, but is an attempt to draw the specifications for comparative purposes. 
Accordingly, any change to be called reform must satisfy five conditions: (1) the 
5 Discussion of this researcher with a number of officials in the Punjab Health Department 
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delineated area of activity that is to be reformed; (2) the originally desired purpose 
of this delineated activity; (3) why the existing set-up did not achieve the desired 
purpose or was achieved at an unwanted cost; (4) how such a situation was 
addressed; i. e. what was the reform; and (5) to determine that the intervention is 
actually happening, it is essential to install an information system (Seedhouse, 1995; 
Berman, 1995). Dougherty (1996: 4) added more variables to these determinants, i. e. 
such an intervention should lead to: (i) improved health statistics, (ii) a financially 
leaner system with sustainable growth, and (iii) a system, which is politically 
acceptable, enjoying support among the citizens and health services providers. 
2.2.2. DeveIopments 
Gonzales-Block (1997) identified three overlapping generations of health system 
reform: structural consolidation, managerial changes, and introduction of market 
pressure during the 20'h century. The former two generations, collectively, are also 
termed bureaucratic reforms, distinguishing them from market reforms. The 
structural reforms, which precede the managerial reforms, refer to the creation of 
new health services and institutions like the National Health Service (NHS) in the 
United Kingdom (UK), and introducing different decentralisation moves. The 
managerial changes refer to: financing interventions like the introduction or 
modification of health insurance systems, improvements in policy process such as 
employing cost-efficiency methods for selecting health service packages, and health 
management improvements by granting autonomy to hospitals and institutions. 
Similarly, three variants of market reforms are: internal market reform and purchaser 
-provider split, managed care competition reform and managed care (Sheaff, 1999; 
Flood, 2000). The market reforms, as will be seen, are not relevant in the Punjab 
perspective. However, to encapsulate the developments, it is worthwhile to briefly 
review these reforms. 
" The internal market reforms introduced in the UK and New Zealand require the 
purchaser - the government appointed agency e. g. health authorities - to enter 
into contracts with the competing public and private health providers. 
" In managed care competition reforms introduced in the Netherlands, there is 
competition between the insurers on the basis of cost and quality. The insurer, in 
this arrangement, has both a purchasing and management function in addition to 
risk bearing, and a government appointed agency facilitates transaction between 
the consumer and the insurer/purchaser. 
" Managed care is a component of managed competition reform. However, since 
this type of reform has become increasingly important, it merits separate 
consideration. The provider, in this case, within a pre-determined allocation, 
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released in advance, is responsible for caring for a defined population. By this 
arrangement, compared to the remuneration method, the providers retain any 
savings in return for assuming the responsibility for any possible loss. The 
consumers, in this system, choose from the managed care plans and in case of 
any utilisation of services from outside the plan, are subject to paying out-of- 
pocket (Flood, 2000; Battistella, 1993). 
So far, the terms used to designate different types of reforms have been introduced. 
In the following, drawing mainly from the World Health Report, 2000 (WHO, 2000) 
the chronology of the appearance of various reforms on the scene during the 20 1h 
century is given. Correspondingly, a commentary is made about the occurrence and 
relevance of different generations of reforms in the Punjab. 
2.2.2.1. First generation reforms 
The first generation reforms, traced during the 1940s and 1950s extending to the 
1960s, marked the founding and extension of the national health care and social 
insurance systems in richer countries. This era corresponds to the withdrawing of 
colonial rule from developing countries including the Indian sub continent, of which 
the Punjab (Pakistan) forms a part. Since the colonial health services were purpose 
specific, driven by the needs of overseas colonial rulers and local 61ite these could 
hardly meet few of the needs of the larger indigenous population (Collins, 1994). 
Therefore, first generation reforms in developing countries are seen as occurring 
during the early post-independence years. These are, in a way, post-independence 
continuation and expansion of the colonial health care system (Gish, 1979). Banerji 
(1974) notes, the 'Brown Englishmen' - the local members of the hitherto Royal 
Indian Civil and Medical Services trained in the traditions of western countries - 
had a profound effect on shaping post-colonial health services. Thus, from 1947 
through to the 1970s, mass campaigns were launched against specific health 
problems like malaria and smallpox, leading to eradicating the latter, while 
containing and maintaining the prevalence rate of the former. This period also saw 
the urban bias and emphasis retained in medical colleges and teaching hospitals in 
the Punjab (see also 1.3.1). 
2.2.2.2. Second generation reforms 
The hallmark of second-generation reforms was primary health care, as a means to 
achieving universal coverage. Developed countries during this era were able not 
only to integrate primary health care into the whole system, but also moved in the 
latter half of the 1980s to the next generation of reforms (WHO, 2000). However, 
the Punjab, as indicated earlier (1.3.1), starting in the late 1970s through the 1980s, 
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followed this course. Pakistan signed the Alma-Ata Declaration, and to increase 
health coverage an integrated network of rural and urban facilities was established. 
This expansion bore the imprints of the recommendations of a pre-independence 
Bhore Commission, 1946 (GoI, 1946). However, the gap between coverage and 
resources increased, also affecting the quality of services. Different programmes 
failed to achieve their purpose. In this regard particular reference is made to the 
referral system, which was difficult to operate (WHO, 2000; Siddiqi et al, 2001). 
The lower level services were poorly utilised; the patients bypassed them and went 
directly to the higher level of care. While this could be attributed to the bias for 
tertiary and urban based health care, the overall deteriorating status of the Punjab 
health sector (1.4) heralded different reforms undertaken during the 1990s. 
2.2.2.3. Third generation reforms 
Whereas the first and second generation of reforms were oriented to healthcare 
supply and the providers were granted a predefined budget, the strategy for the third 
generation reforms changed so that "money follows the patient". Managed care was 
introduced, emphasising the strengthening of primary health care in order to avoid 
unnecessary hospitalisation, as a mean to cost savings (WHO, 2000). In this sense, 
role of government, is redefined i. e., the market forces combined with government 
planning drive the health system. This approach requires the "purchaser - 
government appointed authorities, private insurers, or risk-bearing groups of health 
providers - to proactively manage and allocate resources amongst different health 
care needs" (Flood, 2000: 1). 
However, the Punjab was some way behind, attempting to follow the course during 
the 1990s. As a matter of fact, as in other low-income developing countries, the 
policies continue to address basic systemic questions such as allocation priorities, 
role of government vis-A-vis private and non-government organisations, capacity 
building in key support and delivery systems, and content of the service package 
(Peters and Chao, 1998). Only in one of the reform initiatives - DHG - the language 
of third generation reform was used. However, because this initiative could not be 
implemented, the Punjab did not go into this phase, instead it moved backwards. 
Led by the WHO and UNICEF, National Immunisation Days (NIDs) were launched 
repeatedly against the priority diseases - polio and vitamin-A deficiency disorders. 
Sine qua non to accepting the conceptual and pragmatic dominance of selective 
primary health care, this practice has eroded the healthcare network established for 
comprehensive primary health care. For about one month for preparation before, two 
weeks for implementation and at least two more weeks for consolidation, the entire 
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health sector focuses only on work related to each NID (Khan et al, n. d). 
Consequently, routine immunisation coverage, which was among the highest during 
the 1980S6, sank to its lowest ebb in the 1990s, and Pakistan is still among countries 
where polio is prevalent. During 2001, it reported 85% of the confirmed polio cases 
in the Eastern Mediterranean region and 25% of such cases globally (WHO, 2002). 
2.2.2.4. Beyond the third generation 
By the close of the 20dcenturY, developed health systems, such as in the USA, were 
again faced with access problems, escalating costs and rising concerns about quality. 
However, while they were preparing to move into another round of reform 
(Dougherty, 1996: 1), the Punjab, after having experimented with several reform 
initiatives, embraced devolution. The military government implemented its LGP- 
2000 (1.3.2). All government functions and responsibilities, including the levying of 
taxes, have been devolved to the district (Dawn, 2001). An elected assembly headed 
by a Nazim manages affairs, while the civil servant deputy commissioner re- 
designated as the district co-ordinating officer assists him/her. Thus, the districts can 
now plan, implement and monitor their activities, while the provincial authorities 
concentrate mainly on policy development and supervision (PHDC, 2001). 
2.2.3. Vicious cycle 
So far, in the discussion, it was noted that in the 20th century, whereas a generation 
of reforms overlapped the other, developed countries outpaced the developing health 
systems. That is, the former moved into the next generation, while the latter were 
still struggling with the preceding generation of reforms, and even sometimes 
moving backward. Further, in many cases, the same issues emerged again with 
varying intensity. Why did this vicious circle happen? Moreover, indeed the search 
for a better tomorrow should never stop, but was there any factor in the reform 
process that triggered the next round of reforms? To ascertain this, focusing on the 
study period including the latter half of the 1980s to 2000, the reasons propounded 
for reforms vis-A-vis the proposals made in the context of developing countries are 
contrasted in the following discussion. 
6 The EPI in Pakistan, after evaluation in 1984, won international recognition. The coverage against 
vaccine preventable diseases in Punjab exceeded 95% in children of 2-5 years age and 81% in less 
than 2 years. Source: discussion with a medical officer of the Punjab's EPI programme 
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Why reforms? 
There is a huge body of literature about reforms, but given the boundaries for search 
laid down above, the following examples are selected for outlining the reasons for 
refonns: 
The World Bank (1987: 2-3), generalising the characteristics and performance of 
health sectors in developing countries noted three main issues: insufficient 
resources, inefficient services, and inequity in the distribution of benefits from 
health services. 
Cassels (1995) puts the issues identified by the World Bank in a different 
language. That is, inefficient use of scarce resources and inaccessible services, 
which are not responsive to the needs of people. 
In the Punjab perspective, a World Bank (1998) report notes: insufficient focus 
on preventive interventions, gender imbalance, excessive centralisation of 
management, negative staff attitudes and absenteeism, political influence, lack of 
openness, weak human resource development and insufficient non-salary budget. 
2.2.3.2. What reforms? 
Turning to what remedial measures or initiatives were suggested vis-A-vis the 
problems identified, the prescription by the above three authors are given below. 
" The World Bank (1987: 3-7) proposed four agenda items for health financing: 
user charges, insurance coverage, effective utilisation of non-govemment 
resources, and decentralising the government health services. 
" Cassels (1995) lists six main components of reform programmes: improving the 
civil services; decentralisation; improving the functioning of ministry of health; 
broadening health financing options; introducing managed competition; and 
working with or outsourcing services to the private sector. 
" For Pakistan (Punjab), the World Bank (1998) proposed four interventions: (i) 
achieving a sharp focus on service priorities, (ii) stressing cost recovery, (iii) 
encouraging hospital autonomy, and (iv) improving efficiency and management 
of government services. Further, a number of options including decentralisation 
were also proposed to realise the last (fourth) agenda item. 
2.2.4. Conceptual gap 
From the above, it is seen that each author suggested a range of interventions for 
remedying problems confronting the health sector. For studying these further the 
framework for health sector developed earlier (1.2.2) is applied to classify both the 
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issues identified and the reform agenda suggested. Accordingly, in table 2.1 below, 
the authors arc plotted in the vertical columns vis-A-vis tile problems (ill white) and 
remedies (in shaded) for the different components of health systems given 
horizontally. Support services are missing from this table because no author 
addressed these either not seeing these as problem area or no remedies on offer. 
Table 2.1: - Mismatch between health sector issues and suggested remedies 
Author Governance Provider Communities Resource generator 
World Bank 1987 Inefficient Inequity in the Insufficient 
(Problems) services distribution of resources 
benefits 
World Bank 1987 Decentralisation I Jser char-cs, 
insurance coverage, 
(Remedies) utilisation of'non- 
oovernmental I 
resources 
World Bank 1998 Gender imbalance, Less focus Low non-salary 
centralised 011 budget 
(Pakistan specific rnanaý, ernent, negative "1 -1 
preventive 
problems) staff attitude and services 
absenteeism, political 
interference and lack 
of'openness 
World Bank 1998 Hospital autonorny Sharp focus - Cost recovery 
and improving on service 
(Pakistan specific efficiency and priorities 
remedies) management mainly 
tli]-OLI-, 
-, 
Il 
decentralisation 
Cassels A (1995) Inefficient use 01 An- Non- Scarce resources 
(Problems) resources accessibie responsive 
services services 
Cassels A (1995) Improving civil Improving Broadenin1g, health 
(Remedies) services, Moll fillaricint, options 
decentralisation, Functionitu., 
Key: Non-shaded cell: Problems Shaded cell. Remedies 
The study oftable 2.1 leads to, at least, tile 1`011mving 1,0111- observatiOlls: 
1. While dclining problems some components from tile analysis wcrc missed: only 
one author (Cassels) considered all tile elements of' the health System while 
identit'ying tile problems. However, none of' them addressed all the components 
-32- 
when suggesting the remedies. For the individual components, the communities 
were the most disadvantaged. In one case, some remedy was offered to meet 
their demands. Governance and financing topped the agenda for all three 
authors, while providers were considered by two of them. 
2. The World Bank (1987) document did not identify any governance issue facing 
the world health systems. However, according to its 1998 study, the Punjab 
suffered from an array of such issues. 
3. Generally, the reform package was not proportionate to the problems. The World 
Bank (1987) prescribed decentralisation, while correspondingly there were no 
governance issues. Further, problems were identified concerning both the 
communities and providers, but commensurate measures were not suggested in 
the reform package. 
In the case of Pakistan the prescription largely matched the diagnosis, except for 
community demands and behaviour. Similarly, Cassels (1995), while 
comprehensively identifying issues, including those relevant to the community, 
did not correspondingly prescribe the remedies. 
4. The generic reform package did not match the development stage of the target 
health system. For example, the package proposed by Cassels (1995) has 
elements from all three generations of 20'h century reforms, including managed 
competition and outsourcing. 
One may like to defend Cassels' (1995) views that a generic prescription was 
prepared for a range of countries at varying development levels. However, the 
question arises; given the shortage of an indigenous capacity for policy analysis, 
who will determine the nature and method of administering the reform 
intervention to the ailing systems? For example, it is dangerous to recommend 
market changes for countries which already face access problems because the 
former are likely to exacerbate the latter. 
2.2.5. System thinking approach 
The World Health Report, 2000 attributes the failure of primary health care to the 
lack of attention given to the demands of people; instead the focus remained on their 
presumed needs as determined by providers. The report concludes that because the 
two concepts did not match, the system that was built on these concepts failed 
(WHO, 2000: 14). This principle of mismatches between the 'why' (a raison d' etre 
or the underlying aetiology) and 'what' (remedial measure or prescription) of reform 
leading to the failures is also applicable to the other situations. That is, the reforms 
failing to deliver and the same issues occurring again and the reformers were 
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prescribing the same remedy in a different wrapping. Ham (1997: 135), in the case 
of five developed countries, noted that "if health policy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s was dominated by the concern to achieve cost containment at the macro level, 
and in the late 1980s and early 1990s focused on measures to increase efficiency and 
enhance responsiveness at the micro-level, then in the mid 1990s attention has 
turned to the cost-effectiveness of health care and the difficult choices involved in 
setting priorities". Thus, it was primarily economic concerns that underlay the 
reform efforts made cyclically over time. Interventions were made, which provided 
a solution in the short-run, but in the long-term the problems recurred, and there was 
a need to intervene again. This is because of the narrow vision of the health system 
held by the "system physicians" (policymakers); they looked for some short-term 
symptomatic relief and not the long-term cure. 
Notwithstanding the above, the question still arises - what could have been done to 
avoid such occurrences? Fraser and Wilson (2002) argue that for bringing about a 
change the stakeholders need to change the way they think and work, for it is 
relevant to understanding the complexity involved in health care. They propose a 
'systems thinking' approach, the basic tenet of which is to involve all those who are 
part of the system being explored. Further, because the health system is a social 
system, there are many relations and interactions between its different components. 
Like any medication which is attended by a risk of iatrogenicity and idiosyncrasy, 
tinkering, in any manner, with any component of a system is likely to give rise to a 
ripple effect, with the other components of the system reacting in response. In this 
regard, it is essential to understand two features of how the systems work: 
reinforcing and balancing. In the former case, there is a positive vicious cycle - one 
event, giving rise to more of the same output. For the latter, however, after 
triggering, the resulting event will give rise to an event, which will, in turn, limit the 
first event (ibid). Putting this in a different way Flood (2000) observed that the 
relationship between assuring universal access, controlling costs, and ensuring high 
quality was a 'zero-sum' game. That is, assuring access is likely to increase the cost 
and containing the cost, in turn, might diminish quality and vice-versa. 
2.3. Decentralisation 
In the Punjab health sector, several reform efforts were made in rapid succession, 
nonetheless, employing decentralisation as a strategy common to all these (1.5). It is, 
therefore, pertinent to examine decentralisation in greater depth, and this section 
looks at this aspect in two sub-sections. Firstly, after defining concepts, various 
forms of decentralisation and the rationale for introducing a decentralised structure 
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are given. Secondly, the experience in the Punjab health sector is considered in order 
to contextualise the discussion. 
2.3.1. Conceptual dimensions 
2.3.1.1. Definition 
Although, many authors (see 2.3.1.2) have worked on the subject, the definition of 
decentralisation offered by Rondinelli and Cheema (1983: 18) still remains the most 
commonly referred one, and is upheld. Accordingly, decentralisation is: 
the transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority 
from the central government to its field organisations, local 
administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organisations, local 
government, or non-government organisations. 
2.3.1.2. Forms of decentrafisation 
The transfer of decision-making authority, which is the hallmark of decentralisation, 
may however be seen as a continuum, with centralisation and decentralisation, as the 
moves made in the opposite direction. And depending on the nature of authority and 
its transfer from the centre to periphery, "a number of decision-making structures 
including the delegation of power and devolution" (Green, 1999: 60) is brought into 
place. This consideration invokes identification of a number of ideal types of 
decentralisation (Smith, 1967; Johnson, 1973; Elder, 1973; Rondinelli and Cheema, 
1983; Battistella, 1993; Collins, 1994; Griffith, 1998) which include the following: 
1. Functional deconcentration 
2. Prefectoral deconcentration 
3. Devolution 
4. Decentralisation to local bodies 
5. Delegation to semi-autonomous bodies 
6. Transfer of functions to non-governmental organisations 
7. Federalism 
8. Establishing of public sector markets 
9. Regionalism 
10. Fragmentation7 
However, practically we can only identify certain approximations or mixtures or 
structures in transition. For example, decentralised structures in the Punjab health 
7 This form may be considered by some as a critique of decentralisation (Collins and Green, 1994). 
However, given that the transfer of decision making is on a continuum, fragmentation is an extreme 
form of decentralisation. 
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sector are distinct from the ideal types, and complicated. Here the question is not 
only the transfer of authority from centre to the peripheral unit or a lower tier in the 
hierarchy, but also what type of authority is being talked about. That is, it involves 
considering the authority both vertically as well as horizontally at each level in the 
hierarchy. It is not only the different levels in the organisation, but also what 
functions are performed at each level. For example, since all three functions of 
governance are performed at each organisational level, three major fornis of 
decentralisation - financial, administrative and legal - are identified in the Punjab 
health sector (Collins et al, 2002), and are explained below: 
Administrative powers, and for that matter the principles and code of conduct for 
regulating and maintaining efficiency and discipline and other human resource 
management issues, are drawn up by the Services and General Administration 
Department (S&GAD). These include the authority to appoint, promote, 
undertake disciplinary action, transfer, grant leave, assess training needs and 
decide about the period of training etc. 
The extent of control over resources varies from one tier to the other in the 
health sector hierarchy, which is determined by the Finance Department. An 
office or agency in receipt of a budget is the Accounting Unit and the in charge 
officer is authorised to draw and disburse the amount, depending on his financial 
category. There are four categories of drawing and disbursing officers, 
determined by the Finance Department. Any expenditure beyond the specified 
limit, laid down by the Finance Department, is authorised by an officer higher in 
the hierarchy. 
In addition, there is a plethora of other functions, which do not fall within the 
ambit of either administrative or financial functions. These are legal functions, 
performed at different levels in the hierarchy of the health care network and are 
governed by various enactments. This researcher identified 29 major laws 
relevant to the health sector. 
2.3.1.3. Rationale 
Decentralisation is a political issue that hinges on the power distribution within the 
state system and access to the political decision-making process and allocation of 
public resources. Therefore, its application should not be limited to resolving the 
technical issues of efficiency and effectiveness in management and organisation 
(Collins and Green, 1994). However, the issue is much more complicated. The 
meaning of decentmlisation may be different for different people, and accordingly 
its implementation in an organisation will hinge on its background. For example, in 
Pakistan, according to Rondinelli (1983), decentralisation was believed by the 
-36- 
bureaucracy, as a tool to: (i) foster community participation, and (ii) extend the 
control of the central government - two mutually incompatible objectives. 
Nonetheless, decentralisation has become a popular part of the policy approaches 
adopted by various governments, both with implicit and explicit objectives. The 
former are complex and often difficult to identify, yet they exist (Conyers, 1983). 
An inventory of the explicit reasons or rationale for decentralisation is given below 
(Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983; Rondinelli, 1983; Collins and Green, 1994; Gross 
and Rosen, 1996): 
1. Increases the responsiveness to local needs, because decisions are made by those 
who have access to information and are familiar with the local conditions; 
2. Facilitates the mobilisation of the underprivileged and community participation; 
3. Improves access of the poor to public goods and services; 
4. Promotes national unity and political education because it promotes involvement 
of communities at local level; 
5. Softens the resistance to change by the stakeholders; 
6. Allows a greater opportunity for inter-sectoral collaboration; 
7. Overcomes the disadvantages of centralised and distant bureaucracies by 
reducing red-tape; and 
8. Facilitates the adaptability, flexibility and efficiency in the management of the 
systems. 
2.3.2. Decentralisation in the Punjab health sector 
Decentralisation in the Punjab can be traced to the colonial era, e. g. the 
recommendations of a Royal Commission upon decentralisation appointed in 1904 
and which reported in 1908, formed the basis for promulgation of an All India Act, 
1919. Through this legislation, the subject of health was shifted from the central to 
the provincial list of functions. Later, under the India Act, 1935 provinces were 
granted autonomy, making the provincial legislature and provincial governments 
responsible for developing and implementing their internal policies (Gol, 1928). 
The post-colonial health sector in the early phase, led by the local remnants of the 
Indian medical and civil service, was a continuation and extension of the colonial 
health care system. Another feature, as Collins (1994) notes, during the post- 
independence period was the continuation of programmes and the introduction of 
other disease specific vertical programmes, isolated from the mainstream health care 
system. A senior planner commented that the district health system, "as a result, was 
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being run not as an integrated district health system - it was something else, a 
fragmented system. There were, at least, 7-8 organisations within the district that 
were reporting directly to the province or some office outside the district... " 
During the 1990s decentralisation was a national agenda and constituted a central 
point of the national health policy (MoH, 1998a). The SAP supported it by laying 
down two top priority policy areas: provision of preventive health services, and 
increasing decentralisation of authority to the district level. Under the overall 
umbrella of SAP, a SFHP was implemented, and decentralisation of authority to the 
district level was a dated covenant of this project (GoPb, 1993). For meeting donor 
requirements and to address issues in the health sector, the government of Punjab 
made repeated attempts at reforming the health sector. However, some of these were 
overtaken by the events and others progressed towards decentralisation, yet others 
led to a different outcome. Some authors mention 'centralisation through 
decentralisation' or 'decentralisation as a means for re-centralisation' in developing 
countries (Conyers, 1983; Collins and Green, 1994). In the Punjab, however, 
decentralisation was mayheM8 leading to a status quo. And, it was a joint venture of 
the politicians and bureaucracies, with the latter dominating the process. An 
observer painted the latest situation as follows: 
There is a general feeling that the generalist bureaucracy through semi- 
literate politicians wanted to undermine professionalism, eliminate the 
poor through corporate culture of commercialising and privatising the 
health care in a country where 1/3rd population lives below the poverty 
line. Ironically, there was no real ownership of the decentralisation 
concept either at the provincial government or at other levels. It was 
being nurtured and introduced by those politicians and civil servants 
who believe in and are trained on centralisation. Mughals, Ranjeet 
Singh and Gora Sahib [local designation for the colonial English boss] 
are still their favourite. The model of decentralisation/autonomy for the 
Punjab Health Department should have been indigenous, incremental 
and designed by the stakeholders who were to deliver. It should have 
been a problem solving and bottom up approach without ignoring the 
environment or living in an island. You will not be surprised to know 
that we have not learnt any lesson either from the recent history of the 
health sector reforms or the past history of the Mughal era. Same 
things have happened again in 2002 in the same old way. So ... we are 
proudly at square one9t 
8 Extract from an interview of this researcher with the minister for health, Punjab. 
9 Comments of a senior officer made in his email of February 13,2002 addressed to this researcher. 
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2.4. PoliCy 
The reforms have a bearing on the overall purpose, context, strategies and the 
institutional capacity to implement the proposed changes. Further, these changes, 
whether taking place in the health system or in any of its sub systems, have 
implications not only for the individual sub system they are focused at, but also, as 
WHO (1993 cited in Berman, 1995: 16) propounds, on the overall policies and 
institutions of the health system. Thus, there is a need to explore the policy arena. 
This objective is achieved in this section, firstly, by defining health policy, drawing 
from the explanation of policy in general. Secondly, the debate on policy analysis is 
presented. Thirdly, the policy process is reviewed from the perspective that it is an 
important variety of policy analysis. 
Conceptual debate 
2.4.1.1. Definition 
The dictionary meaning of the word 'policy' is "a course of action that has been 
officially agreed and chosen by a political party, business or other organisatiorf' 
(Longman, 1995: 1089). This definition implies, at least, three elements of policy: 
(i) it is a string of activities and not a one point in time action; (ii) the activities are 
formally agreed to; (iii) by some organised body, political or otherwise. The policy 
could also be of an individual's act as, "a particular principle that you believe in and 
that influences the way you behave" (ibid. 1089). In the context of this study, it is 
the former with which we are concerned. But, this temporal definition of policy 
takes us nowhere (Hill, 1997), because the term is vague and has been used in many 
ways. For example, Hogwood and Gunn (1984) provide an inventory of ten different 
ways the word 'policy' has been used. These range from an expression of a general 
purpose or decision of government to a theory or a process for a much longer time. 
Given the large vocabulary and synonyms for the word 'policy', it may be 
distinguished from decision, as opposed to that it involves a series or network of 
decisions. However, it is less readily distinguishable from administration or 
bureaucracy, since these terms denote the carrying out or implementing policy 
(Parsons, 1995). Sometimes, there could even be no policy on certain issues, as this 
is "an attempt to define and structure a rational basis for an action or no action" 
(ibid. 14). Similarly, Heclo (1972) defines policy as "a course of action or inaction 
rather than a specific decision or action". But, to what end? So, the debate is still far 
away from its logical end. Exploring the concept further, Hill (1997) identifies six 
attributes of a policy which are given below: 
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1. A decision network may be involved in producing actions taking place over a 
long period of time. 
2. Policy is not expressed in a single decision, but in terms of a series of decisions, 
which together comprise the common understanding of what the policy is. 
3. This is dynamic, and a decision in the chain of events may change over the 
course or process of policyrnaking. 
4. Following the Hogwood and Gunn (1984) model,. there may be termination or 
succession of policy. 
5. Non-decision underlies much of the political activity aimed at maintaining the 
status quo. 
6. Action over a period of time without being formally sanctioned by a decision 
may also form policy i. e. street level bureaucracy contributing to policymaking. 
Although comprehensive, yet the above definition of policy is unidirectional and 
maintains the non-specified nature of actions or decisions. Gordon et al (1977) term 
policy in the sense "to describe a range of activities including: (i) defining 
objectives; (ii) setting priorities; (iii) describing a plan; and (iv) specifying the 
decision rules". According to them, "these characteristics of policy differ not only in 
their generality and the level at which it is supposed to occur, but also in whether 
policy is assumed to be entirely prior to action or at least partly a post hoc 
generalisation or rationalisation". They advocate "a recursive relation between the 
policy and action, with policy itself representing an essentially dynamic set of 
constructions of the situation". In other words, policy is a course of action or a web 
of decisions, which iterate before being finalised. 
2.4.1.2. Health policy 
After having explored the definitions of policy in general terms, we can define it in 
the health perspective. According to Foltz (1996), because the health sector in any 
country is part of its general policy environment, the observations made on policy in 
the preceding section usually also hold true for health policy. In other words, the 
aforementioned definition of policy can be adapted to health policy by adding the 
descriptor 'health'. However, Walt (1994: 41) defines the term as "health policy 
embraces courses of action that affect the set of institutions, organisations, services, 
and funding arrangements of the health care system. It goes beyond the health 
services, including actions or intended actions by the public, private and voluntary 
organisations that have an impact on health". This study follows this definition; 
therefore, the subsequent discussion may be seen in this context. 
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2.4.1.3. Types of policies 
Hill (1997: 12) refers to Lowi's (1972) classification of policies. Accordingly, 
distributive policies concern the provision of services or benefits to particular groups 
in the population. Redistributive policies consist of deliberate government attempts 
to change the distribution of income or wealth through, for example, tax. Regulatory 
policies involve imposition of restriction on the behaviour of individuals or groups. 
Finally, in the case of constituent policies, the state is engaged in the design and 
redesign of institutions. 
Webb and Wistow (1986) introduce three categories of policies: service, resource 
and governance policies. In their view, policy in the service context consists of 
commitment to meet the 'specified type and level of need in a particular way' - the 
aim, which is constrained by the resources. Therefore, they argue that the term 
'policy' denotes the orchestrated confluence of services and resources, thus raising 
the question - what orchestrates this confluence? They term such policies that 
determine the orchestration of confluence as governance policies, specifying the role 
of the state in terms of philosophy of management and control within the public 
authority. To these three sets of policies, Challis et al (1988: 37) added a fourth, the 
fiscal policy concerning the level and structure of taxation and related issues. 
Walt (1994) takes a different view in developing the typology of policies. She 
divides policies into 'high' and 'low', borrowing the terms from international 
relations literature. The major decisions concerning the national economy or security 
concerns influenced by the most powerful or ruling class are high policies or macro 
or systemic policies. Such policies fall in the domain of the government and take the 
shape of law through legislature. Low policies, also called sectoral or micro policies 
concern relatively ordinary issues influenced by specific interest groups. However, a 
particular policy may not be static: a low policy, depending on the action by the 
interest group, e. g. media may become a high political agenda and vice-versa. 
Furthermore, the low policies may add on incrementally and over time change to 
systemic policies. Table 2.2 reproduces Walt's (1994: 43) typology of policies. 
Table 2.2: - Policy types and levels 
High policies Low policies 
Policy type Macro policy Micro policy 
Systemic policy Sectoral policy 
Policy level National government Ministry of health 
State government Local health authority 
Regional authority Institute (e. g. hospital) 
Policy example Regulation of private practice Introduction of breast screening 
Civil services reforms Change in vaccine policy 
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2.4.1.4. PoliCy ICVCIS 
Frenk (1994) proposes four policy levels and the matching objectives and issues 
addressed through reform and the resultant change (Table 2.3). Accordingly, 
although a change at any level, for the reform to be comprehensive, he stresses, the 
intervention should contemplate changes at all levels of policy. 
Table 2.3: - Policy levels vis-A-vis objectives, issues and type of change 
Policy Level Objective Issues Type of change 
Systemic Equity Basis for population eligibility and Restructuring or 
Institutional arrangements: redesigning 
9 Public agencies involved in the 
healthcare 
0 Level of government 
0 Public/private mix 
0 Population involvement 
0 Resource generators 
0 Other sectors with effect on 
health 
Programmatic Allocative a Priority setting Re-orientation or re- 
efficiency 0 Cost-effectiveness of programming 
interventions 
Organisational Technical 0 Productivity Re-organisation 
efficiency * Quality of care 
Instrumental Institutional 9 Information system Re-enforcement 
intelligence for 0 Scientific research 
performance 0 Technological development 
enhancement 0 Human resource development 
Source: Frenk J (1994) 
Briefly, the systemic level policies concern the role and responsibilities of the major 
components of health system and refer to those aimed at determining population 
eligibility in order to ensure equity or fairness of the system. The programmatic 
level policies address the contents of health service in terms of the actual 
programmes and interventions, e. g. package of universally available services 
through priority setting for achieving allocational efficiency. Cost-effectiveness 
analysis is often used for this purpose. The organisational level policies are about 
technical efficiency, concerning how best the health services are provided. Finally, 
the instrumental level policies are intended to generate institutional intelligence 
needed for better system performance, and take the form of collecting data and use 
of health system information, research and technology and human resource 
development. 
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2.4.2. Policy analysis 
In the literature the terms 'Policy study', 'policy analysis' and 'policy science' are 
used. Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 29) prefer "using policy study for descriptive 
accounts and policy analysis for prescriptive exercises, with policy sciences as an 
umbrella phrase to cover both". Walt (1996), however, believes that policy analysis 
incorporates also policy process, and serves both to describe and prescribe the 
policies. This definition is followed, because, as will be seen, the description and 
prescription are inseparable. 
Policy analysis is an important aspect of policymaking, and there is wide-ranging 
concern of it having often been neglected, especially in the health sector (Gordon et 
al, 1977; Walt and Gilson, 1994; Frenk, 1995; Barker, 1996). Therefore, in the 
ensuing pages, an account is given of how the concept developed, what are the 
different analytical approaches, and how to conduct a policy analysis exercise. 
2.4.2.1. Conceptual development 
According to Parsons (1995), it was Lindblom who first used the term policy 
analysis in 1958 and indicated the need for its formalising as a scientific non- 
quantitative and largely non-theoretical method away from the conventional 
quantitative and theoretical economic methods. He observed that alternative public 
policies differ only slightly, because in his view the political procedures are 
incremental. That is, the successive policies are only incrementally different from 
each other and the method of analysing these, he called incremental analyses. Later, 
Dror (1967) proposed developing policy analysis as a broader professional 
discipline, essentially building on the concepts for system analysis. He argued that 
the contribution of system analysis, like a Programme-Planning Budget System, was 
mainly due to the "wisdom, sophistication and open-mindedness of the few 
outstanding practitioners of system analysis". To sustain the innovation, he 
advocated for developing such "institutional arrangements, professional training, 
and job definitions, which will provide the desired outputs with ... not necessarily 
outstanding personnel" (ibid). 
The main features of policy analysis suggested by Dror (1967), however, point to 
this phenomenon being a 'state centred' compared to the lately advanced 'society 
centred' approach (Walt, 1994: 4). The former is concerned with the actors within 
the state institutions, while the latter is concerned with analysing how far the 
outsider's interests have influenced the state. In this regard, a reference is made to 
class (where a particular social class dominates decision-making and the outcome 
always favours that class), pluralistic (different groups compete to influence, 
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although practically the one who shouts louder is heard) and public choice (the state 
is itself an actor) approaches (ibid). 
Further, the conceptual boundaries of policy analysis have since expanded, 
borrowing theories from a number of social science disciplines. Heclo (1972) 
indicated that in this approach various parts of 'multi-disciplines' have been 
integrated into a coherent 'inter-discipline'. That is, the disciplinary boundaries for 
policy studies are fluid "as policy concerns organising purposive action in a society 
by the state authority, it is concerned with meta-choices, i. e. choices as to how 
others shall make their choice in whatever sphere the public authority is intervening" 
(ibid). And given that the policies are expressions of these meta-choices, the policy 
study straddles a number of academic disciplines, including sociology, psychology, 
economics and management (Parsons, 1995). 
2.4.2.2. Approaches to policy analysis 
Barker (1996) distinguishes between the analysis carried out with the aim of 
furthering the academic work in health policy; and the studies a health manager 
within the organisation intends to develop in order to strengthen policy process. This 
distinction is based on the earlier attempts at separating the 'analysis of policy' or 
knowledge of policy and policy process from 'analysis for policy' or knowledge in 
the policy process. The former denotes how the problems are defined, agendas set, 
policy formulated, decisions made and policy evaluated and implemented. The latter 
implies the usage of analytical techniques, research and advocacy (Parsons, 1995). 
This distinction indicates a dichotomy in the usage of these terms, reflecting a 
division of disciplinary concerns. Yet, Gordon et al (1977) argue that there is a 
continuum, with the two phenomena overlapping at some point (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1: - Policy analysis -a continuum 
Analysis for policy Analysis of policy 
Policy Information Policy Analysis of Analysis of 
advocacy for policy monitoring and policy policy contents 
evaluation determination 
10 
Source: Gordon el al (1977) 
To the above range of approaches identified within the rubric of policy analysis, 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) add two more: process advocacy and study of policy 
process (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: - Types of policy making 
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Source: Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 29 
In the case of the policy process, according to Hill (1997: 4) "attention is focussed 
on the stages through which issues pass, and attempts are made to assess the 
influence of different factors on the development of the issue". And such a study 
44can consist of individual case studies or attempts to devise generalizable but largely 
descriptive propositions about the nature of public policymaking" (Hogwood and 
Gunn (1984: 27). Since, this thesis is about 'analysing the policy process for the 
Punjab health sector reforms', the policy process is studied in a greater depth. 
Before that however, a brief resum6 of the methods and techniques for analysing the 
policy process is given. 
2.4.2.3. How to conduct policy analysis 
Much more will be said on this topic in the next chapter. However, to complete the 
argument, the issue is briefly introduced here, focusing on how this discipline grew 
to the current practice. Lindblom (1958) proposed to study policy employing 
methods, which contrary to the conventional methods are characterised by relatively 
less reliance on theory; a partial or fragmented view of the important variables; a 
close intertwining of the search for values and facts; and no policy presumption of 
the kind employed in the conventional method. Later, Dror (1967) specifying these 
methods as 'qualitative method' noted that the policy analysis would heavily rely on 
"Gestalt-images, qualitative models, and qualitative methods instead of the main 
emphasis being placed on explicit knowledge and quantitative models and tools". 
Heclo (1972), in his review article took the debate further. He identified that 'case 
study' was the dominant approach employed in policy studies. According to him, the 
case studies are unique in theory construction and with their ability to 'move' with 
the reality of the dynamic world of policy process. Finally, Hill (1997) noted the 
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case study approach appropriate for policy analysis. However, for studying the 
impact of a policy, he advocates the combined use of a case study and quantitative 
method. About the particular techniques employed, Barker (1996) describes three 
broad categories. The first is 'asking the public', which may involve methods like 
individual interviews, focus group interviews and/or group interviews. Second is 
'asking the experts', employing methods ranging from brainstorming to the Delphi 
technique and consensus building conferences. While the aforementioned categories 
are aimed at collecting information, the third category of methods deals with the 
processing and analysing of data, and includes operational research and techniques 
such as cost benefit analysis and cost effective analysis. 
2.4.3. Policy process 
Policy process, according to Foltz (1996) is the process by which a government or a 
society sets its activities and allocates resources. It is complex and dynamic, but 
important, which the policy analysts should not ignore, because it is "created by the 
interaction of decisions, policy networks, organisations, actors and events" 
(Minogue, 1993: 11). Further, the policyrnakers knowing the policy process are 
likely to improve the way the policy for reforms is formulated. 
Almost every author on policy science has attempted at establishing the model for 
studying the policy process. Broadly, these are stagist or comprehensive; and in the 
following, the most commonly encountered ones are presented briefly: 
2.4.3.1. Stagist models 
The Easton model, which has received considerable 
attention, has seven stages (Box 2.1). As elaborated by 
Jenkins (1978 cited in Hill, 1997: 23) he contemplates the 
political systems as the "black box" for policy process, and 
like biological systems exists in an environment, where a 
variety of other systems like social and ecological systems 
are also operative. The demands by individuals and groups 
and support in terms of voting, obedience to the law and 
payment of taxes constitute the input that is fed into the 
Mack how of dnrkinn tnnkincy fnr ennveminn intn thi-. 
Box 2.1 
Easton model 
1. Initiation 
2. Information 
3. Consideration 
4. Decision 
5. Implementation 
6. Evaluation 
7. Termination 
decisions and policies of authorities as output. The output is in turn feedback into 
the system as input. By this approach, Hill (1997) argues, complex political 
phenomena can be better conceptualised. Further, the policy process can be 
disaggregated into a number of segments, making it amenable to analysis. 
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Hogwood and Gunn (1984) go further in devising a model for studying the policy 
process comprising nine steps (Box 2.2). However, this model, unlike Easton's, 
makes no selection or adoption of a particular policy after option analysis, and "goes 
beyond a simple identification of stages to suggest actions that ought to occur. As 
such, it offers a version of a rational model of decision making" (Hill, 1997: 23) 
Parsons (1995: 77), although not happy 
entirely with the stagist approach, presents the 
policy process in a cyclic fashion. The various 
steps involved include problem definition, 
identification of alternative solutions, option 
evaluation, selection of preferred policy 
option, implementation, and evaluation 
(Figure 2.3). Like the earlier models, this is 
rational or logical and shares their merits. 
However, the question arises, how distinctly 
the different stages are demarcated from each 
other, and to what certainty the next stage 
Box 2.2 
Hogwood and Gunn model 
1. Deciding to decide (issue search 
and agenda setting) 
2. Deciding how to decide (issue 
filtration) 
3. Issue definition 
4. Forecasting 
5. Setting objectives and priorities 
6. Option analysis 
7. Policy implementation, 
monitoring, and control 
8. Evaluation and review 
9. Policy maintenance, succession, 
or termination 
occurs? For example, as Walt (1994) argues, 
policies may remain only intentions or may be implemented in a way that distorts 
the original intentions of policymakers. 
Figure 2.3: - Policy life cycle (Parson's model) 
Problem 
Evaluation roblern definition 
Identification 
of alternatives 
Implementati 
Evaluation of options 
election of policy 
Source: Parsons (1995: 77) 
Barker (1996) relates the policy process to planning, distinguishing a number of 
steps involved in the policymaking process (Figure 2.4). Her model, which draws 
mainly on the Hogwood and Gunn's model, is deficient in that after defining 
options, no policy is selected or adopted for implementation. Yet, she advocates 
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policyrnaking as an evolutionary process, often beyond the control of the health 
managers. She stresses that such a managerialist approach is unworkable, although 
development of strategies is possible. That is, the policyrnakers need to carefully 
analyse the policy system distinguishing the environmental constraints that are to be 
lived with and what features of the health system are amenable to change. 
Figure-2.4: - Stages in the policy making process (Barker's model) 
Issue definition 
etting objectives 
Priority setting 
ng options 
Implementation 
Evaluation 
Source: Barker (1996: 28) 
2.4.3.2. Critique of stagist models 
From the above, it is obvious that there is a degree of disagreement about the 
different stages of policyrnaking, but Hill (1997) argues that this approach has an 
advantage as it offers the opportunity for carving out the segments of the policy 
process for an in-depth analysis. Nonetheless, 'stagist' models have been subjected 
to the following critique (Foltz, 1996; Hill, 1997; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993): 
1. The process is not so logically ordered and smooth as portrayed in different 
models. In fact, some stages may occur simultaneously, while others may be 
skipped. Similarly, the health sector, unlike a mechanical system, is not static; it 
is changing. The "social engineer", therefore, has to react accordingly and adjust 
the instrumentation. 
2. The policy process involves the inter-organisational and intra-organisational 
interactions within and between different levels in the government hierarchy -a 
relationship that itself is also subject to change (by some supra-body). There is, 
therefore, a meta-policymaking, i. e. the concern is not only with securing a 
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specific outcome, but also with changing the basic rules of the game, including 
determining the outcome. 
3. The causal explanation - how policy moves from one stage to the other - is not 
provided by the stagist approach, and it cannot be tested empirically. 
4. The stagism characterises policymaking as a managerialistic top-down process, 
excluding the role of 'street level bureaucrats' in policyrnaking. 
5. It fails to provide an integrated view of the analysis of the policy process and 
knowledge, information and research used. The policy analysis does not take 
place in the evaluation phase, but continues throughout the process. 
2.4.3.3. Parsons' model 
Parsons (1995: xvi), sharing the above critique on stagist models, combines different 
stages of policyinaking and proposes three broad and overlapping phases of analysis 
and an overarching meta-analysis to consider the methods and approaches used in 
the policy study. These three phases: meso-analysis, decision-analysis and delivery 
analysis are briefly described below: 
" How the issues and problems are defined and the agenda is set, is called meso- 
analysis. This is the pre-decisional stage of the policy process involving 
identification and anticipation of problems or opportunities that suggest the need 
to consider some action. After that, a conscious decision is needed to make a 
choice of issues, based on explicit criteria. Once a problem or policy issue has 
been identified, then it is analysed in order to define it in its depth and breadth. 
" Decision analysis, considers how the process of decision making per se takes 
place. This phase involves processes like forecasting, objectives setting and 
options analysis. Forecasting is speculating as to how the situation will develop 
if it is allowed to continue, and concerns the expected future and may be 
established by extrapolation, using judgmental or certain modelling techniques. 
Setting objectives and priorities relates to the desired future and is central to the 
administrative and political rhetoric. Since there could be several alternatives to 
achieve a particular objective, these alternatives are analysed using techniques 
like cost-effectiveness analysis, cost-benefit analysis or decision analysis to 
finally select the best alternative for implementation. 
" How the policies are administered and managed is dealt with by delivery 
analvsis, which encompasses policy implementation, monitoring and control, 
evaluation and review, and maintenance, succession, or termination. However, in 
order for the implementation to be effective, it is essential that potential 
problems are anticipated beforehand and measures to combat these are built into 
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the programme. Monitoring implies seeing whether the intervention made is 
performing as planned, and if not then remedial measures may become 
necessary. Unlike implementation, which includes monitoring and control that 
focuses on output, the evaluation and review concerns the outcome, shifting the 
focus to whether the policy is working as intended or requires a review? And this 
review may entail maintaining and replicating the policy or incorporating certain 
changes and succession or termination. 
2.4.3.4. Comprehensive models 
The comprehensive approach considers the policy as a unit and analyses the process 
in its entirety. The most cited examples of this approach, taken into account for this 
study, include Walt and Gilson (1994), Frenk (1995) and Gonzalez-Block (1997). 
Walt and Gilson (1994) consider in their model three basic elements: context; 
content; and process interlocking with actors that assume the central role. This 
model does not take into account the principles and purposes which guide the 
formulation of contents and provides direction to the proposed reform. 
Frenk (1995) argues that for appraising any reform proposal four fundamental 
factors must be kept in mind. These include: problem; proposal; protagonists and 
the broad principles and purpose that should be defined as measures to formulate 
the vision and mission of the health system under reform. He omits 'process' 
from his model since in this case, reform is yet to be implemented. 
Gonzalez-Block (1997) conceives the health sector reforms in terms of their 
content, process, purpose and scope. The actors, in his analytical scheme, are 
placed in the health system, which according to him has two dimensions: (a) 
actors, and (b) interaction amongst the actors. This model, although relatively 
comprehensive, fails like that of Walt and Gilson (1994) to recognise the 
importance of principles or the greater 'why' of the reform. 
2.5. Summary and conclusions 
Chapter 2 explored the concepts surrounding reform, decentralisation and policy, 
contextualised in the Punjab health sector. After attempting to define health sector 
reform and associated terms, its development over time was traced. It was noted that 
with the new millennium, the reforms went beyond three generations seen during the 
20th century in developed countries. On the other hand, developing countries were 
way behind. Whereas the reforms, one after the other, might have been necessary for 
evolving a better tomorrow, their introduction in this way was partly due to the lack 
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of system thinking by the policyrnakers. That is, problems were identified and 
interventions made, without regard to the re-enforcing and/or balancing attributes of 
the health system. Therefore, either the problems requiring introducing reform got 
multiplied or remained unaddressed, giving rise to the need for yet another reform. 
In the Punjab it was seen that decentralisation was a strategy common to different 
initiatives, nevertheless used as a means to maintain the status quo. One may, 
however, wonder why this happened? Collins et al (2000) argue that decentralisation 
has consequences, indicating a need to explore the policy process for developing an 
understanding of decentralisation and the resultant decision-making structures. 
Therefore, the concepts surrounding the policy arena were explored. Since 
'fuzziness' surrounds this concept (Kroneman and Zee, 1997), various definitions of 
policy were discussed followed by a debate on analysing policymaking as a process. 
Different models and frameworks developed for studying the policy process were 
also reviewed. Whereas the stagist models have been widely criticised, the most 
cited comprehensive models lacked perfection, indicating a need for developing yet 
another. In order to respond to this call, in the next chapter this researcher sets out to 
develop a framework for analysing the policy process for health sector reform. 
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3. Conceptual framework 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 explored the concepts surrounding health sector reform, decentralisation 
and policy in order to identify a framework for analysing the policy process. As this 
attempt was unsuccessful, this chapter embarks on establishing one for the reform 
initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health sector. This is done by: 
1. drawing from the discussion in chapter 2, a conceptual framework is developed 
for the policy process; 
2. making a commentary on the component tenets of the framework in order to 
have a better understanding of this analytical tool; and 
developing a hierarchy of variables as a guide for the application of framework 
to studying the reform initiatives selected for this research. 
3.2. Framework for analysing the policy process 
A framework is needed to establish a common understanding and as a means of 
analysing the policy process for the reform initiatives. For this purpose a number of 
frameworks were reviewed (2.4.3). However, since those lacked the needed 
comprehensiveness, it is done again, nonetheless, drawing different elements from 
them. Similarly, the definition of health policy process that forms the basis of the 
framework, developed for the purpose of this study, draws on the definitions of 
health sector reform (2.2.1) and debate on policy (2.4) as below: 
It is a process that originates in the health sector and leads to formulating 
its contents which are then implemented. This process is guided by 
certain principles and the shal2ers remain operative throughout, 
contributing to the outcome. The health sector, which hosts the 
reform(s), forms its context and environment where other reforms may 
also be happening. 
The above definition of the policy process can be depicted figuratively (Figure 3.1). 
Accordingly, this framework builds on and is nested in the framework developed 
earlier for conceptualising the health sector (1.2.2). 
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Figure 3.1: - Conceptual framework for the policy process 
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This framework is based on the assumption that the policy process is divided into 
three overlapping phases: origin, formulation and implementation, while principles 
and purposes, and shapers are operative throughout the process. That is, reforms 
take their origin in the health sector which hosts them and forms their context. After 
passing through the formulation or designing of contents these are implemented, and 
feedback into the health sector, before any decision is taken about their succession, 
termination or maintenance. However, this process is not that simple. It is complex 
and dynamic -a notion supported by the following attributes of the framework: 
1. The policy process is not sequential, for in real life, such a disciplined process in 
a social system, like the health sector, rarely takes place. This is an iterative 
process, i. e. different stages communicate back and forth as indicated by the bi- 
directional arrows, and the net result is often an outcome of the multiple factors. 
2. The principles and purposes set out for the policy guide the shapers in their 
actions. These may be drawn from political or closely related ideological reasons 
and determine the overall direction for the policy process. 
3. The shapers are embedded in the health sector. Unlike the actors (a word used 
by other authors), who come to play a pre-defined role, the shapers are proactive. 
They form a part and influence the direction of the process and the consequent 
output. The shapers could be individuals, groups and organisations. 
4. The environment or context is both internal and external. The former may be a 
component of or the entire health sector, depending on the comprehensiveness of 
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the reform. The external environment is divided into two orbits: the inner orbit 
hosts the national systems, while the international systems are in the outer. 
5. Contents form the body of a policy and are the fine tenets or a set of decisions 
aimed at transforming the contextual grounds to a statement of the desired 
future, including the identification of the means to achieve that. 
6. Implementation or administration is important; policies are meaningless unless 
these are enforced. Peters (1978) considers that policies may be of advantage to 
some and disadvantage to others, indicating these have both objective as well as 
subjective components. The former concerns providing gratification and 
deprivation to the citizens, while the latter is about the way these are delivered - 
a point where the administration of policy becomes important in policymaking. 
7. The decision making process overarches the whole phenomenon; therefore it is 
not separately labelled in the figure. That is, this concerns not only the course of 
action, i. e. one phase running into the other, but also how the shapers and 
principles impinge on this phenomenon. 
8. The dotted boundaries in the figure identify the policy process as a social 
phenomenon which is open and therefore amenable to the effect of factors 
prevalent in the environment and vice-versa. That is, the relationships between 
the reform, the health sector and its environment are dynamic, directing both 
inwards and outwards (see arrows). 
9. The reform may be taking place in the entire health sector or in one or more of 
its components or even in some other sector. Since it is a social phenomenon, it 
will have an effect across the boundary of other health sector components and 
the refonns being undertaken there, but also across the sectors as well. 
10. Different stages in the policy process involve inter-organisational interactions at 
different levels in the government (Health v/s Finance) and between different 
national systems at the same level (Health and Law). However, given the 
relatively weak position of the Health Department, the Finance or Law 
Department might affect and actively contribute to the resultant health policy. 
11. There could be a supra-ordinate shaper or body, e. g. individuals like the chief 
minister or structures like the Chief Minister's Secretariat, impinging on all 
national systems. They may even change the system and structure within which 
the policy process occurs, influencing the very basis and contents of the policy. 
12. The international systems may exert influence on account of their demonstration 
effect or the conditionality attached to them. However, most of the national 
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systems in developing countries, not developed to the level of developed 
countries, are ill-equipped to absorb and sustain such intervention. 
3.3. Tenets of framework for analysing the policy process 
After having described general features, the individual tenets of the framework are 
discussed below. Particular attention will be paid to the application of this 
framework in studying the policy process for the Punjab health sector reforms. 
Principle and purpose 
Seedhouse (1995) emphasises that unless a reformer has first thought out what is 
meant by reform, and defined the principles that should guide the reform process, 
any cogent change cannot even begin to be made. In his view, the reform must be 
forward looking and should lead to a higher stage of development. But, this is a 
general statement of purpose which needs further specification. Hammer and 
Berman (1995) identify three poles around which the international debate on the 
strategies for health sector reform revolve. These are: (i) improving aggregate health 
status, (ii) improving equity and reducing poverty, and (iii) improving individual 
welfare. Although this approach focuses on health, it provides a narrow concept that 
does not take into account all the aspects of reform. The focus is mainly on the 
recipients of the service, while the providers and mediator or governance are not 
considered. Frenk (1995) expands this concept and proposes four principles: 
citizenship, pluralism, solidarity, and universality. Similarly, he suggests three 
purposes: equity, quality, and efficiency. He argues that a system that bases its 
mission on such principles and purpose should satisfy both the users and the 
providers. Since this is a comprehensive approach for laying down the principles 
and purposes for health reform, it is therefore, adopted for the purpose of this study. 
However, consideration of principles or values and the purposes of reform take the 
discussion into the political arena and political ideology held by the reformers. 
Three reasons have been proposed for this. Firstly, different people may value health 
differently. Secondly, it involves the re-distribution of resources, i. e. the question of 
'who gets what? ' or 'whose prioritiesT are addressed. Thirdly, there is always some 
response to a policy - negative from those who do not get and positive from 
recipients, nonetheless both in turn affect the policy process. In other words this 
aspect of the conceptual framework addresses the broader question as to 'why' the 
reform initiative was being introduced (Peabody et al, 1999). This question is 
critical, because this concerns the laying down of objectives, which in turn 
influences the contents of the reform package, and thereby determines the resulting 
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shape of the health sector. Gilson (1999) identifies three policy objectives: explicit, 
short-term political and philosophical. According to her, "explicit objectives are 
modified both by the way in which health services are viewed by citizens, providers 
and government, which in turn are a reflection of the particular philosophical, 
historical, and cultural context of reform, and by short-term political strategies that 
tend to emphasise the importance of cost containment and the use of policy to 
support re-election7. These objectives, in her opinion, influence and determine the 
shape of the health systems and any reforms introduced there. 
To explore the principles and purposes underlying the Punjab health reforms, the 
following logical sequence for directing the enquiry is contemplated (Figure 3.2) 
and two questions are framed - whether the reform was aimed at bringing about 
some change, and what was the motivation behind the initiative? That is: 
Figure 3.2: - Identifying the principles and purposes 
Aim Of 
reform Change 
Yes 
No 
1. Firstly, to know whether the reforms were aimed at bringing some substantive 
change in the health sector? This consideration is essential, because often 
bureaucracy and politicians may not mean what they appear to be involved in. 
For example, Webb and Wistow (1986) noted that the public sector makes more 
progress on paper than on the ground. 
2. Secondly, it is about understanding the motivation for change: ideological or 
political (Gilson, 1999). Ideology concerns the principles and purposes proposed 
by Frenk (1995). Politics, however, deals with the electoral demands and related 
pressures, although this may overlap the former. 
3.3.2. Shapers 
This facet of the analytical framework addresses the question as to 'who sets the 
agenda? ' (Walt, 1994) or 'who is at the helm of affairs? ' for identifying the 
problems, determining the need for intervention, including the setting of a vision and 
strategies, and finally implementing and evaluating reforms. This may be the 
government or organised interest groups, whether international like the World Bank, 
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the International Monetary Fund and other aid agencies or national, such as Non 
Governmental Organisations, Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ibid). 
Glassman et al (1999) from their analysis of reforms in the Dominican Republic 
identified five key groups of players: public sector, private sector, unions (or civil 
politicians), political parties (or public politicians) and other non-governmental 
organisations. Chinitz (1995) refers to such shapers as the sub-governments, 
determining the contents of public policy and shaping its process. According to him, 
"there is no real indication that the general public supports the health reforms per 
se". And he attributes this state of affairs to the politician's lack of interest in 
shaping the people's opinion regarding the substance of reforms. Notwithstanding 
the different shapers identified above and the observations made by Chinitz, this 
study emphasises that the search for shapers must not lose sight of the end users - for 
whom this entire set up is created. An intervention will not have the desired output - 
like improved health status - unless the individual and communities choose to 
benefit from it. Therefore, in Brazil, for example, the National Health Council, 
which has a strategic role in developing and controlling the implementation of 
national health policy, has 50% representation drawn from the end-users. The 
government, health care groups, and providers constitute the remaining 50%. This 
arrangement, it is noted, serves to voice the interests of the community, and fosters 
its participation in the policy process (Collins et al, 2000). 
Walt and Gilson (1994) classify actors as societal, political and public. By societal, 
they mean the role of trade unions, the business community, and marginal social 
groups as well as political parties influencing the politics. The political actors denote 
the political trends; social stratification including class, ethnic and regional loyalties; 
foreign donors and investors, and the size and quality of the Civil Service. Finally, it 
is the Public or Civil Service, which is important because of the role it plays in 
implementing the reforms. While, this is a comprehensive classification, Frenk 
(1995) offers a pragmatic way of identifying actors. He brings all the components of 
the health sector on the basis of his model for the health system as actors, 
categorising them as: providers, resource generators, government, and the 
population. However, this model does not take into account the environmental 
factors, especially the national and international hegemonic systems. 
The next question is how to identify the shapers and their role in the policy process! 
The stakeholder analysis has been advanced as a policy toolkit to identify shapers 
and their characteristics (ODA, 1995; Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000; 
Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000) and as Frenk (1995) indicates, to anticipate their 
prospective role in policyrnaking and devise strategies for mobilising their support 
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for the policy. This exercise, run both prospectively as well as retrospectively, is 
particularly helpful in: 
1. identifying the shapers and their attributes, i. e. importance, interest and influence 
held by them; 
2. locating their position in the health sector i. e. end-users or communities, 
providers, governance, resource generators, support services and environment. 
3. determining their role, e. g. leaders, supporters, bureaucracy, media, donors and 
civil society (see 5.1 for definition of these roles). 
Analysis of shapers for a particular reform can be presented as in Figure 3.3. That is, 
in the first stage different shapers are identified, for example by their designation. 
Second, they are classified according to: (i) attributes or who; (ii) location or where; 
and (iii) role or how they shaped the policy process. 
3.3.3. 
Seedhouse (1995: 1) noted that "transformations are undoubtedly taking place, but 
they are almost always based on incomplete thinking, and are often on account of 
reasons which do not make sense". By this, he emphasises the need for taking into 
account the context or 'where' the reforms are introduced. This is because the 
shapers of reform do not work in isolation, but as Walt and Gilson (1994) argue, 
they are influenced by the context within which they live and operate, at both the 
macro-governmental and micro-institutional level. 
Frenk (1995) terms context as 'problems' the reforms are aimed to solve and include 
changes in the demographical, epidemiological, educational, technical, cultural, 
political and economic situation. Likewise, Collins et al (1999) identify six 
categories of contextual factors or rationale for reform: demographic and 
epidemiological, socio-economic, economic and financial policy, politics and the 
political regime, ideology, public policy and public sector, and external factors. 
Cassels (1995) notes that despite the health sector being riddled with problems and 
Figure 3.3: - Exploring the shapers 
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poor indicators necessitating reforms, some stimulus is needed to evoke the reform 
process. In his view, it is the political, economic and the changing role of the 
government which serves as a stimulus to trigger the reform process. This is more 
so, given the uncertainty and conflict that surrounds policy choice. Walt and Gilson 
(1994) usefully indicate health policy, which used to be decided by the medical dlite 
with a consensus, as 'low politics'. However, after the 1980s, it became a 'high 
politics' agenda item. Economic Adjustment Programmes, like cuts in budgets, 
introduction of user fees, promotion of the private sector etc, contributed to more 
actors appearing on the scene (ibid). 
Collins et al (1999) emphasise understanding the policy context as a critical element 
of policy analysis, as it contributes to the development of policymaking in four 
ways: (i) developing the objectives of health sector reform, as it explains why an 
issue is or is not on the agenda; (ii) policy appropriateness, by increasing the acumen 
of policyrnakers to appreciate uncertainty; (iii) policy process, by enabling better 
understanding of the complex interactions between the actors and the context; and 
(iv) political feasibility of change and providing space for manoeuvring. 
Having underlined the importance of understanding context this can now be 
explored using the framework for policy analysis. Accordingly, the problems (in the 
terms of Frenk) or factors heralding reform can be determined by exploring the 
context at least at three levels (Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4: - Analysing the context 
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Firstly, it is the internal environment of the health sector that is under reform and the 
problems or issues which it faces, justifying the introduction of intervention. This 
level of enquiry can also be taken in further depth to the individual components of 
the health sector. Secondly, the national systems, in the inner orbit of the external 
environment, are taken as context and any problem and intervention made there is 
seen in relation to these. Finally, the international systems, which are in the outer 
orbit of the external environment, form the third analytical level of context 
(Twaddle, 1996). It may, however, be noted that these levels are inclusive and the 
outcome of context analysis would largely depend on where the analyst positions 
him/berself. That is, a holistic view will require studying the context at all levels. 
Another feature of this framework is that each of these levels has two strata: crisis; 
and the usual situation. Alford (1975: xii) argues that crisis serves as a political 
weapon in the hands of interest groups, within and outside government, who use it 
for diverting resources from one programme to the other and arousing public 
opinion. This distinction, nonetheless, raises the question; who determines the 
critical nature of the context? This question was partly dealt with under 'shapers', 
while the remainder will be explored when we discuss 'process'. 
3.3.4. Contents 
The contents form the body of a policy and are the fine tenets or a set of decisions 
aimed at transforming the contextual grounds to a statement of the desired future, 
including the identification of the means to achieve that. The contents correspond to 
the design or formulation phase of policy making. In this regard it has already been 
discussed that the reformers or shapers guided by the principles and purposes 
muddle through the contextual factors for developing the contents of reform. In this 
pursuit, however, care is needed, as already indicated (2.2.5) as any change in one 
part of the health sector will have a ripple effect and other components will respond 
to this intervention. Moreover, as noted earlier (2.2.4) a suggested set of 
interventions, in many cases, was in disregard of the contextual factors, so there was 
a mismatch between the "why" and "what" of reforms. 
Frenk (1994) proposed four policy levels and the matching objectives and issues that 
may be addressed through a reform and the resultant change (2.4.1.4). From this, 
one may infer that reform may range from a piecemeal or low-level policy change to 
a complete comprehensive restructuring. That is, there could be another category of 
reforms, where the change is built gradually, i. e. incrementally, and it is argued that 
a piecemeal change at one point in time may develop flesh over time to develop into 
a comprehensive reform package. Gonzalez-Block (1997) distinguished such 
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reforms from those gradually built-up, depending on their contents. According to 
him. the comprehensive reform denotes the "policy forinUlatioii and implementation 
that comprises the systemic. programmatic. organisational and instrumental polICN, 
levels through explicit strategies sustained in well documented experiences and 
theories, and implemented with the support of a specialised authoritative agelicy 
with consensus building capacity". Although a useful interpretation, it is likely to 
complicate the analysis. For this delmitioii incorporates too many variables 
including those arising from implementation, which althou. gh overlapping the 
formulation phase of the policy process, is considered separate by this franiework. 
The contents are the 'what' of the policy for reforms and in terms of a research 
variable for this study address the question of 'the government's concepts and design 
of reform'. While this framework highlights the relationships between various 
phases of the policy process, the scheme for identifying policy levels is borrowed 
from Frenk (see table 2.3 in chapter 2). Thus, the policy contents inay be analysed at 
two levels. That is, the context with input froin the policy machine and other 
stakeholders in policyniaking guided by principles and purposes is processed in tile 
"black box". The output of this process is tile policy content, which is analysed first 
to segregate the policy per se and qUestions may also be asked about, c. o L- I 
management systems and support mechanism to manage the change and to bUild the 
capacity of tile implementing agency. Was a communication strategy developed and 
to what extent was this used to consult and involve the stakeholders'. ' Secondly, the 
policy is examined for determining the policy level addressed ill terms of it being 
compreliensive or piccemeal (Figure -33.5). 
Figure 3.5: - Determining the contents 
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3.3. -5. Implementation 
Implementation is an important aspect ofthe policy process (Walt. 1994) and it has 
been argued that the public sector is often ineffective in doing it (I logwood and 
Gunn, 1994). For this observation Pressman and Wildavsky (1973 cited in I logwood 
and Gunn, 1984: 197) identify three causes. These are: (i) bad CXCCUtIO11, (ii) bad 
policy, and (Iii) bad luck. While the former two are self-explanatory and are under 
inquiry, bad luck is attributed to the cirCUrnstances beyond the control of 
impicinenters. In this background, Ilogwood and Gunn (1984) prescribed a ten-point 
model for -perfect irriplementation', as given below: 
I. The circumstance external to the agency does not impose crippling constraints. 
2. Adequate time and sufficient resources are available. 
3. The required combination of resources is available. 
4. Policy is based on a valid theory of cause and effect. 
5. The relationship between cause and effect is direct, and there are few, it' any, 
intervening links. 
6. Dependency relationships are minimal. 
7. There is an understanding of, and agreement on, objectives. 
8. Tasks are fully specified in the correct sequence. 
9. C0111111LInication and co-ordination must be perfect. 
10. Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance. 
13LIt, this top-down approach to implementation has been criticiscd l'or being too 
managerialistic and authoritarian and instead a 'bottolll-Lill apprOaCh' has been 
advocated (II. jern and Porter, 1981). In this regard. Lipsky (NSO) propounds the 
idea of 'street level bureaucracy', i. e. those individual civil servants who are in 
active contact with tile clients. III his view, out of their r0LItil1C arld dcViCCS to CopC 
with work preSSUres, they contribUte to policyrriaking. I lowcver, subsequent writers 
saw this phase of policy process as I negotiated relationship bctýveen tile 'central 
steering and local at. 11[0110111y" (Lane, 1987). It is it complex process wherc the 
implcmcntcrs contribl-Ite actively to the policy l'ormulation, which is not it hilear or 
secILIC11tial, but iterative phenomenon. In other \\ords, as Lindblom ( 1958) maintains 
"a policy is directed at a problem, it is tried, altered, tried III its altered I'Orm, altered 
again and so on". And the successful i Ill I)ICIIICIItat 1011 01' a p0IICy I-CLIIIII-CS 110t 0111y 
good political and managerial skills and strategies, bUt also a Set 01' prlIICIpICS that 
govern the relationships among differcrit parties involved (Gilson. 1999). 
Impicnientation ill%'OIVCS tile LILICStIOll, '110\V' tile 110liCieS ý11-C ZI(IIIIIIIISM'CLI MILI 
managed, i. e. it conccrns tile CXCCLItIOll, 1110111toring, and Control Of policy 
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implementation. In other words it looks into government procedures for managing 
reform, including knowing their ultimate fate - whether continuing, replicated, 
modified and continuing, or terminated. However, what was the implementation 
process for the health sector initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health sector? This 
is studied from two aspects: preparedness and execution. The former may appear a 
part of the design phase of policy process, but is considered with implementation, 
because this is about developing a set of tools or infrastructure needed to actually 
commence or execute the reform. And during this phase, the planners should be in 
active dialogue with the managers (Green, 1999). Further, looking at the normative 
way of policyrnaking in the Punjab health sector, this aspect is often left for the 
implementers to work on (see Appendix 3.1 for the Punjab public policy process). 
Nonetheless, to analyse the implementation aspect of policy process at first level, the 
status of preparedness is adjudged by addressing questions like political feasibility 
and testing technical feasibility. The next level addresses the questions surrounding 
execution, mainly whether the initiative is maintained, terminated or has been 
replaced (Figure 3.6). Since, evaluation or impact of policy is out of the scope of this 
study, it is not discussed and no question is framed for the enquiry. 
Figure 3.6: - Exploring the implementation 
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3.3.6. Process 
Classically defined, the process is "concerned with the way the policy is made and 
implemented" (Hill, 1997: 1) or more explicitly, it is "the process by which a 
government or society sets its activities and allocates resources" (Foltz, 1996). In 
other words, it concerns the broader question of 'how' the reform is undertaken in 
terms of origin, formulation and implementation. In this regard, it was noted that the 
process overarches the whole phenomenon qfpolicymaking and concerns not only 
the course of action, but also how the shapers and their principles affect the process. 
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In other words, this aspect of analysis deals with looking into the "black box" in 
order to determine how decisions are made. The policymaker in this exercise is seen 
negotiating within and outside, with the organisations and individual actors whose 
concurrence may be necessary for policy implementation. Given that there could be 
such inter-organisational politics and manipulation, it may become difficult to even 
locate the real policymaker. This makes it difficult to prefigure the process, because 
this is dynamic, the nature of the relationship between policy actors and the world 
around in which they operate is diffused (Gordon and Lindley, 1977). Highlighting this 
phenomenon, Gilson (1999) argues that reform processes are not simple technical 
strategies, but involve social changes that are value-laden and often conflict-ridden. 
According to her, it is "the values, actors, and actors' perspectives that hold 
significant importance over the content and process of reform". In other words, this 
needs determination: how did various shapers contribute towards the reform 
process? Further, at the heart of this question lies another question - what 
determines that a particular decision will be made in a given way? 
The above aspect of enquiry was considered in the section on principles and 
purposes, and shapers. A reference was made about how shapers influence the 
decisions or policy. It was conjectured that this relates to the notion of power and 
output, i. e. the shape a particular policy takes, depends on the manner power is 
distributed in society. In this regard there are different views (Barker, 1996; Walt, 
1994; Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). Briefly, Pluralists view power as diffused 
throughout a society, so that no group alone holds absolute power. Marxists, 
however, view it differently. According to them power is distributed, but not equally 
- he who shouts louder, is listened to. Instead, they see power distributed among 
classes and state functions to ensure the continuing dominance of these classes. 
Based on this theory, Ritists view the power confined in the hands of an influential 
few. In corporatism, the state has the power to overcome the conflict between labour 
and capital. Professionalists see power concentrated in the hands of the professional 
dlite, who prefer their own interests to the public they serve. In this regard the 
technocracy and bureaucracy (especially the generalists) are also relevant. The 
former denotes technocrats making the decisions, often using rational techniques. 
Similarly, the generalist bureaucrats, although being in the service of political 
masters, are powerful due to their knowledge and expertise. 
Perhaps, as Walt (1994) brings evidence from literature, it is artificial to classify 
decision-making approaches: rational, incremental or mixed scanning. Nonetheless, 
explained briefly, rational means that the policymaker follows various steps in a 
logical and scientific order and the result was a rational decision, which achieved the 
purpose most effectively. The incremental model presented by Lindblom (1959), 
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accepts at the outset that only a few issues can be resolved at a time, i. e. policy 
making is a serial phenomenon and the policyrnaker has to come back and forth to 
address different issues, i. e. he is still "muddling through". Therefore, the rational 
approach implies describing 'how it ought to be made', while the incremental is 
grounded in the activities considering practical insight and describes 'how it is 
made' (Walt, 1994: 5 1). Mixed scanning propounded by Etzioni (1967), however, 
encompasses both the aforementioned models. This is the middle position between 
rational and incremental approaches, where the policymaker divides the process into 
the micro and macro decisions - the latter are taken first, while the former are 
looked into later during implementation. 
Ham (1997: 119-120) identified four approaches to a reform process: (1) big-bang 
reform, where the reforms are introduced in a short period of time and are driven by 
a government committed to their implementation; (2) incremental reform is a 
cautious gradual build-up over a long period of time; (3) bottom-up reforms, which 
originate in the lower echelons, and are adopted by the higher levels contrary to the 
top-down approach, where the top tiers dictate the process; and (4) "reform without 
reform"; where change continues to occur despite there being no central policy or 
plan. In other words, instead of trying to build change in the whole of the health 
sector in one go, the pieces where the consensus can be built are identified and 
implemented. This approach to reform can also be regarded as an incremental one. 
Nevertheless, to analyse the process various questions are framed. For example: how 
was the issue identified and how was it decided to bring this (issue) on the political 
agenda? How were the objectives and priorities fixed and then how were those 
addressed? The enquiry may extend to finding about option analysis, projection 
techniques, planning etc. The implementation phase is distinct and analysed 
separately. This is because the implementation largely concerns the output, while the 
process is about the way the decisions are made in developing a particular policy. 
Further, this may be noted that because the process is dispersed throughout 
overarching the whole phenomenon of policyinaking, it is not depicted figuratively 
as the other tenets of policy process. 
3.4. Summary and conclusion 
Based on the concepts explored in chapter 2a theoretical framework has been 
developed in chapter 3 to analyse the policy process for health reforms. This 
framework has six components: principles and purposes; shapers, origin or context; 
contents or formulation; implementation and process. In addition, a number of 
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variables drawn from each of these components (Figure 3.7) were identified in order 
to frame an enquiry for addressing the research question. 
Figure 3.7: - Analytical hierarchy for the policy process 
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Thus, the stage has been set for examining the policy process for the Punjab health 
sector reforms undertaken during the period 1993-2000. In the next chapter the 
research process or methodology is explained for applying the analytical framework 
developed in this. 
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4. Research process 
Introduction 
So far, we have established the context and explored the concepts surrounding this 
study, an exercise that culminated in developing a framework for analysing the 
policy process for the Punjab health sector reforms. This chapter documents the 
process or methodology employed for investigating the reforms. In other words in 
terms of Silverman (2000: 232), it is telling the readers "how we gathered data, what 
data we ended up with and how we analysed them". This objective is achieved in 
this chapter by: 
1. dealing with the general issues about this research in section 1; 
2. explaining the research design and methods in section 2; 
3. providing an account of the process for conducting the fieldwork in section 3; 
4. answering the question how data was transformed into results in section 4; and 
5. presenting the strategies about how the credibility, ethics and quality of this 
qualitative research have been upheld in section 5. 
The research process for this study is seen in figure 4.1, below. That is, the problems 
identified in the health sector led to establishing the aims and objectives and 
defining the research question; a process that was guided by literature review and 
the conceptual framework. Research protocols were developed and used to collect 
data that were analysed and reported, guarded by the research ethics and its 
credibility and quality was ensured through knowledge, rigor and research skills. 
Figure 4.1: - Research process 
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4.2. General issues 
4.2.1. Purpose 
According to Patton (1990: 150), definition of purpose is central to research. He 
provides five alternatives, albeit, on a continuum with no hard and fast line of 
demarcation between them. These are: 
" basic research to contribute to knowledge and theory, 
" applied research to illuminate a societal problem, 
" surnmative evaluation to determine a programme's effectiveness, 
formative evaluation to improve a programme, and 
action research to solve a specific problem. 
The purpose of this study is to conduct a form of applied research, which has certain 
elements of basic research and formative evaluation. However, within these 
technical remits the aim of this study is "to explore factors that influenced the policy 
process for the government initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health sector during 
the period 1993-2000". Drawn from this aim, the major objectives of the study are: 
1. to develop a framework for analysing the health sector; 
2. to describe the changing structure and functions of the Punjab health sector; 
3. to establish a framework for analysing the policy process for reforms; 
4. to analyse the policy process for the health sector reforms undertaken in the 
Punjab health sector during the period from 1993-2000; 
5. to explore the factors both enabling and disabling that influenced the policy 
process for reforms; and 
6. to draw lessons for the ongoing and future reforms. 
4.2.2. Question 
The research question(s) represents the facet(s) of an empirical domain, which the 
researcher wishes to explore (Huberman and Miles, 1998). Ritchie and Spencer 
(1994) note that in applied policy research questions are broadly in four categories: 
contextual - identifying the form and nature of what exists; diagnostic - examining 
the reasons for what exists; evaluative - appraising the effectiveness of what exists; 
and strategic - identifying new theories, policies, plans or actions. According to Yin 
(1994), the researcher may, in certain exploratory case studies, undertake fieldwork 
before a research question is defined. Tellis (1997), however, argues that only an 
experienced researcher could use this option. Since, once a broad question has been 
defined, Keen and Packwood (1999) note, then either of the two approaches is 
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applicable. Firstly, a set of precise questions is developed at the outset and data 
collection and analysis is aimed at answering these. Secondly, the earlier stage of 
fieldwork is used to feed into identifying and refining the specific questions. 
Given the above liberty and caution, the formulation of the research question in this 
case has been an iterative process, and, as seen in figure-4.1, this benefited from the 
conceptual frameworks and their applications. According to Miles and Huberman 
(1994) the research question may be general or particular, descriptive or exploratory. 
In this case, however, it is mainly exploratory and moves from general to specific by 
breaking the former into a number of specific sub-questions. 
Given the aims and objectives (4.2.1), this study addresses the question as to "what 
factors influenced the policy process for the government initiatives undertaken in the 
Punjab health sector during 1993-2000". Since, this question has several facets, and 
as Miles and Huberman (1994) noted, this is the case in any qualitative inquiry, it is 
surrounded by more questions and sub-questions which are given below: 
1. What is the changing structure and functions of the Punjab health sector? 
1.1. What is the organisation of the health sector? 
1.2. What are the role and functions of various components of the health sector? 
1.3. What are the status, issues and problems in the Punjab health sector? 
2. What was the policy process for the health sector reform initiatives undertaken 
in the Punjab health sector during the period 1993-2000? 
2.1. Which reform initiatives were undertaken during the period 1993-2000? 
2.2. Who and how did they influence the shaping of reform initiatives? 
2.3. What were the principles and ideology behind the reforms? 
2.4. Why were the reforms introduced, or what factors or issues preceded the 
introduction of reforms? 
2.5. What were the scope and proposal in terms of concepts and design? 
2.6. How did the government conceptualise and design the reforms? 
2.7. What was the process for implementing reforms? 
2.8. What was the eventual fate of the reform initiative? 
3. What were the factors that influenced the policy process and lessons for the 
ongoing or any future reform initiative in the health sector? 
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4.2.3. Significance 
Despite a great deal of interest in health sector reforms all over the world, few 
systematically planned studies have been undertaken (Gross et al, 1998). This is also 
true for the Punjab and this study where the focus is on analysing the policy process 
and determining the factors that influenced the output of reform initiatives. Sofaer 
(1999) argues this situation is largely due to the health sector researchers borrowing 
theories from the social science disciplines instead of developing their own. 
The current study undertaken in the Punjab perspective, therefore, is an original 
work and 'like many qualitative researches' breaks new ground adding to the body 
of knowledge (Health Services Research, 1999). The government as well as donors 
can use the results to determine the course of action for planning and implementing 
the reform policies whether ongoing or for a future undertaking. 
4.2.4. Boundaries 
Given the research question (4.2.2), this study has several dimensions. It would, 
therefore, be reasonable to identify the mandate posed by this study. However, it 
may be noted that this is not going to be a hard and fast boundary, as all factors and 
influences in the context need to be taken into account (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
This is a qualitative research study, primarily applied with certain elements of basic 
research and formative evaluation. The case study approach has been used to study 
different stages of the policy process - conceptualisation, formulation and 
implementation - with the aim of (retrospectively) analysing the policy process. 
Gilson (1999) notes such an approach as a means for evaluating health reform. 
However, a distinction needs to be made here between summative and formative 
evaluation. The former is aimed at assessing effectiveness once an intervention or 
programme has stabilised. This study, however, is a formative evaluation, which 
uses process data and is aimed at improving the policy/programme. 
The lessons emerging, in or over time, may be seen as remedial suggestions, and are 
part of the researcher's effort to carry the argument to its logical conclusion. 
Nonetheless, this study is exploratory: it detennines the factors, which influenced 
the output of reforms undertaken in the Punjab health sector. However, since it 
poses also "what" questions, in addition to "why" and "how", it has explanatory 
elements as well. 
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4.2.5. Research type 
The research methods are commonly distinguished between those essentially 
qualitative or quantitative research methods. According to Schwandt (1997), 
qualitative, an adjective attached to a variety of social inquiries, is a blanket term for 
various methods. Creswell (1994: 1-2) explains this as "an inquiry process of 
understanding a social or human problem based on building a complex, holistic 
picture formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants and context in a 
natural setting". The quantitative study, alternatively, is "an inquiry into a social or 
human problem, based on testing a theory composed of variables, measured with 
numbers and analysed with statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the 
predictive generalisation of the theory hold true" (ibid). 
This study employs qualitative research methods. This is because, as Keen and 
Packwood (1999) propound, given the aim is to understand the reasons for the 
success or failure of an intervention, the researcher cannot have control over 
conceptualising, formulating and implementing policy. Further, the experimental 
designs are not feasible and the observational designs have limited value. Moreover, 
according to Myers (2001), "motivation for doing qualitative research, as opposed to 
quantitative research, comes from the observation that, if there is one thing which 
distinguishes the human from the natural world, it is our ability to talk! " He adds 
that "qualitative research methods are designed to help researchers understand 
people and the social and cultural context within which they live". But, why use 
qualitative research in this particular case, is the next question to address. 
The health system, which is the object of this study, is complex in terms of its 
ingredients, dynamics and relationships. To study a system of this nature, one needs 
to employ methods that have a holistic approach, and qualitative methods offer this 
possibility (Barker, 1996). Further, there is a lack of agreed research tools and 
frameworks to study the health system, which adds to the dilemma and challenges. 
Since the qualitative methods are flexible, innovative, iterative, and allow the 
researcher to study issues in depth and detail, they are most suited to such a situation 
(Patton, 1990). Qualitative methods cmphasise the context and process and are 
concerned with describing the detail of what is going on in a particular setting 
(Murphy et al, 1998). The researcher is, therefore, in a position to record the case in 
its entirety in order to develop a case study. 
Qualitative research is dynamic in nature, which is suitable for examining the 
intentions, social constructions and meaning in culture and structural processes and 
historical changes using techniques of interview, observation and document review 
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(Grbich, 1999). In a similar vein, Sofaer (1999) notes that qualitative research helps 
move the inquiry towards a meaningful explanation. Therefore, he maintains, this is 
of particular importance in policy studies, because "the rich descriptive capacity of 
qualitative methods can result in a far more complete and often far more compelling 
articulation of the intervention". This is precisely the situation for the current study, 
which is predominantly exploratory and "curiosity" underpins its posture. In such 
settings, Chenail (2000) argues, qualitative research is an appropriate methodology. 
However, as stated earlier, qualitative research embraces an array of methods: case 
study, action research, ethnography and grounded theory. This researcher identifies 
them as 'approaches' for distinguishing from data collection techniques or methods. 
Nonetheless, the next question is, which approach should be used and 'why'? 
4.2.6. Approach 
The case study approach is used in this study. This "consists of an intensive, detailed 
description and analysis of a particular individual or event" (Moore, 2001). Yin 
(1994) identified three types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory, and 
descriptive. The exploratory case studies are considered to answer 'what' questions, 
as a prelude to some social research. The fieldwork and data collection may be 
undertaken ahead of defining research questions, but the framework must be created 
beforehand. The causal studies use an explanatory approach to answer 'how' and 
'why' questions. The descriptive case studies require that the theory covering the 
depth and scope of the case under study be defined at the start (Tellis, 1997). To 
these types, Stake (1994: 236-247) added three more: intrinsic, instrumental, and 
collective. The intrinsic case study is undertaken because the researcher is interested 
in knowing more about a particular case. If the objective is to have insight into a 
particular issue or refinement of a theory, the instrumental case study approach is 
employed. The collective case study is used when more than one case is studied to 
inquire into a certain phenomenon. The objective of adding more cases to the study 
is to have a better understanding of what is/has been going on. 
What type of case study approach was employed in this study? Stake (1994) 
indicates that the researcher could simultaneously have several interests and it is 
often difficult to distinguish, especially between the intrinsic and instrumental case 
studies. Similarly, the boundaries between different approaches as proposed by Yin 
(1994) are not distinct either. There is always some overlap between them and it is 
essential, according to Yin, for the researcher to explicitly define his/her approach 
before embarking on a study. Accordingly, as indicated earlier (4.2.4), this study is 
primarily exploratory with explanatory and descriptive elements. However, why was 
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the case study approach adopted? This approach, since allows a focus on a particular 
policy case (Blaxter et al, 1996), is used to study the reform initiatives undertaken in 
the Punjab during the 1990s. Keen and Packwood (1999) propound that in the policy 
process a number of stakeholders are involved and each one of them has their own 
interpretation of events. Capturing these views, in their opinion, is often possible 
using "interviews or other qualitative methods within a case study design". 
Nevertheless, a case study approach has also certain limitations. The focus is on one 
or just a few case(s) and a limited number of participants selected purposefully may 
not be typical to generalise results. Yin (1994: 30-32), however, forcefully argues 
against such an assumption posing a counter question: "How can you generalise 
from a single experience? " In his view, in a case study, the researcher's goal is "to 
generalise theories (analytical generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalisation)". Or, as Tellis (1997) notes, the "goal of study should be 
to establish the parameters, and then should be applied to all research. In this way, 
even a single case could be acceptable, provided it met the established objective". 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 233) building on an earlier work by Ford (1975), 
conceptualised "qualitative information isomorph" -a termination point of a 
sampling frame. According to them, the sample - large or small - is sufficient when 
it is not profitable to add even one participant. This may be taken as an objective 
way of determining the size of the sample, but purposeful and convenient sampling 
for qualitative research prevails in the literature. 
Another criticism is about the lack of adequate 'rigour' in the case study approach, 
which according to Yin (1994) may allow bias to influence the findings and the 
conclusions drawn. Ratcliffe and Gonzalez-del-Valle (1988) define rigour as "the 
scrupulously precise and scientifically exact application of research methods for 
gathering data and of analytic techniques used to treat and analyse the data". They 
note that although much emphasis is laid on rigour during training, the concern for it 
during the research process is uncommon. Yin (1994), building on this, argues that 
such a deficiency is not unique to a case study, but could also enter in all other 
research approaches. He acknowledges, however, that in case study research this 
issue has not been well attended to. Therefore, he emphasises determining the skills 
possessed by the researcher, as a part of designing the case study protocol. 
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4.3. Study design 
Boundaries for this study, in general terms, were defined earlier. Here the concern is 
about study design, where three considerations are important: location or spatial, 
participants or inclusion criteria and instruments or data collection tools. These are 
discussed below, on the premise that qualitative research allows a flexible design 
and does not require an a priori well-defined framework (Murphy et al, 1998). 
Spatial consideration 
The study focuses on the Punjab province (Pakistan) and the reform initiatives 
undertaken in the public sector health systems during the period 1993-2000 are 
reviewed. Since Lahore is the capital of the Punjab, where the political head offices, 
provincial health secretariat, directorate, special projects and offices of other major 
stakeholders of reform are located, the research was based there. However, the 
researcher also travelled to several other locations, including Multan and Jhelum, 
where the DHAs were established. Journeys were also made to places including 
Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), where the exiled ex-chief minister of Punjab lives, to discuss 
and interview key informants and to hold workshop sessions. 
4.3.2. Inclusion criteria 
For those working with statistical inferences, qualitative sampling can be confusing. 
It is purposive and many strategies can be used depending on the purpose of the 
study (Byrne, 2001). In this case, it is primarily criterion sampling, but purpose and 
convenience overarches the process. As to the size of the sample, there can be no 
single answer. Mainly, it was data saturation used as an indicator to stop recruiting 
more participants. Nonetheless, how the cases, participants and documents were 
selected for inclusion in this study is given below: 
4.3.2.1. Cases 
The qualitative researcher is often content even with one well-chosen case study, 
because as Yin (1994) argues the cases may have several sub-cases embedded 
within them. Contrarily, however, Miles and Huberman (1994) advocate that 
multiple cases may be included in a study. It is helpful, in their view because given 
the varying nature of different cases in terms of comprehensiveness and the 
development stage achieved, such a strategy offers a better understanding of the 
policy process. Further, constraints like accessibility of data and availability and 
willingness of subjects to participate in a study necessitated sampling, so four cases 
were selected for in-depth study. This selection was also due to the overlap in their 
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major interventions, as some were not representative of the whole process. However, 
it was purposive sampling, and given the aim and objectives of this study, four cases 
(SPP, DHA, IA and DHG) were considered an adequate "frame" to analyse and 
explore the policy process that "undergirds" this study (ibid: 27). 
The process for selecting interventions for study is given in figure 4.2. That is, this 
researcher constructed a list of reforms undertaken during the study period (1.5) 
which was later validated in a session with the senior permanent staff of the Health 
Department and finally confirmed from a review of the archives. 
Figure 4.2: - Selection of cases 
Keeping in view that four reform initiatives were studied, the shapers and their 
respective locations in the health system varied and their identification was also 
contingent on a snowballing effect. A final list of such persons was, therefore, left 
until the researcher started the fieldwork. This approach is adopted because 
qualitative methods allow sampling in this manner (Murphy et al, 1998). 
In response to the request of this researcher for allowing access to the officials and 
documents, the government appointed a committee comprising the senior permanent 
staff of the Health Department. This committee assisted this researcher in drafting a 
list of concerned officials and documents for consultation by the researcher (GoPb, 
2000f). A meeting of this committee held on May 27,2000, refined and largely 
verified the erstwhile tentative list prepared by the researcher. In order to 
substantiate this evidence a session on 'stakeholder analysis' was organised as an aid 
to identify the main actors and for whom the success and failure of a particular case 
mattered. Out of the list so devised, participants were selected purposefully for focus 
group discussions (FGD) and individual in-depth interviews based on the 
4.3.2.2. Participants 
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individual's availability and willingness to participate. Nonetheless, more 
individuals were subsequently added for interview as a result of snowballing effect - 
one respondent indicating the other source - to answer queries arising in the mind of 
researcher during fieldwork and to obtain specific pieces of information. The 
process for selecting study participants is given in figure 4.3, while the list of 
participants for interview and FGDs appears in Appendix 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
Figure 4.3: - Selection of participants 
Identified by Stakeholder 
researcher 
II 
analysis 
FGD 
participants 
articipants Vetted by 
--- 
ýInterviewces 
veterans Interviewces 
Snowballing 
4.3.2.3. Documents 
In the health sector a range of documents is produced by the agencies and sections 
involved in the reform or by interested groups. These include situation analysis, 
working papers, minutes of meetings, proposals, review reports, progress reports, 
memos and correspondence, personal diaries, news items, published and 
unpublished material, and all sorts of grey literature relevant to the reform initiative. 
This study envisaged accessing such documents. However, given the enormity of the 
number and type of documents - documentation is one of the basic features of the 
bureaucracy - and their location in various sections and offices of the government, 
the permanent senior staff in the Health Department helped this researcher in 
drawing up a classification of documents. Based on their indications and armed with 
the government's permission, the researcher also used his personal contacts, which 
were often most effective in locating the relevant documents. Added to that list was 
the snowballing effect - one document pointing to another located in another section 
or office of the government. Finally, a purposive selection of documents was made, 
keeping in view their relevance for different interventions. The process for this type 
of sampling is seen in figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: - Selection of documents 
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4.3.3. Instruments 
DHG 
Instruments are tools developed for data collection. Since the qualitative researcher, 
according to Creswell (1994: 145), is the primary instrument for collecting and 
analysing data, and given that "data are mediated through this human instrument 
rather than through inventories, questionnaires, or machines", in the following 
section, concepts around this term are explored further. However, this is done in the 
background that the human are 'the initial and continuing mainstay' instrument, but 
other forms also exist (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 236). 
4.3.3.1. Instrumentation 
Earlier in this chapter (4.2.4) an effort was made to draw boundaries for this 
research. However, it was noted that since qualitative research allows a flexible 
design, it is liable to instrumentation along the way. Instrumentation, as Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 35) note, comprises loosely or tightly structured methods for 
collecting data and in qualitative research this means more than employing device 
for observing and recording events. That is, not only those initially conceptualised 
are reconfigured and revised as suggested by data, but also some technical choices 
may be made during the research process. For example, in the case of an open-ended 
interview, whether notes will be taken? Or tape-recorded? 
However, the question arises, how much "preplanning and structuring of 
instrumentation" should be done? Miles and Huberman (1994: 3 5) while providing a 
useful account of the arguments for "little" vis-A-vis for "a lot" of prior 
instrumentation, also opine on a third option, "it depends". That is, whereas they 
argue that "the amount and type of instrumentation" should depend on conceptual 
framework and research question, the first stance emphasises on certain types of 
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validity, the second is to ensure internal validity, generalisability and manageability 
of data. The third stance considers reaching for absolute answers as unhelpful; 
instead it is both contingent and ecumenical. 
4.3.3.2. Researcher as instrument 
Human instrument can be used as individual as well as organised into teams. In the 
current case, however, because this researcher had a role in the policy process for 
the four health sector reforms being studied, he knew many respondents and most of 
the documentation. That is, articulating the former attribute, he: 
1. led the Sheikhupura Pilot Project (see 5.3.3.1); 
2. coordinated the activities of DHA, Multan (one of the two DHAs) (5.4.6.3); and 
3. was a close observer (and commentator) of the policy process for IA and DHG 
(see for details 5.5; and 5.6). 
Therefore, as Lincoln and Guba (1985: 39) emphasise, he, acting as a human 
instrument in the research process, was in a position to influence, e. g. problem 
definition, design determination, data collection and analysis and reporting of 
findings. Nevertheless, he took up the role because, as they argue "it would be 
virtually impossible to devise a priori non-human instrument (e. g. paper-and pencil 
or brass instrument) with sufficient adaptability" required in a qualitative research 
setting. And given that, as Hofstadter (1979 cited in Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 46) 
noted, there is a trade off relationship between adaptability and perfectibility, there 
are chances of biases creeping in, albeit human can recognise and tackle them better. 
Underlying these observations are the assumptions that "unlike inanimate objects, 
people think, have feelings, communicate through language, attribute meanings to 
their environment, and have different beliefs and personal characteristics" (Devers, 
1999: 1159). However, how were the biases and other confounders controlled in this 
research, it is explained in sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.3. 
4.3.3.3. Study instruments 
Nonetheless, a number of tools were developed as an essential vehicle for eliciting 
the response of subjects, and to keep a general check on the direction the qualitative 
inquiry was taking. The instruments, as Warner (1991 cited in Huberman and Miles, 
1998: 205) observes, help in maximising construct validity, and minimise the 
researcher bias or impact on interpretation by connecting him with peoples' 
experiences. Further, these tools enhance the internal validity, generalisability and 
better manageability of data (see 4.3.3). 
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Instruments were developed for gathering in-depth and comprehensive information 
covering all dimensions of different variables operative in the reform process. For 
this, a framework established to review the reform initiatives was used. Accordingly, 
in these instruments, emphasis is laid mainly on gathering views and information 
both verbal and written about the ideology, principles and purposes; context and 
rationale; contents and scope; process and methodological considerations in 
implementation; and the shapers, both protagonists and antagonists. In total five 
instruments were developed, and their name and purpose is given in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: - Summary of data collection instruments 
No. Name of instrument Purpose 
1. Interview guide To facilitate individual interviews 
2. Question guide To facilitate focus group discussion 
3. Document review guide To organise document review 
4. Observation Checklist To structure observing official meetings 
5. Working paper To guide discussion in meetings and workshops 
4.3.4. Techniques 
Techniques, in the context of a qualitative study, according to Schwandt (1997), 
denote the procedures, tools or methods used to generate and analyse data or both. 
These may be used both in fieldwork or deskwork. Yin (1994) identifies six 
techniques: documentation, archival review, interview, direct observation, 
participant observation, and physical artefacts. He notes the strengths and 
weaknesses in each of these, and advocates the use of a combination of these 
techniques. This study uses mainly individual interviews, focus group discussions 
and document review, which are discussed below: 
4.3.4.1. Interviews 
According to Kvale (1996: 2,88), "this is the 'inter view' or 'interchange of views' 
between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest". He identifies 
seven stages of an interview for research: thematizing, designing, interviewing, 
transcribing, analysing, verifying, and reporting. Thernatizing is about frameworks 
and research questions which have earlier been discussed. This section will discuss 
designing, leaving the remaining components to be dealt with subsequently. 
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Interviewing, as Britten (1999) notes, is a well-established technique used in 
qualitative research. And Patton (1990) identifies three approaches to collecting 
qualitative data through open-ended interviewing - the informal conversation 
interview, the general interview guide approach, and the standardised open-ended 
interview. According to him, these approaches to interviewing differ in determining 
and standardising the interview questions before the interview actually occurs. 
While on fieldwork the researcher discovered various functionaries and civil 
servants that had been involved, in one way or the other, in the reforming of the 
health sector. During such a discourse, which is also termed non-standardised 
interview, frequently an informal conversation took place. This was often a good 
source of information and notes were taken in such instances. In this study, however, 
it is mainly the semi-structured interviews or general interview guide approach that 
was held using an interview guide. The interview guide is an instrument to elicit 
responses and is a checklist to ensure that all aspects of a particular reform initiative 
have been explored. In this case, the interviewer works with a list of information 
required and phrases the wordings and order of questions suitable to the individual 
respondent. On the other hand, when the interview guide is used in a manner that the 
wording and order of questions is exactly the same for all respondents, this may be 
called a standard schedule or standardised open-ended interview. In practice, 
however, the distinction between the latter two categories depends largely on the 
interviewee who sets the momentum of the interview (4.4.5.3). 
The next question is - who should be interviewed? The issue was touched on earlier 
(4.3.2.2), specifically for policy studies using a case studies approach there is little 
literature about the possible interviewees. Therefore, this researcher used his 
theoretical assumption that the health system is the context of reform and the 
shapers of the policy process are located within it. Accordingly, the conceptual 
framework for the health system was used to draw the interviewees from various 
components of the health system. The other dilemma is that how many individuals 
may be interviewed. The adequacy of a sample, as Stake (1994) argues, is 
determined through the researcher's intuition and training. However, the general 
guidance followed was that (i) all components of the health system are represented; 
and (ii) until the interviewees yield no new information. The remaining issues, about 
the actual conduct of the interview, including arranging and logistics for interview, 
will be discussed in the section on fieldwork (4.4.5.3). 
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4.3.4.2. Focus group discussions 
Focus groups are a "form of group interview that capitalises on communications 
between research participants in order to generate data7' (Kitzinger, 1999). The other 
forms include brainstorming, nominal/Delphi, and field interviews. Table-4.2 
provides a typology of the group interviews comparing their dimensions like setting, 
role of interviewer, question format and purpose (Fontana and Frey, 1998). 
TabIc 4.2: - Comparing the dimensions of the types of group interviews 
Type Setting Role of Question Purpose 
interviewer format 
Focus group Formal-pre-set Directive Unstructured Exploratory 
Brainstorming Formal or Non-directive Very Exploratory 
informal unstructured 
Nominal/Delphi Formal Directive Structured Pre-test exploratory 
Field, natural Informal Moderately Very Exploratory 
spontaneous non-directive unstructured Phenomenological 
Field, formal Pre-set, but in Somewhat Semi- structured Phenomenological 
the field directive 
Patton (1990) stresses that a focus group does not comprise discussion; instead this 
is an interview, because there is no decision-making or problem-solving happening 
in this process. Contrarily, however, it is argued that the participants in this process 
indulge in a lively and natural discussion amongst themselves. It is important that 
participants talk to each other about a topic and have an opportunity to agree or 
disagree with each other (Dawson et al, 1992). In a similar vein, according to Khan 
and Manderson (1992), it is the group dynamics which are important and they 
emphasise distinguishing the focus group from individual interviews. The group 
process helps people to explore and clarify their views and this interaction takes the 
research into new and often unexpected directions (Kitzinger, 1994). However, there 
is a danger associated with focus groups i. e. due to the group dynamics, if something 
is of emotional value, it may deflect the flow of discussion (Boeree, 2002). 
As to who should participate in a focus group: from a variety of available 
approaches, convenient sampling is the most commonly employed practice. But it is 
essential that the characteristics of a group should match with the objectives of the 
research (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). In this regard, composition of the group is 
important, and homogeneity is often advocated, although a heterogeneous 
membership may also work. Another factor is the hierarchy within the group and its 
representativeness. In the former case, a senior or a member with a strong 
personality may overshadow the juniors, while in the latter not all sections of the 
population are covered. Accordingly, this researcher, drawing from the conceptual 
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framework for the health system, selected the participants purposefully and 
conveniently. Research needs and resources may determine how many focus groups 
should be organised. However, given that focus groups were held as a 
complementary tool to gathering data obtained from other sources (Khan and 
Manderson, 1992), one session for each case was conducted. What was discussed in 
the focus groups is the next question. The questions, in this case, ordered from 
general to specific and sequenced according to their importance are preferably less 
structured. Further, these are fewer in number and are developed to guide the 
direction of inquiry (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). 
4.3.4.3. Observation 
Interviewing and focus group discussion techniques provide data on 'what people 
say'. Observation, on the other hand tells the researcher, 'what they actually do' 
(Pope and Mays, 1999). This is naturalistic and, contrary to its use in natural 
sciences, the observer is not bound by "pre-determined categories of measurement", 
but searches for the concepts and categories relevant to his/her subject of study 
(Alder and Alder, 1998: 81). Observation may be covert when the observer is 
obscure or overt when the observer and his motives are known. This may be 
participatory, when the researcher is part of the process and setting, which he 
intends to observe and non-participatory/direct, where he is a known outsider to 
observe the subjects under study (Yin, 1994). 
Observation was considered an important qualitative technique that could be 
employed for ongoing or prospective cases. However, since this research is mainly 
about the initiatives undertaken in the past, this type of technique has a limited role. 
Nonetheless, for the initiatives which are still ongoing, observation was thought to 
be a useful tool. Accordingly, the researcher planned to sit in the meetings and 
observe how the government machinery works to conceptualise, design and 
implement its decisions. A guide was also developed in order to structure the 
observations so that no important point was missed. 
4.3.4.4. Document review 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 276-79) make a distinction between record and document. 
The former, according to them, denotes a recorded statement "attesting to an event 
or providing an account" and includes schedule, audit reports, tax form, certificates, 
and the like. The latter, on the other hand, denotes any written material other than a 
record and includes diaries, newspaper clippings, speeches etc. Yin (1994: 81-84), in 
a similar vein, distinguishes archival records distinct from documents. The former, 
from the example quoted by him, equals Lincoln and Guba's 'record'. 
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Notwithstanding the above debate, both terms are used interchangeably, and for the 
purpose of this study no distinction is made, because it was not relevant. All 
documents fell in the 'document' category. The distinction is about their nature: 
records are often quantitative or statistical in nature and access to them may not be 
easy due, for example, to them being confidential or private. Further, these are 
produced for a special purpose and for some particular audience. Tberefore, 
according to Yin, the usefulness of records varies from case study to case study and 
while interpreting these, the aforementioned conditions must be kept in mind (Yin, 
1994). Documents on the other hand, require contextual understanding prior to their 
interpretation (Hodder, 1998: 112). According to Yin (1994), documents help in 
corroborating information from other sources and may lead to inferences. However, 
he emphasises that such inferences must be made with caution, and treated only as a 
clue to further investigation, because in his view these could turn out to be false. 
Tberefore, he notes these categories - document and record - need careful scrutiny 
and use, because these may be wrongly used and are likely to be tampered with and 
their meanings twisted, while interpreting (ibid. 8 1). 
4.4. Fieldwork 
According to Yin (1994: 81-84), the case study is among the "hardest type of 
research". Therefore, he emphasises an intensive plan of training of a researcher 
prior to his embarking on fieldwork. In his view a researcher should possess or 
acquire at least five skills to: (i) ask good questions and to interpret responses; (ii) be 
a good listener; (iii) be adaptable and flexible so as to react to the situation 
accordingly; (iv) have a firm grasp of the issue(s) being studied; and (v) be unbiased 
by any preconceived ideas. The first two requirements are the skill and cognitive 
capacity which any inquirer would need, not only initially, but also throughout the 
research process. However, s/he must gather intelligence about the case - grasp of 
the issues - before formally conducting a diligent, ethical and unbiased inquiry. 
This researcher, after having exercised the skills and cognition in terms of 
developing conceptual framework, defining the research question and outline 
protocol, progressed to the fieldwork. Whereas, the literature review, in order to 
improve research skills and cognition, continued throughout, the fieldwork was 
conducted in five stages: logistics, pilot study, consolidation, intelligence gathering, 
and finally data collection. These stages, which essentially document the application 
of research skills required by Yin (ibid) from the researcher, are described in the 
ensuing pages, but figuratively the fieldwork process is presented in figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: - Fieldwork process 
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It may, however, be noted that although the arrows in the figure are unidirectional, 
the process has throughout been iterative and inclusive. The researcher moved back 
and forth between various steps in the research process. While the skills and 
cognitive development was an on-going process, informal data collection and 
protocol development also continued. Between these extremes a pilot test, 
intelligence gathering and substantive data collection were conducted (Figure 4.6). 
Various stages of fieldwork are described in the following: 
Figure 4.6: - Research process - overlapping of activities 
Skills/ cognition development 
.............................................................................................. 
Research protocols 
Pilot test 
Intelligence gathering 
.......................... 
D ata collection 
.................... ........................................... ................................. . .. I......... ................. ....................................... . .. 
Informal data collection 
Progress of research ------ - --- > 
-84- 
4.4.1. Stage 1: - Ordering the logistics 
4.4.1.1. Permission of the government 
1. Authorities in the government were contacted to seek permission to access 
official records, and interview relevant officers and involve them in research. 
2. An initial meeting was held with the selected senior permanent staffs of the 
Health Department for identifying and mapping the shapers and documents that 
were needed to be accessed and reviewed respectively. 
3. Government allowed this researcher to access and consult any document or 
official in the Health Department deemed necessary during the research. 
4.4.1.2. Organisation of research office and logistics 
1. An office was set up ensuring security of data. 
2. Adequate stationery and relevant literature were arranged. 
3. Recording and computing equipment were purchased. 
4. Transport was organised. 
5. A telephone was hooked up to the fax, e-mail and internet. 
4.4.1.3. Off campus supervision 
1. Communication was established with the local supervisor to seek his guidance. 
2. A university supervisor visited Pakistan to formally meet the local supervisor and 
researcher in his fieldwork on August 14-15,2000. 
3. In addition, the researcher, while in Pakistan received two more supervision events 
from the university supervisors; firstly, in May, 1999 and then in May 200 1. 
4.4.2. Stage 2: - Pilot study 
A pilot study, which is the final stage or test of preparation before fieldwork, was 
conducted. Yin (1994) emphasises the need for running this exercise, because of its 
immense role in refining the data collection plan. The DHG case was used as a pilot 
and the study was sited in the PHDC. Care was exercised in selecting participants so 
they would not be the informants in the actual case study. Also a meeting of the 
Departmental Development Working Party (DDWP) was attended in order to pilot 
the observation guide. 
During this stage, conducted in August 2000, different instruments (interview 
guides; a question guide for focus group discussion; a checklist for document 
review; and a guide for observing meetings) and arrangements made (as a part of 
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stage 1) for conducting this study were tested in the field situation. In this regard 
particular attention was paid to the: 
1. respondents' willingness to answer; 
2. sensitivity and comprehensibility of questions; 
3. flow of questions; 
4. time taken to field different question guides; 
5. availability of documents; 
6. readiness of the respondents for providing access to documents; and 
7. comprehensibility and suitability of documents in establishing the setting/ case 
Although the interview guide and question guide for focus group discussion are 
placed in appendix 4.3 and 4.4 respectively, the checklist for the documents review 
(Appendix 4.5) and the guide for observing official meeting (Appendix 4.6) did not 
work. Therefore, instead of using these techniques, an alternative means of data 
collection was employed on account of the following reasons: 
1. The grey literature did not conform to any standard; each piece was an entity in 
its own right - often bearing a number and date, bound in a file. Further, there 
were certain files containing sensitive issues, marked as "Secret and 
Confidential". Moreover given the restriction posed by "Official Secrets Act" 
(GoPb, 1997u), all official files are considered secret and no private person can 
ordinarily gain access to those'O. It was, therefore, decided to access the 
documents under the cover of the government's permission, review them and, if 
found relevant, notes be taken keeping in view the research question and 
dependant variables. 
2. The utility of observing official meetings as a data collection technique was 
limited because: firstly, to keep an eye on the meetings (on a particular subject 
interesting to the researcher), which are often scheduled at short notice (Shaw, 
1998), was logistically difficult. Also, to seek information about such meetings 
beforehand and then to obtain permission from relevant authorities for being in 
attendance were major hurdles. 
Secondly, given the research agenda, the construct and the guides developed, 
there was hardly any match with the meetings. Despite the problems faced by the 
researcher in fielding the observation technique, according to Sofaer (1999) this 
10 This researcher was denied access to documents in the Finance Department on the pretext, how to 
ensure that the information collected would not be used for 'anti-state' purposes. 
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is not a frequently used technique in case study research. Further, as Yin (1994) 
notes, the case studies need not always include direct, detailed observation as a 
source of evidence. Therefore, apart from the occasional memos arising from 
observation, the current study does not rely on this method. 
Different instruments, techniques and their field test results are seen in table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: - Study instruments 
Instrument type Technique Piloted Outcome 
Interview guide Individual interviews Yes See Appendix 4.3 
Question guide Focus group discussion Yes See Appendix 4.4 
Document checklist Document/record review Yes Did not work- Appendix 4.5 
Observation guide Meeting observations Yes Did not work- Appendix 4.6 
Working paper Meetings/workshops No For example, see Appendix 3.1 
4.4.3. Stage 3: - Consolidation 
The following activities undertaken, subsequent to the pilot study, marked the stage 
of consolidation in data collection. 
1. A supervisor from the Nuffield Institute for Health, University of Leeds, in 
addition to assessing the researcher's progress, assisted him in finalising the 
study design and instruments for use in fieldwork. 
2. The gaps and shortfalls, identified in the study design, including instruments and 
logistics during the pilot stage, were made up. 
3. A workshop on stakeholder analysis was organised in September, 2000 to 
determine and map the shapers that were to be accessed and interviewed. 
4. A list of participants was generated and a schedule of events, such as meetings, 
visits, document review, FGDs and interviews, was drawn up. However, this 
schedule changed over time due to the snowballing effect and availability/non- 
availability of participants. 
5. Workshops were held to test the robustness of the conceptual frameworks, 
developed for the health system and health policy process. NB: the working 
papers and reports on these workshops form part of the case study database. 
6. A meeting was held with two university supervisors in May 2001, when they 
were apprised of the progress and also the working of computer software 
Qualitative Data Processing System was demonstrated. 
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4.4.4. Stage 4: - Intelligence gathering 
1. This stage may also be called pre-fieldwork. Activities, aimed at enhancing the 
researcher's grasp of the issue, marked this stage. The framework for the health 
system and policy process for reform tested in the workshop (4.4.3) was applied 
in reviewing the documents to develop a resumd of the Punjab health sector and 
health sector reforms (1.3; 1.4; 1.5). 
2. The aim of this research is to study the policy process for reforms in the public 
sector. However, a question haunted the researcher - what is the prescribed and 
customary policy process in the government? This researcher, based on 
document review (GoP, 1973; GoPb, 1974; GoPb, 1980; Hussain, 1995; GoPb, 
1997u) and the practicesIl for decision-making in the civil services structure, 
developed a working paper on the public policy process in the Punjab. This was 
circulated amongst several top officials of the government to receive their 
comments. Later, a workshop was held to verify and consolidate the contents of 
the working paper (see Appendix 3.1 for the output of the said workshop). 
4.4.5. Stage 5: - Data collection 
Although qualitative research designs had been field-tested and subsequently 
consolidated, unlike the conventional inquiries, as noted by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985: 267), it is liable to changes during data collection. This researcher was aware 
of this advice and also conscious of three principles of data collection propounded 
by Yin (1994): the use of multiple sources of data; creating a case study database 
(4.4.6.3); and maintaining the trail of evidence (4.4.6.4). An account of how the data 
was collected is given below, beginning, however, with meetings and workshops as 
part of pre-fieldwork intelligence gathering activities. 
4.4.5.1. Meetings and workshops 
In the meetings and workshop's the researcher works with groups. In this regard, the 
Delphi process, nominal group technique or expert panel and consensus 
development conferences are the group interview methods commonly used for 
consensus development in health services research. Each of these techniques has 
strengths and weaknesses: typically certain individual participants or "coalition 
representatives" are likely to influence the group decision (Jones and Hunter, 1999). 
Similarly, meta-analysis techniques have been used to measure and develop 
consensus. But, given the objectives of this study, a modified nominal group 
11 The researcher worked for the government for several years that accrued him the acumen and 
experience of the policy process in the civil service structure of the Punjab. 
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technique was used to validate the predetermined ideas, generate new ones, and 
aggregate the participant's responses. This technique may, however, be 
distinguished from focus group discussion, where the aim is to gather data about the 
opinions, perceptions, knowledge and concerns of the participants about a particular 
topic (Glitz et al, 2001). Different steps for conducting such sessions are as below: 
1. A working paper (with an attached worksheet) on the issues to be discussed was 
developed by the researcher and provided to the participants at the beginning of 
each session. In certain cases, however, this was given beforehand. 
2. The session started with a briefing about the objectives of the meeting. The 
participants were then requested to go through the paper and raise issues, if any, 
for clarification. A flip chart was used to record these comments. 
3. The participants were then asked to respond to various questions raised in the 
worksheet, while they wrote their responses in the space provided. Any point 
arising and the participants voicing views were recorded on the flip chart. 
4. The worksheets were collected. And a report, aggregating the responses, was 
prepared by the researcher and sent to the participants for their comments and 
validation. However, often no feedback was received and this non-response was 
taken as the respondents' validation. 
On the above pattern this researcher organised meetings and workshops, e. g. on: (i) 
the policy process in the Punjab public sector (see Appendix 3.1); (ii) initial meeting 
with the permanent senior staff; and (ii) stakeholder analysis with key informants. 
4.4.5.2. Document Review 
Notes, in most cases, were recorded directly onto the computer -a laptop was of 
immense help. Based on these notes, a database was developed. Each document was 
numbered, borrowed from its origin and placed in the relevant case study file. 
Initially, recorded at random as the documents were accessed, the database was later 
organised in chronological order to help establish the story and further analysis. The 
number of documents consulted for each case is given in table 4.4. It should be 
noted that there were many documents, including 155 newspaper clippings that 
appeared during this period, and those, which had overarching relevance for various 
cases, were categorised as 'general'. 
Table 4.4: - Number of documents consulted 
Case SPP DIIA IA DIIG General Total 
Number of 
documents 112 69 75 46 173 475 
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4.4.5.3. Interviews 
An interview guide was used to retrieve the responses. However, the civil servants, 
often despite assurances for confidentiality and anonymity, especially in junior 
positions, were guarded and even probing questions did little to open them up. On 
the other hand the non-public participants were frank and even volunteered 
information with such a flow that often it was difficult to bring them back to the 
point on the question guide. Overall, it was an oscillation between the 'general 
interview guides' to a 'standardised open-ended interview'. Certain participants 
were contacted through email and their responses were received. Further, when 
agreeing to a schedule, subject to a participant's desire, a copy of the interview 
guide was provided beforehand. Finally, regarding how an interview should be 
conducted, Patton (1990) provides a detailed account. Drawing from him, this 
researcher observed the following protocol for interviewing: 
1. The purpose and objectives of the research were provided and consent about the 
use of the data collecting device was obtained; 
2. The anonymity and willingness of the respondents to answer was respected; 
3. Confidentiality of the information volunteered was assured; 
4. Questions were simple and direct language was used; 
5. Questions were clear, specific and one question was asked at a time; 
6. No leading question - indicating the answer was asked; 
7. No 'why' question was asked - they take the respondents to a defensive position, 
which is not good for the smooth flow of information; 
8. No judgmental remarks were passed as these may offend the respondents and 
furthermore there is no right or wrong answer; 
9. Closed questions, where a response could be yes or no, were avoided - since 
these limit the information flow; 
10. Difficult and sensitive questions were left until nearer to the end of a session; 
11. Questions were asked in a logical manner, although the sequence changed 
depending on the general mood of the respondent and the situation. Often a 
participant started saying something without having been formally asked. At 
such a point, as Sofaer (1999) advises, the researcher took advantage of the lead 
by the participant and guided him/her to the sequence of the guide; and 
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12. The session concluded with a note of thanks for the participant's time and 
interest. Further, they were assured of safeguarding their anonymity, interest and 
choice, while compiling the report. 
4.4.5.4. Focus group discussion 
Focus group discussions were organised drawing people who had stakes/interest in a 
case (Grbich, 1999). Usually not more than eight participants were brought together 
to discuss the different aspects of an issue and were allowed to discuss amongst 
themselves until they exhausted ideas and came to some agreement - consensus or 
not to agree (Barker, 1996). Often, a session lasted for no longer than 60-90 minutes, 
but in certain cases this continued as long as new information continued pouring in 
and according to the participants' willingness to stay on. The researcher sat in this 
discourse to facilitate discussion starting with general questions and converging to 
the specific, ensuring that it was not side-tracked. 
Four focus group discussions were conducted using the PHDC, Lahore as the venue, 
while the protocol followed in conducting the session is given below: 
I. Outlined the question, sub-questions or interview guide used; 
2. Familiarised with the group participants; 
3. Identified the team i. e. moderator; observer; and note taker. They were trained in 
making sure that the team had required skills and knowledge; 
4. Ensured that the meeting venue was accessible, private, comfortable, non- 
threatening, and the seating arrangement for participants was U-shaped; 
5. Before starting the session, the consent of the participants was sought and they 
were assured of confidentiality and anonymity - unless the participants agreed 
otherwise, and in certain cases they allowed the researcher to use their name and 
designation as references; 
6. Session was started by an introduction to the researcher's team, followed by the 
rules for participating, and the particular question or issue for discussion; 
7. Conducted the sessions in a manner whereby the moderator guided and steered 
the discussion; the observer kept silent to note the feelings expressed through 
body language; the note ' 
taker wrote down precisely what was said, without 
adding his own opinion - although s/he could and did so noting in parenthesis 
(the note-taker's role became redundant where a tape recorder was used); 
-91- 
8. An informal atmosphere was created in order to facilitate a free flow of ideas 
and discussion amongst participants, but care was exercised that a particular 
participant did not dominate the discussion; 
9. Effort was made to maintain neutrality - every member of the team performed 
his/her assigned role and did not opine to become a party or exhibit a favouring 
bias to certain responses/participant; and 
10. Finished the session by surnmarising the arguments given by the participants 
during discussion and thanked them. 
Soon after the session a debriefing meeting of the team was held to bring together 
information held by various members and to consider the effectiveness of a 
particular session. This activity is useful because sometimes another focus group or 
meeting is deemed essential to further achieve a greater depth in the understanding 
of an issue(s) (Grbich, 1999). However, such situations did not arise in this study. 
4.4.6. Stage 6: - Deskwork (managing the data) 
The data collected during the course of a qualitative research study is huge and often 
unstructured, but is important and valuable material. It is, therefore, essential that it 
be appropriately organised and managed in order for its subsequent retrieval and 
usage for analysis. This objective was achieved in the following manner: 
4.4.6.1. Recording 
Given the experience of the researcher (he is a serving public servant) in a Pakistani 
situation, tape recording of the interviews was initially considered unfeasible. 
Government officials, despite permission from higher authority, are often tight- 
lipped, apprehensive, and reserved in volunteering information. They have 
developed this trait in response to a law that requires maintaining secrecy of official 
records and government business. Further, by using a recording device the 
respondents are likely to become conscious of their response (Rifkin, 1996). This 
researcher, therefore, planned to mainly rely on logbook notes. 
However, during fieldwork it was felt that note-taking had its own limitations. These 
included that some points were missed; eye to eye contact between the researcher 
and participant was not possible; and it was difficult to fully arouse the interest of a 
participant because the researcher may be busy in writing and at the same time 
thinking and posing probing questions was not easy. Furthermore, quite a significant 
number of participants agreed to the use of a tape recorder. Therefore, a mini-tape 
recorder was used to record interviews and focus group discussions. However, 
-92- 
where a participant did not agree, notes were taken. But, nevertheless, this risked 
data loss, which was avoided by asking the participants to validate the transcription. 
A note-taker could also have been used, and that was used for one focus group 
discussion. However, given the secretive and status oriented bureaucratic culture, 
taking a note-taker along to meetings with officials was thought impractical. Further, 
this had financial implications, and a risk of the note-taker adding his/her biases. 
4.4.6.2. Transcribing 
The recorded matter, notes and comments arising from interviews and the focus 
group discussions were transcribed verbatim and typed in a predefined, 2 computer 
format using 'word processor' MS-WORD. This was done on the same day to avoid 
forgetting, mixing the events and observations, as time passes and thus losing the 
information. For workshops and meetings, notes were taken, which were transcribed 
and typed in a computer format maintaining, however, the originality and exactness 
of what had been heard, seen and read from the response of the participants. Apart 
from focus group discussions, the transcribed /typed matter was sent to the 
participants for their validation. This was likely to generate more data, and, 
therefore, constituted part of the qualitative inquiry (Mays and Pope, 2000). 
However, only in a few instances did this researcher receive any feedback from 
participants. They considered the transcripts of proceedings as their copy. 
4.4.6.3. Developing the case study database 
According to Yin, the case study database is the organising and documenting of data 
collected during fieldwork and is essential for increasing the reliability of a case 
study. Broadly, these may be notes, documents, tabular material and narratives. 
Contrary to Patton's advice of editing and rewriting such material, Yin (1994: 96) 
emphasises that the case study data may be systematically organised, categorised 
and made accessible for later review/ use. 
While on fieldwork this researcher gathered and generated a large number of 
documents. These included literature references and case study documents (hard 
copies), case study notes, correspondence with participants and different authorities, 
minutes of meetings, workshop reports, focus group discussions and individual 
interview narratives and other relevant matter. These were systematically organised 
12 date and time; place visited; person (s) met; precise narration of whatever listened, read or 
observed; and if something felt or noticed from the body language or in the surroundings of 
respondent etc. this be written in parenthesis 
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and are accessible. In addition, 18 (TDK) standard audio-tapes of over 26 hour's 
duration containing recorded interviews and FGDs are also available. 
4.4.6.4. Maintaining the trail of evidence 
The trail of evidence denotes that the evidence provided in a case study report is 
traceable back to its origin. In other words as Yin (1994: 98-99) emphasises, the 
reviewer should be facilitated in moving "from one portion of the case study to 
another, with clear cross-referencing to methodological procedures and to the 
resulting evidence". This, according to him, increases the reliability of information 
cited and the overall quality of a case study. 
In this study the report makes references to the documents reviewed and where 
necessary contents have been reproduced. Similarly, for the focus group discussions 
and individual interviews, the database includes information, interalia, on the time, 
place and mode of record. The report, while referring to the participants, indicates 
their status, but remains short of citing their name and position, except for those who 
allowed it. This is due to the ethics binding this researcher, who promised 
confidentiality and anonymity of participants. Nevertheless, quotations from their 
narratives have been used to substantiate the evidence presented in the report. 
4.4.7. Fieldwork vis-A-vis research question 
In the preceding sections, a range of techniques employed in fieldwork to gather 
data has been given, keeping in mind the study design for responding to the purpose 
and research question,. However, to present the same in a structured manner, a 
matrix has been developed outlining the research objectives and variables addressed 
vis-A-vis different techniques and data sources employed (Appendix 4.7). This 
matrix proved a useful tool for periodically assessing the progress during the 
research process. 
4.5. Data analysis 
It has been shown (4.4) that the research design, data collection and data analysis go 
hand-in-hand and there is a constant interplay between these elements of qualitative 
research. However, the question is, when does the researcher get down to data 
analysis? Pope (2000) notes that the analytical process begins in data collection and 
continues throughout the research process, because, according to her, "it is 
impossible not to start thinking about what is being heard and listened". Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 10), however, go a step further. According to them, the process of 
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analysis occurs even before data collection, when decisions about framework, case, 
question, and the data collection approach are made. They call it the 'anticipatory' 
phase of data analysis. This overlapping contributes to improving the quality of both 
data collection and analysis, but according to Patton (1990: 377-78), the researcher 
has to be careful by not allowing "these initial interpretations to distort" the data 
collection process. Instead, he maintains that the researcher should look for rival 
explanations in order to "invalidate these initial insights" (ibid). 
This debate indicates, as Yin (1994: 102) notes, that the analysis, especially of a 
case study, is the "least developed and most difficult aspect of doing case studies". 
Responding to this call, this section, after providing an overview of theoretical 
issues, gives an account of how the data was analysed in this study. 
What is data analysis? 
Dey (1993: 30) defines data analysis as "a process of resolving data into constituent 
components to reveal its characteristic elements and structure" in order to "know 
how and why as well as what". According to him, "data analysis is a related process 
of describing phenomena, classifying it, and seeing how our concepts interconnect". 
In a similar manner, Wolcott (1994: 9-55), notes that the data analysis process 
occurs in three interconnected stages: data processing or description; data analysis; 
and interpreting or drawing inferences and reporting. He considers data analysis as 
the "identification of essential features and the systematic description of inter- 
relationships among them - in short, how things work. In terms of the stated 
objectives, analysis may also be employed evaluatively to address the questions of 
why a system is not working or how it might be made to work better". Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 10) define analysis "as consisting of three concurrent flows of 
activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verificatiorf'. Given 
such overlapping views, in the following section the concepts about data analysis are 
explored in terms of its purpose, strategy and approach used. 
4.5.2. Purpose, strategy and approach to analysis 
According to Patton (1990: 373), the purpose of the study would largely determine 
the tone and direction of data analysis. Given this study is primarily applied 
research, carried out for scholastic purposes, it should exhibit rigour and contribute 
to theory building. Policyrnakers are also the audience for this research - it attracted 
the Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, which partially funded this 
research. Therefore, the end product is also being aimed at for its "relevance, clarity, 
utility, and applicability of findings" (ibid). 
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The next issue is concerning the strategy for data analysis. According to Pope 
(2000), the strategy could either be inductive or deductive. The former, which is 
considered preferable by social scientists, employs a grounded theory approach, 
while the later is being increasingly used for the framework approach. The grounded 
theory, according to Strauss and Corbin (1994: 273-85) is "a general methodology 
for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed. 
Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay 
between analysis and data collection". The framework approach, on the other hand, 
involves sifting, charting and sorting data around the issues and themes arising from 
data and original aims and objectives introduced in research through, e. g. study 
instruments. Therefore, although the framework approach is primarily inductive, it 
begins deductively from apriori aims and objectives of the study (Pope et al, 1999). 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 18) advocate the framework approach, however 
indicating the trade-offs involved in selecting how tight a framework should be. The 
solution, in their opinion, lies in a middle of the road position - "avoiding the 
extremes". The usefulness of this approach is the systematic documentation of 
analytical process. Since analysis involves the researcher thinking ahead and then 
returning for reconsidering and reworking the earlier ideas, the framework approach 
has strength, as Ritchie and Spencer (1994) note, as it allows easy access to the 
earlier work. Therefore, this study favours employing the framework approach to 
data analysis. However, before this approach is explained (4.5.5), it is worthwhile 
considering certain overarching issues such as the analytical unit and use of a 
computer in data analysis. 
4.5.3. Analytical unit 
What is to be analysed? To answer this question in the perspective of a case study, 
as Patton (1990: 384) notes, analysis involves organising data according to cases, 
which could be individuals or groups, programmes or institutions. Yin (1994: 21-25) 
adds to this list, rather vague and less clearly defined categories, like events and 
decisions about programmes, the implementation process, and organisational 
changes. According to him, "definition of unit of analysis is related to the way the 
research question has been defined". In this sense, given the research question for 
this study, the policy process for health sector reform constitutes the main unit of 
analysis. Within this main unit are the embedded units - the four cases which were 
the subject of this study. Therefore, analysis is made in two layers: (i) four single- 
case studies each derived from the case data on individual initiative; and (ii) cross- 
case analysis to making a case study for the policy process for reforms (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7: - Data analysis process 
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According to figure 4.7, as a result of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, 
document review and exhausting other data sources, 'raw case data', all information 
collected about a specific reform initiative is accumulated as transcripts and logbook 
notes. This was treated in a way, Miles and Huberman (1994: 10) call data reduction 
that "sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards and organises data". This process led to 
constructing a 'case data/ record', for establishing the 'case study', portraying a 
holistic and narrative description of a particular initiative. In the second analytic 
layer - cross-case analysis - the case study data is subjected to further analysis in 
order to develop a multiple-case study for subsequent interpretation (see 4.5.5.5). 
4.5.4. Use of computers 
There are conflicting views in the literature about the usefulness and effectiveness of 
computers in analysing qualitative data. Seale (2000) provides an account of the 
advantages and disadvantages of using computer software, but, in concluding 
remains short of recommending a particular package. He indicates "there are many 
such programs available and if you find that a particular one does not support what 
you want to do, the odds are that another package will contain something more 
useful if you look hard enough". Earlier, Lewando-Hundt et al (1997) comparing 
manual with software analysis using NUD-IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data 
Indexing Searching and Theorising) in qualitative research demonstrated that the 
software does not replace conceptual thinking. According to them, it is an aid and 
support, especially when teams of researchers are involved and the challenge is 
inter-team comparison for enhancing internal validity. Similarly, A1junid (1996) 
who used Ethnograph found that subject to structuring the qualitative data in a 
suitable format, the software facilitates access to data dealing with particular issues 
and easy retrieval of text for analysis and illustration. However, he faced problems 
like the absence of the on-line document being coded, lack of options in printing and 
the tendency for the program to frequently hang. 
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Nevertheless, this researcher planned to use computer software like NUD-IST or 
Ethnograph for analysing data. A request was made to the partial financier of this 
study to arrange the software and necessary training. However, since that request did 
not materialise, this researcher worked on a tailor-made computer utility, Qualitative 
Data Processing System (QDSP), and next section demonstrates how it was used. 
4.5.5. Framework approach 
The framework approach was used for data analysis in this study. This involved five 
stages: familiarising, identifying the thematic framework, indexing, charting, and 
finally mapping and interpretation (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). The step-by-step 
process for data analysis and how the QDPS software assists is given below: 
4.5.5.1. Familiarisation 
The raw case data for the individual cases obtained from different sources, e. g. 
interviews, focus group discussions, document review was organised, source coded 
and stored in separate computer files for individual participants and sources in 
different folders. Hard copies of this data were also treated similarly and placed in 
separate box-files. Although, this researcher himself13 undertook fieldwork and 
deskwork, raw data were again read and re-read. This is called 'familiarising' with 
data. During this process duplications were taken out. 
4.5.5.2. Constructing a thematic framework 
The immersion in data during 'familiarisation' led to identifying the key concepts 
and themes, grounded in data and brought about by the participants or by drawing 
on a priori issues and questions derived from the aim and objectives of the study. 
These concepts and themes were annotated in the margins of the hard copy, and 
were later organised around the framework developed by this researcher for 
analysing the policy process for the Punjab health sector reforms. This activity 
involved ordering the codes, as Bryman and Burgess (1994) call them, logically and 
intuitively into the headings and sub-headings. This process led to creating a table of 
contents or an index, which was fed into the QDPS file. This software createsledits 
table of contents (TOC) up to five levels or sub-headings. This stage, also called 
constructing a 'thematic framework', should be able to address the original research 
question in applied social policy research (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). 
13 It was planned to employ a research assistant, but at the advice of University Research Committee, 
an office assistant was recruited. This arrangement was of immense use, as it added to familiarisation. 
-98- 
4.5.5.3. Indexing 
This stage marked the application of an index developed above (4.5.5.2) to the raw 
case data. The data was again read in its entirety. Whereas more thoughts and 
themes came up and led to marginal editing of the TOC constructed earlier with the 
help of QDSP, the codes or index headings were applied to the data in the hard copy. 
The process was facilitated by the question guide that draws topics from the research 
question and the conceptual framework developed for analysing the policy process. 
4.5.5.4. Charting 
In 'charting' the data is cut/lifted from its original context and pasted/rearranged 
based on the index or the TOC created earlier. According to Ritchie and Spencer 
(1994: 182), "charts are devised with headings and subheadings, which may be 
drawn from the thematic framework, from a priori research question, or according 
to consideration about how best to present and write up the study". Bryman and 
Burgess (1994) note the concern that by removing it from its natural context, data is 
likely to become de-contexualised. However, it is re-contextualised, i. e. although 
removed from its original site, it is placed in a new context alongside the similar 
material in the same categories. 
Data can be directly typed or copied and pasted from a word processing package. 
The data labelled/coded in the previous stage (indexing) was lifted from WORD 
files and pasted in the QDPS files under appropriate headings in the TOC. Since 
QDPS can also record references, any data item in the QDPS database can, 
therefore, be backtracked to its original place in the raw case data. The QDPS file, 
which forms the output of the charting stage, can be printed in a text format for any 
headings' level ascribed in the TOC along with their contents and references. 
To reinforce the charting stage, the output of this stage was again read, but this time 
raising questions and seeking explanations. Whereas some more codes emerged, 
which were annotated on the hard copy and were also added to the framework, gaps 
were identified in the data. For some of these shortfalls, the researcher returned to 
the source, while for others new participants and sources were recruited. Such a 
purposive recruitment of data sources and classification of codes, as Dey (1993: 46) 
notes, is always the case. Thus, it is seen that the thematic framework developed 
initially underwent changes, on account of the ever-emerging concepts throughout 
data analysis. This was finally used to draw an outline for the case study. 
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4.5.5.5. Mapping and interpretation 
This stage involves going beyond data, marking a peak in the thinking process, 
where the researcher begins to ponder what is to be made out of it (Wolcott, 1994). 
In this regard, Patton (1990: 324) argues, "interpretation means attaching 
significance to what was found, offering explanations, drawing conclusions, 
extrapolating lessons, making inferences, building linkages, attaching meanings, 
imposing order, and dealing with rival explanations, dis-confirming interpretation". 
He notes that in this stage, the analyst sets out to map and interpret data as a whole, 
which is now organised around a thematic framework. In this process, he defines the 
concepts, maps the range and nature of the phenomena, creates typologies, finds 
associations, provides explanations and develops theories and strategies (ibid. 186). 
In this stage, reliance was mainly on the charted data, but to substantiate evidence 
quotes were brought from the case data. The QDPS, by searching a word or sentence 
in a selected file displayed along with its reference, helped in finding quotes relevant 
to different case studies. The process of applying the framework approach to analyse 
data for developing single case studies is seen in figure 4.8. In this way, the pattern 
evolved for a particular single-case study was repeated for others. In this process, 
which marks the first analytical layer of this study, the thematic framework evolved 
further and, accordingly, the earlier draft case studies were revised. 
Figure 4.8: - Framework approach to data analysis 
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In the second analytic layer, the multiple-case study was generated, using the output 
of four single-case studies as input. Figuratively, extending from the case analysis as 
seen in figure 4.8, this is shown in figure 4.9. This cross-case analysis process led to 
drawing out, firstly the factors that influenced the policy process for the government 
initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health sector during 1993-2000. Secondly, the 
policy process for the health sector reforms in Punjab was established. 
Figure 4.9: - Cross-case analysis 
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Thus, overall, the analysis of the policy process conducted in this study has three 
dimensions: policy process for the individual reforms (presented as case studies in 
chapter 5), the Punjab health sector reforms and factors influencing the policy 
process (presented in chapter 6). 
4.6. Credibility, quality and ethics 
Certain measures, which make this study credible, were described earlier (e. g. 
maintaining the evidence trail). In the following paragraphs it will be seen how the 
issues of validity, reliability and ethics have been addressed. 
4.6.1. Validity and reliability 
Validity can be internal and external. The former is concerned with confounders, 
biases, and criteria for the selection of study subjects. The latter, on the other hand, 
deals with the notion of generalisation and reproducibility in a population or 
ecological setting. Reliability is related to the measurement of research variables 
(Long, 1984: 44,66). The qualitative methods produce a wealth of data, but its 
validity and reliability depends mainly on the researcher's skills, sensitivity and 
integrity (Patton, 1990: 11). This researcher cannot claim to be free of bias, and 
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section 4.6.3 discusses his role in the research process, and how it was possible to 
minimise this bias and improve the quality of data collection and analysis. 
The researcher rigorously used the research designs as tightly as possible and 
generated findings through careful observation, interviewing, and undertaking the 
content analysis of documents. He had adequate knowledge, training and practice, 
and could put in the required hard work, ensuring that data of high quality was 
generated. Nonetheless, the trail of evidence (4.4.6.4) maintained as part of this 
research process provides adequate evidence for these claims. 
To reduce the likelihood of errors in the application of research methods, data 
techniques like triangulation and respondents' validations were used. In 
triangulation, the researcher corroborated the evidence from various data sources 
(interview on the same issue from more than one subject) or data collection 
techniques (interviews, document review, and focus group discussion for the same 
issue). This was substantiated with the respondent's validation of recorded notes and 
interviews. The emerging patterns and results were also shared with selected study 
participants, for instance the then Minister for Health. 
The issue of generalisation of results in qualitative methods is of limited value since 
the study is context specific (Barker, 1995). However, it may "permit the reader to 
seek patterns that cut across the programme or policies in a number of different 
places and for a number of different groups" (Patton, 1990: 155-56). Further the 
case study approach allows the generation of theoretical propositions that may be 
generalised to other groups either naturalistically or analytically (Grbich, 1999: 188- 
90). Moreover, as Miles and Huberman (1994: 173) note, multiple (four) cases were 
used and the cross-case analysis undertaken contributed to further enhancing the 
generalisability of study results. 
4.6.2. Ethical considerations 
Long (1984) refers to three guiding principles of ethics in research. These are 
justice, beneficence and non-maleficence, and autonomy. Justice denotes the general 
right to benefits, and because the higher-level goal of this research has been to 
improve the health services of the province, the researcher feels no problem in this 
regard. Beneficence implies 'to do good' and by the same token non-maleficence 
means 'do no harm'. Obviously, the current study is likely to contribute to 
improving the environment of the health system and ultimately the people working 
in and benefiting from it. Therefore, this study aims to do good and do no harm. 
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Regarding autonomy, the third concept of ethics, Long (1984) emphasises the 
informed consent and choice of subjects' participation in the study. Informed 
consent of subjects was obtained from the subjects as well as from their employer. 
To protect the participant's rights, they were allowed freedom to join and leave. The 
research objectives, data collection devices and activities were explained and the 
transcripts and reports were also made available to them. Similarly, access to the 
documents was secured after seeking permission from appropriate authorities. 
Confidentiality and non-alignment, while collecting data, is important. This was a 
difficult task to address in qualitative research settings. The information though 
forms part of the findings and the report, this researcher has asked the University to 
release the thesis for consultation after three years. Information sources, including 
those of quotes, have not been explicitly divulged, except where the participants 
gave their permission. Furthermore, the researcher has ensured his non-aligned 
position, keeping in mind the interests and choice of the participants. 
4.6.3. Role of the researcher 
The researcher is an employee of the Government of Punjab currently on study leave 
and has worked for several years in the Health Department in different clinical and 
management positions. These ranged from a house officer to a clinical registrar and 
deputy medical superintendent in teaching hospitals to the assistant project director 
of the World Bank/DFID funded Second Family Health Project, and project director 
of an Asian Development Bank assisted Health Care Development Project. The 
researcher, as such, knew many participants and was also a close observer of the 
policy process for different reforms undertaken during 1993-2000. Therefore, in this 
capacity, he can often bring evidence and quote experience in support of the 
arguments presented in this study. 
Since this researcher designed, collected, analysed and interpreted data, one may 
infer that certain biases might have crept into this study influencing the 
interpretation of data and how it was reported. Becker (1967: 59) notes that the case 
study investigation is especially prone to bias, and given that there is a danger that 
the researcher may use this occasion to "substantiate a preconceived position". In a 
similar manner, Foltz (1996) views policy analysis as a value-laden enterprise, 
where the analyst is not neutral. Nevertheless, the existence of bias in the study can 
also be tested. According to Yin (1994), one assessment of this is to what extent the 
researcher is open to contrary findings. Further, the rigour adopted during the 
research process is the key to protecting the researcher and data collection and 
analysis from bias (Ratcliffe and Gonzalez-del-Valle, 1988). 
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However, such a situation also bears strength, as Yin (1994) recommends the case 
study researcher should have a firm grasp of the issues being studied. And this 
researcher's position of being a close observer of the process provides him with the 
aforementioned strength. Further, using this opportunity to contribute to data 
collection and analysis forms a variant of the "participant observation technique", 
because the researcher has been a participant of events, for example in a 
neighbourhood or group (as in the case of ethnography) being studied. Barker, 
commenting on the range of approaches to policy study, also mentions the 
authorship of a study. According to her this may be the shapers involved in policy 
making process acting as analysts. This argument provides further support to the 
researcher's role as a policy shaper. Finally, the objective of this researcher, as 
Becker (1967) emphasises, has throughout the research process been "to make sure 
that, whatever point of view we take, our research meets the standards of good 
scientific work, that our unavoidable sympathies do not render our results invalid". 
4.7. Summary and conclusion 
Chapter 4 reported the process followed in this research in five sections. Section 1, 
after defining the purpose and research question, dealt with general issues e. g. 
significance, boundaries, research type and approach. The rules and procedures for 
design and methods were laid down in section 2. This dwelt on issues like spatial 
consideration, inclusion criteria, instruments, and data collection techniques used in 
this research. In section 3, the process for fieldwork was described to have been 
conducted in five stages: ordering logistics, conducting a pilot study, consolidating 
arrangements, gathering intelligence, and collecting and managing data. Section 4 
provides details of how data were transformed into results. After defining 'data 
analysis', issues like purpose, strategy, approach, and analytical unit were 
considered. Given that the framework approach to data analysis was adopted, its 
application in this research was also explained. Finally, section 5 presented how the 
credibility, ethics and quality of this research have been upheld with particular 
emphasis given to validity and reliability. 
To summarise, this chapter has set out the rules and procedures for conducting a 
qualitative inquiry. However, a conscious effort has been made to respond to the call 
that the researchers should thoroughly document the research process (Creswell, 
1994). In the next chapter, the policy process for individual cases of health reform 
are analysed following the research rules and procedures set out in this chapter and 
according to the conceptual framework defined in the last chapter. 
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5. Case studies 
5.1. Introduction 
In chapter 3a framework for analysing the policy process for health sector reform 
was conceptualised. This instrument was also a key in framing the research question 
and associated sub-questions. Chapter 4 presented a resum6 of how the research 
methods and techniques were used to address the research question and the data 
analysed. For this purpose the four cases which were selected are: (i) Sheikhupura 
Pilot Project; (ii) District Health Authority; (iii) Institutional Autonomy; and (iv) 
District Health Government. These cases were studied in-depth, and to the data 
generated the framework approach for data analysis was applied (4.5.5) which led to 
developing single case studies marking the first analytical layer of this study. The 
outcome, i. e. the policy process for the four individual cases is presented in this 
chapter following the conceptual framework developed for this study (chapter 3). 
Further, since these case studies follow the same pattern, to avoid repetition, their 
structure is presented below: 
1. A brief account of each initiative is given in section 1. In addition, certain issues 
specific to a particular initiative are also discussed. 
2. In section 2, the principles and purposes followed in the pursuit of the initiative 
are identified. It is explored 'why' the refonns were undertaken. 
3. Section 3 examines the role of shapers contributing to the outcome of the reform 
process. Drawn from stakeholder analysis, they were classified as leader, 
supporter, bureaucracy, donors, media and civil society; and for the purpose of 
this study, these are defined as below: 
The leader is the front-runner key stakeholder, e. g. head of department, institution or 
agency that has personal as well as formal institutional interests at stake. The 
supporte is also a key stakeholder who significantly influences and/or is important 
to the success of the reforms. Bureaucracy represents the secondary stakeholders, 
both in the health and other national systems, and is intermediary in service delivery. 
Donors represent the hegemonic part of the health system, while civil society 
includes primary stakeholders who are ultimately affected, either positively or 
negatively. They include service providers and communities or service recipients. 
Although the media is a part of civil society, it is considered as being separate 
because of the important role it can play in the policy process for health reforms. 
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4. The context or origin of the initiative is explored in section 4. It is determined 
what factors in the health system heralded the reform in terms of issues at three 
levels: the health sector; the national systems; and international systems. 
5. Section 5 deals with the contents of reforms explored at two levels. First, the 
output of the policy process or the policy per se is examined in section 1, and 
second the policy level is determined in terms of its comprehensiveness. 
6. The question, how the initiative was implemented, is addressed in section 6 from 
two angles: (i) preparedness, and (ii) execution. The former deals with feasibility 
and the implementation arrangements, while the latter is about determining the 
fate of the initiative. 
7. An overview of how the policy process for a particular reform initiative was 
undertaken is given in section 7. This inquiry addresses questions how decisions 
about conceptualisation, design and implementation of reform were made. 
Given that the structure for the case studies is provided above, the reader will be 
presented immediately with the headers for different sections. However, before 
embarking on presenting the case studies, certain background issues are introduced, 
which are overarching and common to all the cases. 
5.2. Background issues 
1. The initiatives under study have a common background. The Government of 
Pakistan (GoP) launched a Social Action Program (SAP) for improving basic social 
services. This cross-sectoral programme redirected public expenditure in favour of 
these services. Under the umbrella of SAP, the Government of Punjab implemented 
a Second Family Health Project (1993-2001) in the health sector14. The case studies 
for the initiatives presented in this thesis took their origin from this project. 
2. The SFHP was a multi-donor project assisted by the World Bank, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) and German Kreditanstalt fur 
Wielderaufbau (KfW). This aimed to revamp the entire health sector in order to 
improve the health status of the population of the Punjab. Specifically, its objectives 
were (i) strengthening health services; (ii) staff development; and (iii) organisational 
and management development. Of these objectives, the last one required taking 
14 The Baluchistan province also implemented the (Second) Family Health Project concurrently, 
while the Sindh and Northwest Frontier provinces launched the (First) Family Health Project. 
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adequate steps for decentralising administrative, financial and legal authority. And 
to foster this objective, the government of Punjab launched a number of initiatives. 
3. DFID provided technical assistance (TA) through a Punjab Health System 
Strengthening Component (PHSSC) of SFHP. Under the technical supervision of 
Nuffield Institute for Health, this project was managed by the British Council in 
Pakistan. The TA was channelled through a Provincial Health Development Centre 
and attached District Health Development Centres. Later, however, a technical 
team" based in the DGHS undertook it. 
Figure 5.1: - Organisational linkages 
4. The organisational linkages 
established for executing SFHP are 
given in figure 5.1. A Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU) of SFHP 
headed by an executive director of 
Special Projects (EDSP) was created 
parallel to the DGHS, Punjab; both 
reporting to the secretary health. This 
arrangement had implications not only 
for SFHP, but also for the initiatives 
implemented under the project. 
Secretary Health 
Executive Director Director General 
Special Projects Health Services 
(PIU) (Directorate) 
Project Dire Director Health Services 
SFHP 
Director H District Health Officer PHDC 
Project Directo 
Spp Asstt. District Health Eicer 
Ic D-I,: -+-- : -L--+-A - -1--l 
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administration, which is characterised by: (i) secretariat and secretaries; (ii) 
generalist preference; and (iii) cadre system as explained below (Kennedy, 1987): 
" The secretariat is the policymaking structure comprising various departments in 
the provinces16 that are headed by the secretaries to the government. According 
to the government Rules of Business, the secretary constitutes the 'government' 
and is assigned to assist the political executives, i. e. the minister and chief 
minister in policymaking (GoPb, 1974). 
" Bureaucracy in the public sector is both civil and technical. The former is 
divided into a number of groups or cadres including a generalist or district 
management group, which is a preferred group for the bureaucrats to join. The 
15 This team comprised four district co-ordinators, a social development co-ordinator, while an 
expatriate adviser provided overall support. 
16 In the Federal Government, the counterpart agencies or organisations are called divisions. 
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Secretaries and certain other bureaucrats in the secretariat are often generalists17. 
According to a senior civil bureaucrat, "they are the managers posted to some 
department, where they run things for some time before joining another, and 
have no special vested interest". 
The cadres or groups are the categories assigned to the officials after their 
selection for the public service. Typically, an official remains a member of such 
a group throughout his career. 
The technocrats, commonly called specialists or professionals, as compared to 
generalists, refer to the technically trained officers. They occupy positions in the 
field formations and institutions in the government department according to their 
qualification and expertise18. Since they belong to a particular department and 
serve there until superannuating, the technocrats have interests and ownership in 
the department (Kennedy, 1987). 
6. Certain legal terms have been used in case studies. For example, constitution is 
the most superior which sets the overall direction for the Public representatives/ 
legislature to formulate Acts or legislation. Not inconsistent with these Acts, the 
government frames Rules which provide overall guidance for any organisation(s) to 
operate. Regulations are the next level in the hierarchy that are framed by the 
organisation itself and approved by the government for carrying out day-to-day 
functions. Finally, it is the Operational Manual or Routines and Procedures, which 
are developed by the organisation as a step-by-step guide for undertaking a 
particular activity or task. 
17 Although a number of officials came from the Provincial Civil Service and Secretariat Group, but 
those belonging to the District Management Group were in the senior and effective positions 
18 In the Punjab health sector, the technocrats occupy both the managerial and specialist positions. 
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5.3. Sheikhupura Pilot Project -a case of prefiguring the 
Punjab health sector reforms 
Account of the project 
5.3.1.1. Emergence of the concept 
How was the project conceptualised? To answer this question, it is considered fair to 
directly quote from the first executive director of Special Projects: 
Yes, I was a practising surgeon till I took over as Surgeon General 
Punjab. In this capacity, I came in contact with peripheral health 
services and became aware of the inadequacies in the health sector. 
... convinced me that a radical change needs to be introduced and on 
the other hand my association with rural communities brought out very 
clearly the total alienation of the end users with all government efforts 
in the health and other sectors... 
In addition, I was DGHS when the SFHP and Health Care 
Development Project came. Seeing the huge amount that was proposed 
to commit, I was extremely apprehensive that the inputs will not be 
judiciously used and the end users will he not better off than before. I 
was naive at that time that I proposed to the Wold Bank that a Pilot 
Project he started to test on the one hand the public sector willingness 
to reach down and the end users' collective ability to act as watchdog. 
... this is how the project was conceptualised 
The document review suggests that SPP was envisaged as a case-control research 
study. District Sheikhupura served as the case area, while the sub-district Kasur of 
district Kasur was taken as the control. The project aimed at: 
(i) creating a viable model for primary healthcare that ensured quality 
of services, which are accessible and, what is most important, 
sustainable; and (ii) determining the feasibility of community 
participation including sustainability concerns with special emphasis 
on replicability (GoPb, 1992). 
Accordingly, the project had two sets of interventions, which were designed to 
address the respective aims: 
Management modification: (i) decentralising and re-organising district health 
teams; (ii) integrating the, hitherto, vertically oriented outreach programmes into 
mainstream primary health care; (iii) activating maternity and child health care; 
(iv) improving the health management information system; and (v) enhancing 
the supply of medicine to the health facilities. 
2. Community participation as a process involving: (i) selection of villages; (ii) 
selection of public sector and community animators; (iii) organisation of village 
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health committees; (iv) selection and training of voluntary village health workers 
and traditional birth attendants; and (v) identification, development and 
implementation of small village based projects. 
5.3.1.2. Implementation of the project 
The assistant district health officers in charge of the sub-districts were granted 
financial powers (GoPb, 1993c). Later, in partnership with different stakeholders, a 
set of management interventions was designed. The emphasis was on decentralising 
powers and creating Tehsil Health Teams, while the District Health Team retained 
the overall supervisory role (GoPb, 1993a). To orientate district health staff about 
the project interventions, workshops were held in health facilities throughout the 
district (EDSP, 1993). The government approved the plans for integration and re- 
organisation of CDC programmes, decentralisation of powers to the lower levels in 
the hierarchy, and a career structure for female paramedics to provide incentives 
(GoPb, 1996; EDSP, 1996). But, these plans were not implemented, because the 
focus in the SFHP shifted to the wider reform agenda (EDSP, 1998). 
For organising communities CARITAS19 Pakistan guided the process. A core team 
for the project and district managers was trained in 'community animation' (EDSP, 
1993a), followed by a similar exercise for sub-districts (EDSP, 1994b). This cascade 
continued down to the village level. Trainees in one step identified the participants 
for the next step, leading to developing a team of animators both from the health 
facilities and nearby villages. These animators then organised the communities as 
Village Health Committees (VHC) and the Social Welfare Department registered 
some of these. The VHCs selected the village health workers (VHW) and identified 
all practising traditional birth attendants for training, which was conducted in health 
facilities and villages. The VHCs identified small village based projects and worked 
out modalities for implementation and maintenance. But, these projects did not take 
off (Tareen and Omar, 1997). The project authorities attributed this to communities 
not spending up front (EDSP, 1998a), while a VHW gave another reason, "We 
continued to chase the project even in Faisal Town (where the Project Management 
Team (PMT) was located), but nobody co-operated... " But, why did this happen? 
According to one health worker, this was due to changes in the Project Team. 
19 CARITAS is an international non-governmental organisation which has experience of working 
with communities in the Punjab. 
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5.3.1.3. Fate of the project 
While the project was being implemented, expatriate consultants who worked with 
PHDC suggested different prescriptions for management development in the health 
sector. This advocacy contributed to the government and the SFHP shifting its 
emphasis to establishing the DHMTs first (1995-96) and then DHAs (1997-98) 
(GoPb, 1996a). Later, an anti-tuberculosis project was raised from the remains of the 
SPP, but the Planning and Development Department did not allow its continuation 
in the proposed form (GoPb, 1993b). Finally, the SPP was closed in June 1998. 
5.3.2. Principles and purposes 
The project pursued an ideologically motivated change in the district health system, 
but this was not clearly documented. There is a consensus amongst ' 
the respondents 
that the project intended to introduce a change, although perceptions differed about 
its nature and level. The communities thought that it was a vehicle for a change in 
their life, while for the health sector workers it was a management change. One may 
argue, therefore, given the objectives, the message of the project was conveyed. 
However, what was the motivation for this change? In the opinion of the majority of 
respondents, the project was ideologically motivated. A VHW told this researcher, 
"It had no relation to politics. We worked only with the health workers of the Health 
Department". Augmenting this contention, a senior planner said, "In this country, 
politically motivated projects are often showpieces like infrastructure projects". 
However, he comparing the ideological basis of the project with Marxism, Islam or 
Communism, qualified his statement by saying "it was meant to have a better 
management of whatever we had. That is, instead of increasing the investment, 
improve the management practices". Therefore, it is argued that the project was 
aimed at bringing change to the life of people through their participation and 
introducing management reforms in the health sector. And it was ideologically 
motivated, although it was not clearly laid down in the project documents. 
5.3.3. Shapers 
5.3.3.1. Leader 
The (deputy) project director led the project, but selecting such a leader was a 
mistake, and later dissociating him from the project was also wrong. The majority of 
the respondents subscribe to the view that he was in the forefront, and that he was 
dedicated and visionary. However, in the opinion of a respondent, his impatience 
shown by diving into more intricate details was a shortcoming. But, "by his personal 
- III - 
efforts, he forced the bureaucracy to move the reform process and was the main co- 
ordinating force", a district officer commented. Paradoxically, a senior officer 
considered him "too energetic and strong a person to lead a pilot, instead a normal 
deputy district health officer could have been appointed as its project director". But, 
documentary evidence suggests that after this project director left, there was little 
activity in the project. In other words, as an officer in UNICEF commented, "the 
leader was behind both the success and failure of the project". 
5.3.3.2. Supporter 
The first executive director of Special Projects was a supporter of the initiative, as 
the successive executive directors did not support the projeCt20. He took decisions 
and facilitated the leader in implementing the project. According to a senior project 
officer, he was a dedicated, visionary and an outstanding officer. But, he had 
shortcoming that he was not a public health person, but a surgeon, and had little 
exposure to the field and its intricacieS21. However, he orchestrated the project 
interventions and laid down such strong conceptual grounds that although he retired 
after two initial years, the project continued running for at least a further two years. 
5.3.3.3. Bureaucracy 
Civil bureaucracy in the district was indifferent to the project, while that in the 
secretariat was slow in making decisions on project issues. The executive director 
quoted a deputy commissioner saying "well, this is a health problem and nothing to 
do with us, but any help you need, we are willing to provide". Similarly, almost a 
consensus opinion emerged among participants of the FGD that civil bureaucracy in 
the secretariat, although it had an active role, did not do much. They took the project 
as just another file, because "the staff in the secretariat is trained to deal with cases 
as another file", one ex-DGHS commented. According to a senior project officer, 
with few exceptions, they (civil servants) resisted the change and were slow to react. 
Further, he added that this attitude was perhaps due to the fact that the civil 
bureaucrats had little understanding of the health system and hence they took a long 
time to decide on project issues. 
Technical bureaucracy did not favour the project either. They were critical of 
delegating powers to the lower tiers in the health sector hierarchy, an ex-DGHS told 
this researcher. According to the project proposal, the DHOs were only letting the 
20 An inter-office note (EDSP) - Re: Problems Faced by the PMT during 51h Joint TBANHWS 
Training Workshop - provides a firm clue to this assumption. 
21 Personal communication of this researcher with one of the contemporaries of the executive director 
of Special Projects, Punjab 
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powers go to the lower levels without receiving any incentive from higher echelons 
in return. Therefore, as one SMO commented, they (DHOs) rallied against the whole 
process and did not co-operate. For example, after financial powers were delegated, 
the district accounts staff which was transferred to the sub-districts, was not allowed 
to take up their new positions. Thus, one way or the other, technical bureaucracy 
was alienated from the project from its inception. This is inferred from the tone of 
the officials interviewed, and the memoranda reviewed by this researcher. 
5.3.3.4. Donors 
The donors initially appreciated and supported the project interventions, but were 
inconsistent in their approach. For example, DFID which assisted the community 
participation component of SPP, in parallel espoused the PHDC in establishing 
DHMTs. Later, they changed their strategy. They pulled out of SPP to support 
another initiative, the DHAs. Similarly, this researcher knows that UNICEF, which 
supported the project, withdrew silently in favour of the prime minister's 
programme. Likewise, the World Bank was supportive, but a review of successive 
aide-memoirs reveals that SPP disappeared gradually from its agenda. 
One may question the response of donors, especially when the project ran into 
problems. Why did they not emphasise rectification of the problems? Further, if, for 
argument's sake, as one senior bureaucrat in the Finance Department noted, their 
interest lay in the disbursement of loans or grants and not in the project objectives, 
then how did their supervisory missions justify the previous support? it is argued 
that the donors' support was navigated mainly by factors other than the project 
objectives and that they were more interested in the disbursement of funds. 
Therefore, they changed their support according to the government's desires. 
5.3.3.5. Media 
The media was not used in gathering support for the project, but to only flash up a 
few news items of a ceremonial nature. This view is subscribed to by the majority of 
the respondents and is also supported by documentary evidence. The question arises 
- why was there this gap? A number of reasons were unearthed. For example, a 
senior medical officer commented that it was due to the misgivings in the public 
sector about the media, and underplaying the role of the media was a deliberate act 
of the project authorities. Further, because confidentiality of the official documents 
is protected under the Official Secrets Act, public servants would not be open to the 
media. Therefore the media had a weak role in the public sector. 
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5.3.3.6. Civil society 
The community groups received the project well, while the service providers did not 
adequately co-operate. A general secretary of a VHC reported that the project 
brought a welcome change to the villages. That is, e. g. despite family feuds, people 
would come to attend meetings of the VHCs. The respondents are unanimous that 
the community groups, barring those few with vested interests, were supportive. 
Opposition to the project was from the health sector workers, who were backed by 
their Unions. But, different Unions were not organised and united, therefore, they 
responded differently, and often ineffectively. For example, there is no evidence that 
the Pakistan Medical Association (PMA) ever took an interest in the project and 
even its local branch remained dormant. Why was this so - one may question? 
Because the project was experimenting with a management system for the rural 
areas that did not affect the teaching and specialist cadres in tertiary and secondary 
care, one district officer commented. Further, one may infer that given the PMA 
represents mainly the latter, it considered that the threat was distant. However, this 
indicates a relatively less developed civil society, as not many groups got involved 
with the project. 
5.3.4. Context 
A multitude of factors in all the components of the health sector contributed to the 
origin of the project. Apparently, the project originated from the SFHP. But, a closer 
look at the project design reveals this went beyond that premise. An expatriate 
consultant associated with the project hypothesised that a longstanding malaise 
reflected in the low utilisation rate and wasteful use of health sector resources led to 
conceptualising the SPP. Things had gone so bad that one SMO said "the health 
system was at a crossroads and it was being considered to contract out health 
facilities, because these were not delivering". The administrative and financial 
powers were so centralised that, according to a MO, even to replace a burnt out bulb 
in a facility or to take casual leave, permission of the DHO was needed. 
The communities, the executive director argued, were alienated and did not own the 
public sector. In his words, "... one old illiterate villager told us that whatever the 
government allocated, out of this, 30% is taken by the politicians, another 40-50% is 
taken by the bureaucrats and contractors and the last bit is spent to blacken our 
faces". Primarily a governance issue, this was substantiated by a woman medical 
officer. According to her, in villages the untrained TBAs conduct more than 80% of 
deliveries resulting in high maternal deaths due to birth related causes. This state of 
affairs, in the view of a general secretary of a VHC, was due to: 
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The doctors would mostly be absent and that for a population of 
10,000-15000 we don't have a qualified doctor even practising 
privately in the village. There are afew quacks, like school teachers 
... The TBAs were not trained, but were conducting 
deýiveries. The 
government LBV would occasionally come to the BHU, but if we 
needed some help at night there would be none and we had to take the 
woman to some nearby city.. 
However, these issues in the health sector were perennial and there was no 
emergency or crisis and imminent reason for intervention, many respondents noted. 
But, in the opinion of an aid worker, it was the international interest in the health 
sector reforms that worked as a window of opportunity and the donor agencies 
exerted pressure for introducing change. This assumption is validated from the fact 
that SPP was part of the SFHP, which was a project introduced by the donors. 
5.3.5. Contents 
5.3.5.1. Policy and its level 
From the project proposal, SPP was a comprehensive initiative built incrementally. 
Further, it was intended to be a research project focused on the district and that too 
in the domain of primary healthcare. Tertiary and secondary healthcare and support 
services, such as nursing and blood transfusion services, pre and in-service training 
institutions etc, were out of its remit. So, one might argue that it was a piecemeal 
effort. But a rival explanation also exists. A district officer commented that given 
the envisaged span of activities - management intervention complemented by 
community participation - the SPP was comprehensive in its own right. 
Moreover these interventions were aimed at creating a model of primary healthcare 
that could address the issues of quality, accessibility and sustainability in the 
existing system. And given these objectives, the project falls within the ambit of the 
reform (chapter 2). Further, a retired DGHS supporting this notion viewed SPP as a 
starter not only for the health sector, but also for the other public sectors in their 
efforts to reform. It is, therefore, contended that SPP, within the remits of primary 
healthcare, was a comprehensive reform project. 
5.3.5.2. Communications strategy 
Many respondents underlined the importance and need for a communication strategy 
for the project. But, they noted that the traditional mode of communication was 
used. The plan to publish a newsletter was aborted, because the contributions were 
not forthcoming (GoPb, 1994a). Nonetheless, workshops, meetings, seminars, 
circulars, reports and publications were generated, and thus a substantial time was 
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used in explaining and defending what the project was doing (DGHS, 1995). 
However, in the absence of a formally defined communications strategy how did the 
project proposal get approval, one may question. According to a senior planner, 
"actually SPP was the first project of its kind introduced in the Health Department. 
Prior to this, there were bricks, mortar and equipment projects". In other words, a 
formal communication strategy does not form part of the usual project proposal, but 
in the case of SPP the effort to develop one (newsletter) was not successful. 
5.3.5.3. Monitoring and evaluation 
The project documents envisaged monitoring and evaluation as its integral part, but 
it was inadequate and inefficient. A baseline survey to assess the benchmark status 
of the district health system in the target areas was conducted (PIEDAR, 1994). 
Then, a mid-tenn evaluation covering a technical and a field study was also planned. 
However, only the latter was accomplished (EDSP, 1997). Since it was important to 
compare the baseline and mid-term situation for learning and adopting the future 
course of action, the process to launch a technical study was started (EDSP, 1997a). 
But there is no evidence of this exercise occuring, or a final evaluation survey 
envisaged at the conclusion of the project having been done. A Steering Committee 
was organised to guide the project. But, a review of the minutes of successive 
meetings suggests its ineffectiveness (GoPb, 1994b). The decisions made at this 
forum would hardly be carried out. Later, the project became an agenda item for the 
Steering Committee of SFHP (EDSP, 1995), but with the same outcome. Further, 
there would be review meetings and periodic project briefs were also prepared 
(GoPb, 1996b), nonetheless with little follow up activity. 
5.3.5.4. Management systems 
What management systems were developed for the project? To answer this question, 
a closer look at the project memoranda and the evidence from research participants 
suggests that a devolved structure for the district health sector was being developed 
under the project. According to a senior health manager: 
... this is a model that we can use for establishing the (devolved) district governments at this stage (when the districts are being 
devolved). ... The project developed everything from community 
participation to decentralisation; we can use it at best. 
Further, as indicated (5.3.1.2) different systems envisaged were approved by the 
government, but due to the change in the focus of SFHP these were not followed up. 
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5.3.6. Implementation 
5.3.6.1. Political feasibility 
Political feasibility is important for the successful implementation of any reform. 
Regarding SPP, although most respondents considered that it was a politically 
feasible time for the project, the executive director did not agree with this. In his 
view, given the aim of the project, "it was against the interest of the political and 
feudal leadership of the country. It was, therefore, not a politically feasible time". A 
senior planner qualified this contention further, "when it (SPP) started (in 1993) 
there was some political support (available to the project). However, in the post- 
1994 period, although the civil bureaucracy was supportive, there was no political 
support (to the project)". It is therefore argued that, although initially it was a 
politically feasible time, later in the implementation phase there was little political 
support available to the project interventions. 
5.3.6.2. Technical feasibility 
Regarding technical feasibility, it is argued that given the flexible nature of the 
project, it was not needed to 'dry ran' the arrangements for ensuring their adequacy 
before full-scale launching of the intervention. There is a consensus amongst 
respondents that because the project was itself a pilot, it did not need any field- 
testing. However, the question arises whether it was essential to pre-test, as in the 
public sector this is seldom done22. Instead amendments are proposed which pass 
through the usual planning process. Further, one may argue that due to the flexible 
approach, the project design changed as the implementation conditions required, and 
it was a continuous learning process. Therefore, a field test was not run. 
5.3.6.3. Resources 
The project had adequate allocation both from the government and donors at its 
disposal, but most of that remained unspent (EDSP, 1994). Although a saving for the 
exchequer, it was at the cost of the project objectives which remained 
unaccomplished. Why did this happen? A senior planner commented that it was due 
to a weak team, which was also later changed, that the stipulated inputs could not be 
made. Further, it is argued that dwindling political support and weak bureaucratic 
co-operation affected the efficiency of the project team. Another reason was the 
generic problem of cumbersome financial procedures, which contributed to the low 
utilisation of funds from government sources (EDSP, 1998a). 
22 See appendix 3.1 for detail on the Policy Process in the Punjab health sector 
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5.3.6.4. Organisational support 
The organisational linkages developed for the project hampered the introduction of 
interventions. For implementing the SPP, a PMT comprising two deputy project 
directors and two office assistants was established under the executive director in the 
PIU of the SFHP. This team interacted laterally with the District Health Office in 
Sheikhupura, where a field office was established. These linkages between the PMT 
and district health staff were informal and personal due to the separate reporting 
lines (Figure 5.1). Nonetheless, this mistake in the project design was realised 
during execution, and efforts were made to rectify it. An arrangement was suggested 
whereby the field team reports to the DHO, who in addition to the DGHS also 
reports to the executive director (GoPb, 1994b). But, this proposal needed 
amendments in the rules, which was beyond the purview of the Health Department. 
Later atteMptS23 to link the SPP first with the Institute of Public Health and then 
with the PHDC failed (GoPb, 1994c; GoPb, 1995; EDSP, 1995a). 
However, what were the implications of linkages for project execution? This linkage 
was important both for the institutions and the project (British Council, 1995). The 
project could have benefited from the intellectual mass in the institution, while 
providing a learning ground for the students and faculty. In the absence of such 
linkages, the project developed its own training team drawn from regular health 
facility staff and it is argued that this was a drain on the already weak district health 
system. But, this paid back too as this strategy contributed to building the capacity in 
the district, as one DHO commented. Further, given that reforms are continuing 
processes, these should have been geared from a permanent structure and not 
through a project of limited duration. Moreover, because such initiatives often 
gather documents and rich experiences, what would be the fate of the archives and 
human resource developed in this process, after the closure of the project? In the 
case of the project's linkages with the institutions, the former is likely to be followed 
up, carried over, and used in furthering the concepts (World Bank, 1995: 6/para 37). 
5.3.7. Process 
5.3.7.1. Conceptualisation 
As indicated (5.3.1.1) the SPP was meant to develop and test the interventions of the 
SFHP which, in turn, was a part of the larger SAP. Since the latter was a cross- 
sectoral programme, it can be argued that the SPP was part of the government's 
23 Executive Director of Special Projects: Note on Association of College of Communi1y Medicine 
(Institute of Public Health) with Sheikhupura PHC Pilot proiect - unpublished document 
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larger agenda. However, this needs clarifying. How did it get on the agenda and who 
did it? The executive director told this researcher that he took the initiative and 
convinced the donors to run a pilot alongside the SFHP in order to develop and test 
the interventions prior to their wider replication. However, according to a senior 
planning officer, it was team thinking, which led to this decision. Nonetheless, 
evidence favours that the executive director spearheaded the move to launch SPP, 
while others supported it. 
5.3.7.2. Designing the initiative 
The project proposal passed through a lengthy planning process and the highest 
provincial planning forum, the PDWP, approved it (GoPb, 1993b). However, no in- 
depth study was conducted to validate the context, instead a top planner commented: 
the project itself demanded that a deeper study should take place 
because whichever studies had taken place, pointed to a number of 
issues and had demanded precise answers. So the project was 
conceived as an action oriented research. 
Similarly, no technique was used to anticipate consequences in case the project was 
not launched. Instead, the executive director told this researcher that a sort of 
apprehension existed that the inputs of the SFHP would not be appropriately used, if 
these were not pre-tested. According to a top bureaucrat, "... what we were trying to 
do was to find out the reasons why the available infrastructure was not delivering... " 
Therefore, as a senior officer in the Health Department commented, "the project was 
a paradigm shift in the public sector". In his view, "community participation and 
decentralisation till that time were theoretical issues and to test their operability, the 
pilot project was initiated". 
SPP visualised introducing: management interventions and community participation, 
and following that, the objectives and priorities for the project were set. There is no 
evidence, however, that an option appraisal was done. But it is clear from the 
document review that a flexible approach was adopted, and the project design 
continued changing as conditions required during implementation. Thus, it is argued 
that SPP was a software project aimed at developing management systems in the 
health sector, but no formal study or technique was used in its planning. 
5.3.7.3. Stakeholder involvement 
The policy process for the SPP was conducted in a hierarchical channel, where its 
design was extensively discussed involving stakeholders from different public sector 
departments. Further, given the project proposal underwent several revisions, each 
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time its contents were discussed amongst stakeholders in the directorate, secretariat 
and donors. However, although community participation was its major component, 
none from the communities participated. But, given that it was flexible (5.3.7.2) and 
its final design bore the impression of stakeholders at various levels, the project had 
a broad stakeholders' base. Nonetheless, this strength of the project was 
counterbalanced by its execution in parallel to the mainstream health sector (5.2; 
5.3.6.4) and subsequent loss of support (5.3.3.2). 
5.3.8. Summary and conclusion 
The policy process for the Sheikhupura Pilot Project has been analysed using a 
framework developed for this study. The project arose initially as a pilot to develop, 
test and refine the interventions of the SFHP, but later became its vestigial part. 
Despite the ill-conceived organisational relationships in the health sector hierarchy 
its management team developed a package for management modification and 
established a network of organised village communities. Also, the project attracted 
appreciation and support from the government and donors. 
However, because of the dwindling political support and bureaucratic inertia, the 
required amendments in the rules and regulations took a long time. Further, the 
PHDC -a subsidiary of the same project as the pilot project - took up a similar 
agenda as that of the pilot project. This institution launched initiatives: first DIIMTs, 
and then DHAs that received the assent of the government. About the same time, the 
project team for SPP was changed. Given that with communities it is often the 
personalities and for management interventions it is the continuing thinking process 
that is the mainstay for progress, evidence suggests that little progress was registered 
afterwards. 
The Sheikhupura Pilot Project was the first organised effort in the public sector to 
introduce community participation and decentralisation. There followed several 
upheavals in the life of the project, and in the words of its director, "half of my time 
was spent to defend, one fourth to explain and advocate, and the remaining one 
fourth to work for the project". Although the SPP was gradually lost in this maze, 
nevertheless, it served to prefigure reforms in the health and other sectors, as a 
retired director general of health services told this researcher. 
The Sheikhupura Pilot Project was a leader in introducing the change 
in the public sector. It was a learning ground, not onlyfor the health 
sector but also for other sectors as well. Many government 
departments got inspired and introduced similar interventions. 
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5.4. District Health Authority -a case of a neglected initiative 
5.4.1. Account of the initiative 
5.4.1.1. Emergence of the concept 
The idea of the DHA is traced to a report produced by Collins (1995) who proposed 
advisory groups for different levels of the health system hierarchy, including a 
District Health Board to work with the District Health Office. Later, in another 
development, Omar (1996) suggested an 'Inter-sectoral Health Committee' to focus 
on collaboration. Then, a committee appointed by the government to review these 
reports recommended the establishment of the DHA. However, it was declined, 
because its legal implications could not be circumvented by the Health Department. 
Later, in 1997 the idea of the DHA emerged again as an item on the election 
manifesto of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML, 1997). The chief minister 
constituted a 'Task Force on Health' (GoPb, 1997S)24, which recommended 
establishing DHAs initially in two districts, emphasising that "in order to provide 
legal cover to the DHAs, the department may submit a draft bill. This initiative will 
be extended to other districts on successful evaluation of the results of these two 
DHAs... " (GoPb, 1997c). The DHA also figured in the National Health Policy 
where it was seen as a strategy for management reforms and a means of 
strengthening the district health system (MoH, 1997b). 
5.4.1.2. Establishment of District Health Authorities 
Two DHAs were established with the aim "to improve and develop health service 
for the population residing in the districts". The administrative order for this purpose 
lays down a list of members, portfolios and a range of functions to be performed by 
these new bodies. The DHA had thirteen members with the DIIO acting as its ex- 
offi'do secretary. Six members were drawn from allied public sector departments, 
while the remaining six were non-official honorary persons and the official members 
nominated three of them (GoPb, 1997b). However, no legitimate powers were 
delegated to these new bodies. 
The mechanism for constituting DIIAs had problems: firstly because there was no 
selection criterion one could expect the will and favour of the officials prevailing in 
selecting the members. The governor of Punjab, in a similar situation, obscrvcd that 
24 Noted in the file in longhand and comprising: Dr. Amir Aziz; Ayaz Amir, MPA; Zulfiqar Ahmcd 
Khan Khosa; all Principals of Medical Colleges; Deans and Medical Supdts of teaching hospitals 
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it was against the spirit of decentralisation that the nomination of non-official 
members should rest on the proposals emanating from the official members. 
Secondly, certain components of the health system such as patients and communities 
were not represented (Khan, n. d) and the non-official members, by default, do not 
represent them. Thirdly, the chief minister nominated the chairperson to honorarily 
head the authority and a Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) as its member. 
Similarly, the minister for health nominated one notable from the district. This 
mechanism took a long time to fill vacancies and because the politicians were placed 
remotely from the districts as the minister for health told this researcher, they could 
not effectively undertake this exercise. It is, therefore, argued that this arrangement 
promoted centralisation in the attire of decentralisation. 
5.4.1.3. Fate of District Health Authorities 
The DHAs were taken over by another initiative. That is, while these bodies were 
struggling, a delegation comprising the secretary health, two chairpersons of DHAs 
and the executive director of Special Projects went for a study tour to the UK. This 
tour was organised by DFID for the participants to learn from the experiences of 
DHAs in that country. However, the impressions of these study tour participants 
proved a turning point. The government shifted its emphasis to another initiative - 
the District Health Government. The new initiative envisaged a paid and full-time 
district chief executive with full financial and administrative powers to head the 
proposed structures. The DHAs were left to perish, however as a chainnan of a 
DHA commented "since the order for establishing the DIIA has not yet been 
withdrawn, officially these bodies still exist, notwithstanding being abandoned". So, 
this was the demise of an initiative in its infancy at the hands of its carcrs. 
5.4.2. Principles and purposes 
Insofar as the DHA initiative is concerned, the majority of the respondents argued, 
this intervention was aimed at bringing change in the district health system, which 
was not delivering. The question, however, is that what was the motivation for this 
change? In the opinion of a DHO, the DIIA was not ideologically motivated. Ile 
argued that in that case the government should have adhered to the initiative and 
undertaken the needed homework. However, the DIIA was abandoned in favour of 
another initiative. 
Then, was it politically motivated? This assumption is supported from evidence that 
the initiative figured in the election manifesto of the political party in power, and a 
respondent commented that some MPAs were obliged by inducting them in these 
bodies. But, the question arises, why did the political bosses allow it to be taken over 
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by another initiative? Was it the bureaucracy that was responsible for this takeover, 
and did not translate the political agenda into the operational plans? This assumption 
is supported by the fact that the chief minister asked the bureaucracy to draft 
legislation for providing legal cover to the initiative (GoPb, 1997c), but this was not 
done. Further, the DFID team developed a set of such instruments, but these were 
shelved (5.4.5.4). However, yet the question remains - who was the custodian of 
these principle(s) of reforms being introduced under a political agenda, and what did 
they do for their upholding? Logically, this should have been the minister for health, 
but he was not mindful in following the progress of reform, the chief minister said. 
Thus from the above, it is seen that DHAs visualised a politically driven change. 
However, the bureaucrats were not enthusiastic in creating an environment 
conducive for these bodies to operate. Also, the politicians were not vigilant and 
mindful of their political agenda. Why was this so? One explanation is that they 
looked for change but not the DHA as the tool for that, because they were not clear 
about the nature and basis of the proposed change, i. e. the principles and purposes. 
5.4.3. Shapers 
Leader 
The secretary health led the reform process, but had doubtful dedication for the 
initiative and technical capability. He was full of personal traits which distinguished 
him from his fellow bureaucrats, but as a respondent commented, he seldom used 
those qualities for advancing the initiative. According to a senior officer, he talked 
well for the initiative, but practically did nothing to delegate authority to the lower 
levels. A chairperson of a DHA argued that he was trained under the British colonial 
style of administration, and would never want to lose powers. But, one may also 
argue that his failure to delegate was due to his technical weaknesses. According to 
a politician a person with specifications held by him could not lead the initiative. In 
his view this was a planner's job, and the secretary health was not a planner. 
Nonetheless, he was a successful bureaucrat, who despite having abandoned an 
initiative which was in the political agenda, earned praise from his political 
superiors - an impression of this researcher after he met the chief minister. 
5.4.3.2. Supporter 
The chief minister rendered consistent support to the initiative. However, by 
opening several fronts at a time, he lost control of the process, and hardly anything 
was achieved. According to a respondent, he was energetic and powerful to the 
extent that he was a 'democratic dictator'. He wanted things - rather several things - 
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to be done immediately. Several respondents noted that this haste and urgency 
which was part of his temperament, led to the problems in the reform process. This 
attitude, a politician maintained, could work in the manufacturing or construction 
sector, but not in the social sector. Further, one chairperson of a DHA commented, 
to bring change, the chief minister depended on those (bureaucrats) who were 
responsible for the issues in the system. Thus, the chief minister rendered support, 
but of no avail to the reform initiative. 
5.4.3.3. Bureaucracy 
Overall, the civil bureaucracy was against DHAs and resisted the envisaged 
changes, because they did not want to lose power. The reform process could hardly 
come out of the files in the secretariat, and, once out, it was left unsteered and then 
shortly after abandoned. They did not respond to at least to one of the two DHAs. A 
chairperson reported that "they (decision-makers) never responded to any 
communiqud we made - over 100 letters in about 8 months - and you can well 
imagine the amount of co-operation we received (from bureaucracy)". Similarly, in 
districts, according to a DHO, the additional deputy commissioner -a junior civil 
bureaucrat on the DHA - never came to the DHA meetings. He wanted the DHA to 
meet in his office. Regarding technical bureaucracy, one chairperson of a DIIA told 
this researcher that those in the secretariat were subservient to their superiors in the 
civil service, and had attuned to being bureauCMtS25, while the entire line 
management was against the DHA. According to a technocrat, this was mainly due 
to the fear of losing power, an uncertain future, and that they were not involved. 
But there is another dimension to the role of bureaucracy. They were inefficient in 
undertaking the policy process for health sector reform. This is evidenced from the 
process followed for establishing DHAs. A generic notification was issued in April 
1997, but the first DHA was created in June the same year. The second DIIA was 
shaped after about one year - in March 1998 (GoPb, 1998w). Such delays were 
contested on the grounds that bureaucracy in the secretariat was involved in too 
many assignments in addition to their routine work. This is, however, a weak 
argument. Why did the bureaucracy not delegate? Is not this itself a case of 
inefficiency in the wake of decentralisation, one may argue. Instead, bureaucracy 
took over the responsibility from the PHDC of supporting the initiative (5.4.6.4). 
One may, therefore, draw a logical conclusion that bureaucracy was incfficicnt and 
neither wanted itself nor allowed any other institution to foster the initiative. 
25 This is also something to do with culture. Technocrats like doctors and engineers once they join 
the civil service leaving their technical role don't use prc-f ix Dr. or Engineer with their name. 
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5.4.3.4. Donors 
The donors inculcated the need for reforms, but were inconsistent in their approach 
to Providing technical assistance. DFID was the main financier, while the World 
Bank supported the DHA initiative in principle (GoPb, 1997e). It was noted 
(5.3.3.4) that the donors' support to DHAs was at the cost of pulling out from SPP, 
and it was uneven. That is, they supported through a technical team, but took eight 
months to install it, and then operationalised it after another three months. Since the 
team was there for a short time, i. e. before long it was shifted to work on the DHG 
initiative, it could not adequately interact with the districts. Why was this so, one 
may question? A number of respondents subscribed to the view that it was due to the 
flexibility in the donors' approach that they followed rather than technically guiding 
the government. However, the fact remains why was the project Logframe not 
updated, although the project inputs had changed, leading to the project (PHSSC) 
becoming directionless and technical assistance inconsistent. This was due to, as a 
senior planner argued, fatigue of donors after following a long-term project. 
5.4.3.5. Media 
Apart from few news items of a ceremonial nature, the media was not used to gather 
the support of stakeholders for the initiative. There were some efforts at the local 
level, but not enough to raise adequate pressure for keeping the initiative on the 
agenda of the government. This observation is seconded by a majority view. But, the 
question arises - who could have used the media? The bureaucracy, which did not 
want to support the initiative, would not have done it. The politicians could have 
used this forum to promote the political agenda. The chief minister had several items 
on his agenda, but the minister for health could not take the opportunity, one may 
conclude. The media did not have a proactive role. This researcher could not trace 
any news item or report published about the initiatives during those years. 
5.4.3.6. CiviI society 
The PMA did not generate any debate. One could argue that this was perhaps 
because the local branches were represented on the DHAs. However, if that was an 
incentive, why did they not take up the issue when the initiative was first ignored 
and then replaced with another initiative? Logically, it appears that it was bccausc 
the PMA represents the city doctors and those in tertiary care, while the DIIA was 
about the secondary and primary care in rural areas. Also, it is possible that, as the 
chairperson and other portfolios on the authority were honorary and no perks or 
benefits were involved, there was no competition. However, there is no evidence 
that any other section of civil society took any interest in the initiative. 
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5.4.4. Context 
Many factors embedded in the health sector including its environment led to 
establishing the DHAs in districts. These are summarised below: 
m There were issues in the health sector per se. According to a senior health 
manager, the delayed decision-making coupled with nepotism and corruption 
contributed to the inefficiency, and the overall perception was that the health 
services had deteriorated. People would complain about lacking medicine, 
absentee doctors and missing equipment from health facilities. Complementing 
this observation, a DHO reported that there were no district plans, and if 
available, those were inconsistent with the needs and resources of the district. 
Further, the minister for health added that there was no mechanism for solving 
the problems locally, therefore, "we established the DHAs ... to supervise and 
manage the affairs of all health facilities within a district". 
There were also problems in the national systems. According to a donor health is 
an important and sensitive sector, but the government had run out of remedial 
options for the ailing health sector. The resources were inadequate and, given the 
rising inflation coupled with population growth, it was difficult for the 
government to even maintain budgetary provisions. But, the government was 
only criticised. Therefore, it wanted to shed off or at least share its responsibility 
with the public, and the political government introduced the initiative involving 
the end users in the management of health services. So, both the rewards for 
improvement and blame for any inefficiency were shared. 
The context also extended to the hegemonic systems. According to a respondent, 
the DHA was a manifestation of the advocacy for decentralisation that had been 
there, when healthcare delivery was failing. In this regard, it was noted (5.4.1.1) 
that the donors contributed to conceptualising DHAs. But, initially due to the 
lack of political will it did not take shape. However, later the scenario changed. 
That is, there was political will and also the donors to support it. 
The majority of respondents considered that there was no crisis and it was business 
as usual in districts. However, according to an academic "the government, by and 
large, has been doing crisis management". Why then did other respondents think that 
it was the other way? One logical explanation is that such feelings were due to the 
degenerative process occurring gradually in the health sector to which the people 
were acclimatised. 
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5.4.5. Contents 
5.4.5.1. Policy and its level 
The DHA initiative was part of the government's larger agenda. This is true and is 
supported by the fact that it was on the government's political agenda. Further, the 
origin of the initiative can be traced to the SAP, which was a country-wide social 
sector programme and that several initiatives alongside DHAs were underway. But, 
a rival explanation from a senior planner is that these initiatives were not part of a 
bigger picture; instead, each one was an independent entity. In fact, he was 
indicating the lack of a coherent strategy by the policymakers in reforming the 
health sector. For example, the Planning and Development (P&D) Department also 
proposed to establish similar authorities in health and other sectors. Further, several 
other departments in the social sector undertook the initiatives (GoPb, 1998), but 
only to follow suit and not as a part of the larger agenda. Thus, the DHA initiative 
cannot be considered as a part of the government's larger scheme. 
The next question is how comprehensive was the policy for the DHA? Insofar as the 
district went, it was comprehensive. The minister for health noted that within a 
district all sections of society and allied departments were represented, and the 
Authority could address issues in the entire district health sector. But, this reason is 
weak, because the DHA could not appropriate resources from allied sectors to focus 
on health or vice-versa (DHA, Jhelum, 1997). Further, because no systems were 
brought into place for operating this body (5.4.5.4), it is difficult to judge the level 
of policy. Hence from the evidence available, the DHA was not a comprehensive 
policy. Nevertheless, in the following we discuss important ingredients of the policy. 
5.4.5.2. Communications strategy 
No communications strategy was defined as a means of consulting and involving the 
stakeholders. Conventional methods like meetings and discussions had little effect, 
as observed by a key stakeholder that "2 hours discussion for developing a system is 
nothing". Some workshops were also organised to involve selected stakeholders, but 
public dissemination of the initiative was not done. A DIIO noted: 
No, nothing of that sort was there. However, we were in the process 
and maybe if the DIM was allowed to continue we would have 
developed a communication strategy. Me wanted to work with people 
making them aware about the DIL4. However, this could not happen, 
because the Authority was abandoned all of a sudden... 
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5.4.5.3. Monitoring and evaluation 
No system was set up to monitor the progress of the initiative. Reliance was on the 
informal means of using line managers. Criticising this arrangement, a chairperson 
of a DHA commented, "When you are replacing a system with a new one and 
continue to receive reports from people of the same old system, you cannot expect 
them to provide honest reports. They will never be in favour of change, because they 
do not want to lose powers". A Monitoring and Co-ordinating Committee was 
established, which met only once and a review of minutes do not support its role as a 
monitor. It was a forum used only to criticise the district co-ordinators appointed to 
assist the DHAs. What the DHA has been doing and how the government could help 
them, did not figure in its deliberations (DGHS, 1998). 
5.4.5.4. Management systems 
Every intervention has implications: legal, administrative or financial (2.3.1.2), and 
so had the DHA, but these consequences were not adequately considered. The civil 
and technical bureaucracy was to anticipate and accordingly devise systems 
(Geyndt, 1990), but not much was done. The government notification for the 
initiative lays down mainly what the new body has to do; however, there are hardly 
any guidelines as to how to transact business (Griffith, 1997). A DHS in charge of a 
DHA district furthering this point tells that: 
... I was DHS... when ... the district was picked up 
for implementing 
DHA. I do not remember if I was ever called or consulted (as DHS) in 
the matter. I also do not know if any administrative guidelines were 
given to the newly implanted authorities or those who were already 
working there. ... I do not know if there were any rules or 
bylaws for 
the functions of the authority. Similarly, there were no guidelines for 
the Divisional Director or the DGHS, Punjab for dealing with 
problems of the District where DIL4s were established 
The new bodies after their establishment were deliberately left on their own without 
any guidance. The DFID technical team, working with colleagues from the Health 
Department, developed a 'Health Sector Reform Package' for a decentralised district 
and presented this to the secretary health in April 1998 (DFID, 1998). It 
recommended: amending existing rules, developing operational manuals, drafting 
detailed terms of reference (TORs) and training DHA and DIIMT officials. The 
secretary health informed the team about a draft law "The Punjab Medical and 
Health Institutions Ordinance, 1998" and asked to draft rules for the DIIAs and 
DHMT (Wildman, 1998). The law was promulgated in May 1998 (GoPb, 1998a) 
and applied for granting autonomy to the tertiary care hospitals in July 1998 (GoPb, 
1998v). However, the draft rules for DHAs and DHMTs, prepared in a series of 
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workshops, presented to the secretary health in June 1998 were shelved, as being too 
detailed and liable to work against decentralisation (Griffith, 1999). 
However, why did this happen? In the opinion of a bureaucrat, this was deliberate; 
"let us not limit the body with too many restrictions. Let them devise their own way 
and channel. ... They (policymakers) gave them a sort of four comers and then left 
them to work out details on their own". However, people who were put on this work 
were neither given any orientation or documentation about the issues and the 
intervention, because there was none, and so these four comers remained hazy. A 
chairman of a DHA noted: 
So, everything said and done, I stillfeel that I was being thrown into 
deep water with my hands andfeet tied and eyes covered I had no way 
to go. I was just like a dumb and deaf swimmer, who was trying to 
paddle his way to the edge of the pool. 
"This resulted in that the same organisation (DHA) in different geographical 
locations experimented differently and developed different models" one key 
informant commented. However, why was this allowed to happen? A plausible 
answer one respondent offered was that "they (policymakers in the bureaucracy) 
wanted the new system to fail in order to maintain the status quo". 
5.4.6. Implementation 
5.4.6.1. Political feasibility 
It was a politically feasible time, but the opportunity was lost. Before 1997, when a 
coalition led by the Pakistan Peoples Party was in power, the support for the 
initiative was lukewarm, and civil bureaucracy declined to establish DIIAs. This 
was because constituting this body needed legislation, and the coalition government 
was not confident to get it passed by the Assembly. After 1997, however, the same 
political party (Pakistan Muslim League), with an overwhelming majority, was in 
power both in the province and centre and backed the initiative. However, despite 
the political will and a clear directive (5.4.1.1), the DHA was not provided with 
legal cover; instead work was started on yet another initiative (5.4.1.3). 
5.4.6.2. Technical feasibility 
Although, initially the intention was to pilot test the initiative (Moll, 1997a; GoPb, 
1997c), later it was rather an incoherent strategy. DFID committed to support DIIAs 
in four districts: Jhelum, Multan, Sargodha and Gujranwala. But, it was launched 
only in two districts; Jhelum and Multan. The intention was to extend the initiative 
to other districts on evaluation of these two DHAs. However, contrarily work was 
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started to implement the initiative in 15 more districts (GoPb, 1997g). Also at the 
same time, the P&D Department implemented such bodies throughout the province. 
Whereas little progress was made to expand, the pilot of the initiative in two districts 
was also allowed to perish and be superseded by a new movement, the DHG (Abbot 
et al, 1999). Thus, there was no pilot testing of the initiative. 
5.4.6.3. Resource 
No additional resources were provided to the districts. One DHO commented that 
the districts, in addition to supporting the new structure, were asked to work better 
within the same resources. A planning document submitted by one DHA was never 
responded t026, while the other DHA was looking for something from outside the 
Health Department (GoPb, 1998b). This situation occurred, despite the additional 
provisions promised in the recommendations of the Task Force (MoH, 1997b). 
For the capacity building of districts, district co-ordinators tried to develop the 
DHMTs. One DHO reported that "we were bewildered, but with technical input 
from DFID we got on track. The technical support was tremendous, because without 
that assistance we were scattered and lost". But this endeavour was compromised 
first, as indicated earlier (5.4.3.4), the coordinators had just a few months to work 
with the districts, as before long they were assigned to work for the DIIGs. 
Secondly, they were not provided with any guidelines, so they did things according 
to their own preferences and understanding. For example, one co-ordinator, when 
asked by a top bureaucrat about what he was doing in the district, answered "nothing 
particular! " The top man enquired, "Why"? "You did not give me any work. So, I 
did whatever I understood and was appropriate, " answered the co-ordinator. 
5.4.6.4. Organisational support 
There were no adequate institutional arrangements to support the initiative. Initially, 
the PHDC with the help of donors undertook the policy process including technical 
assistance. It organised a brainstorming session for sorting the issues particularly 
related to the administrative structure, financial rules and regulation (PHDC, 1998). 
Subsequently, DFID shifted its emphasis from the PHDC and based its technical 
team in the Directorate General of Health Services. By this arrangement, according 
to a senior officer, the PHDC went into the background, and also the technical 
assistance escaped control resulting in a lack of ownership of what was delivered. 
Around the same time, the technical wing of the Health Secretariat and the 
26 Personal communications of this researcher with the Chairman of the respective District Ilealth 
Authority 
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Directorate of Special Projects took over this responsibility. The Health Services 
Academy offered its assistance by establishing a field demonstration area for its 
students (HSA, 1998). In response, the Academy was given the status of 'co-opted 
member' of the DHA (GoPb, 1998c). However, by then, the DHG initiative had 
taken root, and there is no evidence that the Academy provided any assistance. 
5.4.7. Process 
5.4.7.1. Conceptualisation 
The donors facilitated in bringing the DHA on to the agenda of the government. The 
expatriate consultant facilitated the introduction of the idea (5.4.1.1), but the then 
secretary health declined to constitute the DHAs, because the legal implications 
were beyond the jurisdiction of the Health Department. Nevertheless, DHMTs were 
established to co-ordinate healthcare activities in the districts (DGHS, 1996a). 
However, the idea of DHAs came up again in 1997. Politicians had picked it up and 
this figured in the election manifcsto of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML, 1997). 
5.4.7.2. Designing the initiative 
A number of consultancies were undertaken, but overall the policy planning for the 
DHA was directionless. In addition, brainstorming sessions were held by a close 
circle of top technocrats and bureaucrats. The need for an in-depth study was not 
felt, because, in view of a senior bureaucrat, all issues were known to the people at 
the provincial level. However, another bureaucrat termed this claim as rhetoric. In 
his view, they should have undertaken some study and analysis. Also, no projection 
was made for determining the consequences if the issues were not solved. 
Nonetheless, there was a strong feeling amongst decision-makers that the system 
would crumble if these issues were left unresolved. 
The objectives laid down in the notification made for the DHAs read "to improve 
and develop health services for the population residing in the district". This is broad, 
non-specific, and difficult to measure. The functions envisaged for DIIA covered 
almost the entire health sector. These were too ambitious to accomplish so that one 
retired army general nominated by the chief minister declined to head one of the 
authorities (GoPb, 1997f). There is also no evidence that an option appraisal was 
done. According to a senior officer, it was top-down planning. A remedy was 
thought through initially and then it was planned how to bring it into place. 
However, in doing so, the bureaucracy failed to translate political policies into 
operational instruments. They did not use the archives and expertise available, and 
they notified a DHA which was different from the one recommended by the Task 
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Force (5.4.1.1). That is, instead of an autonomous legal entity with full financial and 
administrative powers (MoH, 1997; GoPb, 1997c), it was only an advisory body. 
5.4.7.3. Stakeholder involvement 
There was a narrow stakeholder base involved in the policy process for the DHA. 
Many respondents thought that 'apparently' it was a consultative process. But who 
were those involved? In the opinion of a senior technocrat, "they were a few 
bureaucrats, politicians and some technocrats". About this team, one senior planner 
asserted that they had superficial knowledge and understanding of the health system. 
Therefore, they could only work out the broad outline of the policy. Since, in his 
view, the details come from the people working in the system that were not 
involved, these bits remained unattended to. Regarding, how they contributed to the 
policy process, it was argued by another senior technocrat that given the 
bureaucratic culture and the personality of the then chief minister, the entire process 
was rather dictatorial and people just got on board and carried out what they were 
asked to do. In other words, it was not a consultative process. 
5.4.8. Summary and conclusion 
The policy process for the DHA initiative has been examined. Although an in-depth 
study was undertaken, it was hardly utilised in drawing up the final design of the 
DHA. Initially declined by the civil bureaucracy, the initiative came on the political 
agenda and two DHAs were established. The bureaucracy, despite the orders of the 
chief minister did not arrange any delegation of legitimate power to these bodies. 
The British Council, on behalf of DFID, set up its team to support these bodies, and 
it was located in the DGHS office, hitherto in the PHDC. Since no guidelines were 
provided, the team was unclear about its functions and so were the DIIAs in the 
districts. The secretary health led the initiative until abandoned, while the chief 
minister was committed, but could not keep control of the process and the minister 
for health did not help him. The media was passive and the PMA unconcerned in 
this attempt to improve the district health sector. Alongside, tertiary care hospitals 
were granted autonomy, where some gains were observed. Geared by that success, 
when decision-makcrs visited the UK health system, they jumped on the idea of 
DHGs. 
In short, after installing, the new bodies were not provided with any structural 
assistance, and instead emphasis shifted to embark on yet another initiative. Thus, it 
is argued that establishing the District Health Authorities in this manner was the 
death of an initiative in its infancy due to the neglect by its carers. 
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5.5. Institutional Autonomy -a case of mayhem 
Account of the initiative 
5.5.1.1. General issues 
1. The terms 'medical and health institutions' are arbitrarily uscd in the Punjab 
context. The former is synonymous for medical colleges with attached tertiary care 
hospitals, while the rest are health institutions. A principal heads a medical college, 
while a medical superintendent is in charge of an attached tertiary care hospital. 
Both are senior in their own cadre, the former in teaching and the latter in the 
general cadre, reporting directly to the Secretary health (Figure 5.2). 
2. Doctors in the public sector are in 
three cadres - teaching, specialists and 
general - and one joins and progresses to 
seniority in one of these cadres, according 
to the person specifications. 
3. The academics in a medical college 
are also visiting clinicians for the attached 
Figure 5.2: - Administrative dichotomy 
Secretaq 
Health 
Principal Medical 
of Medical College Superintendent 
of attached Hospital 
Academic Stag Clinical Stag 
(Visiting Clinicians) (Registrars & Medical Okelrs 
nospital, but they report to tile principai. 
That is, they work in the hospitals, but are not responsible to the in charge medical 
superintendent. This dichotomy in administration played an important role in 
shaping the autonomy given to the institutions. 
4. The concept of autonomy is not new in the Punjab. A law 'The Punjab 
Government Education and Training Institutions Ordinance, 1960' was promulgated 
for granting autonomy to the institutions in the education scctor. This law rcquircs 
establishing a Board of Governors (BOG) comprising majority official and minority 
non-official members. In addition to the government departmcnt implcmenting the 
autonomy, other departments, like Finance, are also represented on this body. 
Further, there is a Board of Management for running day-to-day affairs. 
5.5.1.2. Emergence ofthe concept 
In February 1997, the secretary health wrote to a principal of a medical college 
about the feasibility of introducing autonomy to the medical colleges (GoPb, 1997s: 
1). The latter, after consulting the colleague principals and medical staff, 
recommended that it was feasible under the Punjab Government Education and 
Training Institutions Ordinance, 1960 (GoPb, 1997h). The new political government 
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came into office on 17 February 1997 and appointed a Task Force for the Healfli 
Sector. At the recommendation of the latter, the chief minister directed that three 
medical colleges with their attached hospitals are granted autonomy within the 
framework of the aforementioned law (GoPb, 1997i). 
5.5.1.3. Granting autonomy to the medical colleges 
The Health Department made nominations for BOGs and asked the Law Department 
for ratification (GoPb, 1997j). However, the latter objected that as against the 
provisions of the law the MPAs were members, and the official members were in the 
minority (GoPb, 1997k). The secretary health tried to resolve the issue, but the Law 
Department maintained their stance (GoPb, 19971). The secretary health, however, 
not agreeing with their view requested the chief minister to approve the proposed 
constitution of the BOGs. The chief minister approved it and then the permission of 
the Law Department was asked for the notification of BOGs (ibid). However, they 
refused, indicating flaws and that it was against the constitution (GoPb, 1997m). 
Thus the proposal to grant autonomy to medical colleges within the framework of 
the 'Punjab Government Education and Training Institutions Ordinance, 1960' was 
abandoned and the chief minister directed to draft a fresh law, so the idea of a 'role- 
model hospital' took birth. 
5.5.1.4. Establishing the Role-model Hospitals 
A law to establish the role-model hospitals was drafted. To review this, the chief 
minister appointed a committee which recommended that the concept be tested in 
three institutions (GoPb, 1997n). Further, it was suggested that the law should 
envisage delegation of financial and administrative powers held by the Health, 
Finance and Buildings Departments to the role-model institutions which should be 
headed by chief executives recruited competitively (GoPb, 1997o). 
The draft law was later discussed in the Cabinet which recommended that the audit 
of the role model institutions be carried out by a third party and the government 
should not interfere in their day-to-day work. A Cabinet Sub-committcc was also 
appointed to examine the proposed law (GoPb, 1998e). While this Sub-committce 
suggested certain amendments in the draft law, the Finance and Law Departments 
expressed their reservations. The former disagreed with the proposed 'indexing' of 
the financial grant (GoPb, 19980 and the latter insisted on granting autonomy under 
the Punjab Education and Training Institutions Ordinance, 1960 (Gollb, 1997p). A 
Specialist Committee comprising the law, business and medical professionals also 
discussed the draft law, underlining the "need to have a Board of Governors which 
will be a supra-body over the chief executive and his Management Committee". The 
-134- 
Health Department was to incorporate these recommendations in the final draft 
(GoPb, 1998g), but there is no evidence that these recommendations were taken into 
account in finalising the law. 
5.5.1.5. Framing the law for granting autonomy to health 
and medical institutions 
The law, 'Punjab Medical Institutions Bill, 1997" was finalised changing the title of 
the initiative from 'Role Model Institutions' to 'Autonomy to the Medical and 
Health Institutions'. The Pakistan Medical Association protested over the 
arrangements and demanded a comprehensive study be undertaken before autonomy 
was granted (PMA, 1998; PMA, 1998a; GoPb, 1998h). With disregard to that 
demand, however, the draft law, the Punjab Medical and Health Institutions 
Ordinance, 1998 was ratified by the Law Department. Later, the governor of the 
Punjab assented to the same with certain reservations (GoPb, 1998i). Since it is 
mandatory under the constitution of Pakistan that an Ordinance should either be re- 
invoked or placed before the Provincial Assembly for vote within six months, 
various formalities were rushed through. The Standing Sub-committee on Health 
considered the Bill on 20-07-98 (GoPb, 1998j) followed by the Punjab Assembly 
discussing it on 16-17 November when only a few members participated in the 
debate (GoPb, 1998k). After having been voted on 18th November the Bill was 
assented to by the Governor of Punjab on 20 November 1998. Finally, it was 
published in the official Punjab Gazette on 25 November 1998 (GoPb, 19981). 
5.5.1.6. Granting autonomous status to medical institutions 
The medical institutions were given autonomy in a phased manner starting in July 
1998, within the framework of the 'Punjab Medical and Health Institutions 
Ordinance, 1998'. Three teaching institutions and six hospitals were granted 
autonomy in the first phase. A Third Party Evaluation (TPE) of these institutions 
was conducted, which indicated certain improvements encouraging the 
policyrnakers to continue the initiative. One teaching institution with two hospitals 
in the second phase (GoPb, 1998m) followed in the third phase by another five 
teaching institutions and eight hospitals were given autonomy (GoPb, 1999). 
The chief executives for these institutions were selected through a process by open 
competition (GoPb, 1998n). They were asked to propose non-official members of 
their Institutional Management Committees (IMC), according to law (GoPb, 1998o). 
However, they were late in reacting and with the change of government on 12 
October 1999, there was a new scenario. The new governor was not convinced by 
the way the initiative was handled (GoPb, 1999a). Ile refused to approve IMCs for 
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the third phase autonomous institutions. In his opinion, it was against the spirit of 
autonomy that nomination of non-official members should depend on the proposals 
emanating from the official members. Later he ordered that until rules were framed, 
the same powers, as ordinarily applicable, should be exercised by the chief 
executives (GoPb, 2000). However, when, by the end of 2001, this had not been 
done, a chief executive in response to this researcher's question, whether under such 
circumstances autonomy was there, answered "No, not really as yet". In other words 
autonomy granted with one hand had been taken back with the other. 
5.5.2. Principles and purposes 
While the purposes for the reform were known, the principles remained unclear. The 
initiative was on the political agenda of the government in power, and the majority 
opinion is that it was aimed at bringing efficiency and quality in terms of better 
availability and accessibility of health services. However, what was the motive 
behind this change? There are two schools. Firstly, the initiative was to promote 
local decision-making. Thus, the administrative and financial powers hitherto held 
by government, were delegated to the institutions. By this arrangement, it was 
thought that the end-users would finally benefit. In his interview with this researcher 
the chief minister vehemently emphasised that he wanted the welfare of the patients. 
Contrarily, others viewed that the state was introducing corporate management to 
change its stature in terms of reducing its welfare functions. In their view, fostering 
quality and efficiency was in order to make the institutions economically viable, so 
that these were better valued when privatised. The proponents of this idea argue that 
if the concern was the end-users, then why were the necessary mechanisms for 
instituting the change not installed? There were no rules for cross-subsidy and 
utilisation of funds; therefore despite millions of rupees in the institution's account, 
the chief executives were forced to charge everyone for the services provided. Also, 
as a senior planner observed, the Finance Department froze the institutional 
allocations at the pre-autonomy level. This was, in the view of an officer in the 
Finance Department, "to impel the autonomous institutions to generate resources of 
their own rather than to look towards government... " Finally the users of the service 
suffered. It is, therefore contemplated that the political government did not want the 
state to change its position, but its administrative arm ended up doing so, because 
the underlying principles for the initiatives were unclear. 
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5.5.3. Shapers 
5.5.3.1. Leader 
The majority of respondents viewed the then secretary health as the leader of the 
reform process, but it is argued that he could not provide ideal leadership. Many 
respondents avoided commenting on his personal attributes, but according to what 
this researcher gathered, he was visionary and pragmatic with doubtful planning and 
implementation capacity. He did not avail himself of the enormous political support 
in pushing structural issues, like framing of rules, regulations and provision of 
guidelines, to the institutions. As a result, the status of the reform process was such 
that the Governor observed, "there are huge voids" (GoPb, 1999b). 
5.5.3.2. Supporter 
The chief minister provided full support, but lost control over the process. This led 
the initiative into mayhem. He was accessible, as a senior project officer puts it, "we 
had a hotline contact with him". According to a senior technocrat, "he took a lot of 
interest and ... mobilised the reform process... He was visionary, 
dedicated and 
pragmatic... " Given these attributes, one may question why the initiative was not 
properly implemented? This is because there is also another side to this picture. One 
secretariat staff member explained that "he wanted to do things overnight" or as one 
medical superintendent commented, "he was ... instead a non-systematic and pushing 
administrator... He was short-tempered and very strong". Once, in a seminar, lie 
said, "I am introducing autonomy and I will implement it whether you like it or not 
and I will see who resists it". These personal attributes notwithstanding, there were 
reasons for him to push the agenda, as a bureaucrat puts it, "it was political 
instability in the hindsight, because since 1985 no government could last more than 
2-3 years". Nonetheless, in the opinion of most participants, the initiative had strong 
support, but was badly handled. 
5.5.3.3. Bureaucracy 
As an institution, the civil bureaucracy did nothing for the reform. This image is 
drawn from the comments of a senior decision-mak-er, but there is adequate evidence 
to support this. In the opinion of the majority of respondents, the secretary health 
amongst the civil bureaucracy was the major player. As an individual, his role as a 
leader was not ideal (5.5.3.1). Ile gathered such people around him, who, as one 
respondent observed "had a narrow vision ... and they did not involve many 
stakeholders... They were dedicated, but did what. they believed in". The remaining 
bureaucracy in the health and other government departments played little role in 
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conceptualising and designing the initiative, one medical superintendent believed. 
Instead, as one chief executive commented, they created hindrances. 
A chief executive noted that out of the technical bureaucracy "a special group 
worked on the initiative, while leaving many others (stakeholders) behind". 
Similarly, according to a medical superintendent, "the senior most people in the 
department, including the principals and even the DGHS were not consulted". Many 
respondents assumed that just a few technocrats teamed up with civil bureaucracy, 
but others maintain that the former only carried out what the latter told them to do. 
A secretariat staff member looked at this issue from another angle. Ile said, "the 
technical bureaucracy acted as puppets. They failed to consider alternatives, because 
they were enjoying foreign excursions at the donors' expense". Nevertheless, they 
were only a few officials around the secretary health, while the remainder were 
barely involved and were against the initiative, as a local consultant observed. 
5.5.3.4. Donors 
Sifting of records reveals that the donors, because they were primarily interested in 
primary and secondary healthcare, did not take much interest initially. They came in 
later, when the initiative was in its implementation phase. DFID supported a study 
tour for two chief executives and a ten days induction course for the chief 
executives. The World Bank worked to support a Teaming and Innovation Loan 
Project'. But, before this project could take off, the government changed and the 
project was shelved. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of interest amongst donors 
and they watched the progress of the initiative, as this researcher knows personally. 
5.5.3.5. Media 
There is almost a consensus of opinion that overall the media was inadequately used, 
and that too late in the process. Further, as one medical superintendent revealed, this 
use of the media was necessitated to mainly defend the initiative after a dispute 
erupted between a chief executive of an autonomous hospital and an influential 
Newspaper Group. Why was this so, one may question? The chief minister was 
candid in answering. He told this researcher: 
I believe the politicians have disappointed people and they don't trust 
them - things should be done instead. Your action should speak... 
The bureaucracy in the Health Department also did not use the media. Documents 
indicate that a promotional advertisement was launched and a cell was created under 
the direction of the chief minister for receiving and collating public opinion (GoPb, 
1997q). However, there is no evidence of any activity undertaken by this cell. It is, 
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therefore, concluded that the media was used only to defend and not to develop 
public opinion and gather its support for the initiative. 
5.5.3.6. Civil SoCiety 
There are contrasting views about the role of civil society. A senior officer claimed 
that people were supportive as otherwise the new government would have scrapped 
the initiative. But a chief executive, differing from the earlier argument, told this 
researcher that the general public were apprehensive and resented the initiative. In 
his view, they took it as a step towards privatisation and levying user charges further 
strengthened their belief. This mixed picture, as a professor told this researcher, was 
due to the fact that "the poor people became excited and similarly the patients. They 
were told that once autonomy was launched, they would get better treatment". But 
insofar as what actually happened, a social welfare officer pointed out that "the 
patients do come to hospital, but when they come to know that they will have to pay, 
they disappear". This attitude was a silent protest by the people, because there were 
no organised groups to protect their rights. 
The service providers also did not like the way autonomy was granted. They resisted 
the initiative and were troublesome, a chief executive informed this researcher. The 
PMA, on behalf of doctors, declared a dispute by rallying against and resisted the 
initiative (The Nation, 1999). The academic staff did not co-operate either (Dawn, 
1998). In most institutions, the principals led them and often created an unpleasant 
situation (CE-NMC, 2000; CE-PMC, 2000). But, why did they behave in such a 
way? An expatriate consultant explained that because autonomy threatened their 
way of life - salary, pension, responsibility, and corruption etc. Similarly, according 
to another respondent, with autonomy their private practice had suffered. Contrarily, 
evidence also suggests that they favoured the concept (Nawa-i-Waqt, 1999), but 
objected to the way autonomy was implemented and that they were not taken on 
board. One principal explained that there are rules governing private practice, and it 
was not the issue. The issue, a top bureaucrat noted, was that the teaching cadre took 
it for granted that the principal would be the ex-officio chief executive. This explains 
why the principals of medical colleges recommended granting autonomy under the 
'Punjab Education and Training Institutions Ordinance, 1960', which provides that 
the incumbent principal shall be the CE of the autonomous institution (5.5.1.2). 
5.5.4. Context 
It was mainly the factors in the health sector and the national systems that were the 
reason for the initiative on the government's agenda. But, there is almost a 
consensus amongst respondents that there was no crisis. However, feeling existed, as 
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a senior officer observed, that "things were going from bad to worse and we had 
reached a stage where things could not be worse than that". But, as a consultant 
remarked, "there was no apparent big bang". The underlying factors identified by 
different respondents broadly fall into three categories. 
Firstly, healthcare delivery was ineffective and the communities were 
dissatisfied. According to a consultant surgeon, the service providers were not 
punctual, instead working more for their private practice. A chief executive, 
substantiating this view, commented that consultants were not available; instead 
house officers were treating patients. Also a medical superintendent noted that 
equipment was often out of order and visiting staff would seldom visit the 
hospital in a bid to promote their private practice. 
Secondly, governance and management had deteriorated and there were 
inordinate delays in decision-making. For example, according to a senior 
planner, it took a hospital over twelve years to purchase an angiography 
machine. And in the view of a chief executive and a hospital manager, the 
public sector institutions were continuously wasting resources, mainly due to the 
administrative dichotomy in the institutions (Figure 5.2). A surgeon, however, 
taking the argument further, attributed the failure of hospitals to the generally 
failed governance system in the country. 
Thirdly, the government wanted to dissociate itself from healthcare delivery and 
autonomy was a tool used to pull out of the big hospitals, an office bearer of 
PMA remarked. Augmenting this assumption, a senior officer argued that 
autonomy was not a felt need of the community; instead it was the wishes and 
whims of the people at the top. However, given the earlier discussion (5.5.2), it 
may be true that the political government wanted to introduce autonomy, but to 
benefit the people, and not to pull out of public welfare. 
5.5.5. Contents 
5.5.5.1. Policy and its level 
The respondents are divided on the question of where did the initiative figure in the 
government's reform agenda? The majority view is that it was a part of the 
government's larger agenda. This assumption is supported by the political manifcsto 
of the party in power, which lays down autonomy as a tool for deccntralisation 
(PML, 1997: 22-24). And as earlier noted (5.2) decentralisation was a key objective 
of a country-wide social sector programme - the SAP. A rival explanation by a 
donor representative is that by this initiative "only certain components of the 
(health) sector were being addressed, leaving other sectors in die dark ages of 
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management". That is, the reform was a piecemeal effort. However, this is 
considered an extreme view of the situation. The position, as an expatriate 
consultant noted, was that health led the process, while reforms were underway 
throughout the government - education, transport etc. A senior technocrat supported 
this argument by saying that "hospital autonomy steered the process through its 
results". Whereas this assumption might have substance, a question arises, why was 
such an impression created? Drawing from the comments of a professor in a medical 
college, this was because the initiative was not adequately documented and 
discussed with stakeholders, and also a consultant working in the Health Sector 
Reform Unit (HSRU) agreed with this inference. Otherwise, it is argued that 
granting autonomy to the institutions was a comprehensive reform, part of the larger 
agenda of the government. 
5.5.5.2. Communication strategy 
No formal communication strategy was drawn up to consult and involve the 
stakeholders or for public dissemination of the initiative. On this conclusion, there is 
a consensus amongst respondents. But, a medical superintendent differed. According 
to him, several seminars and meetings were held to explain and foster support. 
However, this was not an effective method, as according to a secretariat staff 
member, "even people in the secretariat (the hub of policyrnaking) ... did not know 
what was happening". Similarly, at the institutional level, one chief executive noted, 
"there was nothing written - this was left to us how we talk to the people". 
Generally, therefore, as a bureaucrat noted, "... no focused effort was made to take 
the people (stakeholders) along". 
5.5.5.3. Monitoring and evaluation 
Although the law required setting up of a monitoring and evaluation system for the 
initiative, this was not done. In order to monitor the reform process, the law provides 
undertaking a quarterly TPE of the autonomous institutions (GoPb, 1998d). 
However, a review of the document indicates that it was done only once (Anjum, 
Asim Shahid and Co, Lahore, 1999), and then the chief executives themselves 
reported on their own performance27. The validity of these reports was also 
questioned (Dawn, 1999), as the improvements claimed did not match reality. 
Further, the whole concept of TPE was challenged. The governor observed how an 
institution can be evaluated without a legal framework, i. e. the monitoring mid 
evaluation, which was contingent on rules, was void in their absence. 
27 Personally known to this researcher 
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5.5.5.4. Resources 
Although certain alternative sources for financing the autonomous institutions were 
made, due to the poor utilisation mechanisms, these could not be utilised. Contrarily, 
a bureaucrat noted that the Finance Department actually froze the allocation for the 
institutions at pre-autonomy level, instead of increasing it, as envisaged (GoPb, 
1997r). However, they were allowed to open accounts in the commercial banks, thus 
saving them from surrendering any unspent amount. Also to raise funds, user 
charges were levied for different services. But, according to a senior audit officer, to 
use these resources, every institution interpreted its powers differently, because rules 
were not framed. Thus, he added, there were mountains of audit objections. 
Similarly, inadequate arrangements were made to build the capacity of autonomous 
institutions for managing the change needed for instituting reform. Two major inputs 
were made. Firstly a finance director was appointed in the institutions. Secondly, a 
ten days' course was arranged for the chief executives. However, its contents were 
questioned, given that the new system and the legal framework were absent. 
5.5.5.5. Management systems 
One chief executive reported that the outcome of the designing phase or contents of 
policy was an Act of the Provincial Assembly and a Contract document. Nothing 
was done for their translation into Rules and Regulations. These instruments form 
the basis for the management systems of an organisation. This deficiency was 
serious, and the governor observed, "... As I see it, the autonomy has been far from 
provided. We seem to have freed these institutions from the normal government 
controls: law, rules and procedures, but we were unable to provide the new charter 
or an alternate legal framework... " (GoPb, 2000) However, one respondent 
commented, "in the absence of rules, the institutions in the public service cannot be 
stopped from working". But, this was an effort to mask the dcficiency. That is rather 
than following such beleaguered examples, why were the essential preparations not 
made? In the view of a bureaucrat, "you should have done something beforehand, 
declaring the institutions (in such situation) as autonomous, was not the right way". 
Interim financial rules were framed thirty-two months after the first institution was 
granted autonomy. These rules provide chief executives full financial powers to be 
exercised through IMCs (GoPb, 2000a). However, given that in many institutions 
these bodies were not operative, the application of these rules was doubtful. Driven 
by such complications, the new governor ordered that until rules arc framed, the 
powers as ordinarily applicable should be exercised by the chief executives (GoPb, 
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2000b). Thus, although certain measures were taken to provide resources to the 
institutions, poor mechanisms marred utilisation of these funds. 
5.5.6. Implementation 
5.5.6.1. Political feasibility 
It was a politically feasible time for introducing reform. The initiative figured on the 
political agenda of the government and the chief minister pushed it. According to a 
chief executive, he was powerful and a "go-getter". Another factor, a bureaucrat 
remarked, was that he wanted to score points on the political front in order to 
alleviate the impression that he was there in power due to his brother, who was the 
prime minister of Pakistan. Nevertheless, respondents' unanimous view was that it 
was a politically feasible time for introducing reform. 
5.5.6.2. Technical feasibility 
No field-test was conducted in order to determine the operability of reform, before 
its full-scale launching. A chief executive, at the core of the policy process for the 
initiative, told this researcher that pre-testing was not required, because the initiative 
had been tried all over the world and the government was not re-inventing the 
wheel. However, documents suggest that autonomy to different institutions was 
granted in phases, and this might have been a mechanism for learning from the 
preceding phases. But, an official of a donor agency, not agreeing with this 
assumption, commented that "in government, lessons are not learnt from a preceding 
stage or phase of an intervention". Thus, it is concluded that policymakers did not 
pre-test the initiative and no mechanism was evolved to learn lessons emerging from 
the earlier phases of the initiative. 
5.5.6.3. Organisational support 
The organisational support for the initiative changed over time, and tile structures 
brought in place for the purpose were inappropriate. The perusal of records indicates 
that initially the policy process was based in the health secretariat, where tile 
technical wing played a key role in conceptualising and designing the initiative. The 
administration wing, with support from the executive director of Special Projects, 
implemented the reform. Later, a HSRU established in Special Projects supported 
the initiative, but after the project closed this responsibility was taken over by the 
health secretariat. This arrangement led to the following complications: 
This researcher had a problem in locating the records of the initiative as it was 
dispersed in different sections. Further, because the people also changed, it was 
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difficult to establish the ownership of the initiative. For example, the concerned 
file kept shuttling for about six weeks till the administration wing owned and 
took over the subject for developing the details of the initiative (GoPb, 1999c). 
Locating the policy process in the secretariat was challenged. A chief executive 
questioned how an organisation, which itself was under reform, could implement 
and also monitor and steer the process. There were other institutions that could 
undertake this exercise. For example, a medical superintendent identified the 
PHDC, which could support the reform. 
Since the government, in addition to its regulatory function, took over the role of 
operator, there was no one to question them, and none to answer for the 
shortcomings left in the initiative. The concept that started in February 1997 
went into the design phase, lasting for sixteen months, till the law was 
promulgated (May 1998). After another six weeks (July 1998) the first batch of 
institutions received autonomy. Then, forty-three months later, the rules and 
regulations for the new system were framed in January 2002. 
Who is to be blamed for the delay, one might ask, had the assigninent been with 
a subordinate organisation, would the bureaucracy in the secretariat have 
tolerated such a situation? Obviously not! 
The execution, in general, as the minister for health described, was mayhem. As one 
hospital manager reported, this was mainly because no roadmap or action plan for 
undertaking different formalities essential for implementing the initiative was 
provided. Secondly, as a professor noted and a consultant working in the IISRU 
seconded, the initiative was inadequately documented. Therefore, utter confusion 
and disorder prevailed. In this regard, different arguments are as follows: 
For the Children's Hospital and Institute of Child Health, Lahore, the decision to 
grant autonomy was made (GoPb, 1999d), but no order was issued. Therefore 
the institute was still struggling for autonoMy2g. Similarly, in the case of De 
Montmorency College of Dentistry and Dental Hospital, Lahore, an order to 
grant autonomy was made, but the chief executive was not appointed, and thus 
the institution did not obtain autonomy. 
Much more confusion prevailed in constituting the IMCs, In many cases, the 
chief executives were late in proposing the constituent members, and for the 
other six institutions, the governor refused to approve the IMCs (GoPb, 2000c). 
He did not agree with the way the non-official members were proposed. 
28 Personal communication of this researcher with a Finance Officer of an autonomous institute 
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The law requires the government to frame rules and the IMCs to lay down 
regulations. However, since rules were not framed, different institutions had 
their own administrative and financial routines, one respondent commented. 
There was no universality and according to a staff member, confusion prevailed, 
both in the secretariat as well as in the institutions. 
5.5.7. Process 
5.5.7.1. Conceptualisation 
The initiative was in the political manifesto, but the bureaucracy brought it to the 
agenda and the chief minister pushed it for implementation. According to a senior 
technocrat, to identify issues was the responsibility of health sector managers. But 
they had no structured way of doing so, because the self-perpetuating monitoring 
mechanism, which throws out issues, has not been in place. However, one DIIS, 
while supporting this notion, took a different view that "it is seldom, almost 
unknown, that we recognise a problem by ourselves". 
The secretary health in his letter of 14 February 1997 asked a principal of a medical 
college about the feasibility of granting autonomy to the medical colleges (5.5.1.2). 
The question arises, why did he do so? The new government came into office on 17 
February 1997, so there was no obvious political pressure or instructions. The most 
likely explanation came from a senior technocrat; "I think you know the style and 
culture of the Pakistani bureaucracy, when they see their boss growing a beard, so 
they do. If he is clean shaven, they do too. It is the image of the person in the chair, 
they follow". The new chief minister had been named and the bureaucracy knew his 
style of work from the previous tenure (1990-1993) of his brother as prime minister. 
The secretary health judged that the chief minister would espouse this, so lie came 
up with this idea. 
5.5.7.2. Designing the initiative 
People at the helm of affairs made the decision to grant autonomy in a manner that 
the design remained incomplete and unsatisfactory for the end-uscrs. These few 
undertook this exercise, in addition to their routine work. There is no evidence that 
an in-depth study of the issues was undertaken. Instead, a surgeon noted, "the 
selected individuals did the opinion-based analysis". In other words, these people 
had their opinion on issues, which they exchanged. This was because, one chief 
executive acknowledged, "in this area (of policy research) we lacked". Similarly, 
respondents are unanimous that there was no projection made as to what would 
happen if the issues were not addressed. The researcher did not come across any 
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document indicating the undertaking of this exercise. The policymak-crs instead 
relied on their instinct that if no remedial measure was taken, the situation might 
deteriorate to the extent of total collapse, one task manager told this rcscarclicr. 
There was no exercise done to formally set the priorities and objectives, one aid 
worker told this researcher. Criticising the planning process for this initiative, one 
medical superintendent told this researcher "they (bureaucracy) did not consider the 
vision, mission and tasks". Also no option appraisal was done, a top dccision-mak-cr 
acknowledged. In fact, as a consultant noted, "a decision to give autonomy was 
made and then it was done". And one can argue that in planning the policy for 
autonomy the salient ingredients of good planning were missed. 
5.5.7.3. Stakeholder involvement 
The policy process for 'autonomy' was undertaken by a few people. A scnior 
planner explained that the process had both technical and legal aspects. According to 
him, the former was done by a group of 3-4 people in the 11calfli Department. The 
later, i. e. legal part, a hospital manager told this researcher, was done by a rctircd 
Judge. Apparently, therefore, consultation was not intense and broad-bascd. But, 
there is a rival explanation to this generalisation. One consultant told this researcher 
that the methodology was that major issues were extensively discussed first with key 
stakeholders, and then meetings and question and answer sessions wcrc held with 
the staff and the general public. Was this an effective method, one may qucstion? In 
the bureaucratic milieu of the Punjab, as will be noted (5.6.7.3) no junior staff 
objects to the decisions made at a senior level. That is, the proccss was dictatorial. 
5.5.8. Summary and conclusion 
The government of the Punjab visualised the granting of autonomy to the mcdical 
and health institutions in the province. The proposal went through diffcrcnt stages of 
development. Conceptualised initially as 'autonomy to mcdical collcgcs', this 
changed to the 'role model hospital and institutions' and was finally shaped as 
&autonomy to medical and health institutions'. A law was promulgated to provide a 
legal framework for the initiative and in total nine medical colleges and sixteen 
tertiary care hospitals were declared autonomous. 
The chief executives for these autonomous institutions were rccruitcd on highcr 
salaries. While, various sections of the health sector resistcd the initiativc, flic 
government did not provide a new charter or legal framework to the autonomous 
institutions. The new governor, concerned by the voids lcft in the initiativc, 
restrained the chief executives from exercising authority until the rulcs of busincss 
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for the autonomous institutions were framed. However, for this exercise to be 
accomplished, he relied on the same bureaucracy, which took forty-thrcc months 
after the first institution was given autonomy in July 1998. 
In conclusion, although on the political agenda, the bureaucracy involved few 
stakeholders in the conceptual isation, formulation and implementation of initiative. 
And, in this process, they hardly paid any heed to the advice or concern of the few 
on board. From the word 'go' it was not clear 'why' the institutions were being 
made autonomous. But, due to the civil services milieu of Punjab, the problems 
associated with the initiative remained suppressed. However, with the change of 
government, such voids came into the limelight as the governor of Punjab observed: 
the more I look at the record of this initiative, the more I marvel at the 
complications. I feel quite lost in the max created by the Health 
Department... Let me say in conclusion that Ifully support autonomy 
and decentralisation of authority at every appropriate level. But, this 
must be done properly, after due observance offorms and procedures 
and in a lawful manner. That is the only professional way, I know of 
doing things.... I regret to say that this is not the way ofgoing about it. 
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5.6. District Health Government- a case of miscarriage of 
reform in gestation 
5.6.1. Account of the initiative 
5.6.1.1. Emergence ofthe concept 
It was mentioned (5.4.1.3) that DFID organised a study tour to the UK for the 
participants to learn from the experiences of DHAs in that country. However, upon 
arrival back, a dialogue began in the Health Department to establish a new structure 
for the district health systeM29. The chief minister, who was given feedback on the 
study tour, asked the secretary health to prepare a proposal about the district health 
care structure (GoPb, 1998p). The proposal indicated some positive changes in 
service delivery by autonomous institutions, but reported that not much progress was 
made by DHAs in the districts. This argued for establishing a small management 
unit like DHG in the district, recommending that unlike DIIAs, the new body should 
be chaired by a paid and full-time chairperson, vested with full financial and 
administrative powers under a legal authority (British Council Coordinator, 1998). 
The secretary health briefed different stakeholders including tile minister for health, 
the chief secretary and the secretaries of the Departments of Population Welfare and 
Finance about the concept of DIIG (GoPb, 1998q), before presenting it to tile chief 
minister. Later, a committee headed by the minister for health with its membership 
with wide ranging expertise was constituted to examine the proposal (GoPb, 1998r). 
This committee, agreeing with the concept, suggested the composition of a District 
Management Committee (DMC) for DIIGs, and holding a public seminar to 
disseminate the concept (GoPb, 1998s). In this seminar, chaired by the chief 
minister and attended by experts, a concept paper on DIIG developed by the 
executive director was discussed. However, according to many respondents, its 
contents were approved without taking into account participants' rcconinicndat ions, 
as none of these were incorporated into the final draft (Collins el al, 2002). 
5.6.1.2. Legal framework 
The case study on 'Institutional Autonomy' elaborated the nianner in which tile 
'Punjab Medical and Health Institutions Act, 1998' was promulgated (5.5.1.5). 
Suffice to say here that section 2; clause I (a)30 of this law empowers the government 
to establish a health institution - the DIIG for a district, in this case. I'lierc is no 
29 Personal knowledge of this researcher 
30 This clause reads: "establish such Medical Institutions and I Icalth Institutions, as It may dccm fit" 
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explicit definition in the law for the term 'medical institutions'. This shortcoming in 
the earlier draft of the law was indicated by the governor, but was carried ovcr 
without rectification in the final Act (GoPb, 1998i; GoPb, 1998d). Nonctllclcss, the 
Punjab Medical and Health Institutions Rules, 1999 defiric the District Health 
Government as "health institution whose administration and managcmcnt vests in its 
DMC, which exercises all powers and does all acts and things that may be cxcrciscd 
or done by the DHG" (GoPb, 1999e). 
5.6.1.3. Implementation and fate of the initiative 
The chief minister approved the person specifications for the position of the chief 
executives and the composition of selection committee and the DMC (GoPb, 19991). 
Then, the process was undertaken to recruit and select chief executives, cstablish a 
support organisation, develop the profile of the health system in ten districts, and 
accomplish formalities to establish DIIG. In this vein finally the Health Departnicrit, 
in consultation with Law Department, prepared the Punjab Health Institutions Rules, 
1999 (GoPb, 1999e) and notified the name of districts for estabi ishing DI IGs (GoPb, 
1999g). Later, a month-long induction course was organiscd for chief cxecutivcs. 
This focused on health management issues, emphasising practical leaming tools for 
operational and developmental management in the organisational context of DIIG. 
However, the Army, which had taken over the country on 12 October 1999, 
suspended the process for the DIIG initiative. Finally, although a 'Social 
Empowerment Task Force' constituted by tile new govcmmcnt advocated for the 
implementation of DHG (Ahsan, 2000), it was decided to abandon tile initiative and 
instead create the devolved district governments (see 1.3.2). 
5.6.2. Principles and purposes 
In the case of the DHG, the principles and purposes were clear. The respondents arc 
unanimous that the DIIG was launched in order to introduce change in the district 
health system. However, there are only a few who were sure about the direction of 
change and the clarity of motives, so therefore contrasting views were obtained. One 
respondent indicated that the political or ideological motivations arc not mutually 
exclusive, and it is often difficult to differentiate between the two. However, the 
majority viewed the DIIG initiative as an ideological intervention which they 
thought was carried forward with political support. Nonetheless, the D110 was 
introduced departing from the DIIA initiative which was in the political agenda of 
the then government in power (PM L, 1997). 
But, what were the ideology and principles being followed? The concept paper for 
the DIIG contemplates giving a corporate status to the health system, emphasising 
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the introduction of cross subsidy for protecting poor and improving quality. 
Similarly, a project officer asserted that, "otherwise equity, quality or other such 
matters were of secondary nature... It was primarily to improve the cfficicncy of the 
health system... " But, if this argument is accepted, then it was also essential to work 
out the details (Collins and Omar, 1999). However, there is no evidence that this 
was done. Even gaps left in the concept paper remained, i. e. the bureaucracy, failing 
to translate political rhetoric into action, poor documentation and dissemination of 
the initiative, substantiated this assumption. Thus, the principles and purposes of 
reform were though laid down, remained unclear amongst the stakeholders. 
5.6.3. Shapers 
5.6.3.1. Leader 
The then secretary health led the reform, but left many issues unresolved. I Ic played 
a key role in conceptualising, formulating and implementing the initiative. Reporting 
on his personal traits, many respondents found him intelligent, a thinker and a good 
manager, but someone who had little knowledge of the health system. According to 
a senior technocrat, he was not pragmatic, instead lie worked on an ad-hoc basis, 
and thus could not make any impressive contribution to die Health Department. In 
the view of several respondents, this was due to those few aides around him who did 
not have the 'vision and experience' of the district health systcm. 
5.6.3.2. Supporter 
The chief minister was a force behind the initiative, but could not take the initiative 
to its execution. But, given the amount of time lie allocated and the priority lie gave 
it, he was dedicated to the initiative. Further, as indicated earlier (5.4.3.2) lie was 
energetic, pushing, and a "go-getter". Then, the question ariscs, NN'lly could tile 
initiative not be executed? This was because lie was caught in the bureaucratic traps. 
That is, one chairperson of a DIIA noted that lie was misguided, as lie relied for 
change to the system on those from within the same system, who were responsible 
for the problems. And according to a bureaucrat, lie allowed diffcrcnt groups who 
were opposed to each other to negatively influence the policy process (see 5.6.3.3). 
5.6.3.3. Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy, as an institution, was against the initiative. The rninistcr for licalth told 
this researcher that "they were upset in this process due merely to scirish reasons. 
They had personal interests that their role was going to be linlitcd in case the 
reforms take full shape". However, several respondents considered that the sccrctary 
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health, from amongst civil bureaucrats, was committed to the reform. The others, 
both from within and outside the Health Department, were against the initiative. But, 
one bureaucrat classified the bureaucracy into three groups - one against, tile other in 
favour and the third wanted granting limited autonomy. These groups were non- 
resilient in their approach and negatively influenced the policy process. Regarding 
technocrats, the respondents were unanimous in their opinion that those in the 
secretariat, being subordinates, just carried out the orders of the secretary health, 
while those in the directorate and field formations were against, because they felt 
that they would lose their powers. 
5.6.3.4. Donors 
Amongst donors, it was mainly the World Bank and DFID that supported the 
initiative. The former supported in principle and looked for funding government's 
need for technical assistance (World Bank, 1998a: 5/para-21). DFID, after sonic 
reluctance, gave up its pursuit of an already underway programme of supporting the 
DHA initiative to favour this one (Wildman, 1999). 'Flie inputs included establishing 
HSRU, diverting the technical team from DIIA to work for DIIG (Wildman, 1999b) 
and appointment of an advisor to guide the government on health sector reforms 
(DFID, 1999). However, given the final fate of their support, especially for IISRU, 
one may question the effectiveness of donor assistance. Establishing this new unit 
was later condemned by the P&D Department, because it undermined the existing 
institutions. Further, how would the inputs made into the DIIA initiative is 
accounted for? One donor representative, justifying the assistance in this nianncr, 
emphasised, that because a donor agency could not work in a vacuum they were 
bound to go with the decisions of the government. However, according to a senior 
planner it was a route with least resistance, i. e. a laid back approach. 
5.6.3.5. Nledia 
The media was not proactive, and the key stakeholders made no effort to generate a 
dialogue to keep the issue alive on the government's agenda. A review of document 
reveals its minimal use limited to few press briefings, and covering certain seminars 
and interviews. Also those were rhetoric and held to defend the initiative, and as a 
respondent noted "to issue strong political statements". I lowevcr, as a top bureaucrat 
reported, it was not easy for the government to put across their vic%vpoint because 
the opponents took on the government on issues like privatisation and equity 
consequent to establishing DIIGs. Further, in his view, the opposition had more 
influence on the media than the government. Ilowevcr, the media did not act on its 
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own also. This researcher could not locate any investigative or analytical report 
produced by the media. 
5.6.3.6. Civil society 
The PMA was outspoken. Though not against decentralisation, they resisted the 
DHG initiative. The major concern was the way the initiative was being developed. 
They thought that bureaucracy was mishandling the initiative, arguing that not 
enough preparations had been made, which in their view were essential before 
embarking on such interventions. Also, they were critical of the disregard of mcrit in 
the selection of chief executives (Nawa-i-Waqt, 1999a), or perhaps, their members 
were not selected. However, documentary evidence favours the former, e. g. in a 
meeting with director general military services, it was decided: 
... many eligible retired army personnel have not applied for tile 
position of chief executives of DHG... It was suggested that the GoPb 
might like to re-advertise such positions so that eligible personnel of 
army medical corps could also compete with a view to receiving 
quality managers from a wider group including army as well as tile 
private and public sector... (GoPb. 1999h) 
This researcher could not find any other section of civil society contributing to the 
policy process. This was perhaps because the initiative was not executed, therefore 
other stakeholders were not directly exposed to it. 
5.6.4. COnt(! Xt 
The health system was on the brink of collapse and nccdcd some radical 
intervention. The factors, which led to such a situation, were varied and cmbcdded 
in the different components ofthe health system, and are analysed below: 
The respondents indicated a plethora of factors percnnial in the differcrit 
components of the district health sector that formed a priori reason for 
establishing DIIG. These ranged from poor service dclivcry, cspecially in rural 
areas to the governance issues like inadequate financial and administrative 
authority at different organisational levels. Inefficient support scrviccs and 
insufficient resources further contributed to the dacrioration of the licalth scctor. 
Opinions vary as to whether the situation was critical warranting cmcrgcncy 
measures or it was business as usual. The chief minister argued, "the system, in 
terms of performance, had gone to its lowest ebb. Any intervention would, at 
least, improve it and not worsen it further". A senior technocrat also had a 
similar view that "It was quite late. We should have gone for such an initiative 
much earlier. We had wasted a lot of time". 
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A senior planner argued that the earlier intervention - establishing of DIIAs in 
two districts - could not deliver the desired results. And, in his view, DIIG was 
an improvement or a reaction to the failing DIIA intervention. However, since 
there is no evidence suggesting evaluation of DIIAs to draw such a conclusion, 
this is not a well-founded argument. At best, it was a subjective fccling of 
decision-makers that led to abandoning the DHA to embark on DIIG. 
Developments in the health systems around the world also acted as a trigger. A 
study tour to the UK was a catalyst, as a DFID advisor commented: 
the decision to adopt a DHG form of organisation and move away 
from the DHA model appeared to be most influenced by the perception 
gained through a study tour to the UK in July 1998... In particular, 
there was recognition that chief executives could be appointed as fill- 
time professional managers to lead the required organisational 
changes at PHCfocused district level... 
Therefore, there are grounds to conclude that the Punjab health sector was in 
disarray needing urgent intervention and decision-mak-ers jumped to the initiatives in 
rapid succession without waiting for the outcome and evaluation of the earlier ones. 
5.6.5. Contents 
5.6.5.1. Policy and its level 
There is wide-ranging and contrasting response of respondents about the nature of 
the initiative. According to many, because the initiative was launched wider a 
country-wide cross-sectoral SAP, the DIIG was the government's instrument for 
decentralisation in the health sector. And, so die initiative was part of the 
government's larger agenda. A rival explanation by a senior planncr is that although 
a number of interventions were being undertaken in die health sector, the DIIG was 
one of the several pieces that were started simultaneously, but independently. 
Taking this logic forward, a senior officer commented that because the initiative did 
not focus on the system in its entirety, hence it was a patchwork. Ilowcvcr. a 
consultant maintained that DIIG was part of the government's agenda for 
decentralisation, but it appeared an isolated effort, because of inadequate 
documentation by the Health Department (see 5.6.5.2). 
5.6.5.2. Communication strategy 
Weak support systems were developed. Especially, the communication stratcgy was 
not defined for the initiative. A top bureaucrat acknowledged "wc did not havc a sort 
of clear communication strategy. It was the weakness that we had identificd 
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ourselves... We should have a better communication strategy". This researcher 
observed two factors contributing to this outcome: 
m There was poor documentation and weak- institutional memory. Although thcrc 
were numerous transparencies indicating that seminars and presentations were 
held, but when it came to a comprehensive document, apart from (i) a 'conccpt 
paper' (GoPb, 1998u), (ii) a 'working paper on IISRO (EDSP, 1999), and (iii) a 
commentary on the first two by the Nuffield Institute for Health, Univcrsity of 
Leeds (Collins and Omar, 1999), there was none. 
Only a few people did all the documentation, which was not disseminated. 
Confirming this, a task manager in the HSRU commented: 
Seminars were held to give the stakeholders a clear picture of the 
DHG. However, this could not be done adequately. A concept paper 
was also produced, but again, this could not be disseminated to a 
larger section ofthe stakeholders. 
Tbus, concluding the argument, a senior planner commented that a traditional mode 
of communication was used and no comprehensive strategy for the DIIG initiative 
was devised to consult the stakeholders. 
5.6.5.3. Monitoring and evaluation 
The monitoring and evaluation system, specific to the initiative, was not installed 
and the existing one, according to a technocrat, was inefflcient. There is no 
evidence, except the indicators developed as part of a baseline survey conducted in 
ten DHG districts, that a system was devised to monitor the progress of the 
initiative. One request made to DFID by the government, in this regard, was not 
acceded to (DFID, 1999a). Further, a question arises; what was to be monitored? 
There were no systems and implementation plans. Although this researcher knows 
that an effort was made to develop one during the induction course for the chief 
executives, there was no roadmap or action plan devised for the initiative. 
5.6.5.4. Resources 
Regarding capacity building of the new institutions to meet the challenge of changc, 
the Army Medical Corps promised ongoing assistance (GoPb, 1999i), while DFID 
supported a month long induction course for the chief cxccutivcs (Wildman, 1999a). 
This course was, however, criticiscd for its contents. A senior officcr argucd that the 
new system, where the participants were going to work, should have been the focus 
of training, which was not devised by that time. I lowevcr, this rcscarchcr knows that 
the induction training was used as an opportunity to devclop drafts likc the scrvicc 
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level agreements, communication strategy, outline of the DIIG rcgulations ctc. 
Further, it was the first of a series and subsequent modules might have seen more 
developments (DFID, 1999b). Nevertheless, it was argued that "You see, cvcn the 
Constitutions are amenable to change. There should have been something to guide 
the institutions, which could have been further built on". Thus in the abscncc of 
rules the induction training remained unfocused. 
No additional resources were arranged and also no planning done to support the 
decentralised districts under the DHG initiative. Although the govcmrncnt 
recognised that decentralisation poses additional constraints on resources including 
finances (GoPb, 1997r), while drawing up the concept paper, this aspect of the 
policy process was not taken into account. It visualised the districts receiving the 
same budget irrespective of their geographical size, population and economy. 
5.6.5.5. Management systems 
No management systems were designed. The DIIG derived its authority from 'the 
Punjab Medical and Health Institutions Act, 1998'. This law provides broad policy 
guidelines, whereas according to a senior planner, delegated legislation was nccdcd 
at the operational level. Under Section 13 of the Act, the government was to 
formulate 'Rules', while Section 14 demands the DMC to draw 'Regulations' 
consistent with the 'Rules'31. Next in the legal hierarchy are the 'Manuals' that 
provide operating procedures for different situations. However, cxccpt for the 
rudimentary "Punjab Medical and Health Institutions Rules, 1999", there was 
nothing. But, defending these shortcomings, a top bureaucrat contcstcd: 
We did not make rules deliberately. The idea behind was that... By 
making rules you are actually going into the micro-management. Then 
you are publicly committing what would be the outcome - which you 
don't know. First, let the things run as they are, learnfrom these and 
then frame the rules, which are practical, realistic and are also In line 
with the overall spirit of that legislation. 
The proponents of this approach cite several examples where the Acts have been 
promulgated, but even after years the rules and regulations have not been frailled. 
They propound that the 'Punjab Medical and I Icalth Institutions Act, 1998' provides 
an adequate boundary for the institution to operate. The opponents, however, are not 
content with this assumption. They hold that the danger in this approach is that 
31 These Sections of the referred Act reads: "13- Rules: - The government may make rules for 
carrying out the purposes of this Act. 14 - Regulations: - The Managemcnt Committee may make 
Regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the Rules, for carrying out the 
purposes of this Acf'. 
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either the districts will adopt restrictive rules limiting their ability to make any 
change or they will be too loose, causing problems with audit and accountability. 
Further, different districts might adopt different systems leading to problcms like 
failure to establish a universal monitoring & evaluation system ctc (Griffith, 1999). 
5.6.6. ImpIementation 
An official notification declaring ten districts for establishing DIIG was made 
(GoPb, 1999e). This researcher could not access the appointment orders for die chief 
executives, but nevertheless, they attended an induction course, thus assuming their 
duty. However, as they did not go to the districts, no DMC was established. So the 
implementation of the DHG initiative remained incomplete. But the following 
characteristics of the implementation phase of the policy process are identified: 
5.6.6.1. Political fcasibility 
It was a politically feasible time for the DHG initiative till its execution, when tile 
government changed. All participants agree that the chief minister supported the 
initiative and was proactive. He, being in full control of the political scenario in the 
province, organised support from other departments of the government, as well. And 
commenting on the dynamism, an expatriate consultant noted that tile Punjab was 
undertaking "the most ambitious health sector reform programme anywhere in the 
world, which enjoyed full political commitment" (Wildman, 1999). 
5.6.6.2. Technical feasibility 
The intention was to launch the initiative in ten districts in order to learn and finalisc 
strategies for implementation in the other districts, but this was not implemented and 
was finally abandoned by the new government. The concept paper cnvisagcd to 
"establish DIIGs in a phased manner - initially it would be started in pilot districts 
from where strategies will be finalised for their implementation in other districts" 
(GoPb, 1998u). Since, it was planned for ten districts, given the population - 34 
districts in total - it would have been too big a pilot. 
5.6.6.3. Organisational support 
The policy process for the initiative was based in the health secretariat. Its technical 
wing was a key in developing the concept and design, while the administration wing 
came in later just to issue the appointment letters of the chief executives. The officc 
of the executive director of Special Projects supported the initiative all along. 
initially through its PIU and later through a IISRU created with the support of 
DFID, as an interim arrangement before a larger I Icalth Sector 11cforni Organisation 
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(HSRO) was established. Support was also negotiated with the 11calth Services 
Academy, Islamabad that was tied to a project, which did not matcrialisc (GoPb, 
1998t). These arrangements were however inappropriate - an inference dra%vn from 
the following evidences: 
The government in secretariat, in addition to its routine functions, undertook the 
policy process for the initiative. Whereas this may appear a high-profilc 
arrangement, it was criticised on several grounds (see 5.5.6.3). In the view of a 
politician, instead a dedicated structure like a 'standing task force' should have 
undertaken the process, while the secretariat should have only regulated it. 
Establishing the HSRU or HSRO to support the DHG also attracted criticism. A 
working paper contemplating an HSRO in the Special Projects using three 
different approaches was examined at the Nuffield Institute for Health, Leeds 
(UK). In their final comment, it was stressed that the choice of approach should 
rest on an organisational study (Collins and Omar, 1999), which was never done. 
A planning document for establishing the IISRO submitted to the Federal and 
Provincial P&D Departments was so seriously criticiscd that the 11calfli 
Department withdrew it. In their view, the Health Department should focus on 
developing the capacity in the existing institutions instead of building new 
structures (GoPb, 1999j). 
However, in disregard of the above advice, IISRU was established in the PIU of 
Special Projects. The question arises, why was this duplication (in the shape of a 
HSRO) envisaged, while institutions like PIIDC, Institute of Public Health or 
Planning Cell in the secretariat could have supported Ole initiative? Was it tile strong 
personality and authoritarian director of PIIDC and the resultant alienation to this 
institute (Abbot et al, 1999: 1) or an instrument for extending the life of the PIU of 
Special Projects or the actualisation of an old desire of its executive director? Given 
that this aspect of enquiry involves personalities, consideration should be given to a 
document, which the incumbent executive director wrote to the chief minister evcn 
before he took over this position and was not part of the reform process. This rcads: 
... It is proposed that a Professional Support Management Group may be formulated with professionals from related fields like project 
management, finance, procurement, engineering, monitoring and 
evaluation, human resource development and so on. The services of 
such persons can be acquired from government departments on 
deputation wherever available. However, these professionals can also 
be hired from the private ... (Mian, 1997) 
The HSRU, established in the Special Projects, had consultants on its payroll, dra%vn 
both from the public as well as private sector (EDSP, 1999a). Further, the IISRU 
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was not focused in its approach. This unit had a range of activities and accordingly 
several units. Whereas this structure fulfilled the old desire of the executive director, 
review of documents suggests that this arrangement resulted in diffusing the efforts 
and no major gain was made in terms of health sector reforms (11SRU, 1999). 
Ultimately, the HSRU collapsed when DFID suspended its assistance in October 
1999. It was otherwise non-sustainable, because it was based in a project of limited 
duration and entirely dependent on the donor's assistance. 
5.6.7. Process 
5.6.7.1. Conceptualisation 
Documents suggest that the secretary health identified issues in the health system, 
and that DHAs were ineffective in addressing these. However, it was the chief 
minister who decided to act and initiate the process for the DIIG initiative. 
According to a respondent, who was part of the decision-making circle, lie did so 
despite resistance from many stakeholders. But, a question arises why was this 
done? According to a respondent, the chief minister belonged to a family that was 
successfully running medical institutions. And the steps he took are mostly 
explained by the notion that the private sector was doing much better than the public 
sector. Since, the DHG initiative was propounded as a corporate model, so the chief 
minister jumped at the idea, one may infer. But, why did the secretary health go for 
this development, allowing his earlier concept, i. e. the DIIA, to perish? It was noted 
(5-6.1.1) that the UK study tour triggered this, but defending his action, the secrctary 
health told this researcher, it was because the required changes in the system wcrc 
not possible within the scope of DIIAs, so the DIIG initiative was instituted. 
However, this is not accepted as the basis for switching over from DIIAs to DIIG as 
a donor noted "if the principle was to devolve powers, then whether DIIA or DIIG, 
there should not have been much difference". 
5.6.7.2. Designing the initiative 
No systematic in-depth study was made to validate the situation and to establish a 
need for the DHG initiative. Instead, one respondent noted that reliance was on the 
brainstorming sessions, which another respondent dubbed as superficial intellectual 
discourse, and the literature review. Further, a top bureaucrat said that "in our 
system the statistics are not well kept, so we had not launched any study". 
Supporting this argument, another respondent, close to the decisioll-iliakcrs, said 
"everybody knew that the system was not working, so conducting a study would 
have added little to whatever we already know. So instead of wasting time, we 
decided to go ahead". 
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There is no evidence that a projection was made to determine the consequences of 
ignoring the issues. If, at all, as one consultant commented, this was limited to 
voicing concern that if remedial measures were not instituted the situation might 
deteriorate to the extent of a total collapse of the healthcare delivery system. 
Regarding laying down the objective(s) and priorities of DIIG, a survey of 
documents suggests little difference between the aim of the DIIG and that of its 
predecessor DHA initiative. Similarly, there is no evidence that any option appraisal 
was done for addressing the objectives. To conclude, according to a senior officer, 
the decision-makers were actually "predetermined just for this initiative and they 
were only gathering arguments in its favour; no other intervention was considered as 
an alternative approach to solve the problems". 
5.6.7.3. Stakeholder involvcnient 
Only a handful of people undertook the reform process. According to a top 
bureaucrat, a team of four people, who were identified by a senior technocrat as the 
chief minister, secretary health, additional secretary (technical) and the executive 
director of Special Projects were involved. Criticising this team, a senior teclMocrat 
said that "there should have been at least twenty persons sitting around debating and 
using their collective wisdom would have come to a better conclusion". But, a rival 
explanation by a consultant is that "the process was done at two levels. In preparing 
the vision and legislation extensive discussions were held with the stakeholders and 
once decisions were reached, meetings were held with die staff to explain diem". 
Refuting this claim, however, a senior officer noted that in this manner decisions arc 
only conveyed, because in the bureaucratic milieu of Punjab, it is often dangerous 
for subordinates to disagree with their boss or a senior, especially in the open. 
An almost similar situation prevailed in the political bureaucracy. In the Punjab 
Assembly, while debating the Punjab Medical and 11calth Institutions Act, 1998, 
only the leader of the opposition, in addition to the ministers for Law and Health, 
spoke at the occasion (GoPb, 1998k). The non-involvcmcnt of lawmakers, which is 
evident, resulted in serious flaws being left in the law. One respondent noted that 
"If you show it to an experienced politician, he would be tcrrified. All powers of 
government are transferred to the district. All government controls have been let 
loose and the Assembly passed it in only a few minutes". Conrinuing this 
assumption, a politician told this researcher that during that session of the Provincial 
Assembly, he asked the minister for law whether due to the serious faults remaining 
in the law, its assent by the Assembly would be postponed. I lowcvcr, the minister 
for law expressed his inability to do so on account that the chief ministcr was 
pressing hard for the assent of the law. 
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5.6.8. Summary and conclusion 
The government of Punjab undertook an initiative - the District Health Govcmmcnt, 
abandoning an already underway District Health Authority initiative. With the same 
aim as that of its predecessor "to improve and develop health services for the 
population residing in districts" the District Health Governments envisaged small 
management units at the district level created by decentralising the existing district 
health sector. Legal cover was provided to the initiative under the Punjab Mcdical 
and Health Institutions Act, 1998. After an exercise lasting over fifIcen months, tcn 
districts were declared as District Health Government districts. Also the chicf 
executives for these 'health institutions' were selected through 'open compaition'. 
However, before the initiative could be implemented the government changed. The 
new government, instead of implementing the initiative, opted to devolve powers to 
establish district governments with their elected assemblies. The demise of the 
District Health Government initiative in this way is best summarised by a general 
secretary of the Pakistan Medical Association. Ile said: 
"Thus, for a politically motivated idea, the bureaucratic stoppage was 
applied That only delayed the process; otherwise, initiative could have 
been executed in the districts. ... But, nevertheless, in a modifledforin, the same idea is currently being introduced as devolution ofpower... " 
In short, this was a miscarriage of an initiative in gestation, to give way to the 
devolution of districts. However, how far the seeds sown by the District Health 
Government and its predecessors Sheikhupura Pilot Project and District Health 
Authorities had flowered in the new government's Local Government Plan, 2000 for 
devolution, is yet to be seen. 
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6. Factors influencing the policy process 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 presented the case studies or policy process for the four individual cases 
as a product of the first level of data analysis. Overall it was a story of demise and 
struggle for the survival of different reforms. Why did this happen? This is the core 
issue for this study, and this chapter addresses this question by discussing factors 
that influenced the policy process. These factors, essentially emanate from cross- 
case analysis, i. e. the second analytic layer of this study which uses the output of 
four single-case studies as input. For this purpose, the framework for the policy 
process developed and the questions raised in chapter 3 serve as a guide. However, 
in order to situate the discussion, the framework is reiterated below: 
Figure 6.1: - Conceptual framework for the policy process 
International (hegemonic) systems 
-- -------------- -------- ---------------- ---- 
I 
--------------------- National systems 
---------------- -t --- ----------------- ---------------- 
Health system Prin ciples and purposes 
AIL v 
Origin Formulation 
Implementation 
Context Contents 
v 
Shapcrs 
--- ........ ................. ................ 
T -- ------------------ -I ------ --------- ------- --------- 4 ............... 
............... I 
This chapter has seven sections and using the above framework, the first six, with 
slight variation, follow the same pattern for presentation. 17hat is done by: 
1. presenting the findings about a particular aspcct of policy proccss, and tlicn 
associated factors influencing the progress are hypotlicsised; 
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2. discussing the hypotheses, bringing explanations, both rival and supporting, from 
case data and contemporary literature; and 
3. presenting a summary of the section, drawing flie main factors influencing flic 
policy process and concluding the arguments. 
The final section lists different factors and provides a resumd of the policy proccss 
followed for designing the Punjab health sector reforrns. 
6.2. Laying down the principles and purposes 
The principles and purposes constitute the greater 'why' and embody a set of values 
and direction for the reform (Frenk, 1995), thus providing a map or guide for the 
proposed system. However, in the Punjab, there was confusion. VAiy was it so? This 
section looks for the answer by exploring factors surrounding the laying down of 
principles and purposes for the health sector reforms. 
Findings from case studies 
In the case of the Punjab health sector, policyrnakers worked for the end product, i. e. 
granting autonomy to the institutions or establishing the DIIAs. But wily were they 
doing so? It was not clear to them. To investigate this assumption, an enquiry was 
made to explore the purposes and principles of the r6orms. The underlying 
understanding and concern was that the system was not delivering services, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Nonetheless, the statement of purposes for the various 
reforms, deduced from the case studies, are clustered and presented in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: - Statements of purposes 
SPP DIIA IA MIG 
To create a viable model for To improve and To bring efliciency Equity, quality or other 
the primary healthcare that develop health and quality in such matters were of 
ensured quality of services, service for the terms of better secondary nature... It E0 
which are accessible and, population availability and was primarily to 
what is most important, residing in the accessibility of improve the cMclency 
sustainable. districts. health services of the health system... 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of tile purposes drawn from the findings of the cascs. It is 
seen that overall: 
The purpose of reform initiatives was clear to the policyinakcrs. It may be noted that 
purposes are the sub sets of principles and the findings of this study underpin those or 
Frcnk's (1995), i. e. equity, quality and efficiency as the purposes for rcrorin. 
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2. The stakeholders identified quality, efficiency and sustainability as die major conccrn for 
undertaking reforms. Further, it is noted that emphasis on this aspect of the policy proccss 
became increasingly more pronounced, and was clearly defined in the successive reforms. 
However, what about the principles? These are the important tenets of policy, which 
are essential to be defined at the very outset of the process. Otherwise, it is argued 
that in their absence, confusion is likely to prevail about the vision and mission for 
the proposed system (Frenk, 1995). In the case of the Punjab, there was a similar 
picture. A respondent working for a donor agency, agreeing to this assumption, 
attributed this shortcoming to the policyrnakers lacking the understanding of tile 
policy process. He commented: 
I think there was an inadequate understanding of how things work 
There was a simple belief that autonomy is the answer to all evils 
without thinking or listening to others that autonomy is a means to 
something and that something needs to be defined, and also to achieve 
that something you need to put other things in place. Simply, the whole 
thing stemmedfrom lack of understanding. 
Similarly, a Medical Superintendent of an autonomous hospital, supporting the above 
contention, noted that: 
In this exercise they (policymakers) did not consider the vision, mission 
and tasks. Infact, those who were involved were not clear about issues 
and had little knowledge of the set up they were working to reform. 
This study revealed that the 'desire to introduce change' in the existing system was a 
common denominator of all health sector reforms. The intention, which is consistent 
with the aim of the umbrella SHIP, was to improve the health status of the 
population (5.2). However, why did they intend to change things or what were the 
underlying principles for different reform initiatives? Drawn from case studies 
(chapter 5) and Olowing Frenk's (1995) classification (2.4.1.4), these principles are 
determined by this researcher as below: 
Given that the existing health sector is 'pluralist' (people are free to 
choose between different options in the public and private sector) and 
is based on 'citizenship' (access to healthcare is a social right - at least 
theoretically - see GoPb, 1974), all reform initiatives are intended to 
address these principles. But, a gradual move towards 'solidarity' 
[everyone contributes towards healthcare according to his/her capacity, 
so that each person may receive care when needed (Frcnk, 1995)] is 
also noted. Tile IA and DIIG visualise user charges for those who can 
afford to pay and a cross-subsidy for the poor. Similarly, the SPP 
envisaged, in a way, tile principle of 'universality' as it intended to 
develop a model of primary health care that was accessible, affordable 
and sustainable. 
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The above is a statement of the implicit principles! However, what were the cxplicit 
motives behind the change, which the different reforms looked for? The messages 
emerging from different cases arc surnmarised in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: - Statements of principles 
SPP DIIA IA DIIG 
The project was not This initiative The initiative was on The principics and 
politically motivated, visualised politically the political agenda purposes were laid 
and its principles were driven change in the of the government in down, but remained 
not clearly laid down in health system, but the power, but the unclear to the 
documents. principles remained principles remained stakeholders. 
unclear. unclear. 
From table 6.2, it is seen that: 
Based on the political nature of initiatives, there are two groups: (i) DIIA and IA, which 
were on the political agenda of political party in office, and (ii) SPP and DIIG, which were 
not. However, for both these groups, principles remained unclear. But, there is a difference 
between initiatives in the second group. That is, for SPP, principles were not clearly 
documented and were also not known, while for the DHG, these were documented, but 
remained unclear to the stakeholders. 
6.2.2. Factors influencing the laying down of principles and 
purposes 
Drawing from the findings presented above, the following hypotheses surrounding die 
laying down of principles and purposes are conceived: (i) being on the political 
agenda did not ensure that the principles of reforms were defined; (ii) there is a 
tendency to consider more tenets of the policy process in the successive reforms; 
and (iii) the involvement of politicians in conceptualising of reforms is vital for 
laying down the principles. In the following, I test these hypotlicses. 
6.2.2.1. Political agenda and the principles 
It is argued that in order for perfect implementation, there should be a complete and 
universal understanding of the objectives of reforms (Ilogwood and Gunn, 1984). 
Otherwise, there is a danger that, in the public sector, therc are beliefs about the aims 
and intentions of the department (e. g. Ilealdi Department), which would influence the 
problem definition and their possible solutions (Gordon et al, 1977). For example, 
according to Headey (n. d), a similar situation was observed in British policymak-ing: 
In the absence of contrary instructions from their political masters, 
officials normally frame policy programmes, which fit within the 
context of the existing objectives pursued in the department. 
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Innovations and radical changes are not commonly the product of 
proposals generated within the civil service. 
In the case of the Punjab health sector, the political government, while granting 
autonomy to the tertiary care medical institutions, wanted to install a mechanism of 
a safety net for the poor. That is, they emphasised the principle of 'solidarity' and 
during an interview with this researcher, the then chief minister insisted: 
Maybe the Rules of Business are notframed, but I got through a Law 
in the Assembly. It is written there and I ensured that the charges for 
the poor would not he changed. We will charge the rich and the 
income so generated will be usedfor the benefit of the poor. It is 
explicitly written there. Ifyou have a copy of the law, please read it. It 
is, however, inscribed in my memory. 
However, if one reads the above Law that was made to institute reforms, there is no 
mention of the 'poor' or any 'mechanism for protecting' them (GoPb, 1998a). But, 
why did it happen? The straightforward answer is that bureaucracy in the Punjab 
Health Department, which was responsible for undertaking the formalities needed 
for the promulgation of the Law, did not translate the political will into reality. This 
is because for the bureaucracy, it is always written instructions to which they feel 
themselves bound for following their routine (Blau and Meyer, 1971). In this case, 
as revealed from the document review, only verbal instructions were passed. 
Therefore, it is argued, the bureaucracy followed its own interpretation and 
accordingly defined the course of action. 
The above explanation that bureaucracy influenced the political agenda, nonetheless, 
raises two questions: firstly, why did politicians fail to clearly define principles? The 
political manifesto of the government mentions the establishing of the DIIAs and 
granting autonomy to the institutions. But, why did they want to launch the sclicnic; 
it was not explicit in terms of laying down its principles. For this shortcoming, an 
ex-minister for health explained: 
This is because most of the time our (politicians ) academy (assembly 
andl parliament) remained closed. There were no elections, training 
and skill building of politicians. In fact, no one attempted to educate 
the politicians. 
The above observation by the minister for health also matclics reality. In Pakistan, 
since independence in 1947, for more than half of the nations' life, it was the noll- 
political forces that ran the country. During this period, there were no elections, no 
parliaments and the political process remained suspended. Further, due to the 
frequent interruption in the political process, the political executives changed 
rapidly. Therefore, political forces did not mature to be able to develop a robust 
political agenda with a sound ideological base. 
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Secondly, why did not the political executives cfricicntly follow tile inIpIcIlIcntation 
of their political agenda - written or verbal? The answer to this, possibly an offshoot 
of the above argument, is that the chief minister and the minister for health both 
indulged themselves in deciding the street level issues - where the service providers 
are in direct contact with the service recipients. The former told this researcher about 
one such instance: 
I visited the hospital in June (1997) to see that nothing had been 
repaired We, therefore, held a meeting that lasted till 0100 hrs at 
night, and then it is a long story, but we got eve? ything sorted and 
straightened in three months. 
When this researcher commented that if the chief minister had been involved in 
details he would be ignoring the monitoring of government business and work on 
policy level, he said: 
I would work both in detail as well as at a philosophical level, the 
details, because in our culture it is like that... it is the action and not 
the dialogue that makes the difference. If the chief minister had 
meetings and talk philosophy but the government department does not 
act, what is the use of that? 
Similarly, the views of the minister for health on the issue were also not much 
different. For example, about the problems in a teaching hospital, lie explaincd: 
... We then started preparing the hospital to provide patient care. First 
of all we started operating on emergency cases. I shifted rny office 
there and took meetings quite frequently... had I not been a Health 
Minister, maybe 'the hospital'was still non-operational. 
Peters (1978: 233) terms this phenomenon as 'non-adm i nistrat ion', i. e. the 
politicians were doing something ultra vires that they should not have been doing. 
This does not mean, however, that it was beyond their legal powcrs. But, the 
inevitable reality of this "zooming in" is that at the end of the day, tile highcr 
stratum of work is neglected (Jaques, 1976). Thus, one of the consequences of thc 
politicians being involved in a street level job was that the principles for r6ornis 
were not laid down. 
6.2.2.2. Tendency of considering more tencts of the policy 
process in the successive reforms 
Another fact indicated in table 6.2 is that for SPP the principles were not clearly 
documented and were also unknown to the stakeholders. I lowcvcr, for DI IG, which 
was the latest reform introduced by the government, these were documented, but 
remained unclear to the stakeholders. Why did this happen? To explore the answer, 
it is noted (5.3.3.1; 5.3.3.2) that the SPP was both led and supported by technical 
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bureaucracy, while the DHG was a brainchild of the civil bureaucracy (5.6.3.1). In 
this exercise, technical bureaucracy worked with the civil burcaucrats to develop the 
concept, and politicians supported this initiative in designing and inlplcmcntation 
(5.6.3.2). One may then conclude that it was due to the civil bureaucracy that the 
principles were clearly laid down for the DIIG. However, this was not the case, 
because, if that was the case, then why did the policy process for the IA and DIIA 
lack this attribute? In both these cases, the civil bureaucracy was also a partner in 
conceptualisation. Instead, it is argued that by the time DIIG %vas conccptualiscd tile 
bureaucracy had started learning and owning the concepts. A respondent from a 
donor agency commenting on the motivation for the reforms told this researcher: 
For DIL4s, the political or ideological motivation is rather irrelevant, 
because then there was no sense and belief in decentralisation of 
powers to the lower levels as far as the district health system is 
concerned There was no commitment to the idea 
However, for DHG, it was a different phenomenon. By the time the 
concept of DHG came in, there was commitment to the concept, 
because by then the Health Department certainly came to believe and 
own the principle. Otherwise there was not much difference between 
the two initiatives... 
However, the above explanation raises another question. That is, given the technical 
bureaucracy was behind the SPP, and as explained earlier (5.2), it had the ownership 
of the department - why then did it fail to conceptualise die principles? I'lie answer 
lies in an explanation offered by a respondent working for a donor agency: 
Another rationale (for the explicit motives of reform) could be that the 
Health Department learnt lessons through the successive initiatives 
and there also came more commitment, although designing was Iloilo 
with the assistance of theforeign consultants. 
The SPP, as informed by the document review and endorsed by many participants 
was the first project (initiated during 1993) of its kind whereby issues like 
decentralisation and community participation were being tested. On the other hand 
DIIG was quite late in coming (in 1998), and by then bureaucracy had learrit 
lessons, in addition to owning the concept, as noted above. 
6.2.2.3. Involvement of politicians in conceptualising 
reforms is vital in laying down the principles 
The principles and purposes, being a set of values, indicate the political nature of the 
reform process, and it has been argued that they shape the pcrccption of reality by 
the policy analysts (Parsons, 1995). Therefore, politicians arc considered as key 
stakeholders and their involvement in conccptualising or the agenda sctting stage of 
reforms is vital. Otherwise, it is likely that the principles will remain unclear. In the 
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Punjab, however, the politicians had little input into conccptualising the r6ornis 
leading to the principles not being clearly defined. This hypothesis is explored by 
finding 'by whom and how were the reform initiatives conccptualiscd, and the 
agenda set in the Punjab? Against different variables for this question, the findings 
of this study drawn from four case studies are clustered and presented in table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: - Conceptualisation -a component of policy process for reforms 
Who identified How was the issue Who brought tile How W83 the Issue 
the issue identified issue on agenda brought on agenda 
SPP Technocrat - the Technical and civil Technocrats and civil Technical and civil 
Executive Director bureaucracy with bureaucrats working bureaucracy working 
of Special Projects donors in a together in the hierarchy with donors working 
hierarchical manner at planning forums in a hierarchy 
DIIA Expatriate Donors in Politicians in executive Politicians - it was on 
consultants and consultation with position decided to party manifesto that 
technocrats bureaucracy establish DIIAs district health system 
is decentralised 
1A Civilbureaucracy Civil bureaucracy in Politicians in executive Politicians - it was on 
consultation with position decided to party manifesto that 
technocrats grant autonomy tertiary care hospitals 
are given autonomy 
DIIG Civil bureaucracy Civil bureaucracy in Politicians in executive Politicians in order to 
consultation with position decided to decentralise the 
technocrats establish DI IGs district health system 
From table 6.3 it is seen that: 
In the case of SPP the politicians were not part of the process. For tile rciliailldcr, lioN%'cvcr, 
they joined the civil and technical bureaucracy in bringing the issue oil tile agenda. But, for 
the DIIA and IA, it was on account of tile intervention being in the political nianifcsto of the 
party in power, and, as noted above, this does not ensure that die principles of rcfornis will 
be defined. In this case scenario, the DIIG is distinct. This initiative, despite not being in the 
manifesto, had political support, and also its principles were documented, but as notcd in 
table 6.3, these remained unclear to the stakeholders. 
Thus, given the above findings, overall the politicians were not fully on board for 
conceptualising the policy for reforms. This inference is drawn firstly by considering 
that if different cell in table 6.3 are taken as a unit of activity for conceptualisation I 
do not see much involvement of politicians. Secondly, the DIIG initiative was not in 
their political manifesto, but they became involved, adding their ideology to tile 
initiative. However, a question still remains, why the majority of stakeholders were 
ignorant about the principles for DIIG. This was due to, as seen in table 6.3, tile 
politicians not being involved in identifying the issues which were the cause of 
concern for different stakeholders. Therefore, they could not trumpet the issues and 
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the principles for the latter to know. Thus, it is inferred that the full participation of 
politicians in conceptualising refonns is vital for the laying down of principles. 
6.2.3. Summary and conclusion 
This section explored the factors that influenced the policy process in tcrms of the 
laying down of 'principles and purposes' for health sector reform. It was revcaled that 
although the purposes were clear, the principles were not. This state of affairs led to 
confusion in the formulation and implementation of reforms in the Punjab licaldi 
sector. The policymakers worked towards the end product, for example, autonomy; 
however, why they were doing so, was not clear to them. 
To determine the reasons underlying this phenomenon, three hypotheses wcrc 
formulated: (i) being on the political agenda did not ensure that the principles of 
reforms would be defted; (ii) there is a tendency for considering more tenets of Ole 
policy process in successive reforms; and (iii) the involvement of die politicians in die 
conceptualisation phase is vital for laying down the principles of mforms. 
The above hypotheses were discussed and it is concluded that die principles, as a part 
of the policy process were not clear and this shortcoming led to confusion about the 
formulation and then implementation of reforms in the Punjab health scctor. Further, 
although there was a tendency for considering more tenets of the policy process in 
successive reforms, the politicians joining earlier in conceptualising them facilitated 
the defining of the principles for the reforms. 
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6.3. Shapers of the policy process 
In the previous section, it was revealed that the principles of r6orms wcre not clcar, 
because the politicians did not fully participate in the conccptualisation phase of the 
policy process. These principles, according to the conceptual framework of this 
study, are laid down for directing and guiding the individuals and organisations that 
shape the policy process (chapter 3). This section examines the role of difTcrcnt 
shapers, as to how did they influence the policy process? 
Findings from case studies 
Shapers contribute positively or negatively by the way they conduct the policy 
process that, in turn, is influenced by their attributes like 'training, experience, 
interest, preferred management styles, the degree of their knowledge of healthcare 
systems in other countries, their political commitment or ability to take an apolitical 
stance' (Dewdney, 1987). To determine the attributes of the shapers in the Punjab 
they were classified as leader, supporter, bureaucracy, donors, mcdia and civil 
society (5.1). Their characteristics and the role they played in influcricing the policy 
process, drawing from the case studies, is summariscd in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: - Role of shapers in policy process 
Leader Supporter Bureaucracy Donors Media Civil Society 
SPP Technocrat Technocrat - Except few, it Supportive, Passive, Ile users 
- visionary, visionary, was generally but not pro- covered passive, 
dedicated dedicated resistant and active and ncwsof providcrs both 
and and was opposed changed their ceremonial medics and 
energetic orchestrated alliance to nature paramedics were 
the project other reforms opposed, but not 
united 
DIIA civil Politician - do- Supportive -do- - do- 
bureaucrat with a initially, but 
- talked business changed their 
well, but background alliance to 
did not do - energetic other reform 
much and a 
practically democratic 
dictator 
IA do- - do- do- Supportive in Active, but The users 
principle, but only to passive, 
came in to be cover the providcrs mainly 
in the process dcbate medics and their 
and not body - the PNIA 
singled out opposed 
DIIG do. do- do- Supporter, -do- -do. 
butreduced 
to disburse 
and conduct 
I activities 
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From a study of table 6.4, the way different shapers influenced the policy proccss is that: 
Insofar as leadership, the initiatives fall in two distinct groups: (i) SPP, which was lcd by a 
technocrat; and (ii) the remaining initiatives were led by a civil bureaucrat who workcd in a 
bureaucratic way. Similarly, there were two types of supporters: (i) tcclinocrat supporting 
the SPP; and (ii) politician supporting the remaining initiatives. The bureaucracy, cxccpt in 
a few cases, resisted and opposed the initiatives. The donors were supportive in gcncral, but 
their role changed over time. That is, supportive initially to compete and workcd for 
reforms, before finally going into a laid back position. The media cliangcd ovcr time from 
being passive to active. Likewise, civil society was passive and is not well devclopcd. 
6.3.2. Factors associated with shapers 
Given the findings in table 6.4 the following generalisations are made, which will 
subsequently be discussed individually: (i) the leaders lacked qualities to guide the 
process to a success; (ii) the support to the reform process was inconsistent and 
inappropriate; (iii) the bureaucracy resisted the reforms and was inefficient; (iv) the 
donors changed their role over time; (v) the media was not used and it changed its 
role over time; and (vi) civil society was passive and not well developed. These 
factors are discussed below, framing more hypotheses: 
6.3.2.1. Leaders lacked the qualities to guide the process 
The leader, as defined earlier (5.1) is the front-runner key stakeholder, e. g. the head 
of the department, institution or agency and has a personal as well as a formal 
institutional interest at stake. Effective leadership is vital to the success of tile reform 
process (Paul-Shaheen, 1998). Ilowevcr, it was not the case in tile Punjab. That is, 
(i) the technocrat leading the SPP could not effectively harness support for the 
project; and (ii) the civil servant leading the remaining initiatives led tile policy 
process in a bureaucratic way. In the following, these hypotheses arc tested. 
Technocrat could not harness support for the initiative 
In the case of SPP, a technocrat led the Project Management Team and influcnccd 
the outcome of the project (5.3.3.1), but was transferred from the project. Given his 
personal traits, it is argued that the project became complicated, beyond the 
capability of his successors to carry it forward. Even, an institution was reluctant to 
accept the responsibility to manage the project, as, according to a senior officcr, it 
had no capacity and it was being doubted, whether it could do it. Thus, one may 
praise the leader and also question - why was lie transferred from the project? To 
answer this question, one expatriate consultant working in the PIIDC noted that the 
project leader, while working well with his team, posed threats to his scnior 
colleagues. In his view, they were afraid of being overshadowed by him. In other 
words, he was too junior to be in the position, and the bureaucratic milicu, in the 
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Punjab (5.6.7.3) would not allow that. In short, the project manager could not 
harness the support for the project, thus he lacked an important attribute of a leader. 
Civil bureaucrat led the reforms in a bureaucratic way 
In the case of the DHA, IA and DHG a civil bureaucrat was identifled as the leader 
by the majority of respondents. However, it is argued that ultimately lie was 
ineffective and influenced the policy process in a way that the former two initiatives 
were abandoned and the third ran into serious problems. What was wrong widi his 
leadership? According to many respondents, this career civil bureaucrat was 
characterised as the one who talked well, but did not do much practically. T'his 
evidence was also substantiated by a politician, who remarked: 
... We were being hampered by the colonial 
legacies. Yes, Sir! Yes, 
Minister! Such characteristics of the civil bureaucracy affected the 
overall efficiency of the system. I think the biggest hindrance was the 
bureaucracy itself They did change the system to the extent they 
wanted to change. The individuals like ... (name of the leader) wanted 
to change, hut basically still he was a civil bureaucrat trained under 
the old British colonial style ofadministration. Ile would never want to 
lose allpowers. 
In other words, this leader, being part of the bureaucracy, was more loyal to the 
traditions of his own institution than to the health reforms. Ile was a generalist who 
led the reforms in a bureaucratic way, which, as an institution, was opposed and 
resisted, as a senior project officer told this researcher. Further, remarks of a senior 
bureaucrat about the way this particular bureaucrat (leader) conducted the policy 
process, and the advice he rendered, indicate the suit followed by him. I Ic noted: 
One of our problems ... is the reluctance of the government to 
let go of 
its hold over the institutions. This is exactly what is happening in this 
case. ... Either grant full autonomy or do not 
do it at all. In this 
situation, the best description of the system will be that it is 'neither 
fish nor fowl'. Kindly try to give autonomy in the real sense of the 
word (GoPb, 1997v). 
6.3.2.2. The support was inconsistent and inappropriate 
The supporters are the key stakeholders who exercise significant influence, and are 
important for the success or failure of reforms (5.1). They facilitated the process by 
making decisions and co-ordinating assistance from various sections of tile 
government. In the case of the Punjab, the support to the policy process was 
inconsistent and inappropriate. To investigate this assumption, two hypotlicscs arc 
framed: (i) the support for the SPP dwindled over time; and (ii) for the remaining 
initiatives, the support was incoherent and ill focused. 
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Support for SPP dwindled over time 
The respondents were unanimous in their opinion that the first executive director of 
Special Projects supported the SPP. Afterwards, there is adequate documentary 
evidence suggesting that support to the project first became lukewarm and then was 
almost withdrawn. In fact, no respondent identified anyone else as a supportcr. The 
successive executive directors diverted its resources to the main SFIIP, or tried to 
generate other initiatives out of its remains. Thus, gcneralising the findings, it is 
concluded that support to the project dwindled after its initial years of execution. 
Support for DHAs, IA and DHG was incoherent and ill focussed 
The chief minister of the Punjab was the supporter in the case of DIIA, IA and 
DHG. About him, one of his political colleagues told this researcher: 
Basically he was enthusiastic in bringing change, but he was more of a 
dictator than a democratic leader. Well, this attitude did pay off in 
certain sectors like the roads and bridges, hut not in health and 
education. The social sector was a different ball game. However, 
unfortunately the same approach was used in these departments. Ile 
had approach of an industrialist and could not differentiate between 
machine and man. I think that was one of the reasons forfailure. The 
people were pushed too hard and too fast. In the thinking process you 
need time to think hut here people were beingforced to think 
There were several reasons for the chief minister working in this manner (e. g. 
5.4.3.2; 5.5.3.2), mainly due to his business like attitude and the political culture of 
the country. Nonetheless, he ended up having opened many fronts in the Health 
Department at a time, thus losing the focus. In this regard, a senior planner argued 
that, although different initiatives were introduced under the umbrella of SAP, there 
was no coherence between them and each one had its own independent identity. 
Thus, in his view, the multiplication of efforts resulted in that hardly any reform was 
taken to its logical conclusion. Instead the leader, a civil bureaucrat, got control of 
the situation; and it is argued that it was a calculated move by which the bureaucracy 
kept their political bosses engaged and also maintained the statuv quo. 
6.3.2.3. Bureaucracy resisted the reforms and was 
inefficient 
The term bureaucracy is used in the meaning of civil scrvants, and dra%vn from 
Tomlin's (1931 cited in Chapman and 6 Toole, 1995: 4) dcrinition in the British 
context (Pakistan follows the same model) the latter arc "paid wholly and dircctly 
out of the money voted by parliament and work in a civil capacity in a dcpartnicnt of 
the government". They are the secondary stakeholders, both in the licalth and othcr 
provincial/national systems, responsible for: (i) assisting the political cxccutivCs ill 
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policyrnaking and working out its details in the provincial secretariat; and (ii) in 
districts, as an essential partner in implementing policy (5.2). However, the 
bureaucracy resisted the process and was opposed to the reforms.. Tlicrcforc the 
policy suffered both in its design and implementation phase. Many respondents 
subscribed to this observation, e. g. a top technocrat noted: 
... Pakistani bureaucracy is a staunch disbeliever of decentralisation. 
... As the saying goes, a cat cannot see milk 'while drinking. So do 
the bureaucrats. They always amass authority 'beneath them' and 
want to do everything without accepting any responsibility. They want 
to remain at the axis and centre of all decision-making. That is the 
reason that different reform initiatives faced the worst t)pe of 
oppositionfrom the bureaucracy. 
In addition, the bureaucracy was inefficient. In this respect, Blau and Mcycr (1971) 
note inefficiency in bureaucracy on two accounts. First, given the employment and 
promotion opportunities in a bureaucratic set up are based on qualification and 
experience that are protected against arbitrary dismissals, the incumbcnts hardly 
attempt to impress their superiors. Second, the rigidity of civil servants in tlicir 
conducting of official business according to rules that inhibits those exercising 
judgement needed for efficient performance. In the case of the Punjab, the ministcr 
for health seconded the notion of an inefficient bureaucracy, attributing this to its 
vested interests. He commented: 
The civil bureaucracy has not been efficient... I am of the opinion that 
they were upset in this process due to seylsh reasons. They hail 
personal interests that their role was going to be limited in case the 
reforms take shape. 
This inefficiency of bureaucracy due to selfish reasons takes us to another argumcnt 
i. e. politicising of bureaucracy. And it is on this account that Peters (1978) argues 
for political appointees with some combination of 'political disposition' and 
'administrative talent' however cautions against either of tlicse alone. This 
observation, it may be noted, is in line with tile lesson, this study draws (7.5.1) in 
respect of policy analysts. That is, bureaucracy should have been explicit in its 
reservations rather than dragging its feet while working on reforms 
However, the question arises, how the bureaucracy was able to manage its position 
that although inefficient and being opposed to reforms, it was closer to their political 
bosses. For example, a top decision-mak-er told this rcscarclicr: "We had a hotline 
contact with the chief minister... " It is argued that this situation had arisen due at 
least to two factors: (i) 'internal-drivcn politicisation' of bureaucracy; and (ii) 
politico-bureaucratic nexus. In the following I explain these factors. 
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Internal-driven politicisation of bureaucrac 
Hojnacki (1996 cited in Moon and Ingraham, 1998: 79) introduced three patterns of 
politicisation: (i) society-drivcn, whereby the civil society determines the nature of 
politics in policyrnaking; (ii) politician-driven, where the politicians arc in control of 
the process; and (iii) 'intemal-driven politicisation', i. e. the bureaucracy works for 
the survival of its organisation consequent to the administrative reforms. Regarding 
the last characteristic of bureaucracy, Moon and Ingraham (1998) explained: 
Bureaucrats also actively respond to tile administrative reform because 
they perceive it as a systematic threat to the bureaucracy. Under a 
bureaucratic-bashing milieu, the bureaucracy protects its organisational 
interests (i. e. size and budget) by applying new managerial techniques, 
creating new missions and delaying its implementation procedures to 
dilute the political urgency. It often internalises reduction pressure by 
developing training programmes, increasing off-organisation activities, 
or transferring to quasi-government organisations. 
The above observation also corresponds to the Danish experience, where 
Christensen (1997) noted that the civil servants would defend the formal structure 
against challenges. In the Punjab, the bureaucracy behaved in this similar fashion. 
That is, initially they came up with ideas, proposals and arguments favouring an 
initiative and then either forgetting it or turning against the same and propounding 
another. For example, the SPP was considered as an "excellent cffort, which the 
Health Department is going to undertake, to address many of its chronic problems... 
(GoPb, 1992a)" Later, however, this project was allowed to be overtaken by events. 
Similarly, the DIIA was implemented in two districts and preparations were made to 
extend the initiative to fifteen other districts, but instead tile emphasis sliffied to 
instituting yet another initiative, the DHG. By doing so, bureaucracy was seen as an 
active partner of reforms, in fact, one DIIS noted, it was to cnsure that a Status quo 
was maintained. At the same time, however, they also kept their political bosses 
engaged and happy that they were doing a lot. This relationship is explored below. 
Politico-bureaucratic nexus 
Moon and Ingraham (1998) from a study of three Asian countrics concluded that 
government action, e. g. health sector reform, was a product of the interaction 
between politicians, bureaucracy and civil society. In their view, these forces jointly 
form a 'Political Nexus Triad'. However, in the Punjab it was a 'politico- 
bureaucratic nexus', and in that relationship the pendulum shif1cd towards the 
bureaucracy. Civil society was hardly seen in the process. In other words, as already 
noted (6.3.2.2), the bureaucracy was in control of the Proccss. 
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Why did the above situation arise, whereby the bureaucracy dominated the process? 
In this regard, Hashmi (1986) noted that bureaucracy, military and the political dlitc 
has been governing Pakistan, since its independence. That is, given that for three and 
a half decades out of the five and a half decades of independent rule, it was the 
coalition of the former two (bureaucracy and military) that dominated. Tlicrcfore, 
Pakistan has also been called an administrative state or a bureaucratic polity (Islam, 
1990). An ex-minister for health, substantiating this point, noted: 
The civil service is very well organised and well entrenched Why India 
is running nicely is because of the stable political institutions. The 
Congress was quite old when it receivedpower. On the other hand 1he 
Muslim League was quite young and a similar debacle happened with 
the Pakistan People's Party. The civil service used its superiority, 
while the political institutions unfortunately did not work and the 
politicians were not trained In that situation, the civil bureaucracy 
played well... 
However, the politicians instead of striving to mature themselves and taking the 
lead, established a nexus with bureaucracy. And also, in this equation, bureaucracy 
dominated, even when the politicians were in power. For example, during the study 
period (1993-2000), when a political government was in office, except in 1999- 
2000, the political dlite were in coalition with the civil and military bureaucracy. For 
example, to benefit the latter, it was decided to re-advcrtise the Positions of CEs, 
deviating from the procedure laid down for the purpose (GoPb, 199911). As a result, 
as drawn from the document review, two out of ten district chief executives and 
three out of eleven institutional chief executives were retired army ofiliccrs. 
6.3.2.4. The donors were supportive, but their role changed 
over time 
From table 6.4, it is seen that donors were not opposed, but in tile course of die policy 
process, while favouring the reforms, had three milestones in the course of policy 
process: (i) initially inculcated the ideas and built a critical mass for conccptualising 
health sector reforms; (ii) competed and actively supported the policy process for 
certain reforms; and (iii) finally followed suit dictated by tile government. In the 
following, these hypotheses are discussed in detail. 
Inculcatinq the ideas and buildin-q critiCal mass 
Foltz (1994) from her comparative study of United State Agency for International 
Development (USAID) assistance to health reforms in Niger and Nigeria 
demonstrated that the presence of a strong constituency for refornis in tile recipient 
government facilitated the acceptance and implementation of reforms. Working on 
this advice, in the Punjab the donors inculcated the concepts and were successful in 
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developing a critical mass for supporting decentralisation. The civil servants, who 
were initially against it, appreciated the new paradigm to later become advocates 
and finally claimed ownership, stating that the initiatives were 'home-grown'. For 
example, a top technocrat, who was part of decision-making, told this researcher 
about how he, initially opposed, converted to accept the concept: 
About decentralisation, I was not convinced Once an expatriate 
consultant asked me, what was the one solution to the problems of 
healthcare in Pakistan? I thought, because there are several issues 
confronting; there might be several solutions. However, my answer 
was 'management improvement' and after some discussion, we agreed 
on decentralisation, as one measure. 
Then, talking about how the grounds were developed in the health sector and that 
how the donors were instrumental for introducing different reforms, the above- 
referred technocrat narrated that: 
Thinking about reforms that started in the early 1990s, the four 
initiatives can be seen happening in three phases: (i) SPP; (U) DIIA; 
and (Iii) LI and DHG. For SPP, we need to connect its inception with 
the policy dialogue with the World Bank and other donors. That was 
the time when the department started thinking about issues like 
decentralisation and community participation. ... when it came to IAIDHG, the DoH was clear about problems, what to do about those 
and bringing in the comprehensivesolutions that we clearly called as 
health sector reforms ... people say that in the reform process the Morld Bank and other donors guided us. However, this is not true... 
Finally, about the entire reform process claiming its ownership, he commented: 
... This reform process did not come in one day - it was after a long 
process. It was decided, then implemented and thenfine-tuned with the 
help offeedback It was a dynamic process and home-grown. 
Competinq and activelv supportinq 
The governments in developing countries faced with a shortage of funds adopt 
various strategies in order to compete for donor assistance (Dragcr, 1996; Sabbat, 
1997). Contrarily, in Punjab, for example, in the case of SPP, donors were partners 
initially, but later they competed for the initiative, firstly for installing DI IMTs and 
then for instituting DHAs. 
The DHMTs and DHAs were launched from PIIDC, and to secure the identity of 
these initiatives, the move to link the SPP with PIIDC failed (5.3.6.4). Given that tile 
donors worked with PHDC, their role in this decision cannot be ignored. For 
example, in a meeting of a Tecentralisation Sub-group' of tile 'Planning and 
Management Interest Group' the project director of SPP presented an analYsis of 
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SPP interventions in relation to the ten-point plan on dcccntralisation recommended 
by an expatriate consultant (PIIDC, 1995). Ile emphasiscd the linking of SPP with 
PHDC for implementing these recommendations. It was decided that an expatriate 
management development advisor and Management Development Unit of PIIDC 
would jointly prepare a paper for the proposed linkage to present at the next meeting 
of the sub-group. While there is no record of this meeting taking place, a review of 
the proposal developed by them suggests that it was a non-starter (PI I DC, 1995a). 
Followinq suit, instead of quidinq technicaliv 
The last stage of supporting initiatives marks the donors taking a laid back position. 
May be on account of tiredness, as an expatriate consultant noted, after following a 
project for seven years (1993-99), they ended up following suit, especially in the case 
of the DHG. Their role was reduced to directing financial assistance and undertaking 
different activities for the government. This assumption about DIIG is a matter of 
record, however in the case of autonomy to institutions, the donors got involvcd only to 
be in the process, as one of them commented: 
we wanted to 'keep in there'and not be marginalised, i. e. more or less 
be completely ignored or excluded - this was one of the many reasons 
for us in getting involved in the Institutional Autonomy side of things, 
when the district decentralisation process was going so slowly. 
It may be noted that although autonomy to institutions, a reform in the arena of 
tertiary care, was beyond the original mandate, DFID helped in organising an 
orientation course for the CEs and designed a baseline survey of autonomous 
institutions. Why did the donors behave so subserviently? Sabbat (1997) notes the 
effect of asymmetry in the donor-recipicnt relationship. In his view, if recipients are 
submissive, they lack the ownership of donor supported initiative. Further, when tile 
overall funding by the donors represents only a small proportion of the budget, there 
is a greater recipient assertiveness. In the Punjab in the initial years of tile project a 
lack of ownership of initiatives is noted, for the government gave up tile DIIA 
initiative or for that matter also the DIIMTs (both sponsored by donors) to pursue 
the DIIG initiative. Seconding this assumption, a donor representative commented: 
With DHAs, there was a problem of ownership. 7bal is, someone front 
outside the Health Department (i. e. the donors) designed it. The health 
managers did not themselves design the initiative ... 
However, it is argued that the recipient's lack of ownership for initiativcs was not 
due to their submissiveness - they were not. This researcher witncsscd tough and 
often uncompromising negotiations on the part of the recipients, which according to 
Sabbat should have made a greater partnership with donors. Turning to the otlicr 
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variable of Sabbat, i. e. the amount of donor contribution, the donor (DFID only) 
funds constituted about 25% of the total project inputs (GoPb, 1993). This amount 
was not a small part of the budget the government could afford to lose. Ilius, 
logically, the recipients' could not be assertive in their relationship with donors. 
Then why was the 'laid back' position taken by the donors? This can be explained 
only by assuming that the administrative mechanisms of donors had fatigued in 
supporting the reforms. As a result, they could not argue on issues, and appeared to 
be following suit. Admitting this conclusion candidly, an expatriate consultant noted 
that the British Council and DFID took long (an expression of fatigue) to agree 
contract amendments, which itself had a delayed publication. 
6.3.2.5. The media was not used and its role changed over 
time 
The media can play an important role in drawing government attention to die issues 
(Walt, 1994) and is, therefore, a communication link between public and policymakcrs 
(Paul-Shaeen, 1998). However, what was its role in the Punjab? During die study 
period, the media, and the print-media only, because the electronic media was not 
involved, gradually changed from being passive to an active player in the process - 
a generalisation made, based on the evidence from document review corroborated by 
the personal knowledge of this researcher. Secondly, no effort was made to engage 
the media in the dialogue for reforms. In the following I test these hypotheses: 
The media chanqed its role over time 
Table 6.4 shows that in the case of the SPP and DIIA the media was passive. If, at 
all, it covered mainly political rhetoric, as a senior figure in the PMA noted "only 
strong political statements' made the headlines in the newspapers". A senior planncr 
conceding to the weakness of initiatives vis-a-vis the understanding of civil society 
about development commented: 
... because in the minds of the public (and that he meant to include 
media), any kind of development meant the buildings and such things... 
Asfar as the media is concerned we were on a weak wicket. 
That is, for civil society, development meant infrastructure building. Since reforms 
did not envisage such interventions, these remained unnoticed. Nonetheless, about 
IA and DIIG initiatives, the media was active, but in covering the debate bctwccn 
certain interest groups and government. And during this conflict, a highly placed 
technocrat told this researcher, "there was an extensive debate in the media, and 
about 120 items appeared in the press ... " But, there were few instances where the 
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media itself got involved in keeping an initiative on the govcmmcnt's agcnda as this 
researcher did not find any comprehensive press report about the hcalth reforms. 
Policvmaker did not use the media 
As will be noted (6.3.2.6), whereas civil society was not developed, the 
policyrnakers also did not try for that - an observation true for the media as well. 
Few press releases of ceremonial nature and couple of interviews for defending an 
initiative cannot be termed adequate. That is, key stakeholders did not actively 
engage the media in communicating the policy issues to the public. Three reasons 
for this attitude are identified. Firstly, there was a skewed impression of the media. 
For example, a senior medical officer working on the SPP commented: 
Yhis (media) causes more complications than helping. The people in 
the media .. tend to exploit the situation 
by highlighting the weaknesses 
and downplaying the positive aspects. In fact, our civil society is not 
developed to the extent that the media could pW a role in furthering 
the objectives ofan initiative like the SheikInipura Pilot Project. 
Secondly, the mandatory official secrecy inhibited the utilisation of the media. The 
Official Secrets Act, 1926 prohibits government officials from revealing details 
about their official business. In addition, there were at least 12 different laws that, in 
one way or the other, curb the freedom of information (Dawn, 2001a; Dawn, 
2002b). As a result, confidentiality became an 'official decorum' in the public 
sector. In many instances, this researcher was refused access to official documents. 
Further, because the officials were attuned to be secretive and closed, the docunicnt 
review indicates that, although a cell was created on the chief minister's advicc for 
launching promotional campaigns to receive and collate public opinion (GoPb, 
1997q), there is no evidence of undertaking any activity. 
Thirdly, the government was weak in putting across its viewpoint. A top bureaucrat, 
looking for the reasons for non-utilisation of die media, noted that the opponents 
took on the government on issues like privatisation and equity. Further, in his view, 
the opposition had more influence on the media than the government. In other 
words, instead of advocating different initiatives, the government was on the 
defensive. In this respect, the chief minister vividly commented: 
We used it (media) to defend. We did not use it to publicl. -C, because I 
believe the politicians have disappointed people and they don't believe 
in 
- 
them. Rather you talk; the things should be done Instead, That Is, 
your action should speak... 
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6.3.2.6. Civil society was passive and undcr-developed 
Jeffery and Vira (2001: 3) deriving from an earlier work by Pretty (1995) provide a 
typology of participation by people in externally introduced interventions. From the 
range of participation types 'passive participation' is relevant in this case. In this 
kind of relationship "people participate by being told what is going to happen or has 
already happened (or what they are expected to do). It is a unilateral announcement 
by an administration or project management without listening to people's responses 
.. -" (ibid: 3). In the Punjab people from governance undertook the policy process 
without particularly involving stakeholders from other components of health sector, 
i. e. it was mainly the politico-bureaucratic nexus operating, the communities or end- 
users were passive and no organised effort was made to involve service providers or 
their representatives. To test this hypothesis, building on findings from case studies, 
the participation of different shapers in the major tasks of tile policy process, i. e. 
conceptualising, formulating and implementing are given in table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: - Role of different stakeholders in the policy process 
Initiatives 98) DIIA (1995-98) IA 1997-2000) DIIG(1998-99) 
Conceptual isation T T c c 
Formulation CT CTP CTP CTP 
Implementation CTS CTSP CTSP 
Key: T: Technical bureaucracy; Q Civil bureaucracy; P: Politicians; S: Civil society 
From table 6.5, it is seen that civil bureaucracy took over conccptualising from its technical 
counterpart in successive reforms. Similarly, politicians who did not participate in 
conceptualising any reform came into the formulation and implementation phase of tile last 
three reforms. Civil society, in this process, was the most disadvantaged, and figured only 
during implementation - and that too in the execution phase only. In table 6.5, tile implementation cell of DHG is vacant. This is because this initiative, apart from selection of 
CEs and their induction training, did not really get into that phase. 
Thus, while the political and bureaucratic executives were operative throughout the 
policy process, civil society was confined to the execution phase. That is, this shapcr 
was not on board during the conccptualisation and formulation phase of the policy 
process. Given that civil society draws from communities, introducing reforms as in 
the Punjab health sector can be tcrmcd as a 'one-hand clap' phenomenon. It was 
mainly the bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent the political executives wcrc active, 
civil society or recipients of services were hardly considered. Further, tile document 
review reveals that civil society was involved as members of the Managnint 
Committees established under different reform initiatives. Since, such members 
came through nomination, i. e. the civil servants proposing and tile bureaucracy and 
politicians jointly giving approval, they did not directly rcprcscnt pcoplc. 
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This kind of relationship extended to the service providcrs in the health scctor as 
well (see below). But, why was this skewed relationship of civil socicty vis-6-vis the 
nexus of bureaucracy and politicians? To answer this question, it is argucd that: (i) 
civil society including groups in the professions was under-developcd; and (ii) an 
inadequate and inappropriate effort was made to broaden the stakeholdcr's basc. 
Civil societv was under-developed 
Generally, there was a relatively less developed civil society. This researcher could 
not identify many interest groups which contributed to the policy process. The PMA 
came on the scene, but late and ineffectively. For instance, this body was not 
proactive in the case of the DHA or SPP initiatives, which were about reforming the 
district health system. They came when the issue of granting autonomy to the 
institutions and the selection of CEs for the DIIGs was raised. Perhaps, it was 
competition for the lucrative job of the CEs and that the clinical dlitc were being 
affected, or this body did not effectively represent doctors in the peripheral areas 
compared to those from cities and hospitals. In this regard an expatriate consultant 
observed that "I got the feeling that the PMA was very much Lahore rather than 
province-wide based" -a point that is also supported by evidence from case studies. 
Secondly, the PMA was divided (Niazi, 1999) and die different groups had 
conflicting views about the reform process. Some groups favoured it (Elahi and 
Bharwana, 1999), while others were opposed (Rashid, 1999) and yet some changed 
their stance over time (Bharwana, 1999). Evidence suggests that the PMA was 
called into certain meetings, but given the internal divide, its reprcscntation would 
not have been effective. This observation conforms to the subscription by flic 
respondents who were unanimous that despite various groups which resistcd and 
were opposed to reforms, they were scattered and ineffective in their opposition. 
Inadequate and inappropriate effort to broadening the stakeholders' base 
Gerein (1986) reflecting on her personal experiences of working in donor 
organisations, noted that, in developing countries, the system was not supportivc of 
community participation in the primary health care programmes. In the Punjab, apart 
from the PMA, there is little evidence that any othcr group got involvcd. In addition, 
bureaucracy and politicians made no effort to involve any that might have cxistcd. 
Instead, conditions were created that were not conducive to such a partricrship. 
Explaining this situation, the president of a regional 'All Pakistan Clcrks 
Association' told this researcher: 
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... it was at a higher level phenomenon andfor the Secretaries and high 
officials... The seminars were held, hut in the Avarai (afive-star hotel) 
and at the high forums. These should have heen held in Basic Health 
Units or Rural Health Centres. The employees were never involved in 
decision-making. If it were done properly the people would not have 
reacted like they did 
Further, according to a respondent who was near to the policymak-crs, different 
individuals were consulted, but as an ad-hoc arrangement, no formal forum or 
commission of enquiry with explicit terms of reference was created. In such 
proceedings, though certain technical managers and professionals were invited, it 
was not as a technical polity, but as a part of the technical bureaucracy. The lattcr, 
given the bureaucratic milieu in Punjab, were subservient to the civil bureaucracy. In 
short, few stakeholders were involved in policymaking. 
6.3.3. Summary and conclusions 
This section explored factors concerning the shapers of the policy process. Drawing 
from case studies, the general features of different shapers were theoriscd. That is, 
while the leaders lacked the qualities to guide the process to a success, the support to 
the process was inconsistent and inappropriate. The bureaucracy, as an institution, 
was resistant and opposed. The donors were supportive in general, but ovcr timc 
their role changed. Similarly, the media changed from being passive to activc, and 
civil society was not well developed and remained passive in die reform process. 
Exploring the above generalisations gave rise to an array of factors surrounding each 
of the shapers. For example, while the technocrat leader could not harness support, 
the civil bureaucrat ran the process in a bureaucratic way that was not conducive to 
introducing reforms. Similarly, the support to the initiatives either dwindled or was 
incoherent and ill-focused. The donors, who inculcated the reform ideas, fatigued 
over time. Initially, they competed and actively worked for different initiatives, but 
ended up in following suit, instead of actively guiding and assisting technically for 
shaping the reforms. Civil society including the media was not developed and thosc 
at the centre made no structured effort to broaden the stakeholder's base. 
Overall, after studying the role of different shapers in the policy proccss. flirce 
conclusions are reached: (i) it was mainly bureaucracy and political cxccutivcs who 
were involved in the policy process; (ii) the donors fatigucd administrativcly, failing 
to argue on issues and their colleagues in the govcmmcnt overwhelmed tlicni; and 
(iii) given the shapers are spread throughout in the health scctor, thcre was a narrow 
stakeholder's base, and the process for involving them was not cfficicnt. 
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6.4. Context analysis 
In the preceding section it was examined how different shapcrs contributed to die 
outcome of the policy process. This section looks at how did die context analysis 
influence events? That is, the concern is to examine the nature of 'context' and to 
consider how to analyse it as part of a health policy process. Dcwdncy (1987) divides 
health policy into two major areas: (i) health issues proper; and (ii) the machinery for 
coping with the health issues. While the latter is taken up next, this section is concerned 
with the 'health issues proper'. According to the framework for this study, this 
concerns the 'context', and in the following paragraphs I examine how the inadequate 
analysis of context influenced the policy process? 
Findings from case studies 
The case studies in chapter 5, drawing from various sources, presented the contextual 
factors that were the raison detre for different initiatives. Here, firstly these factors, as 
perceived by research participants, are clustered according to their association %ýrith 
different components of the health sector (6.4.1.1). Secondly, evidence is brought from 
documents for determining to what extent the context was analysed in actual practice 
(6.4.1.2). In this regard, it may be questioned that all contextual factors may, but may 
not be documented due to being, for example, politically sensitive. I lowevcr, it is 
argued that such factors are accounted for in the participants' responses. 
6.4.1.1. Participants' perspective of the context 
Using his judgment this researcher marked the contextual factors in table 6.6 as '+', if 
identified by the respondents contributing to instituting a particular r6orni. Similarly, if 
for a health sector component no contextual factor was identified, it is keyed as '-'. 
Additionally, the context was explored in terms of the severity of different factors 
and likewise the response of participants was clustered and keyed in the table 6.6. It 
may be noted that different variables in the horizontal column of table, plotted 
against the four initiatives in the vertical column, are drawn from the framework 
employed for context analysis (3.3.3). 
Table 6.6: - Factors preceding the reform initiatives 
Internal environment External 
environment 
Gravity 
of 
Governance Providers Communities Support 
services 
Resource 
generators 
National 
systents 
flegetuo"Ic 
syMents 
Situation 
SPP + + + + + + + 
DIIA + + + + + + + 
[A + + + + + + + + 
DIIG + + + + + + + +. 
Key: Contextual factor identified: -W Contextual factor not idcritilied: - I-' 
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Table 6.6 reveals that: 
1. Respondents perceived that there were issues at all levels of policy context, i. e. all thrcc 
layers of the environment for different initiatives; and 
2. A mixed situation emerged regarding the perception of die respoildcrits about the 
gravity of the situation confronting the Punjab health sector. 
Substantiating above findings, the chief minister observed, die working of die health 
system, on the whole, was so bad that any intervention would not make it worse, but in 
his view, would improve it. One of his Aides noted: 
Some people suggested to him (chiefminister) that Sir don't tinker with 
the system, because ifyou would the system would become worse. He 
said, 'the system has become so bad that any tinkering would not make 
itfurther worse and if anything perhaps it will improve it. So we must 
tinker with the system. 
In a similar tone, another respondent told this researcher that not only licalth but also 
other national systems, including the political system were in disarray: 
All our systems are broken, and this situation prevails since 1988... 
there has been mismanagement. The Members of Provincial and 
National Assemblies andpolitical parties were pushing and getting the 
transfers and postings (people of their choice) - thus the whole thing 
broke. Such a situation prevailed not only in the health department, but 
also in every government department... 
However, to what extent the. above situation was taken into account and that a 
comprehensive context analysis was undertaken in developing policy, the evidence is 
sought from the review of the documents and is presented below: 
6.4.1.2. Documentary evidence of context analysis 
Table 6.6 above reveals that the respondents viewed factors in all components of the 
health sector. This demanded a review of the entire sector, while analysing the context. 
However, in actual practice, inadequate attention was given to establishing the policy 
context for the Punjab health sector reforms. While this is a hypothesis, how was the 
context established for the interventions? To answer this question, findings related to 
the launching of an in-depth study of the situation for determining die context and tile 
documentation produced about the selected initiatives arc clustered and presented in 
table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: - Means and evidence of context analysis 
In-depth study/situational analysis Documentation 
SPP Baseline survey, discussions in the ad A project document with detailed activity plan and 
hoc committees and bureaucratic financial layout. In addition, a series of documents 
hierarchical decision making including consultancy reports were created during 
the life of project. 
DHA Consultancies, discussions in the ad An (3-page) administrative order provides a 
hoc committees and bureaucratic constitution and a range of functions without any 
hierarchical decision making guideline. In addition, a number of consultancy 
reports were generated both prior to launching the 
initiative and during its implementation. 
IA Brainstorming in the ad hoc Two documents - an (2-pagc) Act and a (4-page) 
committees and bureaucratic Contract, laying down what is expected, but not 
hierarchical decision making how to do it. 
DHG Baseline survey, brainstorming in the In addition to a concept paper, two documents - an 
ad hoc committees and bureaucratic (2-page) Act of assembly and the (2-page) 
hierarchical decision making preliminary rules 
Table 6.7 indicates that: 
1. In the case of the SPP and DHG a baseline survey was conducted, while in the case of 
the DHA, expatriate consultants undertook a number of consultancics. Otherwise, in all 
cases, prior to launching, only discussions were field in the ad-hoc conimittccs and 
decisions were taken in a bureaucratic hierarchical channel. 
2. A number of documents were generated during the life of the initiatives, but overall 
different reforms were not rich in this respect. This researcher could not find much 
documentation on the background and about various phases of the policy process. 
6.4.2. Factors related to the context analysis 
From the above findings, drawn from the participants and the documentary cvidcncc 
for context analysis, it is assumed that: (i) a non-holistic analysis of context was 
made; (ii) non-holistic view of context led to more problems; and (iii) critical 
situation alone did not serve a window of opportunity for introducing rcforms. In the 
following, I discuss these assumptions: 
6.4.2.1. A non-holistic analysis of (lie context 1vas Inatle 
A point is made in the findings above ifliat discussions were held in the ail hoc 
committee, but the focus in these deliberations rernaincd mainly on the issues 
surrounding governance, resource generators and scrvice delivery options. The role 
of the communities, the support services and the influence of other national and 
international hegemonic systems were ignored. While this gcncralisation is validatcd 
from the document review, the comments of an cx-ministcr for licalth arc relevant. 
He cmphasised that unless some time is spent with the comnion man taking into 
account his needs and suggestions, the outcome of policymaking cannot be perfect: 
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As far as the reforms that have taken place in the recent past, I don't 
have reason to doubt the honesty, intention and motive of the 
originators. However, if I have any objection rather reservation is that 
while formulating those policies, what we political workers say is that 
ground realities were not kept in view. 77ial is, unfortunately, when we 
formulate policies, even while our party was in power and I was the 
ministerfor health this exercise was done in Islamabad (capital city, 
remote from the context). ... So, when policies are made in this 
manner, these cannot be accepted as perfect or even closer to being 
perfectfor delivering healthcare to a common man. 
Further, the document review suggests that during the life of tile initiatives a number 
of documents were generated. But these were only bits and pieces. This researcher 
could not locate and access any document in die Health Ministry at any level - 
federal, provincial, regional, district or below, which describes the health system 
(for a particular level) in its entirety. Furthermore, the ones which "N-crc available 
were not comprehensive. For example, as seen in table-6.7, to establish a benchmark 
situation of the district health system a baseline survey was conducted in the case of 
the SPP and DHG. However, if the survey report is analysed using the framework 
for the health sector (1.2.2), this did not address all components, specifically tile 
resource generators, the national and international systems were ignored. 
Similarly, for DHAs, expatriate consultants undertook a number of consultancies, but 
the documents so produced lacked comprehensiveness. Review of these documents 
reveal that mainly these were concerned with the issues surrounding governance, 
service delivery, communities and national systems, while resource generation, support 
systems and the international hegemonic systems were omitted. Why did this happen? 
As noted above, given that no comprehensive document about the health system 
existed for the consultants to base their understanding on, they faltered in dicir 
recommendations. An academician and author of a book on health services in Punjab, 
while indicating this shortcoming, noted the importance of a holistic view of the 
context. He told this researcher: 
... the expatriate consultants do not know the situation, and yet they 
analyse it and even offer recommendations for improvement. ... you have to target issues in their holistic context and not in a piecemeal 
fashion, making an isolated effort. 
Thus, from the evidence presented, although the problems were identified and analysis 
done, this was only a part of the situation, failing to holistically view the health sector. 
This shortcoming, it is argued, led to policy not only failing in addressing the issucs, 
but also giving rise to more problcms. Mis hypothesis is explored in tile ensuing pages. 
-187- 
6.4.2.2. Non-holistic viciv of the context led to more 
problems 
In the case of the Punjab, as noted in table 6.7, the inadequate context analysis led to 
instituting poorly designed reforms. For example, the secretary health, N%, Iicn asked 
about the reason for switching over to DIIG, told this researcher that this was due to 
the DHA initiative not addressing the issues it was aimed at. In his words: 
We changedfrom DIL4s to DHG because we thought that the amount 
of legal support that was available to DIM was very limited It was 
still an appendage to the Health Department. We wanted to devolve all 
powers for decision-making to the district itself. But, it was not 
possible within the existing legalframework and the (new) legislation 
gave us the powers ... however, these changes were not possible within 
the scope ofDHAs... 
Since this study did not envisage undertaking evaluation, there is no empirical evidence 
to indicate the impact of reforms arising from a policy process widi a non-holistic view 
of the context on the overall health sector. But, this can be inferred from similar 
situation during the earlier developments in the health sector. For example, a former 
planning cMef, Government of Pakistan, explained that because die situational 
analysis, i. e. the working paper or project documents prepared in die public sector, did 
not adequately investigate the existing capacity and failed to foresee die cxpansion 
needs in the other sub systems vis-a-vis those envisaged for die service delivery 
component, the balance or equilibrium of the system was disturbed: 
During the 1980s, emphasis was on infrastructure (service delivery) 
development The concurrent inputs needed for developing 
management, support, and resource developmentgencrating systems 
were minimal. This skewed development, more in favour of bricks and 
mortar, created governance problems for the expanding health system. 
Consequently, the health system remained technically weak and the 
health managers and decision-makers had to mainly rely oil the advice 
of the technical agencies and donors. 
Similarly, a senior manager in the Health Department commentcd: 
One thing is obvious that, until 1980, we did not have any big problem 
in terms of health services. Our health outlets were providing services 
with which people were satisfied When, however, the services 
expanded, the bureaucracy did not visualise the commensurate 
expansion in the supervisory capacity of the systeni. For example, 
before the 1980s the DIIO supervised about 10- 15 healthfacilitles ill a 
district Now these have expanded to over 100, whereas the financial 
and administrative powers and the resources of the D110 office 
remained the same. This resulted in the systern, which was providing 
services, crumbling. 
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Another manifestation of the skewed developments was the creation of a nunibcr of 
vertical programmes within the health sector, wl-dch a planner in thc Punjab 11calth 
Department noted, causing fragmentation of die health services, cspccially in districts. 
In his view, this situation was a reason for the government to again embark upon 
reforms in the 1990s. Ham (1997: 135) noted similar phenomena in the case of fivc 
developed countries, where it was primarily economic concerns that underlay dic 
reform efforts made cyclically over time (see 2.2.5). 
Thus, it is seen that a reform initiative designed and based on a non-holistic analysis of 
context led to the same issue presenting in a different manncr and the refornicr also 
prescribed a similar reform in a different wrapping. In the Punjab, as gathered from the 
evidence presented above, whereas certain components of the health sector wcrc 
overlooked, the impact of other national and intemational. systems was not taken into 
account in analysing the context. lberefore, it is noted that while the issues persistcd, 
different reforms with a common strategy were introduced in succession. 
6.4.2.3. Critical situation alone did not serve a window of 
opportunity for introducing reform 
Determining the gravity of the situation is another aspect of die context analysis, 
because, as noted earlier (3.3.3), crisis serves as a weapon in die hands of interest 
groups. In the case of the Punjab health sector, however, the critical situation alone did 
not serve as a window of opportunity for introducing reforms; someone charged widi 
action was also needed. In the following, I discuss this hypothesis, first by determining 
the nature of the situation and then how this opportunity NN-as used to introduce reforms. 
A mixed situation emerged about the nature of the situation in the case of die Punjab, 
given the response of participants (Table 6.6). Many thought that it %N-as business as 
usual and there was no crisis. But, a strong rcalisation existed that if the prevailing 
deterioration continued unabated the health system would soon collapse. Oil the other 
hand, others thought that the government had for sonictime been doing "crisis 
management'. TIiis variation in the perception of the situation held by respondents is 
due to the degeneration in the health system which was gradual spreading o%-cr many 
years past. Therefore, it is argued, people became acclimatiscd and took it as die norm. 
Furthermore, what is regarded as critical and most important is a niattcr of opinion and 
subjectivity, which may vary from individual to individual. 
However, despite the critical situation, either an initiativc was launclicd but forgottvi, 
or it was launched only when someone proactivc supportcd the movc. To cxcinplify 
this, the SPP was launched without political support, but %kms forgottm. '111C 
establislunent of DIIAs was considered technically desirabic, but gimi the thm 
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wavering political feasibility, its implementation was deferred (DGIIS, 1996a) till a 
particular politician took over the office of the chief minister. I'liat is, although it is 
maintained that an opportunity for intervention ariscs when a longstanding problem is 
perceived and a solution to address the same is evolved (Paul-Slialicen, 1998), in the 
Punjab the bureaucrats were alive to the necessity, but could not inipleniclit die 
initiative until a politician willing to support it came on the scene. 
The above situation indicates another dimension to the debate. Various %,, Titcrs on 
policy term its making predominantly as a political process (Hill, 1997; Walt, 1994; 
Reich, 1995; and Barker, 1996). However for this study, views held by Barker are 
subscribed to. According to her, while undertaking policy analysis, one must take into 
account the broader context of the health system and die political context beyond that. 
In other words, policyrnaking, as Lee and Mills (1982: 31-32) argue, is concerned with 
'political feasibility' as well as 'technical desirability'. That is, %N, Iicdicr the political 
environment was conducive and that the bureaucracy was also willing. The latter is 
dealt with elsewhere (6.3.2.3). Regarding the former, it was not the political party in 
power determining feasibility; instead it was a particular politician who mattered. 
Otherwise, this researcher noted that despite the same political party in power, i. c. 
the Pakistan Muslim League, in the Baluchistan province, where a similar situation 
existed, no structural reforms were introduced. 
Thus, it is argued that in the Punjab health sector, die issues were there and according 
to a project officer, the urge to decentralise had been simmering for a long time. 
Further, the document review suggests that the donors were also around, but then came 
a political will and a proactive chief minister. This changed the scenario and several 
reforms were introduced. T'hus, it is concluded that although die situation in flic Punjab 
health sector was critical, it needed someone (chief minister) to rcact. I'lic critical 
situation on its own did not serve as a window for introducing rcfomis. 
6.4.3. Summary and conclusion 
This section examined the role of context analysis in the policy process. It %vas seen 
that a comprehensive analysis of context is possible when tile analyst places himself ill 
relation to the health system. Given that the context of health rcforrns has three layers: 
the health sector, the national and international hcgcmonic systems, for tile holistic 
view of the context it is essential to examine all these three layers one by one. 
However, t1iis study rcvcalcd that in die case of die Punjab, a non-liolistic view ofthe 
context was takcn in conccptualising and formulating reforms. But, this shortcoming 
extcnds to the literature as well. Several authors did not take into account the health 
sector per se in its entirety while discussing die context or offering a rcfonii package 
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(2.2.4). Another dimension of the context analysis is the relative scvcrity of die 
contextual factors. It was found that the critical situation alone did not serve as a 
window of opportunity; some agent was needed to introduce rcfomis. 
In conclusion, the overarching factor in relation to thc policy context was that a non- 
holistic view of the situation influenced the reform process in die Punjab health sector. 
That is, what is needed more is whether the policymakcrs know die health system in 
both its depth and breadth? This question, however, hinges on considering the cxtcnial 
environment and the national and international hegernonic systems operating out there. 
But, the policyrnakers in the Punjab hardly exhibited such characteristics. 
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6.5. Contents of policy 
In the last section, I discussed policy context and how its analysis influenced the 
policy process. This section is about policy contents or set of decisions forming the 
body of a policy. The contents are aimed at transforming the contextual grounds to 
the desired future, including the identification of the means to achieve that future. 
But, it is also important to consider that the nature of policy contents hinge on the 
performance of the 'machine' that conducted the policy process, because the 
strengths and weaknesses of the latter are reflected in the former. Therefore, in the 
following both policy contents and policy machine are examined focusing on the 
influence of the latter on the former. However, I start with policy per se. 
Findings from case studies 
The policy contents denote the design of policy per se and the preparedness or 
securing an environment conducive to implementing the policy. In the case of the 
Punjab, the design was not robust, i. e. (i) the policy design was not comprehensive; 
and (ii) to implement policy, inadequate arrangements were made. In the following 
discussion these hypotheses are tested from the evidence brought from the cases. 
6.5.1.1. Policy design 
Four inter-related policy levels (systemic, programmatic, organisational and 
instrumental) were identified (2.4.1.4) and it was argued that comprehensive reform 
must contemplate all these levels. Yet, a specific initiative may begin at any of these 
levels and subsequently grow to extend to the others (Frenk, 1994). The policy, 
according to Webb and Wistow (1986), may be communicated to implementers 
through government circulars, orders, plans etc. Furthermore, a policy document 
may identify: (i) the services to be made available and the possible impact to be 
achieved; (ii) inputs in terms of resources to be devoted to the intervention; and (iii) 
the guiding philosophy i. e. the ideology and values that underpin the policy (ibid. 
91). Whereas the last one has already been discussed (6.2), the former two arc 
discussed here. That is focusing on the first component of the Webb and Wistow 
model, if the policy documents for the initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health 
sector are judged for their comprehensiveness, the results from case studies can be 
clustered and tabulated as below: 
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Table 6.8: - Design of the reform initiatives 
The policy contents Comprehensiveness 
SPP A project document with a detailed activity Looking forward to developing and testing a 
plan and financial layout. There is a series of comprehensive model of Primary Health 
documents reviewing the background and Care for Rural Areas. There were legitimate 
progress on various project components. powers, but environment was non-conducive. 
DHA An (3-page) administrative order providing Envisaged a comprehensive reform package, 
constitution and a range of functions for the outlining a decentralised district health 
new bodies, but without any approved system including secondary and primary 
guidelines and action plan. There is a series health care, but had no legitimate powers to 
of documents generated by consultants. implement different activities. 
1A Two documents - an (2-page) Act of the Envisaged a comprehensive reform package 
Provincial Assembly and a (4-page) Contract at the tertiary care level, backed by legitimate 
document for the Institutional CEs, laying powers to implement the same. However, the 
down what is expected, but not how to do absence of rules led to problems in reaIising 
that. Many transparencies and presentations. these objectives. 
DHG In addition to the innumerable transparencies Envisaged a comprehensive reform package 
and presentations, there are three documents at the secondary and primary care levels, 
- (2-page) Act of the Provincial Assembly; backed by legitimate powers to implement 
(2-page) preliminary rules; and an the same. However, the new government 
incomplete concept paper that explains the abandoned the initiative in favour of district 
initiative. Also a district baseline survey government that involved devolution of all 
I report produced by consultants is available. government functions including health. 
Table 6.8 indicates that: 
1. There were two categories of initiatives in terms of documentation. Firstly, tile SPP and 
DHAs were relatively well documented, and there is a series of documents regarding 
both the background and progress on different components. Secondly, tile IA and DIJG 
had relatively fewer documents, albeit innumerable transparencies and presentations 
were found. But, there is no comprehensive document providing the background and 
activity plan for these initiatives. 
2. All initiatives envisaged comprehensiveness, albeit, within a particular component of 
the health system. However, given their focus, the initiatives were of three types: (i) the 
SPP aimed at developing a comprehensive package of primary health care, (ii) the DIIA 
and DHG visualised a decentralised district health system, and (iii) tile IA aimed at 
granting autonomy to tertiary care hospitals. 
3. All these initiatives, except DHAs, were granted legitimate powers. However, either a 
conducive environment was not created (e. g. SPP) or inadequate arrangements were 
made resulting in the under-utilisation (notably IA) of available authority and resources. 
Thus, as seen from table 6.8, the reform initiatives were aimed at establishing either 
a decentralised institutional or district health system. Therefore, these interventions 
were potentially structural in nature and were at a systemic level that also could have 
implications for other policy levels (Gonzalez-Block, 1997). However, since the 
overall design of the reform was not complete and that too poorly documented, it is 
difficult to identify the policy levels addressed by a particular initiative. 
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6.5.1.2. Preparatory arrangements 
This aspect of analysis is about the second component of Webb and Wistow's model 
that deals with the state of preparedness for implementing the policy. Drawing on 
the variables derived from the framework for the health sector (1.2.2), focusing on 
governance, resource generators and support services, findings from different case 
studies are clustered in table 6.9. It should be noted that service providers and 
communities - the other components of the health system - were the target of these 
reforms. Hence these components had no role in preparedness except the 
communication strategy that is discussed under support services. 
Table 6.9: - State of preparedness for launching the initiatives 
Variables SPP DHA 1A WIG 
Governance Financial Government No legitimate Interim Interim 
systems rules powers financial rules financial rules 
Administrative Government No legitimate Interim rules Interim rules 
rules powers 
Legal Government No legitimate Not defined Not defined 
rules powers 
Resource Financial Adequate, Philanthropic User charges User charges - 
generators from and informal and locally a corporate 
govemment means enerated. model 
Human Adequate, Adequate, Inadequate Inadequate 
Resource from donor's from donor 
assistance assistance 
Support Communication Informal Informal Informal Informal 
services Informationl Yes - as part Informal, Inefficient Inefficient 
Monitoring of the project existing third party third party 
plan hierarchy monitoringa monitoring 
For the individual variables, the following situation is noted from table 6.9: - 
Governance has three elements: financial, administrative and legal. Tile administrative 
systems are concerned with human resource management, institutional record and 
organisational plans. Such systems form the hub of the organisation. For undertaking SPP 
government rules and procedures were followed, but there is progress over time so that 
DHG was seen as a corporate model eligible to outsource and undergo performance bascd 
contracts with various service providers. DHA, in this scenario, was a transitional stage - 
the government procedures were followed in transacting official business, but this body 
could advise and facilitate the execution of its decisions. The IA was a step forward, and a 
fully authorised IMC was instituted. However, the needed legal systems were not 
adequately worked out for using the authority available to the system. 
There is a mixed picture regarding mechanisms for resource generation and human resource 
develol2men . The SPP had adequate resources from tile government and donors, and also an in built system for human resource development was put in place. For DIIAs thcre was 
adequate technical assistance, but for financial resources it was dependent oil philanthropic 
contributions or certain ad-hoc arrangements. However, in the case of TA and DIIG, there is 
a clear move towards self-sufficiency. In addition to the regular government grant, 
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institutions were authorised to levy user charges and use die income so generated on their 
own. But, non-framing of rules hindered effective utilisation of these funds; and there was 
no system for human resource development. 
Regarding support services, communication and information systems have been studied. 
The communication was informal and no strategy was formally developed to consult and 
involve the stakeholders and for the public dissemination of the initiative. However, 
developments are seen in respect of the information and monitoring system. The SPP had 
these systems, as part of its plan, while for DHA it was informal monitoring - there were 
neither indicators nor any information system. In the case of IA and DHG the law provides 
instituting a regular third party evaluation, but this was not properly conducted. 
Thus from table 6.9 a mixed picture of preparedness emerges, but on the whole, the 
preparatory arrangements made for implementing the policy were not robust. Not 
only the governance systems, but also the support and resource generation systems 
were not well developed. Further, it was noted that the overall design for policy was 
not complete (6.5.1.1). Why was this so? This question is the central point for this 
section, as this takes us to a ftirther depth of analysis. To answer, as indicated in the 
beginning of this section, this was due to the factors infesting the machine 
responsible for designing policy. In the following paragraphs, this assumption is 
discussed in detail, but the policy machine is introduced first. 
6.5.1.3. Policy machine 
a 
The 'policy machine', for the purpose of this thesis, is the organisational framework 
within which the policy for the health sector refonn. was formulated. This machine is 
comparable to Easton's "black box", where different state institutions come together 
for policyrnaking. However, it is called so metaphorically deriving from the 
commonly used "government's machinery" which processed the policy contents for 
the Punjab health sector reforms. But, there is a caveat. First, the operations 
performed by this machine may not be taken as mechanical. It is emphasised that 
this study examines the health sector reform as a social phenomenon, and the 
stakeholders and their relationships and the overall performance and the outcome or 
the policy contents are considered accordingly. Second, the policy machine may 
sound equivalent to bureaucracy, but it is not - the latter is a part of the former. The 
bureaucracy was discussed as a shaper, acting as one of the stakeholders of the 
policy process (6.3.2.3). The policy machine is a decision-making system, where all 
shapers including bureaucracy come together for designing a policy. 
6.5.2. Factors associated with the policy contents 
What were the factors associated with the policy contents? To answer this question, 
it is observed that: (i) there is a skewed understanding of the concept of policy 
analysis; (ii) there is a weak institutional arrangement for policy analysis; (iii) there 
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is an ad-hoc mechanism for consultation; and (iv) political arrogance is essential for 
facilitating the reforms. These hypotheses are discussed below: 
6.5.2.1. Skewed understanding of the concept of policy 
analysis 
In chapter 2 the concept of policy analysis was introduced (2.4.2). It was noted that 
especially in the health sector this concept has not received the importance it 
deserved. In the case of the Punjab, the situation was no different, i. e. various 
echelons in the hierarchy had varying and skewed understanding of the concepts of 
policy analysis. For example, I referred to Lipsky's (1980) idea of 'street level 
bureaucracy', i. e. those that are in active contact with the clients. In his view, these 
individual civil servants contribute to policymaking (3.3.5). Contrarily, however, in 
the Punjab, a top trainer of the civil servants, when asked about the role of the civil 
servants in policymaking, told this researcher: 
Policymaking comes much later in the service of a civil servant. You 
cannot impart this type of training at this level. ... Such 
decisions are 
taken at a much higher level i. e. ministerial, and it is always the 
cabinet under the chief minister or the governor that decides on the 
policy issues. 
Barker (1996: 4) would also receive the same answer from her students. But, 
according to her "the day of passive administration seem to be numbered" and "in 
many ways policyrnaking is the stuff of good management, and characterises the 
manager, a proactive, strategic thinker, over and above the administrator, a servant 
of the policies elaborated by others". This message, however, seemed to have been 
taken in the Pakistani context. That is, when a top generalist civil servant of the 
country was asked about the training opportunities for civil servants on policy 
development, he replied that because such facilities have so far been deficient, the 
arrangements were being made for this purpose. 
In other words, a difference of understanding existed about the role of civil servants 
in policyrnaking and the need for their training within the top echelons of those 
responsible for organising and imparting training. But the state of affairs became 
more confiising when the political boss in the provincial health sector termed this 
question as "funny". He saw no need for such an exercise, because in his view: 
Framing policy is the result of a conglomeration of the intellect and 
other faculties of a human being that develop over time. There is no 
mathematical way of achieving thatfaculty. There could be schools of 
drama, music, and medicine, hut not that of how policy is made. Can 
you teach the king how to make policies? This is his job and he learns 
it through experience. The great leaders of the world have never been 
trained in policymaking. This is the ultimatefaculty of the human mind 
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that is gained by gaining and imbibing experience. You cannot leach 
them how to make policies. 
Tbus, it is seen that in the Punjab there was a skewed understanding of the policy 
analysis held by different parts of the policy machine. Also the apparatus needed for 
building the policy skills of civil servants did not exist. Such a structure is important 
for the civil bureaucrats, both upon induction and refreshers, especially for the 
generalists who move, quite frequently, from one department to the other. Dror 
(1968: 246-59) argued that the quality of personnel determines the quality of 
policymaking. In his view, to achieve this aim the policyrnakers, need to be equipped 
with good education in policy knowledge. However, in the Punjab the situation was 
compounded, because there was no institution for undertaking policy research, 
which could advise the policymakers and contribute to policy development. 
6.5.2.2. Weak institutional arrangement for policy analysis 
The policy machine was drawn primarily from the top echelons in the governance 
component of health system, which networked mainly with Departments of Finance, 
Planning and Development, Law and Services and General Administration. 
Representatives from these provincial departments, appointed part-time on various 
ad-hoc committees, often steered by the chief minister or minister for health, would 
discuss issues relating to the reforms. But, as inferred from the response of a senior 
bureaucrat, there was a core group occupying the governance positions in the Health 
Department, which took part in the policy process: 
We formed a nucleus group of 4-5 people within the Health 
Department, whereforward-looking people were assembled as a team. 
This core group, which was to initiate and then submit their products 
to the government that means the chief minister who was taking 
interest himself and through him we established structures for the 
larger and broader consultation within the health sector itself and 
outside the sector. 
The above arrangement indicates that the policy machine operated at two levels. First, 
in a smaller group an idea was formulated and sold to the chief minister, and once 
espoused then in the second stage other stakeholders were involved. However, given 
the administrative milieu in the Punjab, the second level hardly operated. That is, the 
process would go unhindered in the meetings, because the chief minister wanted the 
issues discussed and decided for action in the meeting called for the purpose. As a 
politician remarked, he was enthusiastic in bringing change, and was more of a dictator 
than a democratic leader (6.3.2.2). Also, the comments of a technocrat are noteworthy: 
There might have been some meetings ofsome experts, but you know 
there has never been a question ofany dissent in such meetings, and 
especially at such a time when there was a very powerful and arrogant 
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chief minister supporting this idea (reforms). You can well imagine the 
response of the hureaucracy and our experts. 
However, after such meetings there would be a backlash. The bureaucrats tuned to 
making decisions in the hierarchy would seldom agree with such a mechanism. 
Explaining this phenomenon, the executive director of Special Projects commented: 
... It is the bureaucratic culture, which led to this thinking. The Finance Department was perhaps thinking by the analqy of PC- 
](Planning document) that after approval by a development forum 
(provincial or national) of which they are part, they would again do its 
post-mortem. Such an attitude was unacceptable to the political 
leadership, who askedfor the decisions there and then... 
Thus the hegemony of the above group, which had designed the idea and sold it to 
the chief minister, prevailed. Further, this group operated parallel to those formally 
envisaged in the SFHP documents, e. g. the Project Steering Committee and the 
Technical Committee. The former was meant to foster intersectoral collaboration to 
bring relevant government departments on board facilitating project implementation. 
Similarly, the Technical Committee was to deal with matters concerning reforms 
and related issues (GoPb, 1993). However, in the words of a donor representative, 
this forum was reduced to almost a nonentity. 
The Technical Committee was notfunctioning in this respect, and in 
my time was merely used as a forum for choosing master candidates 
for training ahroad... and commenting on the choice of short-term 
international experts. 
In other words, the above referred group that was informal in nature (because, it was 
never formally recognised with specific ternis of reference) took over the functions 
of the formally constituted group. On this situation, a senior politician commented, 
66people on the group worked on different assignments at a time ... including the 
purchase of equipment through the donor agencies ... (the result, in his view) was a 
mumble jumble". Further, this group was impermeable and difficult to access by 
other stakeholders. Several authorities are given in case studies, but remarks of an 
expatriate consultant are pertinent at this point: "when life got difflicult there, I just 
went to the secretary health for approval". This donor representative was part of the 
international hegemonic system and on the Technical Committee of the project. 
6.5.2.3. Ad hoc mechanism for involving the stakeholders 
There was a narrow stakeholder's base due to the ad hoc mechanism for involving 
them in the policy process. The stakeholders can be individuals or groups of people, 
organised or unorganised who are affected by, or can affect and influence, a decision 
or action (Dick, 1997). The stakeholder analysis is needed as part of Ole decision- 
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making process to know who the stakeholders are, and how they are likely to be 
affected, in case the system was reformed. This exercise is also helpful in planning 
strategies for approaching various groups and individuals in order to gain their 
support or alleviate their opposition (ODA, 1995). 
In the Pun ab, however, there was no formal mechanism for identifying the 
stakeholders at any level of decision-making. There is no evidence that any available 
tool such as 'stakeholder analysis' was employed while undertaking any initiative. 
Instead, participants for different committees were selected informally on an ad hoc 
basis. In this regard, a chief executive of an autonomous institute told this researcher 
that "... every time there would be different people in the meetings and this was not 
a standing group". Therefore, it is argued, this shortcoming affected the way the 
policy process was undertaken - especially, because a particular group (6.5.2.2) 
dominated the policy process, excluding many stakeholders and alienating others. 
For example, when this researcher asked about the government's process for 
policyrnaking, a senior technocrat commented: 
In my view i(put in one sentence, this process was agency directed and 
most secretive. In this process the stakeholders whether the consumer 
who in our meaning is the patient in a village or the top-level manager 
whether in service or retired, none of them were involved All of them 
wereignored 
Similarly, another technocrat commented about the level of consultation and the 
involvement of stakeholders in the policy process for the reforms, that: ' 
All documentation and planning whatsoever were done by few people 
and never saw the light ofthe day and remained within the close circle. 
It was never made public to the stakeholders. I mean if you ask (34) 
DHOs and (34) medical superintendents, and (8) DHSs, you will be 
surprised to know that none of them was ever involved in these 
activities. Resultantly, hostilities and a sort of antagonism remained in 
the managers andfieldworkers ... 
6.5.2.4. Political arrogance is essential for the success 
Despite the shortcomings in the policy process as described above, a stream of 
changes is seen happening in the Punjab health sector during the 1990s. Several 
respondents subscribed to this observation. That is, the SPP visualised devolution of 
a district health system within the government's control, but gave way to the semi- 
autonomous structure of DHAs. Then, autonomy was granted to the institutions, and 
a DHG reform was initiated to run a functionally deconcentrated district health 
system in a corporate manner. Contrarily, however, the top bureaucrat in the Punjab 
government described the outcome of the reform process as 'neither fish nor fowl'. 
That is, as discussed earlier (6.3.2.1; 6.3.2.3), bureaucracy behaved in this manner 
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while working for decentralising powers under different reforms. However, to 
qualify his observation, I examine the policy process for the Punjab health sector 
reform in a framework suggested by Dunleavy (1995). According to him, five 
factors contribute to generating the policy disaster. In table 6.10, the Punjab 
situation is contrasted against these factors. 
Table 6.10: - Characteristics of the policy process in Punjab 
Dunleavy Factors Punjab situation 
Scale Apart from SPP, there is adequate evidence to suggest this factor was 
aggregation operating in the Punjab scene. There was a tendency to go in a 'big way' - 
even the piloting of DHG in ten (or 30% of) districts 
Overly speedy This was the most obvious phenomenon associated with the policy process in 
legislation and the Punjab. The majority of respondents cited this fact. The Bill was passed by 
policy process the Provincial Assembly after two day's discussion in which only a few 
legislators participated. 
Political hyper- This factor was most pronounced. The DHG, for example, was started in 
activism disregard of the political manifesto, which promised the DHAs. The chief 
minister was hyperactive and also arrogant -a factor that also surmounted the 
bureaucratic arrogance. 
Arrogance of The civil service in the Punjab is generally arrogant, but also behaved 
bureaucracy subordinate in the hierarchy. The generalists commanded the technocrats, but 
were often careful with the political bureaucracy, especially the chief minister. 
Ineffective checks This factor was a quite obvious shortcoming - some reforms forgotten, others 
and balances abandoned, often overlapped each other, some survived and yet there was no 
accountability of the core executives. 
From table 6.10, one may conclude that the policy process for different reforms in the 
Punjab health sector was a 'disaster'. However, the question arises, why were there 
some successes? Not only did successive reforms evolve in their concepts and contents, 
but also some survived even though the government changed. The answer to this 
question lies in revisiting the above table. It is seen that the political arrogance 
surmounted the bureaucracy, which worked for the reforms, although often dragging 
its feet. In this context, the chief minister told this researcher: 
They (bureaucrats) were not very cooperative. But, with stick; I got it 
done from them. When they came to know that I meant business, they 
started working. They would otherwise obstruct. But, I had to he hard 
on them. 
Thus, although the policy machine in the Punjab had several deficiencies, some 
successes were registered. It was due, it is argued, to the political arrogance 
overpowering that of the bureaucracy. Otherwise, the policy machine in the Punjab 
health sector not only needed an overhaul in terms of creating an environment for 
policy analysis, but also some additional parts, especially a policy research unit, 
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were required. Akin to this structure a Health Sector Reform Resource Centre was 
suggested by an expatriate consultant, but the policymakers in the government did 
not pay heed to the same (Wildman, 1999c). 
6.5.3. Summary and concIusion 
This section was about the contents of reforms in terms of design and the policy 
machine. The former denotes the set of decisions or policy that is the output of the 
process. The latter, on the other hand, is the machine or set of individuals and 
organisations that undertook the process. In this section, in addition to examining the 
contents, the nature and attributes of the policy machine were also studied. 
It was revealed that the design was incomplete and arrangements to implement the 
same were not robust. However, the underlying shortcoming was that the policy 
machine had skewed understanding and the arrangements for policy analysis were 
inadequate. Further no structured efforts were made to broaden the stakeholders' 
base. Nonetheless, political arrogance pushed the process and certain successes were 
therefore also registered. Overall, however, it is argued that in the Punjab the policy 
machine faltered. 
This study established that incomplete design and inadequate implementation 
arrangements stemmed from the shortcoming of the policy machine. It needed not 
only overhauling, but also required installing some additional parts. 
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6.6. Implementation 
In the preceding section I discussed policy contents in terms of policy design and 
policy machine. The design meant the policy and arrangements for its implementation, 
while the policy machine is the organisational arrangement brought together to 
formulate policy. The focus of this section is the implementation of die policy. 
Implementation is a complex and iterative process, and given that the implemcntcrs 
contribute to policy forinulation, it is difficult to draw a boundary between formulation 
and implementation. Nonetheless, following the framework for this study, a distinction 
is made between these two phases of the policy process. Accordingly, die 
implementation phase begins once the policy design and implementation arrangements 
are ready and handed over to the implementers for execution. 
6.63. Findings from case studies 
Implementation is studied from two aspects: the operative feasibility and execution of 
the initiative. The former is about 'implementation strategies' that are sensitive to the 
needs, interests and perspectives of implementers themselves, wl-die the latter concerns 
the 'implementation process' (Webb and Wistow, 1986). In the case of the Punjab, 
however, there was confusion, i. e. implementation of various health sector initiatives 
was not smooth. Based on this generalisation, in the following sections I explore: (i) 
the operative feasibility; and (ii) the execution of different reforms. 
6.6.1.1. Operative feasibility 
Feasibility, according to Walt (1994: 55) refers to 'the potential for implementing 
policy'. In other words, the question is whether the state has the capacity to 
implement a particular policy. This aspect of the policy process was tested by 
enquiring whether the initiative was pre-tested and accordingly strategies were 
adopted for wider implementation. Further, what was the political environment like, 
and the agency brought into place for executing the initiative? To answer such 
questions, the following hypothesis that, in the Punjab poor feasibility rating of 
initiatives marred the policy process is tested. And for this purpose, findings from 
case studies for the variables: technical feasibility; political feasibility; and 
executing agency are clustered and presented in table 6.11. 
-202- 
Table 6.11: - Operative feasibility of initiatives 
Technical feasibility Political feasibility Executing agency 
SPP Given the incremental Initially for a brief period it Management teams at district 
approach to develop a PHC was a politically feasible time, and sub-district level drawn 
model , it was not needed to but later in the implementation 
from health scctor were 
'dry run' the arrangements phase, there was not much visualised. However, thcre is 
for ensuring their adequacy political support available for no evidcnce of these teams 
before full-scale launching the project interventions. having been opcratcd at any 
of the intervention level. 
DHA Phased approach, but Initially a lukewarm political Management structure as 
whereas not much progress support, but later the same DIIA with membership 
was made to expand, pilot of political party was in power, drawn from a range of public 
the initiative was allowed to both in the province and sector departments and 
perish and be superseded by centre backed the initiative - it different sections of civil 
a new one, the DHG. was on its political agenda. society who were honorary. 
IA Phased approach was used, It was a politically feasible Management structure as the 
and a third party evaluation time, the initiative figured on IMCs comprising 2 oflicial 
mechanism invoked to learn, political agenda of the and 5 private members and a 
but was ineffective and political government and the paid chief executive in chair. 
lessons were not fed into the provincial chief minister 
subsequent phases. pushed it. 
DHG Phased approach, to learn It was a politically feasible Management structure, as 
from experience, but was time till its execution, when DMC comprising 2 official 
not executed. So, this aspect the government changed. and 5 private members and a 
cannot be commented on. I paid CE in chair 
The salient findings from the above table are as below: 
I. About testing the operability of initiatives, a mixed situation is observed. Tile SPP 
envisaged an incremental approach, while implementation of other initiatives was 
planned in a phased manner. However, the researcher could not find from the archives 
of the initiatives any protocols or arrangements that were made for such an exercise. 
2. The political feasibility for implementing the initiatives was the main environmental 
factor influencing the policy process. This is revealed that apart from certain hiccups in 
SPP and DHA (initially) politicians were supportive and proactive. However, with the 
change in government, it changed and the TA was kept, while DI IG was scrapped. 
3. In respect of execution a development is noted in the organisational charactcristics of 
the agency for the successive initiatives. There is a gradual shift from the ccntral 
bureaucratic control to a management structure with public-private partnership. That is, 
there is evolution in the concepts and design of initiatives, but evidence suggests that 
the executing agencies remained far from performing adequately. 
6.6.1.2. Execution of reforms 
Execution is not a straightforward process, but according to Backoff (1974) it 
"begins with clarifying and checking on the ideas for logic, consistency and the 
meaning. The ideas may have to be reordered for better understanding and may havc 
to be tested by common sense based on actual administrative cxpcriciicc and 
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behavioural insights". Further, it requires considering: "What steps are involved? 
What kind of institution or structure is required? What kind of skills is assumed'? 
What kind of communication, instruction, forms is needed'? Will attitude need to be 
changed? What is implied for staff training and education? " (ihi(l) Willie some of' 
these issues have been dealt with elsewhere (6.5.1.2) it is argued that in the Pull . lab different initiatives were inefficiently executed. Whereas this gencralisation is 
supported by the argument that the executing agency remained Car 1roni being idcal, 
findings from the table (placed at Appendix 6.1) verify it further. That is, InfIcri-cd 
from this appendix/table, the following chronology of the execution phase of tile 
reform in the Punjab is identified: 
The Second Family Health Project overarches all the reforms, indicating being the mother 
project. The SPP was launched to test different interventions envisaged under this project. 
However, before its completion another initiative District Health Authority, essentially a 
variant of one of the interventions of SPP, was initiated. While the structure of these new 
bodies was Yet to be properly developed and legallsed, a new concept, DII(i was initiated. 
The IA was launched alongside the DHA. In the end, whereas the SFIlP closed, the IA 
initiative continued, while the remaining were either abandoned or allowed to perish. 
The findings in Appendix 6.1 can also be translated figuratively. Accordin Ig I gly, IiL re 
6.2 presents different reforms on a vertical axis plotted against tile time (ill years) oil 
a horizontal axis. That is, the area covered by different initiatives oil a vertical axis 
depicts the amount of activity under way during the corresponding period oil tile 
horizontal axis. 
Figure 6.2: - Chronological progression of reform process (1992-2000) 
19 
Chronological Progression on Reforms 
Figure 6.2 reveals that: 
SPP was launched almost alongside tile main Second Family licalth Project. When its 
implementation was attaining its peak, the DIIA initiative started taking shape and there is 
almost a proportionate decline in the emphasis oil SIT. I'lic IA Initiative starled almost 
alongside DHAs, while the DlIG began at the expense of the latter. At this lumit. tile Sill' 
attained a plateau followed by a decline indicating its closure, but coillinuity of 11" 
interventions. A similar situation is observed with tile DIIA and D116, which were 
abandoned, but not withdrawn officially. Therefore, tile graph (toes not touch /ero. 
1992 1993 1994 1995 199t, III IýW 1999 
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6.6.2. Factors surrounding the operative feasibility 
From the above findings (6.6.1.1), the factors surrounding the operative feasibility 
are that: (i) technical feasibility was not judged for any initiative; (ii) the successive 
initiatives had increasing political feasibility; and (iii) die executing agency was far 
from ideal. In the following section these factors are discussed at grcatcr length 
6.6.2.1. Technical feasibility was not judged for any of the 
initiatives 
Zwi and Mills (1995) emphasise pilot testing focusing particularly on perception, 
attitude, process, systems and institutions. it is essential to conduct this exercise 
before actually commencing or executing any initiative. I lowcvcr, in the case of the 
Punjab, although it was intended to undertake such an exercise, the policyrnakcrs 
faltered. This notion was seconded by a donor and also from documentary evidence. 
It was noted that in the public sector there is hardly any culture of learning from the 
experience - even, the advice and observations made by different forums were not 
carried over (Collins et al, 2002). 
Nevertheless, organisational learning is not a highlight of the reform 
process. Two important pilot projects have bccn undertaken in the 
Punjab - the Sheikhupura pilot project and the pilot on DIIAs 
established in two districts: Multan and Aclum. Yet the evaluation of 
the Sheikhupura project was incomplete. In the case of the DI IAs pilot, 
before any proper structure of these new bodies had been developed 
and legalised for their legitimacy or powers essential for their 
operation were delegated, a new concept, the DIIG started taking 
place. The pilots were abandoned before the DIIAs were actually 
brought in place and able to develop a change process. 
Similarly, the above findings were also true for the IA initiative. Initially conceived 
as a phased intervention, it was extended to all tertiary care institutions in the 
province without proper evaluation and Icarning of Icssons. To monitor and to 
extend the reform process, as noted earlier (5.5.5.3), the law provides for a quarterly 
Third Party Evaluation (GoPb, 1998a). I lowcvcr, a review of documents shows that 
it was done only once (Anjum Asim Sliallid & Co Lahore, 1999) and that too 
attracted serious objections (GoPb, 2000). Finally, the chicf executives themselves 
reported on their performanCC33. About DIIG. because this initiative could not be 
executed, its evaluation and testing its technical feasibility cannot be nscermincd. 
33 Personally known to this researcher 
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6.6.2.2. Successive initiatives had Increasing political 
feasibility 
Glassman et al (1999) demonstrated that die feasibility of health scctor rcforni is 
affected by its political timing. In the case of the Punjab for the successive initiatives 
there was increasing political support. That is, political leadership was committed 
and prepared to expend political capital to manage powerful stakeholders associatcd 
with the reforms. Initially, however, this was not the case. I'lic SIT had little 
political support, because in view of the then executive dircctor of Special Projccts, 
its components, i. e. community participation and dcccntralisation, were against tile 
interests of the (then) political and feudal leadership. Similarly, in the initial phases 
of the policy process for DIIAs, there was lukewarm political support. However, 
later on there was strong political support, and this nionicriturn was also niaintaincd 
for the remaining initiatives. Even, the new government maintained this interest and 
the move for decentralisation continued. For example, the IA initiative was kept 
intact, although certain restraints and efforts were made to bridge the gaps 1cft in 
designing the initiative. 
This phenomenon of increasing political feasibility for deccritralisation can be 
explained by assuming that political support to the health sector reforms was subJcct 
to political stability. And one parameter to adjudge political stability NNUs wlictlicr 
the same political party was in power both in the ccntre and provinces. Two quotes 
arc relevant here. First, given the fact that two differcrit political forces were 
governing in the centre and province, it was one of the most unstable political 
periods in the country's political history. Narrating the Own sccilario, one scnior 
technocrat commented: 
I think the worst time in Pakistan's historyfor the Health Department, 
in particular and for all public sector departments bt general. was 
during the periodfrom 1988-1997.71s-o differcitt political partles /till/ 
governments in the Province and centre. lit these )vars, file entire 
structure and functioning of the system is, (Lt destro)vd Corruption 
became rampant that no one could work in a rightful inanner. Rules 
were violated and the district health systent is, (Lv totally eliminated This was the situation in 1997, when we analysed and saw that the 
system had totally crumbled.. 
Second, with the same political force in power both in the ccntrc and province, n 
situation was observed whereby (6.4.2.3) a string of mforms was introduced during 
the period 1997-2000. Regarding the political feasibility of introducing reforms 
during this time, one senior politician commented: 
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It was the best time in Pakistan's political history especially ill the 
Punjab. There had been times in Punjab like Kalabagh, Zia-Ul-Ila(134 
etc, but this time, the political government was in a position to milhe 
laws, to implement the new system and new ideas. It is-as the best time 
possible. 
The above observations can also be tested cmpirically by dcpicting the position of 
different political forces in the govcmment and the Punjab health scctor rcfornis 
launched during the 1993-2000 (Table 6.12). 
Table 6.12: - Governments in power during 1993-2000 in Pakistan 
Punjab Health Period Government In Power 
Sector Reforms Punjab province Centre (Pakistan) 
SPP 1990-93 Pakistan Muslim League Pakistan Pcople's Party 
DHMT (instead of 
DHA) 
1993-97 Pakistan People's Party 
led coalition 
Pakistan Muslim League 
DHA, IA, DHG 1997-Oct. 1999 Pakistan Muslim League Pakistan Muslim Leigue 
TA, Devolution Oct. 1999 - 2000 Military Rule Military Rule 
From table 6.12 it is seen that: 
1. During 1990-97 two different parties were in power in the ccntrc and province. During 
this period SPP was launched. Also die implementation of DIINITs instead of DIlAs 
was allowed, but work was done for conceptual isation and formulation of the lattcr. 
2. After 1997 till the military takeover in October 1999 there was a single party in power 
both in the centrc and province. During this period implementation of DIIAs, IA And 
DHG was allowed. 
3. After October 1999 there was military rule both in the witre as well as in provinces. 
While the IA as a move for decentralisation of institutions was kept intact, districts were 
devolved, i. e. a radicalisation of reforms is seen during this period. 
4. Further, the four initiatives under study can be divided into two sets, based oil their 
political timing: the SPP and the remainder with DI lAs overlapping the two sets. 
Thus, from the findings in table 6.12 the assumption made above is vcrificd. I'liat is, 
the two initiatives launched, when both in the ccntrc and province the same political 
party was in power, received further political support. This support continued 
afterwards, i. e. the military government upheld the mforms, but abandoned the DI IG 
in favour of devolution of powers to the districts. 
6.6.2.3. Execution agency was far front being Ideal 
Executing agency means the individual or organisation rcsponsiblc for cxccuting 
policy. According to Van Metcr and Van I lorn (1975) thc foliowing charactcristics 
have a bearing on the capacity of thc agcncy for implenicnting policy: '(i) 
34 During the 1960s, it was the same political force In power both In the province and wilre, the 
Kalabagh was the then Governor of Punjab. Similarly, Zia-ul-haq (1978-88) was tk military rulcr Le. 
the same political forces was in power in the country. 
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competence and size of the agency's staff, (ii) dcgrce of hicrarchical control and 
processes within the agency; (iii) political resources; (iv) vitality of an organisation; 
(v) degree of open communication within the organisation; (vi) the agcncy's formal 
and informal linkages with the policymaking or policy-criforcing body. 
Contrarily, in the Punjab as seen from table 6.12, a mixed picture is noted regarding 
the nature and the structure of the agency visualised or established to execute the 
policy, but overall, the arrangement was far from ideal. To substantiate this 
argument, the remarks of a consultant regarding DIIA arc the most representative 
and true for all initiatives (Griffith, 1997): 
... DHA acts as a decision making body; Although the DIIA has been notified, the actual and practical 
functions and role of the DIIA is not at all clear and the Chainnan 
of the DIIA says he has "... been charged with a mission to test the 
system and to set the parameters (of the DI IA) ..... ... there is little 
evidence of a real sense of direction for and clarity about the 
DHA; and ... The DHA appears to have management and executive authority. 
6.6.3. Factors associated with the execution of reforms 
From the findings in section 6.6.1.2 two major generalisations are made: (i) parallcl 
and diverse attempts were made to introduce reform; and (ii) it was a story of the 
struggle for survival and demise in the majority of rcfomis. I discuss these bclow: 
6.6.3.1. Parallel and diverse attempts were made to 
introduce Worins 
There were parallel and diverse attempts at reforming the health sector. But, the 
question arises - why was this happening? Three reasons are worth considering: 
First, there was a dire need and desire for change and to introduce this, tile decision. 
makers tried one intervention after the other. 1"his need can be of two typ'es: systcIll 
need; and polifical need. Regarding the fornicr, when a technocrat was nskcd %%Ilctllcr 
there was any crisis in tile system that acted as a prelude to the introduction of refornis, 
he told this researcher: 
It (introduction of reforms) wav rather quite late. We should have gone 
for such initiatives much earlier. We hail wasted it lot (! f fline ... things that we should have done 2-3 decades earlier. ive it-ere thinAing tit this 
stage... 
Introducing reforms was also a political need. The Pakistan Muslim League came 
into power in early 1997 and (Figure 6.2) peak activity is seen during this period till 
the military takeover in late 1999. This was due to the political party in power 
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wanting to register some success to its credit, a desire attributed to tile continuing 
instability and frequent change of governments in the political history of Pakistan. 
Therefore, it tested various prescriptions for the intended change in the licalth scctor. 
Secondly, the lack of or a poor information systcm installed for monitoring r6ornis Icd 
to making frequent interventions. 'nic system was informal and, as one chairman of a 
DHA commented, this was the main weakness of the rcfonii process. Ilicrcforc, those 
who managed change subsequent to intervention could not objectively gauge the 
progress of different initiatives. Further, since die decision-mak-crs relied on their 
subjective assessmentý which they were not sure of, the review of docurtictits rc%, cals 
that no intervention was officially closed. Ibis was, perhaps %vidi hindsight that if die 
new endeavour failed, there could still be a fallback position; and die earlier reform 
will be reactivated without again going into the (formal) process. 
Thirdly, introducing reforms one after the other was a phenomenon of maintaining flic 
status quo. This assumption may appear contradictory to the carlicr argumcnt, but it 
is not. There was a dire need (of the system) and the desire of various stakeholders 
to introduce change, but bureaucracy used a ploy. The bureaucracy, who lcd the 
reform process, came up with the ideas and proposals one after the otlicr, which the 
political bosses espoused. Each of these went through a process. I IoN%-cvcr, at thc cnd 
of the day no structural change occurred and the same old system prevailcd. This 
was due to the bureaucracy, being keen on guarding its system, and nevcr wanting to 
lose powers. Therefore, in figure 6.3, the activity graph dips with the changc of 
political government. This finding seems contrary to the military govcnillient 
advancing the reform agenda (table 6.12), but it is not. That is, since the policy for 
the devolution of powers to the districts was proccsscd at the Fcdcral levcl by the 
'National Reconstruction Bureau', there is little activity in the provincc. 
6.6.3.2. A story of the struggle for sunival or denihe or 
reforms 
Different models for the policy process, particularly Ilogwood and Gunn (1984). 
after evaluation of policy, visualise its inaintcnancc, succession or tcrmillation. In 
the Punjab, as seen from figure-6.3, exccpt for IA all initiitivcs met a fatal outcome. 
First, why was this exception? That is, while other initiatives were cithcr nbandoncd 
or allowed to perish, the IA survived. It is argued that this %%, as because tile chief 
executives of autonomous hospitals had takcn over their jobs, and gh-cli they arc 
highly paid, out of vested interest they rcniaincd in position, contributing to tile 
continuity of reform. Further, this initiative was backcd by an Act of Assembly and 
rudimentary Rules that provided legal structure to this initiative. Second, why did 
other initiatives meet the untoward fatc? Two reasons arc hypothesised: (i) shunning 
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change/high consensus reform and is mapped accordingly. However, given this 
reform was not implemented, it is not possible to comment about this aspect of flic 
policy process. 
Figure 6.3: - Dimensions of policies affecting implementation 
Comprehensive 
E3 
0 
0 
(IQ 
Piecemeal Low 
4 
Consensus on principles or goals 
10 
11 igh 
Aftcr: Van Mew and Van I lorn (1975) 
6.6.4. Summary and conclusions 
This section was about the implementation phase of the policy process and, in this 
regard, operative feasibility and the execution of reforms were studied. A number of 
hypotheses were generated, which were then tested drawing evidence from the case 
studies and raw case data. 
It revealed that technical feasibility was not tested for any of tile initiatives and tile 
agency brought into place for executing reform was far from ideal. Similarly, though 
the reforms were executed inefficiently, increasing political feasibility underlay tile 
success of certain initiatives. 
In conclusion the policy machine was incfi"icicnt in inipicnictiting the different 
reforms. The political feasibility was important. but did not materialisc into any real 
success. A number of interventions initiated in parallcl lcd to the loss of focus and 
the status quo was maintained. 
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6.7. Process 
In the last section, implementation of policy was discussed. I lcre, in this section die 
process as a component of the policy process will be explored. Ilic process ovcrarclics 
the entire phenomenon of policymaking (chapter 3), and concerns not only the wholc 
chain of decisions and course of action for translating die context into contents 
which are implemented, but also how the shapers and principles affect this. 'rhus 
exploring the process requires looking into the "black box" in order to know 'how 
decisions are made'. It is different from die question 'what decisions arc niadc' 
which concerns the design. It is also distinct from the 'policy machine' wherc focus 
is on the nature and attributes of different shapers undertaking decisions. Both these 
questions have been dealt with earlier (6.5). In other words this is about the cntirc 
policyrnaking process including how the shapcrs and principles influence this. 
Findings from case studics 
In the case of the Punjab the 'process' for health sector r6orm %vas marred %vidi several 
shortcomings, which influenced the overall outcome. To test this hypothesis, findings 
of this study drawn from various cases against different variables relevant to 'process' 
are clustered and tabulated in table 6.13. 
Table 6.13: - Process for the health sector initiatives 
In-depth study Forecasting Objectives and option PlannInC process 
priorities setting appraisal 
SPP Brainstorming, No formal Limited The optional Planning was done at 
working papers technique used; objectives were appraisal the planning forumi 
and a baseline impressions set by done In the in a hierarchical 
survey were based on bureaucracy and planning decision channel with 
conducted the subjectivity no priority setting forums limited stakeholder 
of decision- involvement 
makers. 
DIIA Consultancy -do- Limited objective The Initiative Went through a 
and set by the conceived, hierarchical decision 
brainstorming bureaucracy and planned and making with a limited 
sessions politicians who implemented stakcholdcr 
conducted and assented for the without involvement In ad- 
working paper initiative. No appraisal hoc comnlittees 
I deve loped priority setting 
1A _ Brainstorming -do- -do- -do- -do- 
sessions 
conducted and 
working paper 
developed 
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In-depth study Forecasting Objectives and 
priorities setting 
Option 
appraisal 
Planning procc33 
D11G Brainstorming -do- -do- -do- -do- 
sessions, 
working paper 
developed and 
also a baseline 
survey made 
It is seen from table 6.13 that the process for difTercrit initiatives, with few marginal 
variations, was almost similar. Nevertheless, salient findings arc described below: 
I. To validate legitimacy of intervention, techniques such as brainstonning were licld in 
the ad-hoc committees and also working papers were developed. For DI [A, hown-cr, 
donors undertook consultancies. But, as noted earlier (section oil context), these cannot 
be termed in-depth studies, as these were based on a non-holistic view of tile situation. 
2. No formal projection technique was employed to determine die possible situation if tile 
issues were not addressed and forecasting of die likely future if otherwise. Instead 
impressions were formed based on the subjectivity of the dccision-makcrs. 
3. Generic objectives were laid down for various initiatives. If one surveys different 
planning documents in die Health Department, they do not differ much from those laid 
down for these interventions. No alternative objectives were considered, and also no 
priority setting was done. 
4. Similarly, option appraisal was done formally only in the case of SPP by the planning 
forum. For the remainder, the decision to undertake a particular initiative was made first 
and then planning for its implementation was done in a hierarchical manner, involving 
limited stakeholders. These proposals were also discussed in certain ad-hoc committees. 
6.7.2. Factors influencing the process 
Given the above findings, the assumption made at die start of this section is confirnicd 
to the extent that the process was riddled with shortcomings. I Iowcvcr, how %%, as the 
overall process and its outcome influenced? It is argued that: (i) overall, the process 
was inefficient and there was no proper planning for policy; (ii) the lack of learning 
culture led to the shortcomings that perpetuated; and (iii) the inappropriate 
arrangements for support hindered the reform process. 17hese h)Wthescs are tested ill 
the following sections: 
6.7.2.1. The process was inefficient 
From table 6.13 it is seen that a hierarchical decision making channcl was f()Ilo%vcd 
for policyrnaking. But the question ariscs - what is the norniltivc proccss? To 
understand this, as explained earlier (4.4.4) this rcscarchcr developed a %%vrking 
paper followed by a workshop with senior officials in the gowninicnt. Ilic outcome of 
these deliberations is available in appendix 3.1. I'his cxcrcisc of dcvc1oping nn ide. al 
model dictated by the books and experts in the govcninicnt was run with hindsight to 
compare and establish how best it was practiced for dic rcfornis under study. I lo", mr, 
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it was helpful in enriching tile researcher's acumen for the policy process. It was noted 
that in actual practice there were many deviations for tile different initiatives. I'lic most 
glaring was that all initiatives had administrative, financial and legal implications, 
but apart from SPP, none were considered in the process. Thus, many stakeholders 
were excluded and plans remained incomplete. For example, the Finance 
Department commented on the law promulgated to provide legal cover to tile IA and 
DHGs, as follows: 
The Finance Department has first of all to point out that tis the 
Punjab Medical and Health Institutions Act, 1998 had inajorfinancial 
implications and restructuring involvedfor the health sector and in 
that the organisational structure was also being changed, the suininary 
floated to introduce the new Law should have been moved throuji: h the 
Finance and S&GA Department, as provided under the Rules of 
Business. 
(However) the draft law was neither shown to the Finance Department 
nor to the S&GAD. The contribution of the two departments inay have 
avoided a rather very "different" (and in a way an incomplete) piece 
of legislation as now being perceived... the flaws being inherent, it 
may not even be possible to fill -in the gaps or rectify the errors left in 
the Act... (GoPb, 2000d) 
Similarly, the scheme for DIJAs was not shared with the P&D Department, and then 
this department also developed such bodies in the entire province. On a summary 
note submitted by the chairman P&D Board, the chief minister approved 
establishing District Health Committees in addition to those for development, 
education and agriculture and irrigation sectors. Later, however, this order Nvas 
withdrawn at the request of the I lealth Department (GoPb, 1998). 
Actually, in the Health Department people were not much aware of the normative 
policy process. For instance, the chief secretary questioned "why the draft 
notification (of BOGs) was sent to the Law Department" after approval of the chief 
minister (GoPb, 1997v). According to the RuIcs of Business (GoPb, 1974), it was 
not needed, but this move by the I Icalth Departnicntjcopardiscd the N%holc initiative 
of autonomy to medical colleges (5.5.1.3; 6.7.2.2). Likewise, while processing the 
case for nominating the chairperson for the DIIA, Multan the same person was also 
notified as a member (GoPb, 1997d). Similarly, in the case of the appointment of 
chief executives, the Law Department indicated the shortfalls in the contract dralled 
by the Health Department (GoPb, 1998x). Furthcr, such omissions mcant, no details 
like framing of rules, regulations, manuals and dcrining of routines and procedures 
for new bodies established under different initiatives were %vorkcd out. Acrosi the 
board such shortcomings were observed in all initiatives, which many participants 
noted - the most representative from the governor of the Punjab - arc: 
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I am afraid I am not willing to accept afaft accomI)II. I would like 
comprehensive answers to the issues raised here. Could the chief 
secretary invite the secretaries of Health, Finance, Law, P&D, 
Regulations to layout what has been done, what remains to be done and 
how we can extricate ourselves from the total legal chaos that is at best 
obvious to me? I am also uncertain if it is fair to havc a 71ird Party 
Evaluation. Have we put up a framework on the ground, %%hich can 
now be evaluated? As I see it, there arc huge voids and in the prcscncc 
of these, we cannot in all fairness cvaluatc what we arc only claiming 
to have introduced... (GoPb, 2000c) 
Another aspect of the process for the Punjab health sector mforni was that it was a 
case of 'planning follows policy'. This does not mean however, as NValt (1994: 7) 
argues, that the policy was first formulated and the planners were helping to put it 
into practice. The issues or problems in the health sector, whether of a high or low 
political nature (2.4.1.3), were not on die policy agenda. Instead the 'policy ideas' 
such as 'establishing DIIAs' or 'granting autonomy' were agreed and then details 
were planned. This finding substantiates the earlier argument (6.2.3) that 
policyinakers worked towards die end products. Why they were doing so, was not 
clear to them. In other words, the 'policy ideas' were not the result of situational 
analysis, which has a critical role in policy formulation (Green, 1999). 111is 
assumption is supported by findings in table 6.13 that the process for different 
reforms was hardly helped by the planning process, and instead these were picked 
up from contemporary practices. For example, in a summary note for Cabinet, the 
secretary health wrote: 
The chief minister brought in an idea of Role Model Institutions to 
provide standard and quality health delivery services to the people of 
the Punjab. lie directed the secretary health to prepare a plan on this 
concept (GoPb, 1997a). 
Similarly, about DIIAs, one senior official in the I Icalth Departnicilt commcntcd: 
The chief minister had since spent his perichl of exile In the UK. it-here 
he saw DIIAs, which left imprints on him and he ivavfascinated that he 
bought the idea and ordered its immediate intruhiction /is the Pwyah. 
Likewise, a minister for health commenting about the policy proccss, for differvit 
reforms told this researcher: 
We did not have to reinvent the it-heel, Instead we could have gone to 
the internet or some measure like that andpidled out the International 
experience andlearnifrom that to develop aworAable inthlel. 
Barker (1996: 27) indicates a managcrialist approach taUn by some authors e. g. 
Abel Smidi (1994), 'who talk of planning licalth policies as though the planners 
were able to formulate policy unrestrained by thc politics of the licalth sector'. In 
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this manner, she reiterates the limitations of managcrialisni as an approach to 
practice public policy (Minougc, 1983). Following such an approach it is sccn that 
in the Punjab mainly the health managers controlled policyinaking; in practicc, 
however, they could not (6.7.2.3). Neither the policy contents (6.5) nor its cxccution 
(6.6) was ideal. 
6.7.2.2. Lack of a learning culture led to the shortcomings 
that perpetuated 
It was noted (6.2.2.2) that policyrnakers have a tendency for considering the 
increasing number of tenets of the policy process in the subsequent r6ornis. 
Equally, however, evidence points to a lack of Icaming culture in the public sector. 
These two observations are apparently contradictory, but arc not. I'lic fornicr 
concerns the 'knowledge in the policy process' while the latter is about 'kiio%vlcdgc 
of the policy process' (2.4.2.2). That is, the policyrnak-crs were impressed by the 
advocacy, but it remained unclear to them how to systematically undertake policy 
analysis. In this regard, a representative of a donor agency noted: 
Even lessons ftom similar interventions is-ere not learnt. Lessons tire 
not learnt even from a preceding stage of an intervention. Mere is a 
lack of learning culture both in the government and in donor agencies. 
This characteristic of public sector culture led to shortcomings in policyrnaking 
perpetuated throughout the process. There is a huge body of cvidencc that differcrit 
authorities advised the Health Department on ccrtain issucs, but the wcakncsscs 
indicated were never rectificd and were conscqucntly carricd ovcr in thc proccss. 
For example, while assenting to the Punjab Medical and Health Institutions 
Ordinance, 1998, the then governor of the Punjab observcd (Gollb, 1998i): 
I. The ordinance does not dcrine ... medical institution or ... health institution. 
2. The ordinance is silent with regard to properties both moveable and 
immovable and assets and liabilities of the institution. In the absence 
of such provision these will continue to rest in the government. %%hilc 
administration and management of these institutions is transferred it) 
institutions that are corporate bodies i. e. separate legil pcrsoni ... 
cause administrative, financial and other problems. 
3. There is also in-sufficient provision with regard to provincial 
government servants %Nho continue to serve in the notified 
institutions. Will they have the option to become cinplo)-ccs of 1110 
institution? Lacunae like these may lead to avoidable litigation... 
4. -should be urgently attended to in the rules to tv framed under the 
ordinance... " 
However, none of the above advice was liccdcd to by the I kilth Departillclit In 
drafling the Punjab Medical and I Icalth Institutions Act, 1998. Ile mw Govcmor, 
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therefore, took on the bureaucracy for the shortcomings lcfl, and finally flic rulcs 
were framed in January 2002 - forty-two months aftcr the first institution was 
granted autonomy in July 1998. Likewise, a rcvicw of flic communicati oils bct%N-ccil 
the Law and Health Department about the BOGs for autonomous institutions is a 
proof of the above observation. For drawing up the mcnibcrshiP of BOGs, the Law 
Department suggested that some criteria be evolved for the sclcction of non-official 
members to avoid discrimination and that the public rcprcsentativcs be kcpt away to 
preserve the principle that government is responsible to the Provincial Asscmbly. 
They advocated that (GoPb, 1997m): 
A fair criteria/proccss is evolved for making appointment of non- 
official members to avoid objections on the grounds of discrimination. 
Further, since Members of Provincial Assemblies arc members of the 
legislature, it would look better if they arc kept away from the 
membership of bodies, which arc subordinate to the government. By 
doing this they would contribute to the preservation of the principle 
that government is responsible to the Provincial Assembly. 
... It would be observed that according to Article 63(l) (c) of thc 
constitution, a person is disqualified if fie is in the service of a statutory 
body regardless of whether or not the office which lie is holding is 
office of profit. In tile instant case the BOG ... shall be a body 
corporate. In other words, the proposed BOGs arc statutory bodies. 
Pcrsonsjoining as members of the Board would be deemed to be in the 
service of a statutory body. Considering the risk of incurring 
disqualification of the Members of National and Provincial Assemblies 
under Article 63 (1) (e) of the constitution cannot be ruled out. " 
However, if one visits the membership of the Institutional Management Committees 
(IMCs) that were constituted instead of the BOGs, several of theill had NIPAS oil 
them and also the Health Department did not lay dowri any criteria for tile selection 
of members. Instead, it was lcft to the non official members of tile INICs. 17his led to 
the new governor of the Punjab refusing to approw the INICs, and lie commented: 
... I think, it scriously dctracts from the spirit of autonomy that ilic 
nomination of all (5) non-ofilicial nicinbers should depend on the 
proposals cmanating from the 3 official mcnibcrs. lit othcr words, the 5 
non- official mcinbcrs owc their nicinbcrship of the Committce to the 
proposal of the official mcinbcrs. This inilitatcs against the vcry 
purposc of having non-official nicnibers;... (Gol'b. 2000c) 
On the whole, therefore, it can be gcncraliscd that the Punjab health swor hackcd 
the learning culture, which Icd to the shortcomings bdrig pcrpetuatcd ewn in the 
new set up attracting criticism (Dawn, 2002c). 
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6.7.2.3. Inappropriate support structure 
In order to support the policy process for r6orms an inappropriate structure was 
instituted. The support structure is a focal point relating to different components of 
the policy machine in order to process policy for a particular rcform initiative. 711c 
shape of the support structure for various initiatives in the Punjab drawn from the 
relevant findings from the case studies clustered is tabulated below. 
Table 6.14: - Support structurelorganisation for initiath-cs 
SuppOrt structure 
SPP A temporary structure created in the Project Implementation unit or the Second 
Family Health Project as a Project Management Team. This related laterally with 
the district health staff, who otherwise reported to the DGI IS. 
DHA It was initially the Provincial Health Development Centre -a subsidiary of the 
Second Family Health Project, which supported the initiative, but later the technical 
wing of Health Secretariat took over this function. 
1A The technical wing of Health Secretariat had a key role in conccptualising and 
designing the initiative. The administration wing. with support from the executive 
director of Special Projects, implemented the reform. Utcr, aI Icalth Sector lWorin 
Unit established in the Special Projects supported the initiative. but aficr the closure 
of the project the Health Secretariat again took over this responsibility. 
D11G The technical wing of Ilealdi Secretariat and executive director of Special Projects 
jointly conceptualiscd the initiative. Later, aI Icalth Sector Reform Unit established 
in the Special Projects supported the initiative till it was abandoned. 
Given the nature of the support structure, as inferred from table 6.14, it is sccil that 
the reform initiatives under study arc of two types: (i) autonomy to tile lllcdical and 
health institutions (IA), and (ii) establishing a deccntraliscd district health system 
(SPP, DIIA, and DIIG). Both categories of mfornis, howcvcr. were aimed at 
bringing structural change into the health sector, for which involvement of several 
public sector departments like the Finance, Law, Planning & Development and 
Services and General Administration ctc. was essential. In other words, this was a 
case of 'planning for change' as against the 'planning of change' wherc tile licalth 
sector could itself manage (I logwood and Gunn, 1984: 209). Whereas for the latter a 
hierarchical structure will do, the former would need all organic structure with 
flexible tasks and relationships. Such structures arc also called the limplenlent"'Ition 
structures' (11jern and Porter, 198 1). 
However, as noted earlier (6.5.2.2). it was a group of four peoplc as individuals and 
not representative of different organisations who supportcd the 1)ft)ccss. III filct. 
structures akin to implementation structures likc the 'Slecring Committce' and 
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'Technical Committee' meant to support process were taken over hy this group. 
They conceptualised, forniulatcd and handed over the policy e. g. Outlined as all 
Act of Assembly- through a Contract to the executcrs the street Icvcl bureaucrats. 
Thus the relationship which existed between tile 11ormulators and i nip lenient ci's can 
be drawn as in figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4: - Interaction between implententers and formulators 
M Formulalm 13 I-pil-711-711'r 
I 
17111 mcnicni 
4. ForTnulatcrs 
Cd 
Conceptualising Designing t %ecullon 
Source: Adapted I rom ( ircen ( 1994)) 
That is, as seen in figure 6.4 the implenienters are pushed out by tile 1`6rinulators. 
who undertook most of tile policy process including the preparedness part of* tile 
implementation process. Tile implemcnters were reduced to execution only due to 
the inappropriate arrangcments made for supporting tile reflorin process in tile 
Punjab health sector. This generalisation is made oil account of' two reasons: (0 a 
parallel and temporary organisation was created. and (10 the policy machine Itself 
supported the process for introducing these Initiames. III tile following sections, 
these two assumptions are discussed in further detall. 
Parallel and temporary orqanisation 
Bossert (1990), 1rom his 'five country studies' pro% ides a list ol'characteristics Iks 
the guidelines flor a sustainable donor assisted pro 
. 
Iccl. Two ol'thcse, rclcviknt in this 
case, are to: (i) integrate activities into the established administrative structures. and 
(11) gain significant levels of' l'unding from national sources in order to ensurc 
operation beyond the proJect's lille (7.5.7). In the Punjab. neither ol'thesc guidelincs 
was adopted. Specifically, looking at the first. the flollowing picture cincrgcs: 
From table 6.14 it is seen that it Pro . lect 
Management 1'eam cstablished tit the Proiect 
Implementation Unit oI'SFI III managed the Sill'. This team reported to Ilic cxectitivc 
director of Special Projects through the 1)n)jcct dirwor tit' SFIIP. whilc it %%orked 
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laterally with field formations in the district that was undcr the control of the DG I IS 
through a DHS (Figure-6.5). These relationships, as notcd carlicr (5.3.6.4), sincc 
inconsistent with the organisational lines of reporting, %%, crc informal and pcrsonal. 
Figure 6.5: - Organisationil relationship of support struclum 
I Secretary Health I 
Executive irector 
Special 
2rojects 
(PIU) 
I Director General 
Health Services 
I 
(Directorate) 
I 
Project Director 
SFR 
Director I 
PHDC 
1 
Project Director 
SPIR 
Director Health Services 
Health Officer 
U stt. District Hoafth Officer I 
In this arrangement, the organisational (DGIIS) rationale did not coincide with the 
programme (EDSP) rationale (11jern and Portcr, 1981) and as a1rcady identificd 
(5.3.6.4), led to several issues. There was no flexibility in this structure and it was 
marred with bureaucracy and stringent administrative and financial procedurcs 
(EDSP, 1998). Further, both DGIIS and EDSP scrvcd as mastcrs in the rcspcctivc 
organisations reporting separately to the secretary licalth. As a result, symblotic 
relations could not develop between the two. Instcad, at (imcs, a misioll was 
observed, e. g. one ex-EDSP quoted an cx-DGIIS as saying to the theil EDSP in a 
meeting, "Either I work under you or you work undcr me: only thcn the project call 
move". Given such a situation, a top planner in the 11calth Department argued that 
the linkages for the SPP were wrongly designcd: 
Creating a separate set ip of the executive director qfSpecial llrtject. v 
was a mistake. Taking it aivayfrons the DGII. T. who itut the main 
stakeholder of the process, it-at not right, At times ive (decision-niaAers 
in the secretarial) ftIt this shortconsing In inertinjgs and while, 
interacting with the mainstream Health Department. 7hey tilt/ not 
know what was happening. Therefore, they irould not own the results 
of the project. The DGIIS and his line inanagernent would naffeel the 
strong stakeholders of the pr(yect, is-hercim they is-ere. Sa I ivouldstly 
that something went ivronir in the design.. 
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Similarly, for DHAs, the PIlDC initially provided organisational support. I lo%vcvcr, 
based on the above logic, it was also not an appropriate arrangement. 71c PIIDC 
reported to the EDSP, while the DIIA was established in the district ficld forniations 
- in the control of the DGHS (Figure-6.5). Later, a new structure, the I Icalth Scctor 
Reform Unit, was established in the PlU of Special Projects for supporting the IA 
and DHG initiatives. However, it was also far from an implementation structurc. A 
mix of private and civil servants were hired temporarily as consultants in rcalisation 
of the then executive director's proposed scheme of a 'Profcssional h1anagcnicilt 
Support Group' (5.6.6.3). This arrangement was doomed, as a rcprcsciitati%-c of a 
donor agency commented: 
... to make a new set up like IISRU with advicefrons 'soinen-here' (lilt/ implement reform from a de-institutionalised structure - agail; a 
simple individualistic power game... 'someone'who wanted to We the 
lead made sure that the technical assistance was inoved froln (in 
institutional set up to a temporary unit that collapsed soon (aftr the 
donor support was withdrawn). 
Given the analogy of the PMT for SPP and the PllDC supporting DIIAs, 
establishing a temporary structure - IISRU - in another temporary structure - 
Special Projects - was not the right arrangcment for policy succession (I logwood 
and Gunn, 1984). The P&D Department highlighted this shortcoming, and the 
Health Department, in the wake of severe criticism, withdrew (lie proposal it had 
submitted for seeking funds for the IISRU (5.6.6.3). Further, in such an arrungcnient 
for the policy process there was loss of institutional memory and this rescarchcr 
faced immense difficulty in locating the r6orin archives. 
Policy machine itself supporting the initiative 
Findings in table 6.14 reveal that the technical wing of the licalth secretariat (tile 
government) took over die policy process for DIlAs froin the IIIIDC and 
subsequently it also undertook the policy process for DIIG and IA initiatives. Ilis 
policy planning and implementing in the core of government (licalth sccrctarint) can 
be advocated, but it is also contestable. That is, lio%v an organisation itself in necd of 
reform can undertake to steer reforms, a chief executive, a chairnian of DI IA and tile 
P&D Department commented. This was also in deriancc of the principle of planning 
for change, which cannot be implemented by the organisition itself undergoing a 
change (6.7.2.3). 11jem and Porter (1981: 211-27) elaborate the implications orsuch 
an approach, as follows: 
Failure to identify the impIcnicritation structure as administrative 
entities distinct from organisations has lcd to sevcrc difficultics In 
administering the impicincritation or programnics. Whcn a nc%v 
programme is cnactcd, it is assigncd to a single organisation. and 
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everyone walks away secure in the belief that somehow it will be 
implemented. If there is a failure, the programme is assigned to another 
organisation, or the department head is fired, or both. 
Precisely the same situation happened in the Punjab. DIIG was first suspcndcd and 
then abandoned by the new government. The comments of the nc%v govcrnor about 
the conduct of the IA initiative were harsh (5.5.5.5). I'lic secretary licalth who Icd 
the process, according to one of his close associates, was first subJcctcd to scvcral 
serious examinations and was finally transfcrrcd out of the 11calth Departnicnt. 
Nonetheless, besides these complications, the policy machinc itscif supporting the 
process that led to these deficiencies (absence of rules and rcgulations) pcrpctuatcd 
for some time (see 6.7.2.2). 
6.7.3. Summary and conclusions 
This section studied the process, as a component of the policy process, and was 
concerned with 'how did the policy machine work'. It was revealed that wlicrcas, on 
the whole, it was inefficient, the individuals and organisations comprising the 
machine lacked a leaming culture. Underlying this characteristic, lio%%-cvcr, %%us tile 
absence of an appropriate implementation structure. Instead reliance %vý placed on 
certain temporary structures created parallel to those cstablislicd fornially or tile 
policy machine itself undertaking the process. 11is arrangement lcd to 
complications, including the non-devclopmcnt of institutional mcniory and so the 
experience or lessons were not passed on to successors. 
With this section I conclude exploring diffcrent factors that influenced tile policy 
process. The next section, to recapitulate, enlists these factors portraying the rKilicy 
process for reforms as practiced in the Punjab health scctor. 
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6.8. Policy process in the Punjab licalth sector 
So far, drawing from case studies, I have discussed a varicty of factors associatcd 
with different tenets of the policy process. This section sumniarisc these factors in 
Table 6.15, and then provide a comprehensive picture of the policy proccss for the 
Punjab health sector reforms. 
Summary of factors influencing the policy process 
Table 6.15: - Factors influencing the policy process 
Tenet of the Features of refornis and factors influencing the Major flicine 
policy process policy process cinergi ig 
Principles and purposes 
Being on the political agenda did not ensure the laying down ne absence of 
of principles clearly derined 
Tendency of considering more tenets of the policy process In 
principles 
the successive reforms 
Involvement of politicians in conccptualisation of reforms 
was vital in laying down the principles 
Shapers 
Leaders lacked the qualities to guide the process as: 11cre was narrow 
* technocrat could not harness support; and 
stakeholders' base 
or the policy 
0 civil bureaucrat led the reform in a bureaucratic way process was a 
Support for reform was inconsistent and Inappropriate as: fone-hand clip' 
phenomenon 
" support for SPP dwindled over time; and 
" support for the other initiatives was inconsistent and 
inappropriate 
Bureaucracy resisted and opposed reforms as there was: 
" an internal-driven politicisation of bureaucracy-. and 
"a politico-burcaucratic nexus 
The donors were supportive, but their role changed over time 11cre was fitigue 
a conclusion drawn from: ofadministrative 
mechanisms of 
inculcating the ideas and building the critical miss. the donors, 
competing and actively supporting the policy process for 
reforms; and 
following suit, instead of technically guiding 
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Tenet of the Features of reforms and factors influencing the Major theme 
policy process policy process emerging 
The media changed its role from being passive to active, but 
to only cover the debate 
The policyrnakers did not use the media 
The community was passive and undcr-devcloped 
Inadequate and inappropriate effort was made to broadening 
the stakeholders' base 
Context 
A partial analysis of context was made Lack of a holistic 
view of tile 
The interventions designed subsequent to non-holistic 
analysis of the context led to more complications 
context 
Critical situation alone did not serve as a window of 
opportunity for reform 
Contents 
Design Shortcomings of 
tile policy The design of policy was incomplete 
machine 
The preparatory arrangements were not robust 
Policy machine 
There was a skewed understanding of policy analysis 
There was weak institutional arrangement for policy analysis 
There was a an ad hoc mechanism of consulting stakeholders 
Political arrogance was essential for the success of reforms 
Implementation 
Operative feasibility was poor as: 
" technical feasibility was not judged-, and 11cre %%as a lack 
" agency responsible for execution was far from Ideal. but 
of proper 
Implement4floti 
successive initiatives had rising political feasibility Structure 
The execution was 
ineffective 
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Tenet of the Features of reforms and factors influencing (fie Major theme 
policy process policy process emerging_ 
Parallel and diverse attempts made to reform because: 
" there was a dire need and desire for the change-, 
" there was a lack of or poorly developed information and 
monitoring system; and 
" it was a phenomenon of maintaining the status quo and 
inefficiency marked the process. 
It was a story of demise and struggle for survival of reforms 
because: 
" subordinates were shunned of from the policy process; 
" of certain policy attributes i. e. comprehensiveness and 
consensus of stakeholders on principles. 
Process 
The process was ineflicicnt Shortcomings or 
There was a lack of learning culture that led to the 
the policy 
machine 
shortcomings perpetuated in the process 
There was an inappropriate support structure as: 
0 parallel and temporary organisation were established; 
0 the policy machine was itself supporting the initiatives. 
Table 6.15 classifies different factors according to the tcricts of the policy process. In 
addition, presents the common themes, judged by this researcher. emerging from the 
combination of various factors. 
6.8.2. Salient features of the policy process for the Punjah 
health sector reforms 
In table 6.15 various factors influencing the policy process were given, Icaving tile 
question - what was the policy process like? To deal with this question, the saliclit 
features of the policy process for the Punjab health sector refonns arc given Mow, 
essentially building on the conceptual framework (chapter 3) for this study: 
1. The principles for different initiativcs wcrc unclear, which contributed to the 
confusion and lack of direction in the policy process. I lowcvcr, n tendency was 
observed for considering all tenets of the policy process in the subsequent 
reforms. That is why, for DIIG, the latest initiative ill the study period, principles 
were documented but remaincd unknown to the stakeholders. 17his study 
underpins that this shortcoming was due to the non-involvcnictit, or pol iticialls ill 
conceptualising reforms. Contrarily, the purposes for different rcrorms %%vre 
clear, and were common to most devc1opnicrital proposals. 
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2. The different shapers had a varying role in the policy process, as: 
a. The leaders, who were the bureaucrats, did not guide the process to success; 
either they failed in harnessing the required support or it was the bureaucratic 
attitude that got in the way. Similarly, support was inconsistent and mostly in- 
coherent. In fact, the supporter ended in opening up several fronts, thus losing 
oversight and focus. But the most important factor was the absence of 
mechanism for identifying the stakeholders. Both the leader and supporter did 
not employ 'stakeholder analyses' technique. Thus, whereas many stakeholders 
were precluded, no appropriate strategy was developed to harness the support or 
alleviate the opposition of others. This resulted in a narro%v stakeholders' base. 
b. The technical bureaucracy was subservient to its civil partners; and will be 
referred to as a part of the bureaucracy. Its role in the policy process for r6onlis 
was the 'internal - driven politicisation, i. e. as an institution, it was working to 
maintain the 'status quo' and not to bring change in the licalth system. And in 
this purpose they were successful; particularly due to their technical superiority 
and that their political counterparts were not politically mature. It was, therefore 
a politico-bureaucratic nexus, where both bureaucrats and politicians were 
engaged in policyrnaking and also concerned about politics. In this relationship, 
the bureaucracy defied and often downplayed the orders of their political 
executives, but it was due to the arrogance of the political chief cxccutivc that 
certain successes were also registered. 
c. Civil society was not developed, and the policymakcrs made no significant 
effort to either develop or actively involve it in the policy process. Offlicial 
confidentiality and the prevalent administrative rnilicu furthcr added to tile 
exclusion of many groups. Tile media, which was initially passive, became 
active, but mainly to cover the debate bet%%-ccn govcniment and one of the 
newspaper groups. Of the others, it was only the Pakistan Medical Associltioll, 
who participated, but it was incffectivc due to internal splits. Similarly. tile 
health service providers were either not involved or, if at all, not as a technical 
polity, but as a technical bureaucracy -a role that was indistinguishable from tile 
bureaucracy. There is no evidence that the health service recipients were 
effectively involved at any stage of the policy process. In short. because tile 
shapers were mainly from the governance components of the health system. and 
both the service providers and recipients were poorly represented ill tile [X)Iicy 
process, it was a one-hand clap phenomenon. 
d. Tile donors operating from the outer orbit of the external cnvironment forin 
part of the international begenionic systems. I lowcvcr tlicir Me changed over 
time. They inculcated the concepts of deccritralisation. As a result, the civil 
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servants, who were initially opposed, appreciated the nc%v paradigm to later 
become the advocates and finally claimed die ownership of tile rcfonlis. 111C 
donors competed for reforms and drove the move for design mid cxccutioll. 
However, ultimately their role was reduced to mainly directing the financial 
assistance, while technical assistance became minimal. They appeared to be 
following the recipients rather than guiding or technically assisting the project. 
This may be attributed to the effort of donors to go with the govcniniclit, but it 
was also the manifestation of a different phenomenon - 'aid fatigue'. This 
syndrome exists increasingly and concerns die weariness of aid in kind. In tile 
Punjab, however, the money was there and the donors %%-crc also willing to pay, 
but it was the administrative mechanism of donors that fatigucd. 
3. The context was explored, while preparing the case for r6onn, but only 
partially. This was on account of the inadequate undcrstanding of die context 
and lack of its systematic analysis. This led to the intcrvcntions rcinaining 
defective in their design, which upon implementation. not only failcd to 
adequately address the problems, but also gave rise to sonic otlicrs. According to 
the framework used in this study (chapter 3), the context has tlircc inclusivc 
levels: the health system; the national systems; and the intcrnational licgcnionic 
systems. The outcome of the context analysis would thcreforc largely dcpcnd on 
where the analyst positions himself. A holistic view will, however, require 
studying the context at all these three levels. But, in the Punjab, it was not tile 
case. Another related feature of the policy process was that, although the 
situation in the health sector was critical, someone nccded to rcact. I'lic critical 
situation alone did not serve as a window of opportunity for reforni. 
4. Different reforms were aimed at establishing a decentraliscd institution or a 
district health system. Therefore, these %vcre potentially structural in naturc and 
were at a systemic level that could also havc implications for the other policy 
levels. However, since the design was incomplete, it is difficult to pinpoint 
which policy levels were addressed by different initiatives. As conjectured 
above, the contents or design were deficient, and the prcparatory nrrangenicrits 
made to implement reforms were not robust. Such an outconic hinged on the 
performance of the 'policy machine' that churned out reforms and conductcd thc 
process for them. There was an inadequate understanding of the concept and no 
specific institutional arrangement existed for undertaking policy analysis. 1111s 
'machine', in other words, was not only incflicicnt and ncedcd overhauling. but 
certain 'additional parts' were also required. 
5. Implementation denotes the execution of reforms subsequent to detennining 
their operative feasibility. However, there %%-crc shortcomings in K)th these are. m. 
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Reforms were introduced in rapid succession. This indicated the dire need ror 
initiatives by the health system, but equally important %%Ms their skilful 
execution. That was not the case, however. Technical rcasibility was not judged 
for any of the initiatives and the envisaged executing agency was far rroin ideal. 
Nevertheless, some reforms were executed with limited success, which was 
consistent with the increasing political feasibility for successive rcronlis. Also 
the chief executives had taken over and given that they wcrc highly paid in- 
charges of the autonomous institutions, they remained in position, i. e. the vested 
interest contributed to the continuity of the reform. 
6. Overall, the process for reform was inefficient and thcre cxistcd no culturc of 
learning from the experience or listening to the advice of differctit stakcholdcrs. 
The shortcomings were therefore carried over, leaving voids in the policy 
process. This was mainly due to the abscncc of an apparatus likc an 
'implementation structure'. Either the 'policy machine' itscif or sonic tcniporary 
structure coordinated the policy process. This led to sonic rcfarnis being 
forgotten, others abandoned or overlapping each odicr, sonic survivcd and yct 
there was no accountability. Further, the institutional nicinory for rcfomis was 
fuzzy and this researcher had difficulty in locating die archivcs for building the 
case studies for this research. 
6.9. Summary and conclusion 
This chapter discussed the policy process for the Punjab licalth sector rcronns, 
unearthing a variety of influencing factors. Viewed retrospectively. it was not a 
rosy picture; however, limited progress was also registered. Underlying this 
situation, a number of factors were revealed, influencing the policy process. 
However, keeping in view the thematic coninionaltics emerging, six of thm 
stand out prominently. These arc: (i) the absence of clearly dcrincd principles; 
(ii) insufficient involvement of stakeholders; (iii) the lack of a holistic view or 
the context; (iv) the shortcomings of the policy machine; (v) the need ror a 
proper implementation structure; and (vi) the administrativc fatigue or donors 
leading to their adopting a laid back position. 
In the next chapter I relate these factors to the cxisting material on the subject 
and draw implications of this study for the policy proccss in the lwuiýab 11caltil 
sector. Further new venues for rcscarch into the subjcct arc also identillied. 
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7. Conclusions 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, the policy process for the Punjab health sector mforni was 
discussed. Drawing evidence from four individual case studies described in chapter- 
5 and the raw case data it transpired that many factors contributcd to tile outcome. 
However, keeping in mind the common themes emerging, six factors stood out 
prominently. This chapter aims to conclude this study by: 
1. presenting a retrospective overview of whether the research question and the 
surrounding sub-questions have adequately been answered; 
2. identifying the contribution of this study to die existing body of knowledge; 
3. relating the findings to the existing material and insight on the subject; 
4. indicating the lessons or implications of this study for the Punjab health sector 
policy process; 
5. revealing the limitations and the measures taken to circumvent those; and 
6. identifying new venues in the research arcna. 
7.2. Overview of aellievenients 
This study was launched with the following aim and objccti%, cs (Box 7.1): 
Box 7.1: - Aints and objectives 
This study aims "to explore factors that influenced the policy process for the govemment 
initiatives undertaken in the Punjab health sector during the period 1993-2000". Drawn froni 
this aim, the major objectives of the study arc: 
1. to develop a framework for analysing the health sector; 
2. to describe the changing structure and functions of the Punjab health sector; 
3. to establish a framework for analysing the policy process for rcrorms. 
4. to analyse the policy process for the health sector Worms undertaken In tile Punjab 
health sector during the period from 1993-2000; 
5. to explore the factors that influenced the policy process for reforms; and 
6. to draw lessons for the ongoing and future reforms. 
Within the remits of the above aim and objcctivcs, it was to addrcss Ilic rcscarch 
question, "what factors influenced the policy proccss for the govermunt imtiativcs 
undertaken in the Punjab health scctor during the pcriod 1993-2000". Since this 
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question has several facets; more questions and sub-qucstions (Box 7.2) surround it. 
Accordingly this study was designed and conductcd. 
Box 7.2: - Research question 
1. What is the changing structure and functions of the Punjab health sector? 
I. I. What is the organ isation of the health sector? 
1.2. What is the role and functions of various components of the health sector? 
1.3. What are the status, issues and problems in the Punjab health sector? 
2. What was the policy process for the health sector reform initiatives undertaken In the 
Punjab health sector during the period 1993-2000? 
2.1. Which reform initiatives were undertaken during the period 1993-2000? 
2.2. Who and how did they influence the shaping of reform initiatives? 
2.3. What were the principles and ideology behind the reforms? 
2.4. Why were the reforms introduced or what factors preceded their introduction? 
2.5. What were the scope and proposal in terms of concepts and design? 
2.6. How did the government conccptualise and design the reforms? 
2.7. What was the process for implementing reforms? 
2.8. What was the eventual fate of the reform initiative? 
3. What were the factors that influenced the policy process and lessons for the ongoing or 
any future reform initiative in the health sector? 
To what extent have the above aim and objectives been achieved? To answer this 
question, a retrospective overview of the study process is presented Wow. which 
may be best read alongside Appendix 4.7. This appendix outlines the rescarch 
objectives and dependent variables (Box 7.3) addressed by applying difTcrcm data 
techniques and sources in a matrix structure (4.4.7). 
Box 7.3: - Research variabIcs 
L Theoretical framework for health 10. The government's process for 
system conccptualising and designing reforni 
2. Organisation of Punjab health sector 11. The process and methodology for 
I Roles and functions of various Implementing the reform 
components of health sector 12. The scope and particular proposal or 
4. The status and issues in the health different reforms 
sector 13. The eventual fate ordifforent rcrorni 
5. Reform initiatives undertaken in the initiatives 
health sector during the 1993-2000 14. Factors in the licalth system that 
6. Theoretical framework for the policy influenced the process orrerornis 
process for health sector reforms is. Features of policy process that 
7. The ones who shaped the reform Influenced the outcome of reronns 
initiatives 16. Measures or lessons racilitiling the 
8. The ideology behind die reforms ongoing or future health sector reform 
9. The factors that preceded the reform 
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Chapter I addressed research question I and its related variables. That is. a 
theoretical framework formed the basis on which the structure and functions or 111c 
Punjab health sector were reviewed. In addition, the status, problems and a brief 
resumd of the reforms (other than those studied in-depth) undertaken during 1993- 
2000 were reported. Thus, first two objectives and five dependent variables of 
research question I were addressed. 
Chapter 2, by a literature review, prepared die ground to partially respond to 
research questions 2. A framework was developed in chapter 3 for analysing tile 
policy process for four selected cases to address the rcscarch objccti%-cs 3 and 
research variables 6. But, how was this analytical framework applied to tile selected 
cases? Chapter 4 reports the process that was followed in this research. It was tile 
laying down of rules and procedures and their application for conducting a 
qualitative inquiry, while upholding ethics, credibility and quality. 
Chapter 5 replies to the remaining part of research question 2 and the associatcd sub- 
questions. Four health sector reform initiatives were studicd using flic analytical 
framework developed in chapter 3. Individual singic-case studies wcre prcscntcd in 
chapter 5. Thus, research objective 4 and variables 7 to 13 were addrcsscd. 
Chapter 6 answers research question 3. The factors influencing different tenets of 
policy process were hypothesised and tested. This was building theories using flic 
common themes emerging; and six factors were idcritified that influenced the policy 
process for the Punjab health sector r6ornis. Howevcr, lessons for the ongoing or 
future initiatives in the health sector are left to be dealt with in this chapter. Ibis, 
research objectives 5,6 and variables 14,15 and 16 are achicvcd. 
7.3. Contribution to the knowledge 
While justifying the need to carry out this research, it was noted (chapter 4) that 
despite a great deal of interest in health sector rdornis all over thc %vorld, fc%v 
systematically planned studies have been undertaken (Gross el al, 1998). I'llis notion 
is also true for the Punjab, and this study, by analysing the policy pn)ccsi 
determined the factors that influenced the output of rdonns, breaks nc%v ground. It 
is an original work and "like many qualitative researches" opens tip new venues, 
adding to the body of knowledge (Ilcalth Services Research, 1999) in terms oh. (1) 
conceptual framework for the health sector; (ii) conceptual franiework ror the policy 
process; (iii) documenting the research process, especially through use or a 
computer utility "Qualitative Data Processing System"; (iv) introducing new tcrins 
on the subject; and (v) identifying factors that influenced 111c policy process for thc 
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Punjab health sector reforms. In the following section, tlicsc contributions madc by 
this research are explained. 
7.3.1. Conceptual franicivork for the licalfli sector 
Many authors have provided frameworks for the health system (e. g. Roemer, 1991; 
WHO, 2000; Frenk, 1994; and Tareen and Omar, 1998). However, as notcd in 
chapter 1, these models had one or other deficiency. Specifically, it was difficult to 
apply them in the public sector perspective. Given this challenge, the current study 
established a framework for examining the public health sector (Figure 7.1). 
This framework helped in relating the public health sector to other provincial or 
national systems and international systems operating in the social world of the 
Punjab. Whereas, the details about the framework arc available in chaptcr-1, it was 
applied successfully in the Punjab perspective, particularly: 
Figure 7.1: - Conceptual framework for the Punjab licalth sector 
International systems 
- ----------------- ------------------------ ..................... ... I 
........................ 
................ Resourcc Support 
Services Health system Generators 
------------ ...... ......... 
<ýý, 
.......... Governance 
............ 
Service 4 Communitics 
Providers 
---------- .... ..... ...... .................. 
National Systems 
--------------- 
t 
----------- ...................... 
1. the health sector forms the context of the policy for refornis, and the frainework 
was usefully employed in cxploring its changing structure wid functions. 111is 
structured approach to context analysis helped understand how the partial View 
of context contributes to the defcctivc design of reform. 
2. because the shapers of policy, as individuals or organisations, tire prescilt ill 
different components of the health scctor, this franim-ork helped Ill Ilicir 
location. They are the stakeholders, and tlicir exclusion froin the process affectl 
the ultimate design and implementation of policy. 
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3. the study participants belonged to the health sector. The framework was uscrul 
in locating and developing an inventory of those key inforniants that were later 
validated in a stakeholder analysis workshop. Since they shaped the policy 
process it was possible to construct a comprehensive view of tile policy process. 
4. the framework was also helpful in data collection and analysis. By applying this 
framework, it was possible to locate and draw from the material used in tile 
study and then the information so obtained was rc-contcxtualiscd in the thematic 
framework developed for analysing the findings. 
7.3.2. Conceptual framework for the policy process 
Like the health sector, a number of authors have devclopcd framcworks for 
analysing the policy process (e. g. Barker, 1996; Parsons, 1995; 1 logwood and Gunn, 
1984; Walt and Gilson, 1994; Frenk, 1995; Gonzaicz-Block, 1997). However, as 
indicated in chapter-2, these models lack comprelicnsivciicss, i. c. tllcy do not 
address all tenets of the policy process. Therefore, in chaptcr 3, a franiework bascd 
on a working definition of the policy process for licalth scctor mfornis, %%-, Is 
developed (Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2: - Conceptual framework for the policy process 
- 
International (liege nic) Systems 
--------------- 
7 
------------------------- ---- 
t 
------------------ 
National Systans 
-------------- . ........ ............. 
Healdi System Principles and purposes 
A 
Origin Formulation 
Implementation 
Context Contents A4 
Shapcrs 
....... .................. ... ............... 
t 
- ---------------------- ... ......... -------- --------- .......... .. 
The above framework proved robust, bccausc: 
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1. the health sector forms the context of the policy process, a point %%-here this 
framework relates to the framework for the health sector. In this manncr, it was 
possible to holistically analyse the policy context. 
2. it is comprehensive which brings into its rcmit all tenets of the policy process, 
and was successfully used in defining the research question posed by this study. 
It was used to design research protocols, especially data collection instruments. 
3. it helps in establishing a thematic framework used as a tool for organising 
findings from raw case data and analysing and interpreting data. Ilius, it %%-as 
possible to answer the research question from various perspectives. 
4. nonetheless, in determining the factors influencing the policy process, although 
the framework of this study was followed, evidence were brought frorn across its 
components, necessitated due to its being at the second analytical lc%-cl. 
7.3.3. Research process 
This study, responding to the call by the 'qualitative rcscarch authorities', in chiptcr 
4 not only lays down the rules and procedures, but also provides an account of 'how* 
these methods were used in the actual research (Yin, 1994; and Creswell, 1994). 
That is, contrary to what Creswell noted, different steps of rcscirch have not been 
truncated; instead this thesis gives them a due share of space and emphasis, That is, 
I. a detailed presentation is made on how the research was designcd and qualitativc 
data collected, analysed and processed, to cnablc the study to be rcplicable by a 
third party. This was to demonstrate the rigour in the case study rescarch and as 
Yin (1994: 9-10) emphasises, "every case study invcstigator must work hard to 
report all evidence fairly". 
2. a concept of 'pre-fieldwork' is introduced. 11iis activity is riccesslry to gather 
intelligence about a particular case in a structurcd fashion. Pre-ficIdwork was 
helpful in determining the policy process normally practiccd, and to identify ally 
deviation occurring for the Punjab health reforms. 
3. further, for the convenience of readers, the narration of difilcrent rescarch steps Is 
augmented with appropriate visuals. While reading the account. the figures 
present the steps in a logical sequcncc and were appreciated as an aid to 
communication and flow of idcaS35. 
35 Informal comments of a senior colleague who vcry kindly revlowd the chapter 4 of this thol%. 
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7.3.4. Introduction of new terms in the literature on policy 
This study introduced new terms to the literature on policy, c. g. shapcrs, policy 
machine, pre-fieldwork and donors' fatigue. Although used in the tcxt, tllcsc arc 
explained as, 
I. the 'shapers' denote the stakeholders shaping the policy. Unlike the actors (the 
term in the contemporary literature) who play a prc-defincd role, the shapcrs arc 
proactive in forming part of, and influencing the direction of the process and the 
consequent output. They may be individuals, organisations and groups. 
2. the 'policy machine' is the organisational framcwork, within which the policy 
for the health sector reform is formulated; and is comparable to Easton's "black 
box", where different state institutions come together for policy making. It is, 
called so metaphorically, deriving from the commonly used tcrni "government's 
machinery", which processed the policy for the Punjab health sector rcfonns. 
I the 'donors' fatigue' is different from the classic phenomenon of 'aid fatigue, 
that exists increasingly and its manifestation and actiology arc concerning the 
weariness of aid in kind (Burnell, 1997). That is, the money was there and the 
donors' willing to pay, but it was the administrative mechanisms that fatigued 
leading to the donors adopting a laid back approach vis-A-vis the recipients. 
4. the 'pre-fieldwork' connotes intelligence gathering, and is conducted prior to the 
fieldwork proper. More than a pilot case study (Yin, 1994: 74-76). this stagc it) 
the research process helps not only in having a fuller grasp of the case for adding 
robustness to the design and establish the direction or enquiry, but also to 
identify/ detennine the location of the study participants. Further, in many ways 
the pre-fieldwork is also useful in data analysis (4.4.4). 
7.3.5. Factors influencing the policy process 
The policy process is influenced by a range of factors (Gilson and Nlills. 1995., 
Chinitz, 1995; Bloom and Xingyuan, 1997; Oliver and I'aul-Shaliecn, 1997; Patil. 
Shaheen, 1998; and Glassman el al, 1999). This study identifics difilcrent factors that 
influenced the policy process for government initiatives undertakcii in tile llulýllb 
health sector during 1993-2000. Since, this study is the first of its kind cvcr cliff ied 
out, contributes to the existing body of knowledge. 
Different factors that influenced the Punjab policy proccss arc: 
1. the absence of clearly defined principles; 
2. insufficient involvement of stakeholders; 
3. lack of a holistic view of die context; 
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4. shortcomings of the policy machine; 
5. the need for a proper implementation structure; and 
6. the donors' fatigue in supporting the reforms. 
7.4. Relating findings to the existing material and insight into 
the subject 
This section attempts to place the findings of this study i. e. dic six factors that %vcrc 
identified, as influencing the policy process, in the international pcrspectivc. 
7.4.1. Absence of clearly defined principles 
It was found (6.1) that in the Punjab health sector no attempt was made to clearly lay 
down the principles for these health sector reforms, mainly because the politicians 
were absent from the conceptual isation phase of the policy process (6.2.2.3). 
Clearly, this issue hinges on broadening the stakeholders' base by including 
politicians. However, given its importance, it is discussed separately. 
This study argues that the principles serve as spectacles for assisting in searching 
and identifying the issues and helping in agenda setting. By this, it means that the 
principles and purposes, although not predating a particular policy, indicate a course 
of action for drawing a policy. In other words, they should not be confused with 
'policy advocacy' (2.4.2.2). The latter is used in the sense that a particular jX)licy or 
a group of related policies are advocated for adoption. The proponents, in this case. 
argue for a particular recommendation (Gordon ct al, 1977). 
For the principles to be clearly defined, it was noted (6.2.2.3) that tile participation 
of politicians in the conccptualisation phase of the policy process was vital. I'llis fact 
might explain the anxiety as to why certain issues get placed on the agenda and 
others do not (Ilogwood and Gunn, 1984) and also highlights tile importance of tile 
involvement of politicians in the policy process. Because politicians bring ideology 
to the process, it is urged that the policy analysts should bcnefit fi-oni such spectacles 
(principles) - perhaps they bring tlicir lenses (of ideology) from Marxism, plunilisill. 
dlitism or structuralism. 
The above approach may be called the reformist's way (Gordon et al, 1977). but 
several authorities subscribe to this view. For cxampic, the WHO madc a Similar 
call. In its charter on 'Reforming Health Carc', a sct of principles 11: 13 twol 
articulated for the member countries to follow, whilc cinbarking on health reronim 
(WHO, 1996). Such considerations, as Dougherty (1996: viii) notcs in the Aincricall 
context of health reform, are essential, because in his view: 
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... the market changes tend as a rule to be unconscious or moral values 
- sometime supportive, sometime inimical, and generally unawarc. 
Reflection of moral values is therefore critical for two reasons: to curb 
the worst excesses of the directionless change that is reshaping the 
system and, most importantly, to set the stage for renewed cfforts to 
reform the system consciously. 
7.4.2. Insufficient involvement of stakeholders 
In the Punjab case, there was a narrow stakeholders' base and, further, thosc 
involved were there for a relatively short period. But, how does this situation 
compare with the observations of authorities in the literature on policy? Jordan 
(1981) identifies three types of images for dccision-making: (i) iron triangle, (ii) 
policy network, and (iii) corporatism. The 'iron triangle' in die American context 
'comprises the interest groups, relevant government agency and the congressional 
committee, and is difficult to be accessed'. According to him, the 'cabinet 
government' demonstrates an authoritative alternative to 'corporatism'. In a similar 
way he advanced his earlier work with Richardson (1979 cited in Jordan, 1981: 105) 
on policy communities as a comparatively smaller circle of participants that a civil 
servant might define for a particular policy. This concept was further developed by 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992 cited in Hill, 1997: 72) who charactcrised the policy 
community by: their limited membership sometimes consciously excluding others, 
sharing values, exchanging resources with the group leader able to regulate, and 
having a relative balance of power amongst members. Hill (1997), however, 
advocates that, while networks and policy communities arc closely Mated, the latter 
are a stronger version of die former, 
In the case of Punjab it is argued that both the 'policy communities' and 'policy 
networks' were operating - the former was at the first level and the latter at tile 
second level of decision-making (6.5.2.2). To substantiate this assumption tile 
response of a top technocrat to the question, as to how reforms were ronnulated, Is 
worth mentioning. His remarks indicatc the nature or cohesion in the group - an 
identifier of being a policy community. According to him, 
We had a hotline contact with the Chief A finister. Me Chitf A finister. 
Secretary Health, Additional Secretary (Technical), Evecutht- Director 
of Special Projects and others working together and then tnoAlng 
presentations to the ChiefAlinister. 
The policy networks, on the otlicr hand, arc largcr in sizc and are drawn from thc 
lower level agents in the systcni with a fluctuating degrce of contacts alliong them. 
They have varying amount of rcsourccs, but arc unable to regulatc their use on a 
collective basis, and also have uncqual powcr (I fill, 1997). In the Puiýab, according 
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to a bureaucrat, there were conflicts in this stratum of policyrnaking, mainly due to 
the inflexibility of network incumbents. 
7.4.3. Lack of a holistic view of the context 
According to Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 197), "The reason, which is less 
commonly - or at least less openly - offered in explanation of policy failure is that 
the policy itself was 'bad', in the sense of being based upon inadequate information, 
defective reasoning, or hopelessly unrealistic assumptions". In other words, policies 
are sometimes inefficient; not because they are badly implemented, but because they 
are bad policies. That is, the policy may be based upon an inadequate understanding 
of a problem to be solved (ibid). In this regard, Seedhouse (1995: 1) noted that 
"transformations are undoubtedly taking place, but they are almost always based on 
incomplete thinking, and are often on account of reasons which do not make sense". 
By this, he emphasises the need for taking into account the context or 'where' the 
reforms are introduced, and lays down the conditions for the systematic reform of 
any system in terms of a number of questions essentially aimed directly and 
indirectly at exploring the context. 
However, what is context? In the contemporary literature the health sector per se 
seems to be excluded. It is mainly the external environment that is taken into 
account (Frenk, 1995; Collins et al, 1999; Cassels, 1995). Similarly, Buse and Walt 
(2000) noted a tension between global prescription and local diagnosis and solution 
in the World Bank's Agenda for change (World Bank, 1987). In their view, drawing 
from Gilson et al (1995), "w , 
ithout proper regard for ensuring local, facility-level 
retention of fees (to improve quality), developing adequate capacity and systems for 
protecting the poor, the service utilisation for various ... groups and illness 
categories were adversely affected, placing public health at risk". Likewise, Qadeer 
et al (2001) noted that the governments exerted little effort to evaluate these global 
prescriptions. The case in point is the 1993 World Development Report that was 
taken as the guideline for planning for health and the proposed interventions were 
implemented in the Third World without scrutiny and critique as to what extent it 
was relevant to the local conditions (ibid). About this, Uglade (1995) concludes that 
"as a guide to health policy makers it is of little value and could be used to deny 
essential health services to the poor of the third world". 
This study, as explained in chapter 3, argues that the context has three layers with 
the health sector occupying the innermost layer. The enquiry about this layer can be 
extended to a further depth, taking into account the individual components, i. e. 
governance, providers, communities, resource generators and support service. The 
-238- 
next two layers correspond to the external environment that has two orbits, 
accommodating the national and international systems respectively. The former 
refers to the nation state and people in terms of their demography, history, culture, 
health problems, economics, welfare and political systems, media and information. 
The latter, on the other hand, includes bilateral and multilateral aid organisations, 
international economic agreements and non-governmental organisations, which 
often influence developing countries by setting controls and laying down 
boundaries. Hence, these are also called hegemonic systems (Twaddle, 1996). 
The inclusion of all three layers in the context analysis acknowledges the fact that the 
reforms are located in the health sector, which itself needs to be understood if it is to 
be reformed. That is, it is "ensuring that the process and context of policymak-ing is 
sensitive to the local context is likely to be the key to success" (Social Science and 
Medicine, 2002). However, it hinges on the question where the analyst places 
himself while analysing the context. In the case of the Punjab, while drawing up the 
initiative, the context was not viewed holistically. As a result a range of reforms 
were undertaken by the successive governments, but despite substantial inputs, a 
number of these were abandoned, others forgotten while some remain. 
7.4.4. Shortcomings of the policy machine 
It was concluded (6.5.3) that mainly the bureaucracy and political executives were 
the main players who undertook the policy process. In order to explore the kind of 
relationship between politicians and bureaucracy, Aberbach et al (1981) describe 
four images in the European perspective. Accordingly, in image I or 
'policy/administration' policyrnaking is the domain of politicians, while the 
bureaucrats are charged to administer it. Image 11 or 'fact/interest' perceives both the 
bureaucrats and the politicians participating in policyrnaking. The former bring 
forward the facts and information, while the latter contribute through the interests 
and values or political sensitivity in the society. Image III or 'encrgy/equilibrium' 
considers that both the bureaucrats and politicians as engaged in policyrnaking and 
both are also concerned about politics. The latter energize the policy system, while 
the former bring equilibrium. This phenomenon is also called politicising 
bureaucracy or bureaucratising the politics. Finally, in image IV or 'pure hybrid', 
the distinction between the politicians and bureaucrats virtually disappears. The 
bureaucrats, in this form, are closer to power and are key in the policy making game. 
Where did the bureaucracy stand in the Punjab? When this researcher asked tlIC top 
bureaucrats in Pakistan about their role in policyrnaking, the majority claimcd to 
work in a Weberian style or as image I above, but came to acknowlcdgc having 
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operated within an image II environment after some discussion. However, review of 
documents reveals that in the administrative milieu of the Punjab health sector, it 
was the image III. That is, whereas the politician especially the chief minister was 
strong, but bureaucracy was maintaining a middle of the road position. Further, 
evidence suggests that there was a tendency for the relationship between 
bureaucracy and politics to be moving towards pure hybrid. That is, the fornicr were 
also involved in politics. 
Why was there such a relationship? It has been noted that it was nurtured by die 
factors like (i) the politico-bureaucratic nexus (6.3.2.3) operative in the Punjab; (ii) 
both politicians and bureaucracy were subject to frequent changes in their positions 
(6.3.2.2; 6.3.2.3); and (iii) it was the tiny group drawn from this nexus who 
undertook the policy process in addition to their routine work (6.5.2.2; 7.4.2). But, 
the next question is; who should otherwise have undertaken this aspect of the policy 
process? Gordon et al (1977) identify the research branch in the government 
department, some government-funded consultant, an independent or funded 
individual or organisations, and professional bodies could also undertake this. 
According to him, this exercise may be limited to organising the information, which 
could also go beyond this to defining the relationships and proposing various policy 
options. However, in the case of the Punjab, there was neither such a unit to assist 
the policyrnakers in policy fonnulating, nor was any external agency involved. 
7.4.5. Need for a proper implementation structure 
Implementation is a complex and iterative process, and it is difficult to delineate a 
clear boundary between the policy formulation and its implementation. According to 
the top-down approach expounded by flogwood and Gunn (1984), forniulation 
continues into the implementation, which embodies also monitoring and control. 
The latter is important, in order to keep progressing according to schedule and 
specification, and to ensure that timely remedial measures are taken. Evaluation is 
undertaken at some point in time to decide whether policy be maintaincd or 
terminated or succeeded with amendments or started afresh. The proponents of the 
bottom-up approach argue that the implementers play an active role to the cxtcnt 
that there may be some redefinition of objectives and goals of the policy (Elmore, 
1978). In this regard Lipsky (1980) propounds the idea of a 'strcct lcvcl 
bureaucracy', i. e. those individual civil servants that are in active contact with the 
clients. According to him, they, out of their routine and devices to cope with their 
work pressures, contribute to this policymaking. 
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Comparing the two approaches, Hill (1997) identifies the former (top down) as rigid 
and prescriptive, which takes policy as an input for the implementation process. The 
latter (bottom up), on the other hand, is adaptive to user needs and the policy is 
considered as an output. Lane (1987) in this scenario proposes a third approach; the 
implementation comprises a coalition of actors, which is a learning process and 
involves responsibility and trust. He argues that responsibility charactcriscs the top- 
down approach, while trust forms the basis of a bottom-up approach. In his view, in 
the case of the former, there is little space for the imPlementers to use and develop 
their faculties, while with the latter option there is a danger of losing sight of even 
the objectives and the goals. He, therefore, proposes the implementation process as 
an advocacy coalition, evolutionary learning and a combination of accountability 
and trust. Similarly, in the planner's terms implementation requires continuing 
dialogue and the involvement of managers in the planning process (Green, 1999). 
However, in the Punjab no appropriate implementation structure was established for 
the planning and implementation of the reform initiatives. Instead, reliance was on 
the bureaucratic hierarchy in the central ministry or in some temporary structure 
(6.7.2.3). This fact also verifies the earlier assumption about the narrow 
stakeholders' base, i. e. there were few that were involved and so the hegemony of 
the policy community over the policy process was demonstrated. This is, however, a 
phenomenon, that Kennedy (1987: 162) referring to PAEME (1969) notes, has been 
there for a long time, and has often been criticised by the professional bodies. But, 
why did it happen? Two explanations exist. Firstly, policymak-ing in the Punjab is a 
top-down phenomenon (6.5.2.1; 7.4.4). As a result, every civil servant looks to tile 
upper echelons in the hierarchy for approval. Secondly, the policy formulators saw 
implementation as a means to demonstrate their role (6.2.2.1 ). 
em an o er argue a no programme i ing e 
organisation; instead a cluster or parts of both public and private organisations come 
together to form an implementation structure. According to them, the 
implementation structure is less formal in that there are fewer authoritative relations. 
The actors comprising the structure do not represent a legally dcfincd entity and 
their decision to participate in a programme is based on the consent and negotiation, 
i. e. they do not essentially belong to the organisation formally responsible for 
implementing the programme. In the case of the Punjab, as seen earlier (6.7.2.3), an 
effort was made to establish a structure akin to the implementation structure. 
However, firstly these structures were temporary, and secondly they were overtaken 
by the 'policy community'. That is, to conclude, there was no proper structure for 
implementing the reforms. 
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7.4.6. Donors' fatigue in supporting reforms 
The donors, as part of the international system, lie in the outcr environment of the 
health sector (Figure 7.1). They influence the health sector directly as well as 
indirectly through other systems, which may also be receiving foreign aid. This 
influence, Buse and Walt (2000) found, has grown due to enhanced lending by the 
World Bank. This increased flow of resources has also raised the profile of health on 
the international and national development agenda drawing the focus to issues like 
financing, priority setting and systemic reforms. The health sector reforms in the 
Punjab were supported by the donors (5.1), mainly DFID. However, as noted earlier 
(6.3.2.4) they expressed signs of fatigue and went into a laid back position. That is, 
the money was there and also the will to pay, but the 'donors fatigued' in supporting 
reforms. This phenomenon was different from the classic 'aid fatigue' that 
increasingly exists, but its manifestation and aetiology concerns the weariness of aid 
in kind (Burnell, 1997). 
The SFHP was initially a five years (1993-98) project that was extended for anodicr 
two years. This long duration may on its own right be the cause of fatigue as this 
extended to the donors failing in adequately undertaking their assignments. A senior 
bureaucrat in the Finance Department noted that the donors failed to propcrly 
monitor the project's performance. In his view, "the donors were only unloading 
their monies... " Similarly, Buse and Walt (2000) noted the salience of loan 
disbursement in donor assisted projects. Akin to this observation, a senior official in 
the government painted the picture, "... people (donors) attempted to pleasc 
everyone (in the government that mattered) and followed a route of least rcsistancc". 
This 'laid back' phase of the donors (6.3.2.4) was not confined to the front running 
individuals in the project, but extended to the administrative mcchanisms. The 
policyrnakers in the Punjab had 'ready access' to the higher levels of the donors' 
hierarchy. The latter, however, could not argue, e. g. when the intcrested individuals 
deinstitutionalised the technical assistance first by moving it from the PHDC to the 
DGHS without establishing the reporting and monitoring channels, and finally to a 
temporary structure - the HSRU (6.7.2.3). A donor rcpresentativc argucd that they 
(donors) could not be blamed for the "fiasco" that was there in the project - they 
were flexible and wanted the Health Department to use technical assistance to tlicir 
advantage. However, this contention, if accepted, takes the discussion back to the 
initial argument of a 'laid back' approach taken by the donors in aid disburscinent. 
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7.5. Implications of study for the Punjab licalth sector 
This study indicated several issues confronting the policy process, and to rcmcdy 
those, emphasis is placed on the system physician (refornier) to 'heal thyself' by 
instituting the discipline of policy analysis and broadening the stakeholders' basc. 
Particularly, as Zwi and Mills (1995) note for decentralisation to be successful, and 
that is the case in point, "a longer period of planning, defining and clarifying 
responsibilities, training, preparation and implementation is required". How should 
this advice be homed in the context of the Punjab health sector? It is not an casy 
objective to achieve because of the challenges confronting the researches 
influencing decision-making. The most prominent of these challenges as TrostIcY el 
al (1999) indicate in the case studies of Mexican policies is that die "researchers arc 
but one of the many interest groups, and the research but one input among many 
equally legitimate elements to be considered by the policymakers". 
Nonetheless, informed by the literature (e. g. Haines and Donald, 1998; Madhok, 
1999; Black, 2001; and Donald, 2001), the following are a number of suggestions, 
which although dispersed here and there in this thesis, are reiterated for making the 
policy process a robust phenomenon for any future undertaking. 
7.5.1. Laying down the principles and purposes of policy 
The politicians should be on board in the conceptualising phase and then should 
remain involved throughout the policy process. It is assumed that they would, by 
their ideological input, assist in laying down the principles and purposes for rdorms. 
Also, the other partner i. e., policy analysts should be explicit in thcir position, as 
Foltz (1996: 214), referring to an earlier work by Lindblom and Colicn (1979), 
advocates that: 
... the policy analyst is viewed as just another actor with his own sct of 
values and biases. Policy analysis is a value-laden enterprise and it is 
not neutral. Therefore, policy analysts, to be useful to the 
policymakers, must incorporate their values and speak to them in their 
language. 
In other words, as proposed earlier (7.4.1) the policy analysts should put on their 
'spectacles' with whatever (ideological) lenses and give clear guidance and direction 
to the policy process. That is, the greater 'why' of the reform should be known loud 
and clear. In this regard guidance can be had from the 'Ljubljana Charter on 
Reforming Health Care'. Accordingly, in order to articulate principles that emerge 
from the experience of countries implementing health reforms, the Charter lays 
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down two sets of principles: the fundamental and those for managing change 
consequent to reforms (WHO, 1996). 
7.5.2. Broadening the stakeholders' base 
The stakeholder's base undertaking the policy process is broadened using some 
structural approach such as undertaking 'stakeholders' analysis' (Brugha and 
Vavasovsky, 2000; Dick, 1997 and Vavasovsky and Brugha, 2000). This is a sort of 
policy toolkit developed to identify stakeholders, and assess their attitude and 
influence, and the manner in which they participated in the origin, design and 
implementation of the initiative. Further, it is a tool for knowing the positions the 
stakeholders would take in the event of launching an initiative; and understanding 
their views while devising a plan and strategies is likely to ensure the longcr-tcrni 
success of policy. The implementation unit (7.4.5) may organise this activity in 
collaboration with the formulators of policy i. e. the key stakeholders in the health 
secretariat. This exercise is done in a group and the politicians, i. e. the political 
executives, who form part of the governance set up, should also be on this group. 
Further once selected the stakeholders should remain part of the policy process to 
play their defined roles. 
7.5.3. Analysing the context holistically 
Building an understanding of the policy context has been cmphasised (Collins el al, 
1999). This study reinforces these views and suggests the following measures to the 
policyrnakers in the Punjab (Pakistan) for analysing the policy context, which can 
also be generalised to similar situations. 
7.5.3.1. Adopting a system thinking approach 
It was earlier conjectured (2.2.5), as Fraser and Wilson (2002) argue that for 
bringing change - and reform is a change - the stakeholders need to change the way 
they think and work. For this purpose, they proposed a 'systems thinking technique'. 
According to this technique, it is relevant to understand, in entirety, the complexity 
involved in health care and the basic tenet of this approach is to involve all those 
who are part of the system being explored. In their view, it is essential to understand 
two features of how the systems work, i. e. reinforcing and balancing. In the former 
case, there is a vicious cycle - one event, giving rise to more of the same output. For 
the latter case, however, after triggering, the resulting event will give rise to an 
event, which will in turn limit the first event (ibld). Disregard of the basic tenets of 
how the systems work is likely to give rise to complications and to avoid those, (his 
study underlined the essential nature of context analysis that the system undcr 
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reform should be examined in its breadth and depth as part of the policy process. For 
this purpose a scheme is outlined (3.3.3), but to carry out that, it requires a rcfcrcncc 
document be developed. 
7.5.3.2. Need for a comprehensive document 
Conyers (1982) identifies the need for 'data collection and analysis' prior to the 
policy formulation for social planning, and emphasises determining tile situation of 
the existing provisions, while projecting future requirements. Similarly, Gordon et at 
(1977) see the importance of information as a case for action to introduce a new 
policy or revise an existing one - or perhaps to maintain the status quo, i. e. 
'deciding not to decide'. In addition to placing the reform initiative in its right 
context, it is argued that undertaking a situational analysis will broaden tile 
policymaker's acumen. In this context, Green (1999), while advocating the running 
of this exercise, views it as an educational process for participants. Ile considers it 
like establishing a baseline that can be referred to for subsequent monitoring of 
progress. Further, this document, which may be termed as a health system profile, 
serves as a ready reference for consultants and donors. 
7.5.3.3. Establishing the health systern profile 
The next logical question is - what should constitute the health sector profile? 
Gonzalez-Block (1997) suggests a 'minimum data set' for developing the licaldi 
system profile. Given the conceptual framework for context analysis suggested by 
this study (3.3.3), this data-set does not address certain components of the context, 
e. g. the international systems. Nonetheless, this can still serve as a starting point. 
Most of Latin American countries are engaged in developing their health sector 
profiles (PAHO, 2000). However, for countries like Pakistan with a weak 
indigenous capacity, where there is no comprehensive document about tile health 
sector, this exercise can be built progressively. For this purpose, the 'minimum data 
set' in table-7.3 can be tailored to the local needs and agreed by tile policymakcrs. 
This exercise, which requires periodic increments, may however require sonic 
institutional arrangement for their maintenance. 
7.5.3.4. Organisational responsibility for maintaining the 
health sector profile 
Parsons (1995) argues that possible candidates for developing the suggcstcd 
database are of two types: those inside the government and others outside the 
government. However, since, in his view, the latter are to a certain degree partisan, 
there is a danger of a clash of ideas, which may limit the policy options. The forincr, 
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on the other hand, are drawn from within the government structure and in sonic 
organisational form they are already engaged in drawing up working papers or 
context analysis. However, in the Punjab, this activity is not institutional iscd, and 
given that there is no research branch, some organisation needs to own tile 
developing and periodic updating of such a document. It is, therefore, suggested that 
the PHDC (a unit for the management development and in-scrvice training in the 
Punjab Health Department) be assigned to develop and periodically update die 
document. Further, since the PHDC has a chain of DHDCs attached to it, the 
exercise is extended to the districts as well. This is important, because the districts 
have been devolved and the elected District Assemblies manage tile affairs with 
little interference from the centre (1.3.2). However, it is pertinent that such prorilcs 
are placed in the public domain and kept open to the inputs from other sources. 
7.5.4. Establishing a policy research unit 
A policy research unit (for example, as part of the Planning Cell) is needed to assist 
the policy machine in the Ministry of Health to develop policy options and an 
outline design. The importance of such a unit was conjectured earlier (7.4.4). 
Further, the reforms are for a longer term and essentially require developing a vision 
and an ability to build the institutional memory of 'what works and what does not'. 
Therefore, continuity of both the personnel and the institution involved in the 
process for an adequately longer time is important. For example, Walt et al (1999), 
for personnel, advocate an incumbency period of five years as the breaking point. 
Contrarily in the Punjab the average stay of the secretary health and executive 
director of Special Projects responsible for steering the health reform was about one 
year. Actually, it was the saying in the Health Department that the Secretary to the 
Government for Health -a generalist civil bureaucrat - who often had little idea of 
the working of health sector takes six months to understand and before lie starts 
implementing policies he is transferred to another sector. Therefore, this unit would 
serve at least two purposes. 
First, it is assigned to organise orientation sessions for the new in-comers to tile 
bureaucracy in the health sector. Foltz (1994) noted that in the case of Niger a lack 
of indigenous capacity in policy analysis led to few of the technical assistance skills 
being transferred and the implementation of reforms was also difficult. Thus, in 
order to institutionalise and further build the capacity for such skills in the Punjab 
this function may be extended to the other components of the policy illichinc. 
Second, acting as a linchpin this unit will organise information, and go beyond 
defining relationships and proposing various policy options. Such policy units, as 
Prince (1983 cited in Parsons, 1995: 387) advocates, contribute to improving the 
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effectiveness of organisational decision making. However, for longcr-tcrm 
sustenance, according to him, this unit would need pre-requisites, at least: 
1. being headed by a strong and influential patron; 
2. being taken seriously by the senior officers as a unit and the views expressed; 
3. being staffed by experienced and high status personnel; and 
4. being capable of undertaking reviews and research on various issues. 
7.5.5. Establishing a reform implementation unit 
A pennanent structure for undertaking the implementation of the policy process, 
mainly its preparedness and then carrying out the monitoring of the execution of 
policy is established in the health secretariat. This structure has two components: (i) 
an implementation unit; and (ii) an organic structure. The former is a nucleus 
responsible for coordinating all related activities, including organising meetings and 
establishing liaison with the organic structure. A structure akin to the 
implementation unit created in the PIU of SFHP (HSRU) was criticised. It was 
advised that "instead of creating another empire, the Health Department should 
focus on the conceptual resource development and capacity building in the existing 
infrastructure"36. Similarly, Glassman et al (1999) noted that locating the reform 
group outside the Health Secretariat in the Dominican Republic allowed it to be seen 
as an outsider by the bureaucracy and was linked symbolically with donors 
weakening the groups' legitimacy. This researcher, therefore, suggests that given 
both the physical and administrative proximity of the Planning Cell to the decision 
makers it should host the 'Reform Implementation Unit'. 
The organic structure is a standing body that draws from different components of tile 
health system and the national and international hegemonic systems that are partners 
in the policy process. However, its membership can be determined by using a policy 
toolkit like a stakeholder analysis, but should be high level in the hierarchy to ensure 
the representation of the interests of those affected. Further, this group, called tile 
'Reform Steering Group' ensures an effective coordination and close integration 
between different structures participating in the policy process. The constitution of 
this group would differ depending on the nature of reform being introduced and its 
implications for the remaining system(s). However, its core membership would 
remain the same and include: Finance, Law, Regulation, Planning and Development, 
and Services and General Administration Departments. 
36 From the observations of the Punjab Planning and Development Board put forward for the IDWP 
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7.5.6. The new paradigm 
This study reinforced two concepts. First, a systematic approach to policy 
formulation and implementation is advocated (Bloom and Xingyuan, 1997). The 
process begins by identifying the problem the proposed reform is intended to 
address and exploring the context holistically. For this, an in-depth Study is needed, 
otherwise there is no point introducing change merely for the purpose ol' change. 
Then policy options are considered, assessing the potential Impact ol'cach ofthese. 
Once a particular option is agreed, interventions are formulated and implemented. 
During this process, however, constructing a coalition of stakeholders is essential, 
otherwise pressures by the powerful are likely to influence the ultimate outcome. 
Second, as Massey (1995) notes, there is an increase in the ageneification of' 
government as a common structural product of the reforms; and so is suggested by 
this study. In this regard figure 7.3 provides an overview of the proposed structures 
and their roles envisaged for the policy process. 
Figure 7.3: - Relationship of various agencies in the policy process 
MPHDC MResearchOrg OFormulators 0 Implementation Str ElExecutors 
Exocutors 
0. Formulators Implem*ntation 
C Org PHDC Research Org 
Profile Agenda Design Legislation Preparednm Execution 
Accordingly, different activities carried out as part of the policy process are seen oil 
the horizontal axis, while the extent to which different structures participate in tile 
carrying out of these activities is measured on tile vertical axis. Thus, the area 
covered in the graph by each structure represents the amount of involvement by tile 
particular shaper in the specific phase of the policy process. However. it may be 
noted that, although different organisations appear one after the other, they relate to 
each other through the implementation structure. In this manner different structures 
remain part of the policy process throughout, albeit, with varying InMisity. 
There is a caveat, however; the relationships and the extent of' responsibility 
endowed to each structure should essentially be defined clearly. Ifthis is not done, 
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there is a danger of introducing nothing less than a toothless tiger, and an cxtcndcd 
bureaucracy or the agencification in the Health Department. It is not, as Jordan 
(1994 cited in Massey, 1995: 72) argues 'simply a championing of the virtues of 
organisational plurality'. Further, drawing from Peter and Pierre (2001) and Massey 
(ibid) this proposal is defended on the grounds: (i) the existing monopoly of the civil 
service in the policy process will be broken, i. e. they will confinc thcmscIvcs to a 
supervisory and monitoring position; (ii) in this manner decentralisation will also be 
introduced in the health secretariat; (iii) such an arrangement frees-up rcsourccs 
through greater efficiency; and (iv) it is likely to develop accountability through 
small identifiable units. 
However, the above constellation of organisational structures is also fraught with 
risks; particularly losing the ownership of policy, and given the likelihood of intcrcst 
groups with vested interests as indicated above (7.4.2), there is a potential danger of 
them hijacking the entire process. Nonetheless, the mechanism suggested above in 
terms of establishing a strong steering group should safeguard against such 
eventualities. Further, coordination between these agencies could be another issue, 
which can be circumvented by the Reform Implementation Unit. 
7.5.7. Lessons for the donors 
Whereas in the foregoing the implications of this study for the recipient i. e. the 
Health Department were discussed, there are also lessons for the donors. Foltz 
(1994) noted that whereas the donors send out technically competent expatriates, 
they falter in the 'rough and tumble of policy formulation and implementation'. 
Particularly, given that the context of each country is unique, the 'blueprints' are not 
useful (Walt et al, 1999). It is, therefore, argued that special care is needed in 
selecting the incumbent Resident Advisor who should be well conversant with the 
local conditions. The newcomers would need briefing and integration into the 
ongoing process. For that, however, the stability of key players in their positions for 
a sufficiently longer period is crucial, as they carry institutional memory (Pavignani 
and Durao, 1999). About the particular initiative and its successful implementation 
assuring sustainability, this study reinforces the findings of Bossert (1990) that 'the 
donors should design and manage the project in a manner to: (i) demonstrate 
effectiveness in reaching clearly defined goals and objectives; (ii) integrate activities 
into the established administrative structures; (iii) gain significant level of 
counterpart funding; (iv) negotiate project design with mutual give and take, and 
respect; (v) include a strong training component for building local capacity'. 
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7.6. Limitation and delimitation 
There have been arguments and counter arguments about the biases, gcncralisability, 
possible lack of rigor, purposive sampling and so on, in undertaking qualitative 
research, and that such limitations are considered inherent in the case study 
approach. Nevertheless, qualitative methods were used, because these arc flexible, 
innovative, iterative, allowing the researcher to study issues in depth and detail 
(Patton, 1990). It is argued that this debate of 'quantitative versus qualitative' is 
rather tired and possibly dead, and especially after the arguments presented by Baum 
(1995), this controversy should come to an end. She provides the basis for public 
health researchers to move on, using appropriate (qualitative) methods for particular 
research agendas in public health. Nonetheless, this researcher faced certain 
limitations. For example, despite having laid down a prior! boundaries, the 
overlapping of purposes, approaches and techniques could not be avoided. That is, it 
was not possible to draw demarcation lines between the dimensions of this research. 
The unit of analysis in this study is the policy process for health sector reform, and 
embedded within this unit are four cases, which have been subjected to inquiry. T11c 
policy process has six dimensions which have been contrasted in the preceding 
pages for the four reforms undertaken in the Punjab health sector during the period 
from 1993 to 2000. For this purpose, empirical evidence was gathered from the 
purposively selected individuals and a range of documents. This was to ensure that 
all components of the health sector were represented and that no inforniation gap 
was left in developing a case. But, in some cases, the same participants were used 
for more than one case. In such a situation, the challenge was how to ensure that the 
response was relevant and that they did not mix their views on different cases? This 
problem was circumvented by mutually defining the context and through a guided 
questionnaire. Where this arrangement was not possible, the participant was 
classified as being in a general category, and the information was used to fill the 
knowledge gap left in different case studies. 
Another limitation was that a number of participants did not allow tile use of a tape 
recorder. This risked data loss and the researcher's bias creeping in firstly while 
note-taking and then drawing the findings and interpretation. To overcome that bias, 
the researcher sent transcripts to the relevant respondents for their validation. 
However, given that only rarely was a response received, this researcher platincd a 
workshop for the policyinakers, especially those who participated in this rcscarcil. 
The intention was to share the preliminary results and receive feedback to further 
augment the information database of this research. This opportunity was crivisagcd 
as the culmination of a process whereby the participants were involvcd in policy 
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research. But lack of resources became a problem. As an alternative, however, major 
findings of this study were emailed to the key informants for their comments. It was 
encouraging that about two thirds of them responded validating the findings. 
Access to official documents was problematic. Despite the researcher having the 
permission of the relevant authorities, the gatekeepers would not allow him access, 
on one ground or another. However, if there were some personal contacts, then no 
matter how big the lock was, it opened instantaneously, and did not need any key in 
terms of permission. The alternative scenario was that, if the output of the rcvicw 
was linked to the need of the authorities, then the documents would walk to the 
researcher. For example, the secretary health liked the idea for developing an 
institutional memory of different reform initiatives, and then all the documents wcrc 
made available. Nonetheless, poor record keeping and lack of interest by the staff in 
reforms was an overarching factor, which hindered access to the relevant 
information. This limitation might have compromised this study. 
This research was an in-depth study of the policy process for the Punjab health 
sector reforms, starting from agenda setting, their conceptualisation through 
formulation to implementation. Therefore, study participants were required to be 
drawn from a range of polity representing different components of the Punjab health 
sector. Also, there was a similar problem with documents. This challenge was met 
by conducting a stakeholder analysis workshop, which helped in identifying key 
informants, who were engaged through various means in an active dialogue in order 
to unearth their views. Likewise, for locating documents a meeting with the senior 
staff of the Health Department was useful. They indicated the offices and 
organisations holding archives of various initiatives. But, access to die participants 
as well as documents was costly, both monetarily as well as in terms of time. 
Sometimes, for example, the Leader of the Opposition in the Punjab Assembly 
lingered on making time for an interview and finally refused to be seen. Similarly, a 
senior bureaucrat initially resisted, but, when the interview started lie offercd all out 
help and asked this researcher if anything else could be done. In the rcscarclicr's 
view, this is due to the lack of exposure of public servants to academic discourscs 
and a sub-conscious inhibition due to restrictions by the Official Sccrcts' Act. 
The researcher had earlier (4.6.3) defended his role as a close observer of the policy 
process for the reforms studied in this research. Those arguments will, therefore, not 
be repeated here. Nevertheless, this role risked adding the researcher's biases to tile 
findings and interpretations made in the study. Also, given that the data was being 
collected from more than one case, there was a danger for the researcher that lic 
himself could mix the findings and analysis and interpretation of one case with 
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others. This limitation was overcome by, first developing individual singlc-casc 
studies, and then developing a comparative case study. Further, givcn that flic 
policymakers, who served as key informants, were also the key stakelioldcrs for 
various reforms, they could have considered the analysis of the policy proccss as a 
threat to them. There was, therefore, a danger of their bias coming through tlicir 
responses, and also influencing the analysis and interpretation by this rescarchcr. 
However, this was overcome by validating the research findings, cmploying 
triangulation, methodological rigor, and the integrity of this researcher. 
Finally, four cases were selected based on the logic explained earlier (4.3.2.1). The 
in-depth study of these cases accrued a huge body of evidence, which was uscd in 
unearthing the factors influencing the policy process. Whilst this approach to design 
enriched the research, enhancing its validity and reliability, quite a significant 
amount of raw case data remained unutilised. This limitation was mainly due to 
space constraints and to avoid labouring various points made in this study. 
7.7. The way forward 
According to Hyder (1999 cited in Bryant, 2000: 70) for identifying specific areas, 
where further research would make a difference, at least five questions need 
answering. These are: (i) what is the magnitude of the problem? (ii) how long has 
the issue/problem persisted? (iii) what is the existing knowledge base? (iv) cost- 
effectiveness of the proposed research? and (v) the current status of inquiry. This 
research has provided an insight to the policyrnakers regarding what has been going 
on in the Punjab's health sector reforms in terms of the policy process. Given that 
some of them were involved in different stages of this research, a foundation has 
been laid for developing a critical mass to promote the culture of a critical approach 
to health policy development. Therefore, seizing the opportunity, the research 
agenda can be carried forward. In this regard, it is proposed that: 
A decision-making instrument as an aid to policy analysis is developed. 
This tool may consist of a checklist of issues to be addressed while 
undertaking reforms as well as a systematic way of analysing the policy 
process for reforms. Zwi and Mills (1995) suggest that developing such 
methods would assist in agenda setting, policy formulation, policy 
implementation and evaluation. 
The Punjab (Pakistan) has recently undergone a devolution process by establishing 
district governments through elected district assemblies. In such a situation, to avoid 
any complication, this study reinforced the need for developing the capacity of tile 
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policyrnakers for policy analysis (Collins et al, 2002). Within this background it is 
worth exploring, retrospectively that: 
How far the shortcomings of the policy process observed during tile 
reforms of 1993-2000 have been avoided in the policy process for 
devolution of powers and whether there is a need for introducing tile 
measures suggested by this research. 
This study has indicated a number of shortcomings in the policy process, and the 
implications for the Punjab health sector have been highlighted (7.3). However, in 
continuity to the above proposal, prospective research is needed. That is: 
The suggestion made by the current research study may be considered as 
an agenda for action research and tested in the Punjab health sector. 
However, as Walt (1996) notes, this type of research should be carried out 
by involving interest groups, ensuring that policyrnakers take responsibility 
for designing an appropriate policy response and implementation strategy. 
In addition to advancing knowledge, the above proposal would also help in the 
development of capacity for policy analysis amongst policyrnakers in the Punjab. 
However, there is a caveat. Given the limitations encountered (7.6); this study 
reinforces the observation that different sections of the government in devcloping 
countries are not 'sanguine' about policy process research (Foltz, 1996). Tllcrcforc, 
it would be advisable to solve such issues by agreeing modalities with stakeholders 
at all levels of the health sector before embarking on the assignment. 
7.8. Final comment 
The analysis of the policy process for the Punjab's health sector reform undertaken 
by the government during 1993-2000 revealed many loopholes. Several initiatives 
were implemented in rapid succession. Some of these were abandoned, while others 
were forgotten, and yet others are still struggling to survive. This study, by revealing 
the factors responsible for this outcome, underpinned the importance of developing 
the capacity of policyrnakers for policy analysis, overhauling the policy machine and 
broadening the stakeholder's base. 
This thesis began with a quote by a senior bureaucrat, "It was a very exciting fline, I 
must say". In retrospect, given the challenges posed by the Punjab licalth sector 
reforms, it was undoubtedly an exciting time for the policymakcrs. But, had the 
policyrnakers paid some heed to the abovc-rcferred factors and made sonic 
endeavour in analysing the policy and involving more stakeholders, the tinic would 
have really been productive and beneficial, as well as, exciting. 
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Appendix 3.1 - The Punjab public policy process 
The researcher, based on document review and norms practised for decision-mak-ing 
in the civil service structure, developed a working paper. This was circulatcd among 
the top officials of the government of Punjab. Later a workshop was held with a 
group of them to discuss the contents of the working paper and receive thcir 
comments. The outcome of these deliberations is given below: 
The Punjab public policy process - prescribed and customary 
The key stakeholders often identify the issues or some influential technocrat fccds 
them. Sometime, politically driven - from within the department or by the popular 
politicians, this may also be evoked accidentally or a natural calamity becomes a 
cause. Public demand or unrest could be another reason and occasionally the routinc 
monitoring system is the source for identifying and defining the issues. However, 
considering the issues for action and bringing them on the active agenda of the 
government depends on a number of factors: What is the extent or population 
affected? Epidemic would readily attract attention compared to a problem, which is 
endemic or pandemic. How severe is the problem, is another consideration. The 
issues, which are chronic and long standing, may be allowed to simmer, while those 
acute in nature are attended to immediately. Availability of the remcdial measure is 
another factor that plays a significant role for the issue taken up for action. Finally, 
public concern is important to the 'decision for deciding'. 
A working paper providing the background information and situational analysis is 
prepared. This is often done by a technocrat and may envisage, inter-alla, the 
proposed interventions to address the issues. This working-paper, subject to the 
assent of the decision-makers, and depending on the extent and rangc of 
implications - legal, financial or administrative, passes through an approval or 
decision-making process before it is implemented. This phenomenon may take placc 
at any level in the organisation. However, in the civil secretariat, the following 
course of action is adopted: 
The issue once on agenda, the concerned section officer takes it up in 'a file' as a 
'paper under consideration' (PUC). S/he 'puts it up' - providing a gist of contents, 
relevant rules and laws, past precedents, and suggestions for the deputy secretary to 
facilitate the decision. The latter may agree to or seek furdier clarification from the 
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section officer and forwards it to the additional secretary. S/he, in turn, considers the 
issues in the light of the information provided and using his own acumen; offers 
his/her comments and passes it on to the secretary health. If the issues and the 
suggested intervention fall within the purview of the Health Department, die 
secretary health will pass orders on the case. However, in case it is beyond his 
jurisdiction, the matter is then referred for advice to the relevant department or to die 
governor/ chief minister as a 'Summary'. And for that depending on the nature and 
implications of the case, it is routed through the Departments of Law, Finance, S& 
GAD, P&D, the minister for health, and chief secretary (figure 3.1.1). Apparently, 
this is a long and protracted course, but it is often the actors, who determine die pace 
of this process. The case is then processed further, according to its implications. 
Legal implications 
The issue in the working paper, after having been discussed at various levels in the 
Health Department, is decided exercising the delegated powers within the provisions 
of existing Laws. Otherwise, it is sent to the Law and Department, which processes 
the proposal and the draft Bill. It is inter-alia, examined whether the proposal is 
within the remits of the constitution and that it is not contradictory to the existing 
Figure 3.1.1: Agenda setting in the public sector 
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laws. Following that, the cabinet and or cabinet sub-committce consider the draft 
law before approval of the governor/chief minister. If the Assembly is in session, die 
draft Bill is placed before it, where it is scrutinised at two levels: in the standing 
committee on health followed by a clause-by-clause reading in the house, before it is 
tabled for vote. In case the Assembly is not in session and the issue is considered of 
public concern, the proposed law is placed before the governor for approval as an 
Ordinance. However, this is done with the concurrence of die relevant minister, 
chief secretary and the chief minister/ governor in a hierarchical manner. 
Often an intervention may require framing of rules/regulations under existing laws 
or certain modifications therein. In such cases the issue instead of rcfcrring to the 
Assembly is decided in the government. In this discourse, if the proposal has a 
bearing on other sectors, those are also consulted (figure-3.1.2). 
Figure-3.1.2: Public policy process for legal interventions 
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Administrative Implication 
For the administrative interventions, having intra-sectoral implication, the proposal 
is dealt within the Health Department in a hierarchical fashion and if the solution 
lies within the provisions of the existing policy, an administrative order may be 
deemed sufficient. Otherwise, it is submitted to the chief minister/govcmor via thc 
minister for health and chief secretary and any subsequent action is contingent upon 
their agreement. In case there is some ambiguity in the interpretation of existing 
rules pertaining to the human resource management or there is cross-sectoral cffcct, 
this is referred to the Service & General Administration Department. 
Figure-3.1.3: Public policy process for administrative interventions 
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In the above situations, this department may clarify the issue through an advice or a 
Rulemaking Committee examining the proposal for amendments or framing of new 
rules. Its recommendation after the approval of the chief minister/govcrnor becomes 
law, which is notified and published in the 'Estacode' (figure-3.1.3). 
Financial Implications 
Where the financial matters are involved, then the Finance and or the Planning & 
Development Departments/ Board become stakeholders. In case the concern is about 
the recurrent budget, this may be resolved within the Health Department. I lowcvcr, 
when the implication exceeds the delegated powers for incurring the expenditure or 
any deviation from the existing financial rules is involved, the proposal is sent to thc 
Finance Department. Here, it is subjected to a hierarchical decision-making process 
and an advice given is finally translated into 'audit-copy' by the Health Department. 
The Finance Department authenticates this instrument, as without this formality, the 
Accounts Office may not allow the payment to the office incurring die expenditure. 
On the other hand where the intervention implies a new scheme/project, this is tak-cn 
up at the multilevel 'Developmental Forum' in the public sector and is dccidcd, 
depending on the cost of the scheme. However, if co-financing of project by a donor 
is proposed, then it is got cleared from a 'Concept Clearing Committee' established 
at the federal level in the EAD, before the Development Foruni takes it up for 
allocating the resources. The amount of foreign exchange involved is another 
determining factor for decision-making on financial issues (table-3.1.1). 
Table-3.1.1: Decision threshold in a multilevel 'Developmental Forutn' 
Sr. Organisational Developmental Forum Ilead/ Decision threshold 
No. Level Developmental 
Forum 
1. Institution Drawing and Disbursing I lead of the Institution Its. 1.5m 
Officer in Category-I 
2. District District Development Deputy Commissioner Its. 5m 
Committee in district 
3. Division Divisional Development Commissioner of Its. I Orn 
Committee division 
4. Administrative Departmental Secretary of the Its. 20m 
Department Development Sub- department 
Committee 
5. Planning & Provincial Developmental Chairman P&D Board Its. 200in 
Development Working party 
Board 
6. (Federal) Central Developmental Deputy Chairman Recommends > Its. 200m & 
Planning Working Party Planning Commission approves if foreign exchange 
Commission > 25% 
7. National Executive Committee of Federal Finance Schemes recommended by 
Economic the National Economic Minister the Central Development 
Council Council Working Parly 
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The minutes of the proceedings at the Developmental Forum of any level form the 
basis for the issuance of 'administrative approval'. For the decisions made within 
the Health Department, the department itself issues it, while for the higher levels of 
'Development Forum' the Finance Department endorses this. Similarly, where tile 
creation of staff positions is involved, this is referred to the Finance Department for 
their concurrence and an audit copy is issued. The capital for construction and 
infrastructure development is authorised to the Buildings Department, while for the 
equipment and revenue, it is allowed to the Health Department (figurc-3.1.4). 
Figure-3.1.4: Public policy process for financial interventions 
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After a decision on an issue has been taken, the line management is tlicn askcd to 
implement it. For the projects, however, a special body may be cstablishcd for 
coordinating/implementing the activities. In case of financial intervcntion, tlicrc is a 
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prescribed system of monitoring and evaluation. Accordingly, for tile recurring 
expenses periodic statements of expenditure are submitted and an annual audit is 
instituted. However, in the case of developmental schemes, there is a system of PC- 
forms (Planning Commission Forms). The PC-1 - denotes project proposal; PC-11 is 
the feasibility study of the project; PC-III is the project monitoring proforma; PC-IV 
or Project Completion Report (PCR) is a project completion report; and PC-V is a 
project impact report. The P&D Department is responsible to institute tile 
aforementioned monitoring mechanism. 
The above arrangements are, however, seldom brought in place for legal or 
administrative interventions. Instead, reliance is made on the existing set up, even 
the physical and financial resources are not provided to implement and sustain these. 
The existing set up, according to the secretary health is that "every issue is dealt 
with on a file. This has two parts - note portion and correspondence. The section 
officer takes up the issue and decided at appropriate authority level. This 
arrangement ensures that the decisions are timely and right. However, this process is 
not done in isolation, but is amenable to judicial scrutiny". In addition, as deduced 
from the evidence gathered by this researcher, hardly any strategy is evolved to 
effectively involve the stakeholders and little effort is made to train or orientate 
those who are responsible for implementing the policies. 
In the case of the foreign aided interventions, it is often imperative for die 
government to follow donors' procedures. Since, the national managers, especially 
the account managers are not familiar with these guidelines; there is oflcn confusion 
in implementing such projects. In certain cases, however the donor agcncies install 
their own implementation arrangements. Similarly, there could be variations in die 
federal projects or programmes implemented in the provinces. Ilowcvcr, since 
beyond the scope of this study, such interventions will not be discussed. 
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Appendix 4.1: - List of interviewees 
Case Studies Participants 
Sheikhupura PHC 1. Director General Health Services, Punjab 
Pilot Project 2. Executive Director, Special Projects, Punjab 
3. Additional Secretary (Dev) Health Department 
4. Project Director, Second Family Health Project 
5. Senior Planning Officer, Health Department 
6. District Health Officer, Sheikhupura. 
7. Deputy District Health Officer, Sheikhupura 
8. Programme Director, DHDC, Sheikhupura 
9. DFlD/SFHP Project Director 
10. Caritas Pakistan/NGO 
11. Senior Medical Officer, Rural Health Centre 
12. Chairman, Village Health Committee 
13. General Secretary, Village Health Committee 
14. Village Health Worker 
District Health 1. Minister for Health, Punjab 
Authority 2. Parliamentary Secretary for Health/Chairman, DHA 
3. Chairman, District Health Authority 
4. District Health Officer/Secretary, DHA 
5. District Health Officer/Secretary, DHA 
6. District Health Officer/Secretary, DHA 
7. DFID/Health Planning & Management Advisor 
8. Director, Health Services Academy 
9. Director Health Services (DHA, District) 
10. Director, Provincial Health Development Centre 
11. Project Director, Second Family Health Project 
12. World Bank, Consultant 
13. DFID/District Health Management Coordinator 
14. Senior Planning Officer, Health Department 
Institutional I. Additional Secretary (Tech) Health department 
Autonomy 2. Chief Executive, Autonomous Hospital - male 
3. Chief Executive, Autonomous Hospital - female 
4. Chief Executive/Principal, Autonomous Hospital 
5. Senior Health Specialist, World Bank 
6. Senior Health Specialist, World Bank 
7. Medical Supdt, Autonomous Hospital (male) 
8. Medical Supdt, Autonomous Hospital (female) 
9. Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery, KEMC 
10. DFID/Health Planning and Management Advisor 
11. DFID/Consultant 
12. Executive Director, Special Projects, Punjab 
13. Task Manager, Health Sector Reform Unit 
14. Task Manager, Health Sector Reform Unit 
15. Section Officer, Health Department 
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Case Studies Participants 
16. Staff Officer, Chief Secretary, Punjab 
17. Project Director, Second Family Health Project 
18. Statistics Branch, Mayo Hospital 
19. Social Welfare Department - to represent the patients 
District Health 1. District Chief Executive (select) - male 
Government 2. District Chief Executive (select) - female 
3. District Chief Executive (select) - female 
4. Director, Provincial Health Development Centre 
5. Task Manager, Health Sector Reform Unit 
6. Project Director, Second Family Health Project 
7. Senior Planning Officer, Health Department 
8. DFID/District Health Management Coordinator 
9. Director, Health Services Academy 
10. DFID/Health Planning and Management Advisor 
General 1. Chief Minister, Punjab (ex) 
2. Minister for Health, Punjab (ex) 
3. Minister for Health, Punjab (current) 
4. Chairman P&D, Government of the Punjab 
5. Patron, Pakistan Medical Association 
6. President, Pakistan Medical Association 
7. Member, Institutional Management Committee 
8. Deputy Secretary, Finance Department 
9. Additional Secretary, Finance Department 
10. Director General Health Services, Punjab 
11. President, All Pakistan Clerks Association, Lahore 
12. Additional Secretary (Admn) Health Department 
13. Secretary Health (current) 
14. Secretary Health (ex) 
15. Secretary Regulations 
16. Professor of Urology/Author on Health Issues 
17. Director Audit and Accounts, Health Department 
18. Director General, Civil Services Academy 
19. Director General, National Institute for Public Administration 
20. Secretary Government of Pakistan (Establishment) 
21. Director Health Services (DHA, Districts) 
22. Dean, Lahore University of Management Sciences 
11 111-ir I 
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Appendix 4.2: - List of focus group discussion participants 
Case Studies Participants 
Sheikhupura PHC A. Senior Planning Officer, Health Department 
Pilot Project B. Assistant Chief, PHDC, Lahore 
C. Deputy District Health Officer, Sheikhupura 
D. Programme Director, DHDC, Sheikhupura 
E. Women Medical Officer, Sheikhupura 
F. SMO, RHC, Warburton, Sheikhupura 
G. Lady Health Visitor, Sheikhupura 
District Health A. Director Health Services (Development & Evaluation) 
Authority B. Senior Planning Officer, Health Department 
C. Assistant Chief, PHDC, Lahore 
D. Programme Director, DHDC, Jhelum 
E. Under Secretary, Health Department 
F. DFID/District Health Management Coordinator 
Institutional A. Assistant Professor, KE Medical College 
Autonomy B. General Secretary, PMA, Lahore 
C. Task Manager, Health Sector Reform Unit 
D. Medical Superintendent, Autonomous Hospital 
E. Senior Planning Officer, Health Department 
F. Staff Officer to CE, Autonomous Hospital 
District Health A. District Chief Executive (select), DHG 
Government B. Director, Provincial Health Development Centre 
C. Task Manager, Health Sector Reform Unit 
D. Project Director, Second Family Health Project 
E. Section Officer, Health Department 
F. DFID/District Health Mana-ement Coordinator 
G. General Secretary, Pakistan Medical Association 
H. Programme Director, Management Development Unit, Provincial I lealth 
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Appendix 4.3: - Interview guide 
NB: The following is a generic question guide which was adapted to the individual 
case studies. Further each of these questions was supplemented with more questions 
for an in-depth enquiry, particularly if a response was not satisfactory. 
1. How do you see the establishment of (name of initiative) in the health sector - 
was this aimed at some change? 
2. What was the motivation behind undertaking the (name of initiative) - was it 
motivated politically or ideologically? 
3. What were the factors or issues that necessitated the government to introducc 
(narne of initiative)? Whether any crisis acted as a prelude or catalyst to die 
intervention? 
Who identified the (aforementioned) issues and how did they do it - what was 
the mechanism that was adopted for identifying issues? 
Who decided to bring the (aforementioned) issue on to the agenda and how was 
this done? 
6. Was any in-depth study or analysis of the selected issue (for introducing reforni) 
undertaken and how was this carried out in the case of (name of initiative)? 
7. Whether the (aforementioned) analysis involved any projection as to how the 
situation would develop if it was allowed to continue? [and the (name of 
initiative) initiative was not introduced] 
8. How were the objectives/ priorities fixed in the wake of situation and who sct 
those? 
9. How were the objectives and priorities addressed - who prepared and approvcd 
the plans, and what was the planning process for the (name of initiative)? 
10. Whether any alternative approaches to achieve the objectives were considercd 
and was any analytical technique used to appraise the alternatives for (name of 
initiative)? 
What was the communication strategy as a part of any consultation and public 
dissemination process? Was this strategy used to consult and involve diffemit 
stakeholders? 
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12. How was the operability of intervention field tested - as a pilot for testing the 
ground and learning lessons for the full-scale introduction of (name of 
initiative)? 
13. How was the initiative (name of initiative) received by people (different intcrcst 
groups) - was there any opposition and whether those in opposition were all 
united or divided i. e. had they different stances on the issue and what was their 
position? 
14. What was the role of civil bureaucracy vis-A-vis technical bureaucracy in 
conceptualizing, designing and implementing the (name of initiative)? 
15. Politically, how was the timing for introducing the (name of initiative) - was it 
at a feasible time i. e. was there a strong political backing to support the 
initiativc? 
16. How do you see the introduction of (name of initiative) in relation to flie 
goverment's agenda - was it (initiative) part of a larger agenda (of 
comprehensive reforms) or it was a stand-alone piecemeal effort? 
17. Who was the leading figure in the entire process for introducing (name of 
initiative) and what were his/her personal attributes e. g. individual with vision, 
pragmatism and dedication to guide the way forward for the initiative? 
18. Who else supported the leader in the process for introducing (name of initiative) 
and what were his/her personal attributes e. g. individual(s) with vision, 
pragmatism and dedication to guide the way forward for the initiative? 
19. How were the media used to develop public opinion and gather its support and 
what efforts were made to keep the issue alive on the policy agenda including 
defending the (name of initiative)? 
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Appendix 4.4: - Focus group discussion guide 
I Why was the (name of initiative) introduced? What was the ideology bchind 
introducing the (name of initiative)? 
2 What were the factors or issues that preceded the (name) initiative? 
3 How was the (name) initiative designed? What influenced this process? 
4 How was the (name) initiative implemented? What influenced this proccss? 
5 Why did the (name) initiative have such fate (status of the initiative)? 
tn 
00 
. 
"- 
E 
Ow 
MW 
0 
E 
12 
a) r_ a) 
0 
(D 
C') 
a) - 
c) 
cu a) 0. 
>-. 
I I- 
c2 
2 
.2 (13 
0- 
0) 
17L 
0 
Cý 
(D 
. 
2: 
M 
E 
m 
CL 
E 
. 0- 
(D 
:s 
CM 
(D 
0 
Cý 
> 
CL 
P 
U) (D OR 
10 0 
a) 
CL 
U) 
4... 
.0 (D &- 
m 
m 
:s ýo 4ý 0 
m 
a) 
E 
E 
E 
(D 
(D 
CD (D 
(a ED ca 0 
cli vi 
: zý 
Z3 
01 
02) 
(D 
"0 
. 5; CL 
:3 
CY) 
21.1 .= Mo ýa 
M 
x 
Q. 
M 
0 
co C- 
:3 
0 CD 
:3 
.0 0) ai 0 CL 0 
0 
(1) 
0) Cý Cl. 
C 1.0- 
(1) 
m C: U) 0 
(D 
cm U) 2 
(D 
2 S. - c :3 (D cl c 
75 0 U) 
_r_ E 
(n Im 
M W 
(D 
M 
a) 
(D 
cu 
. 2 
M 
0 & CL ý2 . a) Cý- -: s (1) 
(1) 0 M r_ 0 
co (1) 
X: U) D) 
0 2 CL Cý 
X- 
a) a :3 (a. 0 - C: W > E M 0 
t_- - 
L- 
0 
cm 
:3 
a) u .E (11 
m 'r- C: 
2 E ca 
I_- c a) 
41) 
cm Jo- 
J 
T) (a ' (n E 
c 0 a) U) 4) c 
9 
. U) 115- (a (a :5 h c 0 
(D - (D 
ip >. (1) Cl) E a (1) - 
&- :s 
4- E 0 c w c 0 0 
tf Cý E 
0 
cu 
m (D 2 
0 >1 0 0 m (D cu E 
:3 L- :3 :3 
_ CL C: 
:3 41) 12 a) 0. C%- 9- .2 
0 w 5 0 a (D m 2 
m 
lv 
(o 
to CY) M CL 0 . 0 c (D C- 
CL 4 - 
,5 cy) C: a) 1-- (1) - (D r- r- c - 
(D 
r- 
. :5 -5 2 
cn cn 0 a) a) cn (D co a) m m (D 
ý g o > c: : ;ýC :. m i > -- 3 _ 
Cd U') ýd Lc) 6 tc) -6 U') aj U') C6 r--: 06 ci 
6 
. E- 
(D 
U) 
c 
cc 
cc 
t: 
cc 
CL 
0 
(1) 
oc 
J 
IC- (N (N 
q 
- 
U-) 
- 
(. C) 
- 
r- 
-q 
- 
U-) 
c) CD 
'o rl- 
C) 
- 
C: ) co 
a) 
0 0 a) CL cl 
(1) a a) -a E 
E 
0 
o cn C) 
z E E V) I- 
0 : t-- 
0 CL a) z 
(L) 
m 
-0 0 a- 
c 0 
a) 
cr- -t! Z -ffi - (n 2i 
- :0 
M ", (L) 0 , 2i C: o a . ý - -0 
C: 
C) C: C) Q) - 
14- 
0 
c 
o 
- 
3: u) 0 - 
76 
( ) 
E 
9 -2 
t . ; -- 
2 
ý6 ;ý a) 
7ýý 
.; a) " 0 
. 
ýE . - (L) 
L) 
. 
- 0 -5 (/) CD 
CL a) 
m 
a > 0 CD 
a) 
I-- 
E 
(L) 0 C: 
E .9 tt -L' 4 Z6 
ýL- 
U) a) - 0 (L) Ff = LL 
- 
. .- U) a) (Y- 
I 
- a- 
I 
> LLI 6 2 :: ) 
a) U) - 0 - o I z I W 
- 
. G 
- 
cl. 
- 
cl) 
C 
H 
-C3 
(D 
E 
0 
_0 
C) 
0 
Ct 
0 
.7 
0 
C: ) 
CD o C, C, C, 
E 
CL 
> 75 
-ý: U) 
cu 
) c L- L) M C/) 
.2 E 
z C: c i 
CL 
- 
I- LL (D 0 
(D 
E 
0- (1) 
_0 
(D 
C) 
0 
4- 0 
U) 
U) 
" 
-0 M 0. - M 
-0 > 
C: m cz (n 
a) 4- Ec a) 
u 0 
. 2-o 
0 
_j 
. 
L) 0 
I 
00 00 
CD 
C 
0 
cc 
E 
C 0 0 
0 
cn 
. a- a) =3 CL 
.0-r: 
ul 
0 
0 
C) 
C 
4-' 
E 
-C 
r- -0 
0 
'a 
5D 
. r- 
U) 
E 
E 
a) 
0 ca 
(D 
CL 
ui 
CL 
U) 
0 (n 
a) 
Cl) a) >0 
Cl, 
U- 
C 
0 
C., 
0 
U) 
10 
CO 
LO ý6 
. 
c 42 
m CL 
.2 
0 > 
0) 0) r- 
m L- e U) m (L) a) (L) in 
m > 
Z -5 
U) 
0 90 
a) 
0 E 
4- 
0 
0 c: 
U) 
U) 0 
0 
E CL c U) 
ul 
Z 
(0 m c 
1 m U) 0 
.2 
c 
(U LO 22 c c 
Li) 
cm 
JA c (L) 
CL) 
:e 90 9) j; r- (0 0 
9 
0 
9 
= g c8-: -2O Z: 
le, rý c-; -i ui 
Oc 
C, a) 
a) 
'E 
CL 
m 
0 
_0 
V) 
M 
- _0 .2 
cn a) 
E 75 
> 0 m 
m m 0 
. I-- -0 ?: c m 
- U) U) a) > 
t) 
s n : V) 
m 
a- Q) 
0 L) 
0 
'0 
U) 
U) 
0 U 
U) 
ýo CL 
C: 
m 
m 
U) 
m 
t cl. E 
o> m 0 >1 
> 
C: 
C: 
m 
U) 
M (n 
02 
ui u 
z 
uj 
tic 
ui U. 
LU 
w 
a) E 
0 
Ul) 
Ul) 
-r- u 
0 41 
-0 
Q) 
4ý 
fa 
u 
0 
(13 
0 
4t z 
r 
.2 LT IA 
4) :0 
(1) < 
CD :: :)C: ) 1 (C"), 1'C 
c :& 2 . (D 0) U) 0 (D 
cn 
rL 
: 1, (1) 0) 
4 2i 
0 
u 
0 0 0 0 
co o 
ca. 
-2 
> 
06 
ý; C" T - (1) (-) - ib m 
C: C: 
4, d E C L) (D c: s - -C) m (L) C a) . _ < (D 0 
C> 
01% 
CIA 
0 
*Z 
Gn 
Cj 
L. 
I .. 
14 
Qw 
-tý 
0 
fi J., ce -: S 
cu 
m 
44 
0 
9 
u 
1. 
ce 
10 
u 
t:, 
0 
in 
', ' 
ß. 
(L) 0 '0 > «o 
M 0 - -ý 
'25 
E , 
A (i ß. , 1. -1 
2 
ý (U M- ß. E! g *ü t- 
6 
e 
E > 
2 2 
oj r- u 
im 9.0. "0 (V = 0 ie Ei " S 
A CY 
0 > 
"Ci 
, 
A Iti b 
E3 (l> - - r 2 
tr. u m 5 - N. C, tu ý c4. 0 02 0 u '0 > E 0 
"' 0 0 c 1. - 0 ý > 0 
20 2 
0 (1) A 9 A u g 2 Z- 102 - A m (A M 0 12 2 * u ur- V 0 m Jul. 12 0 U ci tu 
-In 
21 
u2 
1-. 
9: w = im 0 -5 ýc -5 
- 
J. 3 
JA 
.M 
8 M S to cq 
> - 
(i. - 
A 
r- 
.2 - 
8-. 
2 ga 
0 cn r. 
-. 
t 
Im 
ýý 
0 - U 
5 
- 0 2 cu 2 u E ce , t . 
0 u 
Zw 44 
vi 
re o cu zs (6) ý 
0 
> 
0 
c1 
r_ rý (A 
.0 
;e 
c3. 
0 
4. 
0 1 u 
9 
u -c lýI', ;ä r, : 
l, A u Ei . U 0 
c14 94 &A 
IZ 
- ci C. k. 0 >, Z -0 
- J ä m C., r_ tu c m 0 t2 70. . 0 rA = Co i 1-- 9) 'n j P. ce e) LM -5 0 
IC (> 
ýr = . - 
u 
8-. - e 5 0 ci 0 e g 88 
r_ 0 Je 
-bd cn 
U 
r Gýn 7,1 *ý E S 2 c ei) 
r- 
_ *Z 
Z 
u 
V) "2 a :Z 0 1 
. 5. ZJ - 9. 
7; 4 
12 0 0 1-, 02 
f 
0 r. A (n u 
X E 
i 
- In t) tj cr .. . 
20 Z Ei m u 
A M u 5 
ý ? 
m C) Gn M 0 u 
Ln 
:m 9 l! m 
42 Co 0 I 2 c2. . (U lu m vi 2 0 0 4 
0 0 ce E 4) 0 0 A m oo q U t; :2 
u *5: A 
(1.0 
1: 4 , O u 
0 u ý. te 2 0 -2 . 
9. 
P. u - 
4) 
-5 
0 
r_ E- , _W. 
PC L 
im c* 
_ 72 & 0 1 A u ý 
. 
> 
(L) rA - E ll'n :i - 
2 ý 0 l? 9? E vi 5 P. 10 t M 
40 . 2 u u 4 
cý. 
0 
"0 
= 
0 
u 
5 -5 m 
0 
m 0 
2 - 2 .2 u > 0, u e - -0 0 4-. u 
Ei 
E 
ce 
E 2 0 :2 r. , Im 
CJ 4T - Q. ýRO "0 
g m 4, 
l', ' C ,A Z u r. -;; In a>ý (A ' 0 Z 0 - 5ý G ý. 0 C) 
c 
2 
CA 
1 -- m n u 1 - . > 
cn 0 i e . 
10 Ici 2 :2 Q 
0 0 
40. u 
-0 
Al. 0 a 0 
(n 10 Gn 10 
n .2 Ln c , L' cm ' " 
2 
12 '-, 0 22 
C, 3 
2ý, " 0 > 0 r cu ä 0 N. t U , " 
2 
. - 
u 
Z m u 
" - ýý * 0 ' .2 
C t2 e 
- 
1.. >, e .5 - e u 0 
j - > ' 
c c 
tu GA r , 9 
9 9 
1 ci 
9 
E -e 40. 8-. 
i - 
en A * 
ý 
4 " 9 
W . 52 
e 4, a A 
-0 
9 Gn 
- 0 0 u CU U 
rn 
414 
p4 m N. 74 N. tn 
u CA Z) E U u 
3. 0 ý 
x O 
0 
-: s 
Q) tl 0 
(U e 
0 0 u 0 
I 
cq 
(ON 
cq 
,A 0 
> 
0 iz > 
-m w M 
ýt CA bz A 
b. 
2 
iz 4-, Q tc m Q) 1 
4z m 
vi -l t :2 ý 0 . 0 - > Z ce oi ý ci Z M - ý O 
cr 
Ei 
4. 
Q Z 
tj) 
*= E z o ce 
= 
0 Z ýL. Ce 
aj Z Ei 
CY 
1 
0 
c 
;e 
Ei E w 0 t'2 :9 -, 0 
0 
1? i im . 
c) 
lu 
. CZ 0 (L) (U c2 cm 0 
0 
ýI 40 
12 t4-. ý4 4-. t) ý , (M 
Z 
fj er (U E 
0 - Q) 
10 
9 
0 
12 . u N. 4 "ti 9 
ý e b. 
ý 
0 
A 
r. .2 M e 2 
. 0 
uý 
2 
m0 
i >2- 15 (2 0 
5 
e 
r. -D: 
... 0 
0 
0 . 0 U 4ý (D A 44 4. 0 Ei n. "? (- im. 0 - 
"v in Z E 
-- - 
Ln Ici 
Q 9 ) ;g 
4. 
0 
? e rA KA 
Z 
cu 
. 
Ici cý. 
Je 
-Z J. - 
r 
I 
0 
Q. 
19 
A 
'm -c 0 9 'Z > , .2 0 e u 
C) 
12. ii E 9 2 . rz 42 0 u 
g 
LA - ej 1 
16 
-ti 
0 
E2 
u 
0 
:3 
Q 40 . > u 
0 
4. 
0 
0 
4. 
. cq gi -frE 
&) 
9) 
4) 
E 
4ý 
c) 
2 
N. 
u m (A = 
4) 
N. = k. 
gi rz ix 
cu ' 10 u 0 > 
0 
c (1) 
4- 
0 
rn 
&) r- 0 
cu 
cu 
A Z = M r. cr CJ m cu -5 - C., 0 >ý a ci vi zi 9. ) to to r. to *2;; . 1. - .ý Ei 9E e, S '0 0 9 
(U 
.Z 
zn 
u c) - 0 (.. 0 8 -, 
m v pý tn le 02 
0 0 
to 
n' 
o or. 
" 
n 
0 CL 
-cs 0 JD Im 0 - E - >ý 0 e .. . - cm Co 9) - - 
ý 
C 02 - -, LA 
m 
E 'CJ X- 4. 0 10 u 0 0 2 E; - A 
N. 
0 ý: U E pä 0 
2 
ý.. 
= 
ýA 
Gn 
N.. 
ä 
cn u ; ýj '0 u 0 ß. u cu Q ý, ' to Z, -0 - 
cý. 
>ý 
e 0 u = Gn 
(6. 
0 tu 
U 
pý . 0 u0 
Ici v 
> 
S 
,P 
0 
= 0 
u 0 lý -ci j2 
-0 0 
1,11 0 ý 5 coi 4 ö» 0 5 4 . 0 W. i iýW 0 
= 
0 E 
0 
ci 
Q 
-ci 
"0 
M 
r- . 2 u n. 
x 
.M 
U 
U 
0 
> 
ce 
'3ý 
ce 
u 
= , ý a 
cu ýn 0 -. E5 0 -ci u; 
5 to -14 A E 
0 
ci &Z Ö- 
, I- C. N 
C14 
tu 
c-) 
\O 
>, 
E Z ' *5 0 i 
0 
12 
e: :=2=2 
ý itý 0 
.ZE 
öl 
E 
P4 r. az 
9 
me eý 
E g2u 
u J ag 0 «ra ý- ýÜ . - . -M 00 00 
-- 2 -9 21 
2 E . e . - . '12 0 s c2. ii *c 0 
k. 
. 
l* A Z8 CZ :2 1 - 
-cj 10 
JD 
, <E. 89 im u ýn 
S-o Q > 
Ei - 
2 
CZ 
- 
. uS 
7ý -0 
8 
;a 
t Ci. 
E 2. 
Z 
u 
-. 
u m 
jg 
0s 
9: 6 
ý_o r- 
2 
- u 19 -9 
m 
2. 
"E 
1 
4. 
c> 2M 0 Iä 
A 
«cl 
0 43 m 12 A 
2ý Z 
ý L 
-r lu r t 19 
9-. 5 g 
2 m 00 1. l 
92 IN ; 4, t5 
1 
10 . . c: ý CZ a u fi. s E. ýc jE M >, ý g f 
Z fi . 
0 li. olz = C: 6 u 126 
c2. ý '0 u 
üE 
jj 
U j2 
: cl 
*M 
m 
> ýw A, 5 ýp 5 -s 1- 
-22 1 
* e C ci 
